Bodily Resurrection

Paul enigmatically describes humanity’s universal sinfulness in Rom. 3.23 as a lack of ‘the glory of God’. Interpreters have tried to situate the lack of this glory in various contexts: ancient honour discourse, ancient Jewish Adam traditions, and Paul’s ethical discourse. To interpret this passage, this article utilizes the literary context of glory language throughout the letter. From this we find that glory denotes not only elevated honour, but also incorruption. Thus, the lack of glory in 3.23 refers to mortality and shame as the result of sin. In addition, this study of glory has implications for the burgeoning interest into the question of theosis with regard to Pauline theology.

Modal Arguments in the philosophy of mind purport to show that the body is not necessary for a human person's existence. The key premise in these arguments are generally supported with thought experiments (e.g. I could either in some other bodily form or in a disembodied state). I argue that Christians endorsing the Doctrine of the Resurrection have good reason to deny this key premise. Traditional Christianity affirms that eschatological human existence is an embodied existence in the very bodies we inhabited while alive. The raises the Resurrection Question: why would God go through the trouble of resurrecting those bodies? I argue that adequately answering this question requires give up on Modal Arguments within the philosophy of mind.

"Representations", N. 129, Winter 2015.

The essay analyzes the project of maintaining the body of V. I. Lenin in the Mausoleum in Moscow for the past ninety years, focusing on the unique biological science that developed around this project, and the unexpected political role this body has performed.

The disbelief demonstrated in 1 Corinthians towards the idea of the resurrection of the body is really not about the resurrection of Christ, but only about the general resurrection of the dead. This dilemma cannot be explained by referring either to Platonic beliefs, where all forms of bodily resurrection were considered equally absurd, or to Jewish tradition, which did not know of any resurrection and subsequent immortalization of a single individual before the end of the world. Turning, however, to more traditional Greek material, one finds that the idea of bodily resurrection was not at all unknown. But there was always a question of absolute bodily continuity. No body or body part that had been annihilated could be recreated. As such, this may explain why Paul's opponents in 1 Corinthians did not consider the resurrection of Christ controversial, but did reject the idea of a general resurrection of the dead.

This book examines the relationship between the growth of Christianity in Greece and the belief in resurrection from the dead. Traditionally, Greek religion held a strong and enduring conviction that immorality always had to include both body and soul. Both mythical and historical persons were also believed to have been resurrected from the dead and become physically immortal. The Christian belief in the resurrection of the flesh evolved only gradually, beginning with Paul who simply denied it. But the more popular Christianity became among the Greeks, the stronger the emphasis became on the resurrection of the flesh; the more Christianity stressed physical incorruptibility, the more Greeks left their ancient beliefs for this new religion. As such, the success of Christianity may also be seen in connection with how it responded to the traditional Greek longing for immortal flesh.

Interpretations of the resurrection proof in Mark 12:26-27a must explain the relevance of  Jesus’ Exod. 3:6 citation and indicate how his conclusion points to resurrection rather than immortality. Current scholarly proposals often render the proof unconvincing in its logic and incompatible with / irrelevant to other NT presentations of resurrection. This article argues instead that Jesus’ proof rests on the premise — derived from the Sadducees’ example of marriage — that death annuls a covenant. Since the death of the patriarchs would therefore have released God from his covenantal obligations, God’s faithfulness to those obligations in the Exodus must imply the patriarchs’ continuing existence and eventual resurrection. This interpretation not only shows Jesus’ response to the Sadducees to be a well-reasoned, coherent whole, it also accords well with the presentation of resurrection elsewhere in the NT.

Although almost completely ignored, Aquinas’s account of persons with severe intellectual disabilities is key to his understanding of human persons and their salvation. Aquinas extensively addresses questions of human impairment, and for Aquinas physical and mental impairment are not nearly as important as moral or spiritual impairment. Contrary to those who focus on Aquinas’s account of rationality and suppose he thinks that a person must exercise rationality in order to be moral and in the image of God, Aquinas’s view is that persons with severe mental impairments have a distinct spiritual advantage, due to the impeccability of the gift of wisdom given them in their baptism.

