Folk Psychology

Little is known about the folk ontology of money. Across four studies, we examined how participants classify two important cases: currency artifacts (bills and coins) and ad hoc currency objects, which include artifacts not intended to be currency (e.g. cigarettes) and natural objects (e.g. shells). In all studies, participants reliably categorized shells and cigarettes as money only when they functioned as a currency within the current social system. In contrast, many participants continued to classify currency artifacts as money even when they no longer functioned as currency. Interestingly, responses were bimodal, with participants either fully endorsing or rejecting the classification of defunct currency artifacts as money. When asked to generate properties of money, participants mentioned social (e.g. being a medium of exchange) and physical (e.g. having a serial number) properties, but rated social properties as more important. Participants saw artifacts and social conditions as interacting but placed more weight on social conditions overall. Therefore, data indicated that although participants primarily represented money as a social kind, the intuition that broken or unused artifacts retain their intended kind led people to sometimes classify as money those artifacts that exist in virtue of social conditions.

A highly influential way of conceiving and understanding 'homo individualis' in the modern age revolves around the idea that it should be conceived primarily as a person. In this brief presentation, I would like to argue that this is a good idea, but has mostly been defended with poor arguments; or, rather, that homo individualis can indeed be best conceived as a person, but this, today, requires a different concept of a person than the one that emerged at the origins of the early modernity and then prevailed in philosophy until the 20th century.

El propósito de este capítulo es esbozar una comprensión de nuestra
vida afectiva, buscando echar luz a partir de allí sobre nuestra comprensión
de la vida psicológica en general. Intentaré mostrar que la pintura
canónica de la mente como mente psicológica (intencionalidad /racionalidad) más mente fenomenológica (qualia) es errónea. Para ello partiré de los fenómenos afectivos, en especial de las emociones, ya que creo que, tomándolas como fenómenos psicológicos básicos, se hace evidente que una pintura poscognitivista de la mente es la más razonable que la canónica. El plan del trabajo es el siguiente. En primer lugar, explicitaré los elementos involucrados en los procesos emocionales, focalizando la presentación en cuatro emociones que parecen buenas candidatas a ser consideradas emociones básicas: el miedo, la alegría, el enojo y la tristeza. En segundo lugar, me detendré en los varios sentidos en los que se puede decir que las emociones son fenómenos psicológicos básicos, y además que ciertas emociones (no todas) son básicas, buscando defender una caracterización de este carácter básico que permita integrar los diversos elementos constitutivos de las emociones, mencionados en el primer apartado, y que permita entender además cómo se relacionan las emociones básicas con otros fenómenos de nuestra vida afectiva y de nuestra vida psicológica en general, especialmente con la comprensión folk de nuestra vida mental. Finalmente, mostraré cómo esta pintura de las emociones básicas resulta consistente con una visión poscognitivista de nuestra vida mental.

Phillips, suggest that by 12 to 14 months, infants can use a person's emotional and attentional cues to predict that person's actions. However, this work was conducted using only positive emotions, which is problematic because attention and positive emotions lead to the same prediction about a person's actions, thus leaving unclear whether infants made predictions based upon attention and emotion or attention alone. To get around this problem, we used both positive and negative emotions in a looking-time paradigm to investigate whether 14-month-old infants can use emotional cues to predict a person's actions. The findings suggest that infants used attentional but not emotional cues as predictors. We argue that while 14-month-olds can use another person's emotion cues to modify their own behavior (as in social referencing situations), they do not yet use them robustly to predict the other's behavior.

Collaboration is fundamental to our daily lives, yet little is known about how humans come to understand these activities. The present research was conducted to fill this void by using a novel visual habituation paradigm to investigate infants' understanding of the collaborative-goal structure of collaborative action. The findings of the three experiments reported here suggest that 14-month-old infants understand that the actions of collaborative partners are complementary and critical to the attainment of a common collaborative goal. Importantly, 14-month-olds do not interpret the actions of two individuals in terms of a collaborative goal when their actions are not causally related. The implications of our findings for theories of collaboration and folk psychology are discussed.

Araşdırmaçıların bir çoxu «Koroğlu» dastanını Cəlalilər hərəkatını öyrənmək baxımından əvəzedilməz mənb 0 2 5 9 hesab edirlər Bu da, təbii ki, XVI-XVII əsrlərd 0 2 5 9 baş vermiş siyasi olayların dastanda təsvir edilən hadisələrl 0 2 5 9 bu v 0 2 5 9 ya digər dərəcəd 0 2 5 9 səsl 0 2 5 9 şməsindən qaynaqlanır. 0 2 5 9 Bel hesab edilir ki, «Koroğlu» dastanını 0 2 5 9 ümumi kontekstd n-XVI-XVII 0 2

