Contents: The general idea underlying modal epistemology Modal theories of knowledge and warrante... more Contents: The general idea underlying modal epistemology Modal theories of knowledge and warranted belief Tracking dispositionality Masking, mimicking and altering A dispositional theory of knowledge and warranted belief Bibliography Index.
Abstract In his ‘Gundersen on Counterfactuals and Tracking’ (Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy:... more Abstract In his ‘Gundersen on Counterfactuals and Tracking’ (Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy: 2005), Joshua Smith presents some very interesting points of criticism relating to my ‘Outline of a New Semantic for Counterfactuals’ (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 2004). In the following I'll do three things. I will briefly summarise the central theses from that paper and sketch the arguments that I take to support these theses. Then I will discuss Smith's objections; identify some points of agreement – but also some points of disagreements – and try to shed some more light on certain central views of mine that might otherwise give rise to objections akin to those offered by Smith. Finally I will pursue a bit further a line of enquiry taken up by Smith. The central question here is to which extent, and why, tracking (and safety) theories of knowledge are vulnerable to Gettier cases.
Abstract. It is argued that reconstructions of the so-called ‘Master Argu-ment ’ of Dideros Crono... more Abstract. It is argued that reconstructions of the so-called ‘Master Argu-ment ’ of Dideros Cronos to the effect that possibility should be understood as present or future truth, essentially relies on two axioms: i) that every true proposition concerning the past is necessary, and ii) that it follows neces-sarily from a proposition being true that it always has been the case that it would be true. It is furthermore argued that these two axioms are in-consistent in the sense that any tense/modal semantics which incorporates both collapses either modally (fails to distinguish between truth simpliciter and modalised truth) or temporally (fails to offer a plausible semantical ac-count for propositions about the future). This finding is, furthermore, taken as indicator for the more generel claim that there are principled difficulties involved in construing semantics for combined tense/modal logical systems.
Dispositional theories of knowledge: a defence of aetiological foundationalism
... In particular, I would like to thank Lars Binderup, Eline Busck, Jonathan Dancy, Patrick Gree... more ... In particular, I would like to thank Lars Binderup, Eline Busck, Jonathan Dancy, Patrick Greenough, Bob Hale, Jesper Kallestrup, Fraser McBride, Duncan Pritchard, Stephen Read, Sven Rosenkranz and Stephen Shapiro for their valuable criticism and suggestions for ...
According to Nozick's tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her beli... more According to Nozick's tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p, and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p. In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent of a dispositional account of knowledge: it invites us to think of knowledge as a manifestation of a cognitive disposition to form true beliefs. Indeed, given a general account of dispositions in terms of subjunctive conditionals, the two tracking conditionals are satisfied just in case the belief in question results from some cognitive disposition to form true beliefs. Recently, such a conditional account of dispositions has, however, been criticised for its vulnerability to so-called 'masked', 'mimicked' and 'finkish' counterexamples. I show how the classical counterexamples to Nozick's theory divide smoothly into four corresponding categories of counterexamples from epistemic masking, mimicking and finkishness. This provides strong evidence for the thesis that satisfaction of the two tracking conditionals is symptomatic of knowledge and that knowledge is instead constituted by a dispositional capability to form true beliefs. The attempt to capture such a cognitive, dispositional capability in terms of the tracking conditionals, although providing a good approximation in a wide variety of cases, still comes apart from the real thing whenever the epistemic layout is characterised by masking-, mimicking-and finkish mechanisms. In the last part of the paper I explore the prospect of improving the tracking theory in the light of these findings.
ABSTRACT It is argued that the so-called principles of “strong centering” and “weak centering” ce... more ABSTRACT It is argued that the so-called principles of “strong centering” and “weak centering” central to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals are both fallacious. A foundation for an alternative semantics without these prinsciples is outlined. The core idea is that the statistically normal worlds – rather than those worlds most qualitatively similar to the actual world – should serve as the semantical fulcrum.
It is argued that reconstructions of the so-called 'Master Argument' of Dideros Cronos to the eff... more It is argued that reconstructions of the so-called 'Master Argument' of Dideros Cronos to the effect that possibility should be understood as present or future truth, essentially relies on two axioms: i) that every true proposition concerning the past is necessary, and ii) that it follows necessarily from a proposition being true that it always has been the case that it would be true. It is furthermore argued that these two axioms are inconsistent in the sense that any tense/modal semantics which incorporates both collapses either modally (fails to distinguish between truth simpliciter and modalised truth) or temporally (fails to offer a plausible semantical account for propositions about the future). This finding is, furthermore, taken as indicator for the more generel claim that there are principled difficulties involved in construing semantics for combined tense/modal logical systems. CONTENTS 1. Introduction, p. 50 2. The Master Argument, p. 50 3. De re and de dicto reconstruction of The Master Argument, p. 53 4. Ockhamist, Peircean and other branched tense-modal logics, p. 56 5. Conclusion, p. 59
It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively... more It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.
Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia
Synthese, 2008
... 24 The paper has benefitted from comments and criticism from numerous philosophers. Special t... more ... 24 The paper has benefitted from comments and criticism from numerous philosophers. Special thanks are due to Birgit Brogaard, Eline Busck, Carrie Jenkins, Jesper Kallestrup, Joe Salerno, Asbjørn Steglick-Petersen and Crispin Wright. 123 Page 11. ...
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