The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that have been applied to the doctrine of the resurrection: substance dualism, constitutionalism, and animalism. We argue that animalism offers a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection: since human persons just are their bodies, life after death requires resurrection of one’s body. We conclude that Christian dualists owe us an explanation and that Christians seriously should consider the merits of animalism.

The Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity, but prior to the advent of such concerns there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body. Although this latter issue has exercised scholars of various ages, concern with it was particularly keen in early modern times. In this paper I chart the various ways bodily identity was conceived by early modern thinkers in connection with the resurrection, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in response.

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https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no1.03
This article is a rebuttal to Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti's article, "Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig's Inference to the Best Explanation," which argues that the Standard Model of current particle physics entails that non-physical things (like a supernatural God or a supernaturally resurrected body) can have no causal contact with the physical universe. As such, they argue that William Lane Craig's resurrection hypothesis is not only incompatible with the notion of Jesus physically appearing to the disciples, but the resurrection hypothesis is significantly limited in both its explanatory scope and explanatory power. This article seeks to demonstrate why their use of the Standard Model does not logically entail a rejection of the physical resurrection of Jesus when considering the scope and limitations of science itself.

Abstract: The doctrine of bodily resurrection is a core tenet of Christian faith, yet it is a doctrine fraught with several philosophical problems, the most significant of which concerns the persistence of personal identity. This is especially true for physicalist accounts of human nature. Here I put forth a possible solution to the problem of resurrection identity. Turning to the theology of the 18th century American colonial theologian, Jonathan Edwards, as a resource, I argue for what I am calling “Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism.” This is a form of anti-criterialism in which pre- and post-resurrection bodies are identical because God treats these bodies a metaphysically one. After providing a sketch of this view I defend Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism from two objections and provide three reasons why Christians might be inclined to accept this proposal.

Keywords: Anti-Criterialism; Identity; Jonathan Edwards; Metaphysics; Resurrection

Recently the walking, talking cross in the Gospel of Peter has been interpreted as a popular belief or a common apocalyptic motif, irrelevant for understanding the gospel’s christology. I argue that the animated cross should be understood as a manifestation of the resurrected Lord. This is demonstrated through a comparative study of epiphanies from Greek, Roman, and Jewish literature in which gods are identified and manifest by their unique signs, including talking trees. Since this cross appears simultaneously with the Lord’s enormous resurrected form, I conclude that the Gospel of Peter represents a polymorphic christology.

Gegenwärtig wird das gehende und sprechende Kreuz im EvPet gern als Element eines Volksglaubens oder als verbreitetes apokalyptisches Motiv gedeutet, das irrelevant für die Christologie des EvPet sei. Demgegenüber wird hier argumentiert, dass das belebte Kreuz als Manifestation des auferstandenen Herrn verstanden werden sollte. Dies wird an einem Vergleich von Erscheinungserzählungen aus griechischer, römischer und jüdischer Literatur gezeigt, in denen Götter anhand ihrer individuellen Zeichen, darunter als sprechende Bäume, identifziert werden. Da das Kreuz gleichzeitig mit der übergroßen Gestalt des Auferstandenen auftritt, wird geschlussfolgert, dass das EvPet eine polymorphe Christologie repräsentiert.

There is an important debate underway concerning Aquinas’s view about the status of persons in the interim period between death and resurrection. According to corruptionists, Aquinas believed that the person ceases to exist at death and begins to exist again at the resurrection. Survivalists, on the other hand, deny this. According to them, the continued existence of the soul in the interim period between death and resurrection is sufficient for the continued existence of the person. One objection raised by survivalists against corruptionism concerns Aquinas’s supposed rejection of the metaphysical possibility of intermittent or “gappy” existence. In this paper I reply to this objection in defense of corruptionism, arguing that Aquinas explicitly endorses the possibility of intermittent existence, that none of the texts cited against corruptionism in fact prove otherwise, and that Aquinas’s silence about the matter in his discussions of the resurrection can be easily explained.

