Eva Kittay

I engage with Kittay's theory of moral status and obligations towards people with severe cognitive disabilities. While I certainly agree with the inclusion of people with cognitive disabilities in moral personhood, I disagree with Kittay's strategy, which rests in part on the distinction between the moral status of humans and nonhuman animals, leading to the exclusion of the latter. I present a counterargument to Kittay's position regarding the unjust exclusion of nonhuman animals from the sphere of moral personhood. She emphasizes relational identities and care in the definition of human worth as specific aspects of the moral relation of the human that ground its higher moral worth. I disagree with the thesis that these aspects are specific to human relations and thus define humans' privileged moral status. Kittay's rejection of the comparison between humans with disabilities and nonhuman animals is subject to the challenge of species narcissism and hierarchical views that privilege humans. I propose to extend Kittay's relational perspective to nonhuman animals by emphasizing the interconnectedness of all sentient beings. This favours a more inclusive and compassionate approach and promotes a more just society that values the well-being of all living beings and challenges hierarchical moral value systems.

Cura e cittadinanza Storia, filosofia, diritto a cura di CINTIA FARACO e MARIA PIA PATERNÒ Editoriale Scientifica Napoli Il presente volume è stato pubblicato grazie al contributo finanziario elargito dall'Unione Europea nell'ambito del progetto Jean Monnet sul tema The Care of the Other in the EU. Politics, Principles and Opportunities. I saggi pubblicati in questo volume sono stati sopposti a doppio referaggio cieco.

Cura e cittadinanza Storia, filosofia, diritto a cura di CINTIA FARACO e MARIA PIA PATERNÒ Editoriale Scientifica Napoli Il presente volume è stato pubblicato grazie al contributo finanziario elargito dall'Unione Europea nell'ambito del progetto Jean Monnet sul tema The Care of the Other in the EU. Politics, Principles and Opportunities. I saggi pubblicati in questo volume sono stati sopposti a doppio referaggio cieco.

A core question in practical ethics is 'which entities do we need to consider in our decision-making?' In this chapter we evaluate the justifications and motivations for defending species-membership views of human moral status. These are views on which human beings have a distinctive type of moral status grounded in their being human or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being human. Many ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because they believe that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and purportedly well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and treatment. We argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or humanprivilege view on moral status in order to justify species partiality in consideration and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and treatment that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more egalitarian views about moral status, according to which an entity's moral status depends on its own features, not the biological group to which it belongs. Given the traditional objections to species-membership views, to the extent that justified species partiality is consistent with alternative views of moral status, there is reason to reject the moral status significance of being human.

Cet article revient sur le parcours d'Eva Feder Kittay et s'attarde, en particulier, sur le rôle qu'a joué dans sa réflexion philosophique son expérience de mère d'une enfant atteinte d'un handicap mental sévère. Tant la critique par Kittay des théories standards de la justice, que sa redéfinition de la personnalité morale ou sa réflexion plus récente sur les rapports entre normalité et vie bonne trouvent leur source dans cette expérience, dont la prise en compte permet en retour à Kittay d'apercevoir des problèmes et de poser des questions qui demeurent absentes de la philosophie morale et politique traditionnelle. Le travail de Kittay illustre ainsi la fécondité théorique et l'importance éthique de la reconnaissance de l'expérience personnelle. Il montre également qu'à la condition qu'il s'élabore sur la base d'une telle reconnaissance, le travail théorique peut devenir un travail de care.