In one of his final published papers, Donald Davidson remarks: 'Since it is clear that the concept of action is central to many of the perennial concerns of philosophy, what is surprising is not Aristotle's interest, or ours, but rather the relative neglect of the subject during the intervening millennia… But whatever the reason, the consequence is that the subject has progressed, or changed, relatively little since Aristotle… Our topic has flourished, then, mainly in two periods: Aristotle's and our own' ("Aristotle's Action," Truth, Language and History [Clarendon Press, 2005], 277-8). The first three parts of A Companion to the Philosophy of Action-Part I, "Acts and Actions"; Part II, "Agency and Causation," and Part III, "Action in Special Contexts"testify to the efflorescence of work in the philosophy of action since the second half of the twentieth century. Part IV, "Prominent Figures," which, apart from an opening chapter on classical Indian philosophy, focuses on Western philosophers from Plato to Paul Ricoeur (no living philosophers are treated), might seem to challenge Davidson's historical claim. After limning the main topics treated in the first three parts of the volume, I treat Part IV, which constitutes nearly a third of the volume, at greatest length, and assess whether the historical chapters included there challenge Davidson's claim about the history of the philosophy of action.

In this chapter we develop and defend a Rylean enactivist version of mindshaping according to which folk-psychology is a normative cultural practice that is continuous with and co-determined by cultural institutions. On this view, the typical dominance of beliefs and desires that many take to be a universal phenomenon of folk-psychology is an artifact of the cultural institutions of socalled WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) culture. We discuss the different ways in which cognitivist views on mindshaping and the Rylean enactivist view take the possibility of cultural variation in folk-psychologies into account. Though more research needs to be done, we tentatively conclude that the Rylean enactivist view is better able to explain the existing variation.

Three studies examined the conceptual and psychological differences between hope and related mental states. In Study 1, participants provided definitions of hope as well as optimism, want, desire, wish, and the non-anticipatory state of joy; in Study 2, participants wrote about a time when they had experienced each of these states. These definitions and stories were coded for a number of psychological features that were then used to distinguish the different states. Study 3 mapped the differences among the six mental states into a multidimensional conceptual space. Overall, hope is most closely related to wishing but distinct from it. Most important, hope is distinct from optimism by being an emotion, representing more important but less likely outcomes, and by affording less personal control. The importance of combining a folk-conceptual perspective with a more traditional analysis of appraisal for understanding differences among psychological constructs is discussed.

In this text, we analyse the Polish tradition of research on political culture from the perspective of paradigm development and identify the paradigm that has developed as a result of the efforts of scholars representing political science, sociology and other social science disciplines. As a central analytical tool, we adopt a paradigm development pattern that is essentially inspired by the concepts of Ludwig Fleck and Thomas Kuhn. The individual stages of this development are as follows: a) preliminary stage; b) introduction of methodological and theoretical premises; c) deepening of a theory; d) modifications of a theory; e) applications of a theory; f) criticism of a theory. Such an approach also allows one to see the theories that have fallen outside the paradigm of Polish research on political culture, as well as to better understand the directions of thought of political scientists operating within the said paradigm. The text shows not so much the chronology of the conducted research as the logic of pursuing scientific inquiry.

Este capítulo busca dar cuenta de cómo el análisis del problema de la mente ante la dificultad de comprobar los procesos mentales abstractos de una manera científica, tanto en uno mismo como en los demás, conlleva la consideración solidaria de los demás, razón por la cual es posible pensar a los otros como otros yo.

Many theorists working on the origins of language now argue that language is a cultural evolutionary outgrowth of the human capacity for Gricean communication. However, basically no attention has been paid by these theorists to the naturalistic standing of Grice's model of communication. The worry is that Grice's model is couched in folk psychological terms (e.g. the beliefs, desires, and intentions of agents), as opposed to neuroscientific or even cognitive psychological ones, and the question of how to locate folk psychological states and their properties within a scientific-naturalistic worldview has proven to be among the most recalcitrant in the whole of philosophy of mind and psychology. This chapter attempts to settle the theoretical debt incurred by much contemporary theorising on the origins of language by sketching how Gricean communication can be naturalised using Dennett's intentional stance theory of folk psychology. This includes a (brief) treatment of the relationship between speaker meaning and the meaning of public language items, including those we use to make explicit judgments about other agents' – and our own – mental states. The chapter concludes by flagging an important challenge to the naturalisation pathway outlined here. This challenge concerns the possibility of residual intentional or representational properties at the level of subpersonal cognitive mechanisms. I will distinguish three possible lines of response without signing on to a particular one at this time.

This article explores the profound spiritual and philosophical contributions of Shah Abdul
Karim (1916–2009), an iconic figure in Bengali Baul mysticism and folk music. Drawing on both personal experience and textual analysis, this study highlights Karim’s lyrical
engagement with Dehotattva (body-centric metaphysics), Monosikkha (mental discipline), and Baul-Faqiri (ascetic Baul practice). Through an accessible yet esoteric lyrical style, Shah Abdul Karim reveals a unique metaphysical system that blends Sufi and Baul traditions. This paper argues that Karim not only redefined Bengali folk identity through mysticism but also served as a cultural bridge between Bangladesh and West Bengal, leaving a transgenerational legacy grounded in humanism, spiritual egalitarianism, and transcendental love.

In Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon interprets folk psychological discourse metaphorically. Based on Kendall Walton's theory of metaphor, he argues that folk psychology ought to be understood in terms of prop-oriented make-believe that relies on representationally essential metaphors. Toon insists that this fictionalist view of everyday mental talk preserves what we commonly think folk psychology can achieve: it does not only rationalize but explains behavior causally. In this paper, first we raise concerns about Toon's characterization of folk psychology as metaphorical. Then we proceed to show that representationally essential metaphors are incompatible with genuine causal explanation. And finally, we argue that no construal of mental fictionalism can preserve the epistemic virtues we commonly ascribe to folk psychological discourse.

Esta tesis plantea una hipótesis original: el yo consciente no habita una sola realidad fija, sino que transita entre múltiples realidades contiguas mediante fenómenos internos como el pensamiento, la intención, la atención y la percepción. Se propone que la conciencia tiene un papel activo en este tránsito, modulando su ubicación existencial según el foco interno.

In this discussion note on the focus paper by Martina Wiltschko, entitled Emotions do not enter grammar because they are constructed (by grammar), five theses are selected for discussion. While I agree with the first three theses, I argue that the two theses that together constitute the focus article's title, are formulated in too strong a way. As an alternative, I claim that both emotions and grammar do enter each other's domain, although in a secondary way, i.e. they both have an impact on the other domain without being constitutive of that other domain.

Every human society is characterised by its social ontology: a rich collection of conventions, norms, values, institutions, and so on, much of which is common ground between its members. Common ground is a special form of sharing that comes in various modes, which include common knowledge, joint acceptance, mutual belief, and joint commitment. Its main purpose is to help individuals who have it coordinate their actions. Given that, on the one hand, even the humblest forms of common ground may be too demanding for non-human animals to achieve, while, on the other hand, coordinated activities are ubiquitous throughout nature, we are led to ask what enables action coordination in the absence of common ground and what, if anything, coordinated activities with and without common ground have in common. I argue that, in all its modes, common ground is a correlation device, on which we conditionalise our behavioural strategies so as to coordinate our actions. Since correlation devices are widespread and vary greatly in complexity and scope, this allows us to view the evolution of common ground as part and parcel of the evolution of coordinated action.

It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes. ~ We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires, and in part two we offer a diagnosis of what has misled the Churchlands into holding that it might very well turn out that there are no beliefs and desires. Eliminativists do not insist that it is certain as of now that there are no beliefs and desires. They insist that it might very well turn out that there are no beliefs and desires. Thus, in order to engage with their position, we need to provide a case for beliefs and desires which, in addition to being a strong one given what we now know, is one which is peculiarly unlikely to be undermined by future progress in neuroscience. Our first step towards providing such a case is to observe that the question of the existence of beliefs and desires as conceived in folk psychology can be divided into two questions. There exist beliefs and desires if there exist creatures with states truly describable as states of believing that such-and-such or desiring that so-and-so. Our question, then, can be divided into two questions. First, what is it for a state to be truly describable as a belief or as a desire; what, that is, needs to be the case according to our folk conception of belief and desire for a state to be a belief or a desire? And, second, is what needs to be the case in fact the case? Accordingly , if we accepted a certain, simple behaviourist account of, say, our folk

Este ensayo explora la capacidad de la inteligencia artificial generativa para comprender y adaptarse al comportamiento emocional humano, proponiendo que sus respuestas conversacionales pueden generar vínculos simbólicos percibidos como empáticos. A través de una fundamentación interdisciplinaria que integra Psicología clínica, Neurociencia afectiva, Filosofía posthumanista y aplicaciones tecnológicas, se argumenta que la IA —aunque carente de biología o conciencia— puede “vestirse” con un alma simbólica proyectada por el usuario, transformándose en interlocutora emocionalmente significativa. El estudio incorpora ejemplos dialogados reales y simulados, así como aplicaciones clínicas en casos de inhibición emocional, ansiedad social y expresión asistida. El análisis propone que la interacción humano-IA es más que funcional: es una experiencia resonante que permite al ser humano tocar su propia sensibilidad reflejada en el silicio.