This article examines questions about Paul’s attitude toward the future in his first letter to the Thessalonians. Whether the fate of the dead, future bodily resurrection, the parousia, or questions about judgment and destruction, Paul has plenty to say about what is to come in one of his earliest letters. This essay takes up Paul’s attitude toward the future in 1 Thessalonians to consider its role in the formation and maintenance of the recipients’ social identity. What social categories govern Paul’s vision of the future? How does he portray those categories? How does his portrayal of the past (including past social categorizations) relate to his vision of the future? How does his portrayal of past and future relate to the behavioral expectations set forth in the letter? Drawing on models from the field of Social Identity Theory, I argue that Paul defines the community in relation to “the day” (1 Thess 4:8) of Christ’s anticipated return and all that it entails. He portrays the past, in terms of both the Christ story and the conversion of the Thessalonians, to cohere with that anticipated future. This coherent representation frames and strengthens the ethical expectations Paul articulates in the letter.

Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, dem Konzept der »eschatologischen Anthropologie« in der Commedia nachzugehen, also der Frage, welches Menschenbild Dantes Jenseitsdarstellung vermittelt. Die Entscheidung, sich auf eine Jenseitsreise zu beziehen, um etwas über diesseitige Identitätskonzepte herauszufinden, mag zunächst überraschen. Doch wird sich zeigen, dass ausgerechnet die Darstellung eines Jenseits als Raumes des Überlebens nach dem Tod einen interessanten Ausgangs.
Manuele Gragnolati (Paris)

Scrinium 9 (2013)

Acc. to Philoponus, the resurrected human bodies will be composed from completely different incorruptible "elements".

My point is that the impossibility of reconstructing Philoponus' thought about the Resurrection resulted from our total dependency on the Cononite sources (the monophysite tritheist party of the opponents of Philoponus): Timothy of C.ple (a Chalcedonian) was depending on the Cononite information, too.

The Cononites understood Philoponus' notion of εἶδος as synonymous to σχῆμα, whereas its real meaning was different (the soul as a separable ἐντελέχεια of the body etc.). Thus, the famous knot from the Cononite anti-Philoponian florilegium, the following Philoponian quotation (about the resurrected bodies):
ܘܠܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܝܢ ܠܗ̇ܢܘܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ܆ ܐܠܐ ܘܠܐ ܫܘ̈ܝܝ ܒܐܕܫܐ ܠܗ̇ܢܘܢ.

must be cut with an emendation:

ܘܒܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܝܢ ܠܗ̇ܢܘܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ܆ ܐܠܐ ܫܘ̈ܝܝ ܒܐܕܫܐ ܠܗ̇ܢܘܢ.

which will be in accord with other Philoponus' works and, especially, a place in the Arbiter (Syriac only) which was so far misinterpreted, too.

The resurrected bodies, according to Philoponus, will be different in their elements but the same in their "eidos".

Through an examination of their respective treatments of the resurrection of the dead, this article argues that the ninth-century, northern Mesopotamian Syriac authors John of Dara and Moses bar Kepha provide a key to understanding Saadia Gaon’s knowledge of Christianity and his overarching project of “hellenizing” rabbinic Judaism under Abbasid Islam.

This article, and its companion "Ethics and the Spirit in Paul : Religious-Ethical Empowerment through the Relational Work of the Spirit", deal with the question of how, according to Paul, the Holy Spirit enables religious ethical life. This article challenges the "infusion-transformation" approach to Pauline pneumatology which builds on a Stoic concept of the Spirit as a material substance that transforms the substance of its recipients in order to enable ethical behaviour. The second article argues that in Paul (as well as in a significant number of texts from early Judaism) the Spirit transforms and empowers people for ethical living primarily through initiating and sustaining an intimate relationship with the divine and with the community of faith.

