Books by Francesco Guala
Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the... more Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules.
Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of "looping effects" and "interactive kinds" defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences.
Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us.
Endorsements:
"This valuable and beautifully structured book reviews and explains the key idea of correlated equilibria and also offers a novel theoretical synthesis. Clearly written, but even better, clearly conceived, this book is a winner on many levels."--Stephen Turner, University of South Florida
"In this complex and sophisticated book, the unified view of institutions is original because it bridges two views that have been considered to be incompatible. Moreover, the unified view is linked with other key issues in the philosophy of social sciences. With its enormous scope, it will appeal to specialists in the philosophy of social sciences, as well as such social science practitioners as economists and theoretical sociologists."--Jack Vromen, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Table of Contents:
Preface vii
Analytical Table of Contents xiii
Introduction xvii
PART I UNIFICATION
1 RULES 3
2 GAMES 20
3 MONEY 33
4 CORRELATION 44
5 CONSTITUTION 57
6 NORMATIVITY 70
INTERLUDE
7 MINDREADING 89
8 COLLECTIVITY 102
PART II APPLICATION
9 REFLEXIVITY 119
10 INTERACTION 132
11 DEPENDENCE 146
12 REALISM 163
13 MEANING 177
14 REFORM 194
Bibliography 207
Index 219
The experimental approach in economics is a driving force behind some of the most exciting develo... more The experimental approach in economics is a driving force behind some of the most exciting developments in the field. The 'experimental revolution' was based on a series of bold philosophical premises which have remained until now mostly unexplored. This book provides the first comprehensive analysis and critical discussion of the methodology of experimental economics, written by a philosopher of science with expertise in the field. It outlines the fundamental principles of experimental inference in order to investigate their power, scope and limitations. The author demonstrates that experimental economists have a lot to gain by discussing openly the philosophical principles that guide their work, and that philosophers of science have a lot to learn from their ingenious techniques devised by experimenters in order to tackle difficult scientific problems.
Papers by Francesco Guala
Philosophy and Finance: Ten Open Questions, 2025
Little is known about the folk ontology of money. Across four studies, we examined how participan... more Little is known about the folk ontology of money. Across four studies, we examined how participants classify two important cases: currency artifacts (bills and coins) and ad hoc currency objects, which include artifacts not intended to be currency (e.g. cigarettes) and natural objects (e.g. shells). In all studies, participants reliably categorized shells and cigarettes as money only when they functioned as a currency within the current social system. In contrast, many participants continued to classify currency artifacts as money even when they no longer functioned as currency. Interestingly, responses were bimodal, with participants either fully endorsing or rejecting the classification of defunct currency artifacts as money. When asked to generate properties of money, participants mentioned social (e.g. being a medium of exchange) and physical (e.g. having a serial number) properties, but rated social properties as more important. Participants saw artifacts and social conditions as interacting but placed more weight on social conditions overall. Therefore, data indicated that although participants primarily represented money as a social kind, the intuition that broken or unused artifacts retain their intended kind led people to sometimes classify as money those artifacts that exist in virtue of social conditions.
Vonken van Inzicht: Liber Amicorum Filip Beukens, edited by Hans Dooremalen, 2025
On a beautiful island, in the archipelago known as ‘the Carolines’. It’s a sunny day, and the mar... more On a beautiful island, in the archipelago known as ‘the Carolines’. It’s a sunny day, and the market is busy. Many people roam around the stalls, chatting, haggling, buying and selling what they need for their daily chores. Two people are having a lively conversation. It is reported here by memory, as recalled by one of the participants, identified with the fictional name of ‘Yip’.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2025
Philosophers have become increasingly aware of the difficulties that plague accounts of kinds wit... more Philosophers have become increasingly aware of the difficulties that plague accounts of kinds with objectively determined boundaries, and generally recognize that scientific taxonomies are shaped by human pragmatic interests and non-epistemic values. Against this trend, we propose an account of kinds conceived as dynamic entities, characterized by qualitatively distinct and robust trajectories originating from bifurcation events in the development of complex systems. We argue that the homeorhetic dynamic kinds account can be applied to systems investigated in a variety of disciplinary contexts, ranging from biology, medicine, and the social sciences. Shifting the focus from a synchronic (homeostatic) to a dynamic and processual (homeorhetic) perspective, we show that homeorhetic dynamic kinds allows a better characterization of discontinuities among kinds. We then outline its implications for pluralism, particularly how homeorhetic dynamic kinds can help us understand how scientific categories are shaped both by ontological aspects of developmental trajectories and by pragmatic, value-laden considerations.