La proclamation de droits économiques et sociaux dans nombre de déclarations internationales (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1948, Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels de 1966 par exemple) manifeste un souci pour le bien-être de chacun et l'exigence de fournir à tout individu les conditions minimales d'une vie décente. Ces déclarations sont motivées par une considération impartiale du bien-être de chaque homme. L'impartialité, conçue comme une préoccupation individualisée du bien de chacun, justifie un traitement équitable des individus et s'avère spécifiquement pertinente dans les revendications mettant en cause des inégalités produites par le système social car une société qui permet l'existence d'inégalités importantes entre ses membres, quant aux avantages et aux désavantages dont ils ne sont pas responsables, est manifestement incapable de les traiter impartialement et équitablement. C'est le cas, par exemple de l'inégalité résultant des choix du marché-au plan national et international-ou d'une priorité accordée délibérément à certaines personnes. Néanmoins la question de savoir si l'on peut attendre des hommes, tels qu'ils sont réellement constitués, qu'ils adhèrent aux conséquences sociales qu'aurait l'implémentation de considérations d'impartialité dans l'interaction sociale, se pose. Il s'agira donc pour nous de déterminer dans quelle mesure les individus concernés accepteront une remise en question des normes sociales qui contreviennent à une prise en compte impartiale du bien-être de chacun et dont certains tiraient jusqu'alors profit. En somme, notre propos sera de tester l'acceptabilité de la justification d'une réduction des inégalités sociales motivées par un traitement impartial du bien-être de chacun. Pour ce faire, nous examinerons, en premier lieu, les conflits entre « point de vue personnel » et « point de vue impersonnel » dans l'appréciation des situations sociales par chacun et dans la volonté de les voir évoluer. Nous envisagerons ensuite les modalités d'un accord légitimant une prise en compte impartiale des situations individuelles et ses conséquences, en l'occurrence les critères de « l'acceptabilité universelle » et du « raisonnablement acceptable ». Enfin, nous considérerons les procédures les plus à même de garantir le respect d'une norme d'impartialité dans le traitement des situations individuelles en matière de bien-être que sont la légitimation procédurale décrite par J. Habermas dans le cadre de l'éthique de la discussion et la description, par B. Barry, des « circonstances de l'impartialité ». Ces analyses permettront de montrer que l'évolution de nos sociétés démocratiques vers une prise en compte impartiale du bien-être et des intérêts de chacun passe par la mise en place d'espaces de dialogue où s'échangent les points de vue et se formulent les intérêts mais aussi et surtout par l'institutionnalisation de procédures de décision, en elles-mêmes, équitables et impartiales.

This chapter explores the ethics and politics of dependency and vulnerability with regard to disability and illness. It looks at the account of dependency and vulnerability offered by three contemporary philosophers, these being Eva Feder Kittay, Havi Carel, and Judith Butler. It focuses on the convergences and divergences between these different frameworks, their philosophical suppositions, and their respective implications on thinking about disability and illness. In doing so, the chapter highlights how their reflections on dependency and vulnerability can inform and illuminate philosophical theorising as well as socio-political critique. It is worth noting at the outset that, while there are clear convergences between the three philosophers, they are coming from three very different theoretical backgrounds, with Kittay’s work rooted in feminist ethics of care, Carel’s in phenomenology of illness, and Butler’s in a poststructuralist critical theory. This explains the tenor and different emphases of their work which, however, this chapter brings together in dialogue. The chapter is divided into four parts, culminating in a more focused engagement with the ethico-politics of dependency and vulnerability found in Butler’s work.

van der Weele, accepted for publication). By definition, caring relationships are relationships of dependency, too. This has been recognized by foundational thinkers of nursing studies and care ethics alike. Virginia Henderson, for instance, defined the nurse's function as 'to assist the individual, sick or well, in the performance of those activities contributing to health or its recovery (or to peaceful death) that he would perform unaided if he had the necessary strength, will or knowledge' (Henderson, 1964, p. 64). Henderson thus assumed nursing to spring forth from a relationship of dependency between the caretaker and the care recipient (Dorothea Orem (1959) spoke of a 'self-care deficit'). Similarly, Joan Tronto writes that 'care arises out of the fact that not all humans or others or objects in the world

van der Weele, accepted for publication). By definition, caring relationships are relationships of dependency, too. This has been recognized by foundational thinkers of nursing studies and care ethics alike. Virginia Henderson, for instance, defined the nurse's function as 'to assist the individual, sick or well, in the performance of those activities contributing to health or its recovery (or to peaceful death) that he would perform unaided if he had the necessary strength, will or knowledge' (Henderson, 1964, p. 64). Henderson thus assumed nursing to spring forth from a relationship of dependency between the caretaker and the care recipient (Dorothea Orem (1959) spoke of a 'self-care deficit'). Similarly, Joan Tronto writes that 'care arises out of the fact that not all humans or others or objects in the world

A core question in practical ethics is ‘which entities do we need to consider in our decision-making?’ In this chapter we evaluate the justifications and motivations for defending species-membership views of human moral status. These are views on which human beings have a distinctive type of moral status grounded in their being human or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being human. Many ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because they believe that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and purportedly well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and treatment. We argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or human-privilege view on moral status in order to justify species partiality in consideration and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and treatment that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more egalitarian views about mo...