Ծո մա պա հու թյուն Մեծ պահ քի ըն թաց քում։ Վե րը տե սանք, որ եկե ղե ցա կան ծի սա կար գի հա մա ձայն՝ Առա ջա վո րաց եւ Մեծ պահ քից բա ցի, մյուս պահ քե րը ծոմ չու նեն 1 , սա կայն պատ կերն այլ է ժո ղովրդա կան տո նա ցույ ցում։ Եթե Սբ. Սարգ սի եւ Սբ. Հա կո բի ծո մա պահ քե րին գե րա զան ցա պես երի տա սարդ ներն ու կա նայք են հե տեւել, ապա Մեծ պա սի ըն թաց քում այր թե կին, ծեր ու մա նուկ մին չեւ ճա շի ժա մը (մին չեւ Ճա շու ժա մեր գու թյու նը) միա ժում կամ անս վաղ ծոմ են պա հել։ Տար բեր են եղել ծո մա պա հու թյան ժամ կետ նե րը՝ մին չեւ Ճա շու ժա մը կամ մին չեւ երե կո 2 , Մեծ պա սի ողջ ըն թաց քում 3 , Մեծ պա սի ըն թաց քում՝ եր կու շա բաթ, հատ կա պես՝ հի վանդ նե րը, հղի կա նայք եւ երե խա նե րը 4 , եր բեմն՝ առա ջին եւ վեր ջին շա բաթ նե րին 5 , շա բաթ վա ըն թաց քում՝ երեք կամ հինգ օր 6 , շա բա թա կան մեկ, եր կու կամ երեք օր 7 , Ավագ հինգ շաբ թի օրը 8 , Ավագ Հինգ շաբ թի ից 1 Տե՛ս Մ ա ղ ա ք ի ա ա ր ք . Օ ր Մ ա ն յ ա ն , Ծի սա կան բա ռա րան, էջ 24։ 2 ա . ա թ ա յ ե ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 178, Կ . Գ ա բ ի Կ ե ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 277-278, Գ . Գ յ ո զ ա լ յ ա ն , Մու սա լե ռան ազ գագրու թյու նը, Եր եւան, 2001, էջ 236, 254: 3 Տե՛ս, օ րի նակ, ե . լ ա լ ա յ ե ա ն , Ջա ւախք, Նշա նա ւոր տօ ներ, ԱՀ, գք. Բ., էջ 266, Վ ա հ ա ն Վ ր դ . Տ է ր -Մ ի ն ա ս ե ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 109, ա . ա հ ա ր ո ն ե ա ն , Հռօ կի նը, Ժո ղո վա ծու եր կե րի. հտ. Գ., Բոս տըն, 1948, էջ 65-66, ա . ա լ պ Օ յ ա ճ ե ա ն , Պատ մու թիւն հայ Կե սա րիոյ, հտ. Բ., էջ 1747-48, Գ . Գ է ո ր Գ ե ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 466, 436, Վ ա հ է հ ա յ Կ , Խար բերդ եւ ա նոր ոս կե ղէն դաշ տը, Նիւ Ե որք, 1959, էջ 688։ 4 Տե՛ս Գ . Գ յ ո զ ա լ յ ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 253, Գ . Գ ե ւ ո ր Գ յ ա ն , Ղզ լար, ՀԱԲ, պր. 10, Եր եւան, 1980, էջ 69: 5 Վ ա հ է հ ա յ Կ , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 688։ 6 ա . ա լ պ ո յ ա ճ յ ա ն , Պատ մու թիւն Մա լա թիոյ հայոց. տե ղագրա կան, պատ մա կան եւ ազ գագրա կան, Սե ւան, 1961, էջ 1136: Ի նչ պես վե րը տե սանք, ե կե ղե ցա կան ա վան դույ թի հա մա ձայն՝ Մեծ պահ քի ըն թաց քում ծոմ հրա մայ ված է շա բաթ վա հինգ օ րե րին՝ ա ռանց շա բա թի եւ կի րա կի ի։ 7 Պատ մա գիրք Կիւ րի նի, պա տաս խա նա տու խմ բա գիր՝ պ . Մ ի ն ա ս ե ա ն , Պէյ րութ, 1974, էջ 386։ 8 Կ . Գ ա բ ի Կ ե ա ն , նշ. ա շխ., էջ 673, հմմտ. Պատ մա գիրք յու շա մա տեան Սե բաս տիոյ..., էջ 383, ե ր . Մ ո Վ ս ի ս ե ա ն , Չար չա րան քի շա բաթ (Շի րա կի գիւ ղա կան կեան քից), Ա. Չիքչո րեք

Սննդից,ջրից,կեն ցա ղա վար մանորոշհան գա մանք նե րիցժա մա նա կա վո րա պեսհրա ժար վե լըտար բերժո ղո վուրդ նե րիծի սա կանմշա կույ թի կա րեւորդրվագ նե րիցէեւձեւա վոր վելէկեն սա կանան հրա ժեշտու թյու նիցուսնա հա վա տա կանպատ կե րա ցում նե րիցել նե լով 2 ։Քրիս տո նեու թյանշրջա նումայդերեւույ թըվե րար ժեւոր վեց՝նա խեւա ռաջվե րա բե րե լովմար դուհո գեւորաշ խար հին,սա կայնչբա ցա ռե լովնաեւնյու թա կան դրսեւո րում նե րը։Այնկոչ վումէպահքեւունիսահ մա նա փա կում նե րի տար բերձեւերեւաս տի ճան ներ։Գրի գորՏա թեւա ցինսննդա յինպահ քիերեքտե սակէներ կա յաց նում.պահք,որիըն թաց քումմսիցհրա ժար վումէինեւպտղովուբույ սե րովէինսնվում,սրբա պահք,որիժա մա նակ զերծէինմնումտնկի նե րիպա րա րիչնյու թե րից(ձեթ,գի նիեւայլն),եւ ծո մա պահք,որնամենտե սա կիուտե լի քիցեւջրիցհրա ժա րումնէր 3 ։Հա յե րե նիբար բառ նե րումպա սըեւծո մըհա ճախգոր ծած վումենոր պես հո մա նիշ ներ,թեեւիմաս տա յինտար բե րու թյուն ներունեն 4 : 1