Synthese
We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an imp... more We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an important task of philosophy is to provide the bigger picture. To this end, it should investigate folk views and determine whether and how they can be preserved once scrutinized from the perspective of the sciences. However, the sciences typically present us with a fragmented picture of reality. Thus, an important intermediate step is to integrate the most promising social scientific theories with one another. In addition to this, social ontology can provide input to and benefit from other philosophical disciplines that engage in normative theorizing. Thus, we propose that social ontology connects not only with folk ontology and scientific ontology but also with fields such as ethics and political philosophy. Building bridges between them serves to formulate a credible and encompassing worldview that is of theoretical and practical significance.
Philosophical Psychology
Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focus... more Meta-representation does not always facilitate social interaction. We illustrate this claim focusing on the case of coordination, and conjecture that people coordinate using a mode of reasoning that does not require the representation of others' beliefs. We compare this sort of belief-less reasoning with theories that appeal to limited meta-representation, and present evidence indicating that people employ both -- with meta-representation being used less frequently in coordinative than in competitive tasks.
Erkenntnis, 2021
Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory th... more Can rational agents coordinate in simultaneous interactions? According to standard game theory they cannot, even if there is a uniquely best way of doing so. To solve this problem we propose an argument in favor of 'belief-less reasoning', a mode of inference that leads to converge on the optimal solution ignoring the beliefs of the other players. We argue that belief-less reasoning is supported by a commonsensical Principle of Relevant Information that every theory of rational decision must satisfy. We show that this principle can be used to justify (some versions of) team reasoning, as well as other schemes of practical reasoning that do not involve sophisticated metarepresentation.
Philosophy of Science
Standard defences of ontological individualism are challenged by arguments that exploit the depen... more Standard defences of ontological individualism are challenged by arguments that exploit the dependence of social facts on material facts-i.e. facts that are not about human individuals. In this paper I discuss Brian Epstein's "materialism" in The Ant Trap: granting Epstein's strict definition of individualism, I show that his arguments depend crucially on a generous conception of social properties and social facts. Individualists however are only committed to the claim that projectible properties are individualistically realized, and materialists have not undermined this claim.
International Review of Economics, 2021
In The Community of Advantage Robert Sugden advocates a system of universal social insurance to e... more In The Community of Advantage Robert Sugden advocates a system of universal social insurance to ensure that all citizens enjoy the benefits of market institutions. The Community of Advantage however does not shed light on the extent of redistribution that social insurance should provide. While the criterion of mutual advantage seems to licence only a minimal level of insurance, people's expectations and collective bargaining power are likely to lead to a much more extensive redistribution. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since a well-functioning society is more than a well-functioning market economy. An extensive social insurance protects the rich, the poor, and, above all, the cooperative attitudes without which a democratic society cannot function well.
Piketty's Just Society
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2020
A review of Thomas Piketty's Capital and Ideology
Synthese (forthcoming)
Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, th... more Institutions generate cooperative benefits that explain why they exist and persist. Therefore, their etiological function is to promote cooperation. The function of a particular institution, such as money or traffic regulations, is to solve one or more cooperation problems. We go on to argue that the teleological function of institutions is to secure values by means of norms. Values can also be used to redesign an institution and to promote social change. We argue, however, that an adequate theory of institutions should not be 'moralized' in that they should not be defined in terms of the values they are supposed to promote.
Institutions in Action: The Nature and the Role of Institutions in the Real World
What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer th... more What is an institution? And what distinguishes one type of institution from another? We answer these questions using a functionalist approach: types of institutions are identified by their function, or the coordination problems they solve; token institutions are specific solutions to these problems, or equilibria of strategic games. The functionalist approach provides some insights into the limits of reform, or the extent to which institutions – like marriage, property, or democracy – can be modified without turning them into entities of a different kind.
