Aristotle's famous sea-battle argument in De interpretatione 9 launched a still-ongoing debate over the status of future contingents. For present purposes I'll follow Todd (3) in taking these to be propositions stating of some causally...
moreAristotle's famous sea-battle argument in De interpretatione 9 launched a still-ongoing debate over the status of future contingents. For present purposes I'll follow Todd (3) in taking these to be propositions stating of some causally contingent event-type (e.g., a sea-battle) either that it will happen or that it will not happen. 1 Aristotle seems to have held that such propositions are neither true nor false so long as both the event's occurrence and non-occurrence remains an open question, that is, so long as the event remains both causally contingent and future. On this view, there being true future contingents is incompatible with the causal contingency of the events they describe. Despite the esteem generally accorded Aristotle, the majority view has long been that he was wrong on this point: There are true future contingents. This became the majority view partly for theological and partly for philosophical reasons. Theologically, belief in true future contingents is driven by the idea that God is omniscient and provident, and therefore knows exactly how the future plays out. Philosophically, it is driven mainly by conceptual worries about bivalence and excluded middle. Until recently, the main source of dissent from the majority view has been determinism, both its theistic and physical varieties: There are no true future contingents because there is no causal contingency. Of late another dissenting view now known as open futurism has emerged as a major player in both philosophical and theological contexts. Open futurism affirms causal contingency (over against determinism) but also denies that there are any true future contingents (over against the majority view). Philosophically, open futurism derives support from recent developments in physics (esp. quantum mechanics), logic (tense and multi-valued), metaphysics (esp. issues of temporal ontology and alethic grounding), and of course Aristotelian-style worries about whether an alethically settled future is compatible with causal contingency (esp. human free will). Theologically, open futurism derives support from perspectives like open theism and process theism, both of which affirm that the future is (to some degree) open-ended from God's own perspective. It is in the context of open futurism that Patrick Todd's book is situated. Unlike Aristotelian-style non-bivalentist open futurism, which says that future contingents are neither true nor false, Todd contends that all future contingents are unequivocally false. I'll call this all-falsist open futurism. Todd is not the first to argue for such a view, 2 but he is the first to give it a book-length defense, and with a major academic publisher to boot. This will likely secure a 1 While I follow Todd's usage here, it's better to think of future contingents as causally contingent event-types rather than as propositions about those things. Focusing on propositions adds an unnecessary conceptual layer that makes it harder to integrate future contingents with probabilities. See (Rhoda Forthcoming). 2 See, for example, (Hartshorne 1965).