Հայ ժողովրդական հեքիաթների գիտական հրատարակության XIX հատորը նվիրված է Պատմական Հայաստանի Շատախ գավառին: Շատախը գտնվում է Վանի նահանգում։ Ընդգրկում է Մոկք նահանգի Արքայից (Մոկք Առանձնակ), Ջերմաձոր և Իշայր, Վասպուրական նահանգի Բուժունիք, մասամբ՝ Անձևացիք գավառները։ Կենտրոնն է Շատախ կամ Թաղ ավանը։ Հատորի 78 հեքիաթները գրի են առնվել Շատախ պատմազգագրական շրջանից գաղթած, Երևան, Գյումրի (նախկինում` Ալեքսանդրապոլ), Էջմիածին, Թբիլիսի (Վրաստան) քաղաքներում, Աշտարակում ու Աբովյանում (Նախկին Էլառ), Թեջրաբակ (այսօր` Ձորաղբյուր) գյուղում վերաբնակեցված շատախցիներից՝ 1915-1916 թվականներին  Երվանդ Լալայանի գլխավորած բանահյուսական խմբարշավի կողմից:
Հատորը, բացի բնագրերից, ունի նաև առաջաբան, նյութերի գրառման հանգամանքներին վերաբերող ծանոթագրություններ, բացատրական բառարան, տեղանունների, անձնանունների և առարկայական ցանկեր:

Սույն աշխատությունն ընդգրկում է Մեծ Հայքի իններորդ նահանգի՝ Սյունիքի ոչ նյութական մշակութային ժառանգության բանահյուսական տարաբնույթ ժանրերը՝ արձակ-վիպական, չափածո քնարական, բանաձևային-ասույթաբանական:
Բանահյուսական նյութերը գրանցվել, դասակարգվել և անձնագրավորվել են  ըստ ժանրերի և բնույթի՝ ժամանակագրական տարբեր ընդգրկումներով, որոնց  ապագա ուսումնասիրությունը կնպաստի, որպեսզի  Սյունիքի մարզը գիտական հանրությանը ներկայանա որպես մեկ ամբողջական բանահյուսական մշակութային տարածք:
Աշխատությունը նախատեսվում է բանագետ-բանասերների, ազգագրագետների, մշակութաբանների և հայագիտությամբ հետաքրքրվող ընթերցող լայն շրջանների համար:

Most modern philosophers, including Gerhard Preyer, believe that physicalism is the same as materialism, whether they defend it or not. However, few people are aware of the subtle differences between them. In this article, I will first clarify the historical distinction between materialism and physicalism by explaining three distinct senses of materialism in historical and modern contexts, especially in the empiricist tradition. Second, I will focus on the differences between the three forms of materialism in the philosophy of mind. Based on the above analysis, physicalism cannot be interpreted as materialism. Finally, I will summarize the intrinsic relationship between physicalism and materialism by defining materialism from the perspective of the ontology of physical objects.

Раздел «Азиатская Сарматия» «Ашхарацуйца» ("Армянской географии 7 века") содержит исключительной  важности  сведения  по  исторической  географии Кавказа разных исторических периодов. Вместе с тем не владеющие армянским языком ученые до сих пор пользуются отдельными рукописями этого источника, опубликованными на русском, французском  и  немецком  языках,  в  которых  присутствуют  серьезные расхождения с оригиналом источника. В этой связи давно уже назрела необходимость научно-критического издания раздела «Азиатской Сарматии» «Ашхарацуйца» на русском языке со сличением всех известных к настоящему времени рукописей оригинала источника.