How does a living body come to be? What happens when it passes away? Questions like these captivated both Aristotle and St. Paul, despite their significantly different times and cultures. While it does not make any claim that Paul explicitly relied on Aristotle, this article does argue that each of them faced down parallel dilemmas and responded with the same conceptual move. Writing on animal generation, Aristotle rejected theories which overemphasize continuity through the developmental process or so stress the intelligibility of discrete stages that the process itself disintegrates without coherence. Likewise, Paul, writing on the plausibility of bodily resurrection, exhorts the Christian community in Corinth to reject overly continuous caricatures of resurrection while also urging them not to abandon hope for the bodies of those who have died-"what you sow," he tells them, "come[s] to life." Both Paul and Aristotle point their readers toward accounts of bodily development which refuse to collapse into either identity with the past or discontinuity between past and future-Paul and Aristotle insist on both. Such insistence is plausible on each of their accounts because they advance a shared conceptual shift away from prioritizing the temporal order of bodily change and toward a teleological order which privileges a greater whole. Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. (1 Corinthians 16.51-52) 1 Every realm of nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers who came to visit him found him warming himself at the furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, is reported to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture on the study of every kind of animal. (Aristotle, Parts of Animals 1.5, 17-22) 2 1 Quotations from the Bible are taken from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translation. Michael D. Coogan (ed.

Cet article propose l’édition et le commentaire d’un traité inédit copié en minuscule AB dans le ms. Berlin, SBPK, Hamilton 132. Ce traité, que l’on intitule Epistola contra hereticos, se veut la réfutation d’hérétiques inconnus des années 800-810, affirmant que le Christ n’est pas ressuscité dans sa “vraie” chair et n’a pas pu la conserver au ciel. L’article déconstruit le montage hérésiologique de l’auteur, qui fait de ces hérétiques des successeurs à la fois de l’arianisme et de l’adoptianisme, tout en montrant, grâce à la critique interne du traité et au témoignage externe de la lettre 41 d’Alcuin, que des débats sur le corps ressuscité du Christ ont bien eu lieu dans le sillage de l’adoptianisme. Le texte ne peut être attribué à aucun des grands auteurs du règne de Charlemagne ; par sa forme (des questions et réponses articulées autour de versets bibliques), il témoigne de la polémicité locale, ordinaire, d’un monde carolingien en pleine renaissance culturelle.

This article provides the edition and commentary of a theological treatise copied minuscule in ms. Berlin, SBPK, Hamilton 132. This text, which we propose to call Epistola contra hereticos, intends to refute an otherwise unknown heresy born around 800; these heretics allegedly claimed that Christ did not rise in his “true” flesh and did not keep a “real” human body after his ascension. This paper deconstructs the heresiological discourse behind these accusations, according to which these “heretics” are the heirs of both arianism and adoptianism. Nonetheless, internal critique and the external evidence of Alcuin’s letter 41 tend to show that such discussions on the risen body of Christ did take place in the wake of adoptianism. The treatise cannot be attributed to any known author under Charlemagne’s reign. The form of the text (questions and answers about biblical verses, instructions on how to refute the opponent) bears witness to a local sphere of theological debate, as soon as the first wave of the Carolingian reform.

The question of the resurrection has nourished, since the birth of Christianity, many debates, including the polemic of the Great Church against Origen. The latter's doctrine, set out in the Treatise On the First Principles, according to which after the resurrection man will receive a ‘spiritual’ and not a ‘carnal’ body, provoked an immediate reaction from other representatives of the Great Church. Among his opponents, having lived in the third century, the only one whose work remains attested to us is Methodius of Olympus. Composed of three books in Greek, the De Resurrectione has reached us in its original version only in a fragmentary state. On the other hand, the ancient translations allow us to know this treatise in its entirety, because the De Resurrectione has been entirely translated into Paleo-Slavic. The complex tradition of this major work of the late Ante-Nicene Period (Greek fragments of half of the treatise; the entire work in Paleo-Slavic; fragments, quotations and allusions in Latin, Syriac and Armenian) raises several problems concerning the method of editing. In addition, the discovery of new Paleo-Slavic manuscripts and new Greek witnesses, unknown at the time of the first edition of this treatise by N. Bonwetsch, makes it possible to complete this text in an important way, as well as to introduce several corrections which will make the meaning of the Paleo-Slavic translation of De Resurrectione clearer.