According to John Rawls's political liberalism, the exercise of political power should be justified by appeal to political values and principles that all citizens can reasonably be expected to share. I argue that we find a similar way of thinking about political legitimacy and justification in Immanuel Kant. Thus I defend the thesis that Kant's conception of right can be inter

A core question in practical ethics is ‘which entities do we need to consider in our decision-making?’ In this chapter we evaluate the justifications and motivations for defending species-membership views of human moral status. These are views on which human beings have a distinctive type of moral status grounded in their being human or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being human. Many ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because they believe that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and purportedly well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and treatment. We argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or human-privilege view on moral status in order to justify species partiality in consideration and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and treatment that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more egalitarian views about mo...

This article presents an argument for veganism, using a formal-axiomatic approach: a list of twenty axioms (basic definitions, normative assumptions and empirical facts) are explicitly stated. These axioms are all necessary conditions to derive the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty. The presented argument is a minimalist or core argument for veganism, because it is as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the narrowest definitions, the most reliable empirical facts and the minimal assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion. If someone does not accept the conclusion, logical consistency requires that s/he should be able to point at axiom(s) on which s/ he disagrees. The argument exposes hidden assumptions and provides a framework for an overview of the philosophical literature on animal rights and vegetarianism / veganism.

Animals are now widely accepted as subjects of justice: not equal but deserving equal consideration; not free but deserving liberties (that is, selfconstraining human duties). But liberty and equality are not all there is to a flourishing society – how about amity and reciprocity? Isn't a minimal degree of friendship or amity between human and animal on the one hand, reciprocity of feelings or reciprocal benefits on the other, needed to ensure that justice will last? It is, I shall argue, possible to interpret some human-animal relations as reciprocal, even as mutually beneficial (symbiotic) exchanges (and not necessarily exchanges of goods or services). Human-animal amity, on the other hand, is excluded, since it demands the impossible of animals: identification with a joint project. The 'best' we can get is quasi-amity, the one-sided and dubious belief that animals benefit from and enjoy being part of the basically purely human enterprise, the joint venture that societ...

Animals are now widely accepted as subjects of justice: not equal but deserving equal consideration; not free but deserving liberties (that is, self- constraining human duties). But liberty and equality are not all there is to a flourishing society - how about amity and reciprocity? Isn't a minimal degree of friendship or amity between human and animal on the one hand, reciprocity of feelings or reciprocal benefits on the other, needed to ensure that justice will last? It is, I shall argue, possible to interpret some human-animal relations as reciprocal, even as mutually beneficial (symbiotic) exchanges (and not necessarily exchanges of goods or services). Human-animal amity, on the other hand, is excluded, since it demands the impossible of animals: identification with a joint project. The 'best' we can get is quasi-amity, the one-sided and dubious belief that animals benefit from and enjoy being part of the basically purely human enterprise, the joint venture that soci...

Dependency functions as a keyword in care theory. However, care theorists have spelled out the ontological and moral ramifications of dependency in different and often conflicting ways. In this article, I argue that conceptual disputes about dependency betray a fundamental discordance among authors, rooted in the empirical premises of their arguments. Hence, although authors appear to share a vocabulary of dependency, they are not writing about quite the same phenomenon. I seek to elucidate these differences by teasing out and comparing different conceptions of dependency found in the literature. Borrowing a phrase from Eva Kittay, I trace four "paradigm cases" of dependency: the infant, the physically disabled person, the profoundly intellectually disabled person, and the refugee. These paradigm cases serve as the empirical touchstone from which theorists extract their conceptions of dependency. Each paradigm case, moreover, permits (or even implores) a particular ethical sensibility toward care. How we understand and value dependency thus seems to determine how we understand and value care, and vice versa. In this way, I contend, our normative orientation toward care might influence what sorts of dependency we see-and, by extension, which forms of dependency we fail to notice.

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, Gauthier)
sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call decent treatment. Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than others do. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.