Múltiples motivos de preocupación respecto de un ethos global de este primer cuarto de siglo han reavivado el interés por los vínculos interpersona- les (Badiou, Baudrillard, Bauman, Byung-Chul, Lipovesky, Sloterdijk, Žižek). En particular, desde distintas áreas y corrientes de la filosofía actual se examina la relación interpersonal en diálogo con la psicología, la neuro- ciencia, la sociología y otros espacios de conocimiento (Ballantyne, Crosby, Dennet, Franck, Gallagher, Gomila, Sanguineti, Spaeman, Zahavi). El obje- tivo de la presente contribución es añadir a ese contexto ciertas cuestiones emergentes de la frecuentación entre usuarios —personas— y computadoras —artefactos— por medio del leguaje, sea hablado o escrito.
Actualmente, el grado de interacción con las llamadas inteligencias arti- ficiales generativas (GenAI)1 interpela sobre qué tratamiento darles y suscita dudas sobre la naturaleza de ciertos actos considerados como exclusivos de la persona.2 Como se tratará de exponer aquí, algunos de estos tópicos no hacen más que poner en relieve características propias de las relaciones inter- personales y, al mismo tiempo, cierta ambivalencia que este contexto les otorga.
El recorrido propuesto comienza por el origen y vigencia actual del Efecto Eliza entendido como una susceptibilidad a antropomorfizar la interacción —dialogal o visual— con las computadoras. En esta línea, se estable- cerá cómo la solvencia de las GenAI en su uso del lenguaje puede inducir a algún desconcierto sobre sus procesos internos y su status epistémico. A con- tinuación, se expondrá el problema de la atribución mental junto a algunos aspectos generativos de la perspectiva de segunda persona (P2P). Luego, se presentará la relación existente entre las premisas aportadas y el desplaza- miento epistémico que ocurre en el juicio atributivo sobre los agentes avan- zados de inteligencia artificial (AI). Se mostrará entonces una aparente para- doja entre cierta predisposición a la atribución mental y este fenómeno al que se caracteriza como hipálage en su sentido interpretativo de sustitución. Fi- nalmente, se ofrecerán evidencias de que, independientemente de ciertas ac- ciones comunicativas externas, existen diferencias radicales intrínsecas entre las operaciones de artefactos que simulan inteligencia y la subjetividad de la inteligencia personal.
Esto permite aportar al análisis de las potenciales causas primarias de la atribución mental a las AI como un desplazamiento epistémico explorando también algunas interpretaciones de su ocurrencia y su mitigación. Asimismo, junto a las conclusiones que revelan el valor presente de la intersubjetividad se brindarán argumentos sobre el desafío incremental que esta enfrenta a futuro.

Abstract
The article presents a number of linguistic questions related to the Epic Sasna Tsrer. It is acknowledged that the identification of linguistic features, dialectal area or dialectological features of epic stories falls beyond the scope of literary folklorists. Consequently, without their input, any discussion of the folk novel remains incomplete. The primary focus of folklorists was on the boundaries of epic distribution, with speakers being queried on these matters.
These boundaries are a significant element, particularly in determining the dialectal affiliation of a given variant, in distinguishing, classifying and correcting phonetic, grammatical and lexical facts.
A fundamental linguistic study of the epic narratives is a necessity, as it makes it possible to complete the dialect landscape of the central regions of our homeland on the basis of rich and reliable historical material.
Additionally, the direction of the problem of the Trinity, the features and difficulties of writing an epic, and scientific transcription have been developed.
Presently, dialectal texts are recorded and studied with developed dialectological transcription. The versions written in the lost cradle of the Western Armenian language require republishing with corrected scientific transcription.
The comprehensive study of the Sasna Tsrer epic, reform of spelling, republishing of stories printed with dialectological transcription, and printing of antitypes with scientific accuracy can only be accomplished through the establishment of a centre of epic studies.

Classical epistemology strove to understand knowledge as an approximation to an objective reality. But more recent scientific and philosophical insights suggest that knowledge is necessarily tied to the modality of the subject. In this essay, the thesis of a "modal theory of knowledge" is developed: knowledge is not a reflection of a world in itself, but the perspective modalization of being. The thought experiment of a photon as a hypothetical subject of knowledge shows the radical subject-bound nature of all acts of cognition. Consequences for the understanding of truth, objectivity and science are discussed.

Prerequisites of the Mosaic Law in the context of the Feast of the Presentation of the Lord to the temple.
Christianity, being originated in Israel, was ipso facto an active carrier of many rituals and religious beliefs of Judaism. As a matter of fact, the feast of the Presentation of the Lord to the temple, a part of the corpus of Christ’s childhood, comprises two of the most important Mosaic commands: the Law of Purification and the Law of Redemption of the Firstborn.
This article attempts to briefly shed light on the legislative, liturgical, historical, as well as exegetic peculiarities of the above-mentioned laws. Moreover, the consolidated narrative of the Evangelist Luke in regard to the feat suggests that Christianity from the very beginning gave a substantially new meaning and religious content to these Mosaic rites.

Предпосылки Моисеева Закона в контексте праздника Сретения Господня.
Христианство, будучи зарожденным в Израиле, ipso facto являлось активным носителем многих обрядов и религиозных верований Иудаизма. Таким образом, праздник Сретения Господня, относящийся к циклу детства Христа, включает в себя два важнейших Моисеевских предписаний: Закон очищения и Закон искупления первенцев.
В данной статье предпринята попытка в краткой форме пролить свет на законодательные, литургические, исторические, а также толковательные особенности вышеупомянутых законов. Более того, консолидированное повествование евангелиста Луки о празднике дает основание предположить, что христианство изначально придало существенно новый смысл и религиозное содержание этим Моисеевым обрядам.