Economics and Philosophy, 2019
Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to ... more Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realisable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency, edited by Anika Fiebich (Springer), 2020
Game theorists have tried for decades to explain how rational or quasi-rational individuals are a... more Game theorists have tried for decades to explain how rational or quasi-rational individuals are able to coordinate in situations in which there is more than one way to satisfy their preferences. In this chapter I focus in particular on the formation of common beliefs that supposedly sustain coordination in Hi-lo games. I review some attempts to solve the problem, such as bounded rationality, team reasoning , and solution thinking. Following their lead, I suggest that successful coordination is belief-less coordination, and that simple means-ends rationality explains how coordination problems may be solved using techniques of minimal mindreading.
Revue d’économie politique, 2018
Adam Morton has argued that a special kind of simulation, called 'solution thinking', explains su... more Adam Morton has argued that a special kind of simulation, called 'solution thinking', explains successful coordination in games of strategic interaction. In this paper I develop Morton's idea arguing that (i) simulation explains how focal points generate common beliefs; and (ii) people engage in a special type of simulation when they reason as a team. An important feature of solution thinking is that common beliefs are an output, rather than an input, of coordination. This suggests that they may play a less central role in sustaining coordination than previous theorists have assumed.
The Effect of Group Identity on Distributive Choice: Social Preference or Heuristic?
Economic Journal, 2017
Group identity can influence significantly people’s attitudes toward monetary allocations. In thi... more Group identity can influence significantly people’s attitudes toward monetary allocations. In this paper we reassess the representation of group identity using social preference models. First, we show that the influence of group identity varies unsystematically across different types of mini-dictator’s games and cannot be described using a well-behaved preference function. Second, we demonstrate that the effect is not robust to slightly increasing the complexity of the task, suggesting that group identity is a framing effect that can be easily displaced by alternative decision heuristics.
Enacting the Dismal Science: New Perspectives on the Performativity of Economics, 2017
Economic sociologists have been criticized for using the term “performativity” in a way that seem... more Economic sociologists have been criticized for using the term “performativity” in a way that seems unfaithful to Austin’s notion. In this paper I defend this usage against Uskali Mäki’s challenge, in particular his claim that economic theories cannot constitute illocutionary acts. To counter this claim I argue that performative speech acts play primarily a coordinating role by manipulating agents’ beliefs, and this is the same role that theories like the Black-Scholes model of option pricing play in financial markets, if MacKenzie’s historical reconstruction is right.
Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Norms in the Wild
Iride, 2017
A symposium on B. Epstein, The Ant Trap, Oxford University Press.
M. Bianchin, Mente, metafisi... more A symposium on B. Epstein, The Ant Trap, Oxford University Press.
M. Bianchin, Mente, metafisica e società = /= F. Guala, Un'ontologia sociale Pluralista. Epstein su "anchors" e "grounds" = / = I. Testa, I fatti sociali dipendono da atteggiamenti individuali? Sul pluralismo metafisico di B. Epstein
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Books by Francesco Guala
Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of "looping effects" and "interactive kinds" defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences.
Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us.
Endorsements:
"This valuable and beautifully structured book reviews and explains the key idea of correlated equilibria and also offers a novel theoretical synthesis. Clearly written, but even better, clearly conceived, this book is a winner on many levels."--Stephen Turner, University of South Florida
"In this complex and sophisticated book, the unified view of institutions is original because it bridges two views that have been considered to be incompatible. Moreover, the unified view is linked with other key issues in the philosophy of social sciences. With its enormous scope, it will appeal to specialists in the philosophy of social sciences, as well as such social science practitioners as economists and theoretical sociologists."--Jack Vromen, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Table of Contents:
Preface vii
Analytical Table of Contents xiii
Introduction xvii
PART I UNIFICATION
1 RULES 3
2 GAMES 20
3 MONEY 33
4 CORRELATION 44
5 CONSTITUTION 57
6 NORMATIVITY 70
INTERLUDE
7 MINDREADING 89
8 COLLECTIVITY 102
PART II APPLICATION
9 REFLEXIVITY 119
10 INTERACTION 132
11 DEPENDENCE 146
12 REALISM 163
13 MEANING 177
14 REFORM 194
Bibliography 207
Index 219
Papers by Francesco Guala
M. Bianchin, Mente, metafisica e società = /= F. Guala, Un'ontologia sociale Pluralista. Epstein su "anchors" e "grounds" = / = I. Testa, I fatti sociali dipendono da atteggiamenti individuali? Sul pluralismo metafisico di B. Epstein