Elaborazione dal libro Capabilités, Climats, Paris 2012, pagg. 118-124.
Le teorie del contratto sociale originano dalla filosofia di John Locke nel XVII secolo. John RAWLS trova problematici quattro ambiti della teoria del contratto sociale di Locke.

I argue that animals have rights in the sense of having valid claims, which might turn out to be actual rights as society advances and new scientific-technological developments facilitate finding alternative ways of satisfying our vital interests without using animals. Animals have a right to life, to liberty in the sense of freedom of movement and communication, to subsistence, to relief from suffering , and to security against attacks on their physical existence. Animals' interest in living, freedom, subsistence, and security are of vital importance to them, and they do not belong to us; they are not the things we have already possessed by virtue of our own nature.

Publié dans Renan Larue (dir.), «La pensée végane. 50 regards sur la condition animale», Paris, PUF, automne 2020.

RÉSUMÉ
Alors que le spécisme concerne la discrimination fondée sur l'appartenance à une espèce donnée, le capacitisme (ou « validisme ») est la discrimination reposant sur les capacités d'un individu. Il affecte ainsi les personnes ayant un handicap physique et/ou intellectuel. À première vue, combattre le spécisme et combattre le capacitisme devraient aller de pair. Étant donné que nous ne sommes responsables ni des capacités dont nous héritons ni de l'espèce à laquelle nous appartenons, il est injuste que nos droits soient restreints ou niés pour ces seules raisons. Certains penseurs estiment d'ailleurs qu'à sa source même, le spécisme est fondamentalement une forme de capacitisme. Les animaux non humains seraient en effet exclus de la pleine considération morale au motif qu'ils seraient notamment dépourvus de la capacité de raisonner, d'agir moralement ou bien de mener des luttes politiques. Et pourtant, les relations entre le mouvement antispéciste et le mouvement des droits du handicap sont à couteaux tirés et, dans le monde universitaire, les recherches sur ces deux thèmes se sont largement développées en parallèle. C'est seulement depuis quelques années que des penseurs et des activistes cherchent à jeter des ponts entre les deux. Pour plusieurs d'entre eux, les théoriciens et les militants de chacune de ces deux traditions gagneraient à mieux se comprendre. Nous nous proposons ici de rendre compte des tensions entre ces deux champs avant d'examiner les propositions visant à réconcilier leurs approches.

“The Other within Us: Reframing, with Spinoza, the Self’s Relationship with Ageing and Disability” by Iva Apostolova and Élaina Gauthier-Mamaril adapts the philosopher Baruch Spinoza's anti-dualist theory of the conatus to the question of aging. The authors argue that since we always conceptualize ourselves in relation with others, the cultivation of compassion is a moral attitude that asks from each of us an effort to negotiate between our own interests and those of others.

Jakob Brücker (1696- 1770), “Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta” (Leipzig 1742-1744) adlı kitabında felsefenin başlangıcını “beşik”e (daha doğrusu ilk insanın kundaklanmasına) kadar götürür. Kitabın I. cildinin ilk sayfasında bir resim vardır; bir ayı tek pençesi ile bir şey yer gibi tasvir olunmaktadır. Buna ilişkin ifade ise “ipsa alimenta sibi”dir yani “O, kendi(si) kendisinin yemeğidir.” Bu ifade Horaz kökenli sanılmasına rağmen aslen Properz III, 24, 4’tendir. Sextus Propertius’un mısrası şu şekildedir: “Ipse alimenta sibi maxima praebet amor” yani felsefe başka bir gıdaya ihtiyacı olmaksızın (yani evvelki bilim ve sanatlara muhtaç bulunmaksızın) inkişaf edebilme kabiliyetine; kendi kendine yetebilme tavrına sahiptir. Yani felsefe kendi kendinden huruç etmektedir.
En işlevsel metafor teorilerinden olan Kittay’ın “İçeriği İkiye Katlama Teorisi” semiotiğin imkânlarından faydalanmak sureti ile metaforu izah bakımından diğer teorilerden ayrılır. Dolayısı ile bir tarafta Richards, Black, İpsen, Jolles, Trier, Porzig, Coseriu ve Weinrich gibi metafor teorisyenleri dururken diğer tarafta da Peirce, Morris, Cassirer ve Eco gibi semiotikçiler vardır. Kittay tam olarak bu iki tarafı birleştirmeye muvaffak olmuştur, denebilir. “Metafor ve Semiyotik” isimli çalışmamızda evvela teoriyi tanımladık. Daha sonra “semiotik”, metafor bağlantısı koparılmadan izah edilmiştir. Bu minvalde “göstergebilim” yanlış adlandırması, sembol- simge farkı ve semiotik imlasının (y’siz) doğruluğu da ihmal edilmemiştir. Akabinde Kittay için temel olan etkileşim ve alan teorileri ele alındı.
Metafor ve semiotik bağlantısı idrak edilmekle sadece ayı ve elindeki şey değil; ağaçlar, orman, ormandaki diğer hayvanlar ve birbirleri ile olan rabıtaları, beslenme şekilleri ve dahi sindirim sistemi vb. hakkında da malumat edinilebilecektir.