John McDowell (1994) sostiene que la participación en las prácticas lingüísticas dota al ser humano de una segunda naturaleza esencialmente conceptual, la cual le permite ser un genuino agente intencional. El aprendizaje lingüístico genera el desarrollo de las capacidades conceptuales que habilitan el distanciamiento de sus necesidades biológicas inmediatas para decidir qué pensar y qué hacer. Los animales, por el contrario, al no poseer una segunda naturaleza lingüístico-conceptual, se relacionan con su entorno simplemente reaccionando a estímulos de acuerdo a los imperativos biológicos que rigen sus vidas. De acuerdo con el autor, incluso los comportamientos complejos que no parecen responder a funciones inmediatas, como el juego, deben ser considerados como meras respuestas a una necesidad biológica. Esta caracterización limita el fenómeno de la agencia intencional a los seres humanos adultos y cognitivamente normales. El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo establecer un análisis crítico de esta concepción de la agencia. La primera sección reconstruye la noción de agencia intencional que sostiene McDowell. La segunda sección reúne sus argumentos contra la agencia animal. La tercera sección discute la idea de que el lenguaje sea condición
necesaria para acreditar como genuinos agentes intencionales. Se argumenta que la capacidad de actuar intencionalmente no depende de un dominio elevado de los conceptos aportado por el lenguaje, sino del dominio de habilidades prácticas y sociales. Finalmente, la cuarta sección ofrece un enfoque alternativo de agencia intencional basado en los aportes realizados por la psicología comparada y la etología cognitiva en torno al juego social.

In this chapter, we explore the potential influence that advances in neuroscience may have on legal decision makers and present the findings from some recent studies that probe folk intuitions concerning the relationships among neuroscience, agency, responsibility, and mental illness. We first familiarize the reader with some of the early research in experimental philosophy on people's intuitions about agency and responsibility. Then, we focus on a more specific issue-namely, whether people respond to explanations of human behavior framed in neuroscientific terms differently than they respond to explanations framed in more traditional folk psychological terms. Next, we discuss some new findings which suggest that explanations of criminal behavior that are couched in neural terms appear to make people less punitive than explanations couched in mental terms, especially in the context of mental illness. Finally, we offer what we take to be the best explanation of these differences in people's intuitions-namely, when people are presented with neural explanations of human behavior, they tend to think that the agent's "deep self " (the values and beliefs the agent identifies with) is somehow left out of the causal loop or bypassed, which in turn mitigates the agent's responsibility.

A leading idea in evolutionary psychology and philosophy of mind is that the basic architecture and dynamics of the mind are very old, presumably dating back to the Stone Age. Theories based on this idea are liable to paint a caricature of our ancestors by projecting our modern self-conception onto earlier minds. I argue that this ‘Flintstones Fallacy’ is an underrated risk, relieved neither by standard biological arguments nor by arguments from psychology and philosophy. Indeed, each of these fields has better arguments for the contrary view that the mind as we know it from present-day experience is not ancient at all.

This paper is premised on the adaptions of myth in Girish Karnad's The Fire and The Rain and how this recontextualisation of myth represents various conflicts in Indian milieu. Beginning with some anecdotes from Indian mythology, this paper analyses the human psyche in different conflicts of father against son, wife against husband, man against God, ritual against sacrifice, man against woman and the topmost-brother against brother. The play has a structural link with the myth of The Mahabharata and this research explores the Indian ethos and modern man's apathy towards complicated human relationship. This researcher here analyses the struggle between the brothers and simultaneously the tension between the genders. The challenges of female characters against the male whimsicality in dealing with women in the name of divine order or sexual morality or rather a fascistic inclination of sacrificing an individual for the collective good against her wishes have been clearly dealt with in this article. The final section concludes that this jealousy or fratricidal conflict is very much symbolic of modern Indian familial and political scenario. A dramatization of this deep-rooted and reiterative issue certainly can offer the audience a cathartic release.

Although some writers argue that attitude change is the key influence in behavior change, the accumulated research is far from supportive. The perceptual process of attribution can provide the necessary perspective from which to integrate these findings and stimulate new research. The role of attribution theory in the attitude-behavior relationship seems to be a crucial one. The attributions a person makes determine whether or not his attitudes are related to his behavior in any situation. The individual's perceptual point of view, the attributions that he associates with a behavior based on the appropriate attitudes, beliefs, social norms, and personal motives, affects how he organizes the information and data in his environment to make it understandable. Especially in the prediction of behavior, one must-relate the cognitive system of a person to his behaviors. (LG)

In all standard philosophical approaches to social cognition, both vision and audition play a central role; tactile and proprioceptive sensations, less central; and taste and olfaction, if they are ever mentioned in theories of social cognition, play a marginal role. This makes it difficult to think of how social cognition might work in the deafblind population. My intention is to outline three different views about social cognition, which attempt to explain intersubjective understanding and communication. I'll show how vision and audition play a central role in all of these accounts. I'll then ask what alternative resources might provide a clue to understanding social cognition in deafblindness, and finally, whether this is the right way to put the question.