Sunaura Taylor enjoint à la fois les partisanes de la lutte pour la libération animale d’éviter de reconduire des préjugés capacitistes et les membres du mouvement pour l’émancipation des personnes en situation de handicap à combattre la discrimination fondée sur les capacités cognitives même lorsque les victimes ne sont pas humaines. 

Les animaux ont-­‐il une vie morale au même titre que les humains ? La philosophe Alice Crary soutient qu'ils sont visiblement porteurs de qualités morales, comme nous le montre la littérature. Mais les valeurs sont-­‐elles ainsi susceptibles d'un constat empirique ? Un soir de l'été 1967, alors qu'il visite le Nocturama du Zoo d'Anvers, le narrateur d'Austerlitz aperçoit un raton laveur assis derrière sa vitre « la mine sérieuse au bord d'un ruisselet, occupé à laver et relaver sans cesse la même tranche de pomme […] » 1. Le narrateur quitte ensuite le Zoo pour rejoindre la Gare Centrale d'Anvers, où il rencontre pour la première fois Jacques Austerlitz, le personnage principal du roman, occupé à rédiger frénétiquement des notes sur l'architecture du bâtiment au milieu de la foule. La ressemblance des situations frappe le narrateur : le raton laveur semble espérer « par ce nettoyage d'une méticulosité outrancière, échapper au monde factice dans lequel il s'était retrouvé, à son insu en quelque sorte » 2 ; l'obsession de Jacques Austerlitz pour l'architecture trouve son origine dans son histoire personnelle faite d'exils et de pertes, causés par la Seconde Guerre mondiale et la Shoah. Jacques Austerlitz n'est évidemment pas un raton laveur et inversement, mais Sebald semble suggérer que le narrateur n'aurait peut-être tout simplement pas vu la détresse de Jacques Austerlitz s'il n'avait pas d'abord été sensible à celle du raton laveur. Alice Crary, professeure associée à la New School for Social Research, propose un commentaire philosophique magistral de l'ouverture d'Austerlitz dans son nouvel ouvrage, Inside Ethics. On the Demands of Moral Thought (p. 246-247). Selon elle, cet exemple littéraire mettrait d'une part en avant le fait que les humains et les animaux se situent « à l'intérieur de l'éthique », c'est-à-dire qu'ils possèdent « des qualités morales qui sont, à strictement parler,

This is a substantial introduction to the book, New Essays in Applied Ethics: Animal Rights, Personhood and the Ethics of Killing (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Besides the summary of each essay, what may be of particular interest is the author's view on the nature of applied ethics, and what the term "applied ethics" may be a misnomer (and hence the term "practical ethics" is to be preferred).

The institution of owning pets has been subjected to compelling criticism on moral grounds. Yet advocates of a reformed, guardian/dependent model may yet face an abolitionist conclusion. We argue that treating companion animals as dependents entails an indefensible moral priority for them in the face of their guardians’ competing moral demands. An abolitionist dilemma arises as a result: if the property and reformed models fail, a morally acceptable characterization of the moral relationship between humans and their companion animals has yet to be articulated. We close by inviting others to develop plausible alternatives to the ownership and reformed models.

Justice is at the core of European identity.Through the history of Western philosophy, justice has always been considered as a virtue or a practice concerning the human as a rational being. Moreover, within the liberal egalitarianism of the XIX century, justice has been connected to the notion of person defined as an independent and self-sufficient being. Therefore, independence and productivity are conceived as the main criteria of belonging, as equal citizens, fully cooperating, to a liberal, well-ordered, society. Where is in this moral conception – in which independence is conceived as normative – the place for those whose rational capacities are impaired and for disable or ill people? Starting from this question and referring to today’s European crisis of social justice, my article aims to rethink the idea of justice in connection with human dependence and health through a feminist perspective. My main references are the work of Eva Feder Kittay Love’s Labor and her article When Caring is Just and Justice is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation. The ethics of care can help us to develop a new approach to justice in the consideration of the whole human experience in which dependence and vulnerability are undeniable features.

“Disabilità, giustizia, diritto” è uno studio finalizzato a comprendere se nel panorama gius-filosofico contemporaneo le persone con disabilità siano annoverate tra i soggetti di giustizia e di diritto. Data la complessità del tema, gli itinerari percorsi a tal fine sono molteplici: essi spaziano dal neo-contrattualismo rawlsiano all’approccio delle capacità, dall’etica della cura a quella della vulnerabilità, dal percorso foucaultiano a quello dell’età dei diritti, fino a indagare quale possa essere la compatibilità tra l’astratto soggetto di diritto razionale ed i concreti soggetti con disabilità, che reclamano il proprio diritto all’inclusione. “Disabilità, giustizia e diritto” percorre tali itinerari valorizzando la prospettiva dei Disability Studies che, avendo favorito quel passaggio da una visione “medico-individualista” ad una “sociale” della disabilità oggi recepita anche in ambito normativo – in particolare, si pensi alla Convenzione Onu sui diritti delle persone con disabilità (2006) –, aprono scenari in parte ancora inesplorati, costituendo una sfida difficile, ma al contempo interessante ed indifferibile, per la riflessione filosofico-giuridica contemporanea.

As the world population is growing and government directives tell us to consume more fatty acids, the demand for fish is increasing. Due to declines in wild fish populations, we have come to rely more and more on aquaculture. Despite rapid expansion of aquaculture, this sector is still in a relatively early developmental stage. This means that this sector can still be steered in a favorable direction, which requires discussion about sustainability. If we want to avoid similar problems to the ones we have experienced with livestock farming, we need to generate knowledge of the biology, profitability, environmental aspects, consumer awareness, and product appreciation of particular fish species. However, the discussion about a sustainable aquaculture also raises the question how we should treat fish. This moral question is regularly addressed as a problem of applied ethics with a focus on tailoring ethical principles to practical questions. In this article we do not deny the importance of the practical accounts, but we start from the fundamental question whether and why fish matter in our moral deliberations, i.e., from the discussion on moral status. We elaborate the distinction between moral considerability and moral significance in order to show both the importance and the limitations of the discussion about moral status for practical problems in aquaculture. We illustrate these points with a case-study about the farming of a specific fish species, the African catfish.