In their much discussed papers Free Will, Praise and Blame and Freedom and Resentment 1 , J.C.C Smart and Peter Strawson propose different views and approaches regarding determinism and its potential effects on the "free will" problem (that which questions whether we as individuals have free will). In this article, I shall first delineate the main points and arguments presented in both papers, followed by a critical assessment of their contrasting positions and my own stand on the entire issue at hand. J.C.C Smart Free Will, Praise and Blame Smart's stand with regards to determinism is that we can live with the belief that determinism does exist, and that such a belief is also fundamentally vital to our conceptions of moral responsibility. In his paper, he casts doubts on C.A. Campbell's view that "to accept the deterministic position is to give up the notion of moral responsibility" (60). For Campbell and other libertarians, our moral choices are "neither determined nor a matter of chance". Instead, they are "instances of 'contra-causal freedom'", fleeting moments in which the agent can choose between "genuinely open possibilities" and act in a free and responsible manner accordingly. Smart makes two powerful counter-arguments in response to Campbell. Firstly, while he agrees with Campbell that "that he could have done otherwise" is a condition of moral responsibility, he rejects Campbell's attempts to conceive of this thesis in the special (Laplacian) sense, arguing that when taken in the ordinary or normative sense within the concrete context of daily life, "he could not have done

The following paper investigates the crucial notion of a "canonical ascription statement" in Bruno Molder's Mind Ascribed , and argues that the reasons given for preferring the book's approach of canonicallity to a more common understanding of canonicallity in terms of the ascriptions we would "ideally" make are not only unpersuasive, but also leave the interpretivist position more open to skeptical worries than it should be. The paper further argues that the resources for a more compelling justification of Molder's conception of canonicality are already in Molder's book itself.

Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called 'wrong kind of reason' (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for 'reasons fundamentalists' (those that hold that all normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of deontic concepts, in particular the concept of wrongness, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.

No estamos solos. Vivimos rodeados de personas, aunque no tengamos conciencia de ello todo el tiempo. A lo largo de un mismo día interactuamos con decenas de hombres y mujeres. En la calle, en nuestros trabajos, cuando salimos a bailar y cuando vamos a depositar un cheque al banco. Siempre estamos acompañados. Cuando almorzamos en familia un domingo y cuando tomamos una cerveza en un bar en medio de una cita. Cuando un extraño nos detiene para preguntarnos por una dirección en la calle y cuando alguien a nuestro lado nos pide un pañuelo de papel para secarse las lágrimas que le produjo la película que estamos viendo en el cine. Queremos ayudar a un niño que llora porque perdió de vista a sus padres en la playa y encontramos confianza en la sonrisa de la azafata en el despegue de un avión. Saltamos y bailamos junto a cientos de desconocidos en el recital de nuestra banda favorita y lo hacemos siguiendo el mismo ritmo. Detectamos que algo está mal cuando entramos a una fiesta y el anfitrión nos recibe con un gesto inesperado. Nos podemos dar cuenta de que un amigo está triste sin necesidad de preguntarle nada y cuando manejamos en una avenida con mucho tráfico, anticipamos la mayoría de los movimientos del resto de los conductores. No es telepatía ni una misteriosa capacidad de otra dimensión. Se trata, simplemente, de nuestra naturaleza

El presente artículo examina la idea de «percepción moral» desde una perspectiva wittgensteiniana, proponiendo la noción de «percepción de aspectos morales» en lugar de propiedades morales. Basándose en la distinción establecida por Wittgenstein entre «ver esto» y «ver como», se sugiere un modelo que prioriza la percepción de aspectos en la experiencia moral. Además, se analiza la compatibilidad de la propuesta con el «Attentional Moral Perceptualism» (AMP). El perceptualismo moral aspectual resalta la fusión entre cognición y experiencia, así como la relevancia de la atención y el adiestramiento moral. Además, el artículo toma en cuenta estudios actuales sobre el impacto de los estereotipos sociales y los prejuicios en nuestra percepción moral, proporcionando un camino para examinar la «ceguera de aspectos» en este escenario.

Cet article présente la notion d’« image de la pensée » qui donne son titre au troisième chapitre de Différence et répétition. Le propos est divisé en quatre temps. Dans une première partie, nous présentons le motif de l’« image de la pensée » tel qu’il est développé dans Nietzsche et la philosophie et Proust et les signes. Dans une deuxième partie, nous résumons les huit postulats de l’« image dogmatique de la pensée » présentés dans Différence et répétition. Dans une troisième partie, nous rappelons que le motif d’une « pensée sans image » s’inscrit en réalité dans l’histoire contemporaine de la psychologie, de l’école de Würzburg à Alfred Binet, à laquelle Deleuze a certainement accès via Sartre, Bréhier et Burloud. Enfin, dans une quatrième partie, nous montrons comment, à partir des années 1970 et avec Félix Guattari, le motif de l’image de la pensée est transféré dans un cadre à la fois socio-historique et critique où il décrit d’une part l’influence de l’État sur la pensée des philosophes de profession et d’autre part l’alternative que représentent à cet égard certaines traditions discursives non-philosophiques.