Je m'intéresse dans cet article à ce qui se passe quand, dans les théories philosophiques dominantes en faveur de l'intégration des animaux dans la communauté morale humaine, ou en faveur de l'extension de cette même communauté aux animaux, la critique du mauvais anthropocentrisme chasse le bon. Parlant des théories philosophiques dominantes, j'entends spécifiquement celles qui inscrivent la défense de la « cause animale » dans le prolongement des luttes d'émancipation qui, au XX e siècle, ont fait tomber les figures idéologiques de la discrimination à l'intérieur de l'espèce humaine, à savoir au premier chef celles de Peter Singer et Tom Regan. Au-delà des divergences profondes entre ces deux théories, aussi profondes que le gouffre qui sépare l'utilitarisme du déontologisme , elles s'accordent en effet sur l'idée suivante : l'anthropocentrisme qui gouverne aujourd'hui encore nos relations avec les animaux, que ce soit l'anthropocentrisme (plus ou moins) réfléchi de la philosophie ou l'anthropocentrisme (plus ou moins) spontané du sens commun, est mal placé et même n'a pas lieu d'être du tout. Nous pourrions et devrions donc nous en débarrasser, condition pour affranchir les animaux de la tyrannie d'une convention qui, pour sembler aussi solide qu'une loi de la nature, est pourtant riens moins qu'arbitraire, et ne tient sa nécessité apparente que du seul fait d'être à notre service, à notre convenance. Cette déclaration une fois faite, il n'est cependant pas aisé, lorsqu'on regarde comment opèrent et argumentent ces théories, de savoir exactement ce qui à ce titre est combattu. Quand il s'agit de déterminer qui ou quoi a droit à notre respect, jusqu'où s'étendent les limites de l'attention morale, quels sont les êtres qui sont concernés par la norme d'égalité de considération ou de traitement, dire que l'être humain ou son point de vue sur le monde doit être délogé de sa position « au centre », voilà qui ne se réduit évidemment pas à la correction d'une erreur topographique, mais qui est beaucoup moins limpide que ce qui est parfois suggéré. Sur la base de ce diagnostic, mon propos est tout à fait modeste, et consistera essentiellement en un travail de clarification ou de « désembrouillage ». Il ne s'agira donc aucunement de m'opposer aux conclusions pratiques des théories de type Singer/Regan, du moins dans leur visée générale, et je laisserai d'ailleurs de côté leurs désaccords sur ce point et d'autres, ainsi que leurs justifications philosophiques. Je m'opposerai encore moins au souci éthique qui anime leurs théories. Je m'intéresserai seulement au mode d'argumentation et d'exposition de ces conclusions, et par là aux moyens employés pour soutenir par la force de la preuve le besoin de plus de justice. En développant quelques propositions de la philosophe américaine Cora Diamond, j'essaierai alors de montrer que faute d'assumer leur ancrage dans un certain anthropocentrisme, qui ne se réduit pas à celui qui tient le haut de l'affiche et qu'elles rejettent unanimement, ces théories (et plus largement l'éthique animale) scient la branche sur laquelle elles sont assises, et sabordent en partie leur pouvoir critique.

Chaque fois qu'une personne n'est pas ou plus en situation de faire valoir les mêmes droits que les autres du fait de son handicap, c'est le fonctionnement de nos sociétés démocratiques qui est mis en jeu. En bousculant et en interrogeant les catégories qui structurent l'anthropo-logie occidentale et l'imaginaire social dominant, le handicap possède ainsi, sur de nombreux sujets qui concernent chacun d'entre nous, un fort pouvoir d'interpellation morale et politique. Rencontrer les multiples voies ou modes d'existence du handicap, écou-ter les voix qui l'expriment et le revendiquent, tel est le projet de ce livre. Mêlant l'analyse de sociologues et de philosophes, il déploie des réflexions relevant aussi bien des débats contemporains dans la recherche (théories de la justice, disability studies, éthiques du care) que d'une perspective plus appliquée (architecture, politiques publiques, pratiques artistiques). Dans une perspective interdisciplinaire, il offre ainsi diverses propositions, théoriques et pratiques, pour reconfigurer les normes de l'autonomie et de la dépendance.
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This chapter outlines key ideas associated with ethical biocentrism. It distinguishes between forms of ethical biocentrism in terms of whether they adopt an egalitarian or inegalitarian approach to value; whether they are value monistic or pluralistic; and whether they adopt virtue, consequentialist or deontological approaches to ethical theory. Drawing in particular on the work of Robin Attfield and Paul Taylor, the chapter then explores how different forms of ethical biocentrism interpret and respond to anthropogenic climate change.

It's widely agreed that animal pain matters morally-that we shouldn't, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals, and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing other kinds of pain, for instance from predation? Using an example that includes both wild and domesticated animals, I outline two contrasting ways of thinking about our moral responsibilities with respect to assisting animals that are apparently in need. One approach is based entirely around animals' capacities; the other takes context and historical relations into account as well. While not attempting to adjudicate between these views, I'll point out the advantages and difficulties of both.

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Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others' choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that-independently of its inability to ground a whole political moralitysuch a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing.

In this paper I critically engage some of the philosophical ideas Kleingeld presents in Kant and Cosmopolitanism, namely patriotism, poverty, and global justice. Against Kleingeld, I propose, first, that perhaps democracy is less important and affectionate love more so to both Kant himself as well as to an account that can successfully refute a Bernard Williams style “one-thought-too-many” objection to Kantian patriotism; second, that guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief for all its citizens is constitutive of the minimally just state for Kant; and, third, that there seem to be more dis-analogies between the domestic and the global public authorities in Kant’s account of right than Kleingeld’s interpretation allows for.