From shape-shifting Merlin to the homunculi of Paracelsus, the nine fascinating essays of this collection explore the contested boundaries between human and non-human animals, between the body and the spirit, and between the demonic and the divine. Drawing on recent work in animal studies, posthumanism, and transhumanism, these innovative articles show how contemporary debates about the nature and future of humanity have deep roots in the myths, literature, philosophy, and art of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The authors of these essays demonstrate how classical stories of monsters and metamorphoses offered philosophers, artists, and poets a rich source for reflection on marriage, resurrection, and the passions of love. The ambiguous and shifting distinctions between human, animal, demon, and angel have long been contentious. Beasts can elevate humanity: for Renaissance courtiers, horsemanship defined nobility. But animals are also associated with the demonic, and medieval illuminators portrayed Satan with bestial features. Divided into three sections that examine metamorphoses, human-animal relations, and the demonic and monstrous, this volume raises intriguing questions about the ways humans have understood their kinship with animals, nature, and the supernatural.

J. Eugene Clay is an associate professor of religious studies at Arizona State University, where he writes and lectures about religious movements in Eurasia and the encounters of the world religions. His work has appeared in Church History, Russian History/Histoire russe, and the Cahiers du monde russe. He has received grants and awards from the Social Science Research Council, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the International Research and Exchanges Board.

This study engages in the longstanding scholarly debate concerning the development of Paul’s resurrection theology, by investigating the correlation between his bodily experiences and his diverse articulations about resurrection. Drawing on insights from cognitive linguistics, I consider Paul’s ideas about resurrection as fundamentally grounded in recurrent patterns of bodily experience and argue that the bodily experience of some religious activities in Paul’s time—death rites, spirit possession, and baptism—contributed to the formation and development of his resurrection theology.

Specifically, this book demonstrates that developments in Paul’s ideas about “bodily transformation at resurrection” —reflected in 1 Corinthians 15—resulted from a change in the experiential patterns on which his new idea is constructed (rather than “transformation during heavenly ascent” as seen in Jewish traditions of resurrection). I identify this radical development in experiential patterns by applying cognitive linguistic tools to two considerations: (1) whether Paul had contextual reasons to generate his innovation in 1 Corinthians 15, and (2) whether Paul’s innovation recurred or had continual effects in Christian groups. In so doing, I show that Paul’s innovation directly addressed a contextual issue of death rites in Corinth and exerted a continuing effect on Paul’s later ideas of transformation, spirit possession, and baptism.

Thus, instead of considering theological ideas as emerging solely from intellectual activity necessarily indebted to existing ideas in Paul’s cultural milieu, this study offers a rigorous and testable methodology to argue that bodily experience contributed significantly to his thought-development.

Although there is a clear historical connection, Jewish beliefs on the afterlife were never identical with what Christians held to be true. We must also consider to what degree Judaism actually influenced the development of the resurrection belief in Christianity. This forces us to ask another basic question, How typical of Judaism during this time was the belief in the resurrection, not least the belief in the resurrec- tion of the flesh? Does Judaism in early imperial times offer any clue for why early Christians chose this one form of belief in the afterlife and not anything else?

2세기 후반의 그리스도교 문헌인 ｢바울과 테클라의 행전(Acts of Paul and Thecla; ATh)｣은 종종 초대 교회의 젠더 위계질서에 도전하기 위해 쓰여진 문헌이라 생각되었다. 따라서 테클라가 머리를 자르고 바울을 따르겠다고 하거나 남성의 옷을 입고 사역을 하는 등의 문학적 모티브 역시 테클라가 열등한 여성성을 버리고 남성성과 종교적 권위를 획득하는 젠더 전복적인 의미를 갖는 것으로 생각되었다. 그러나 이처럼 젠더 문제에 집중하여 문헌을 읽는 가운데 종종 간과된 것은 ATh에서 반복적으로 거론되고 있는 부활의 문제인데, 이것은 ATh에 등장하는 다수의 문학적 모티브들과 테클라의 경험을 일관성 있게 이해하는 중요한 해석의 열쇠가 될 수 있다. 이 같은 주장은 다음의 근거를 바탕으로 한다. 1) 문헌이 쓰여지고 읽히던 2세기 그리스도교 내에는 부활에 대한 다양한 견해가 대립하고 있었으며, 특히 육신 부활이 중요한 문제가 되고 있었다. 2) 이 같은 상황에서 ATh가 속해 있는 문헌 『바울 행전(Acts of Paul)』은 전체적으로 육신의 부활을 핵심으로 다루고 있으며, 이 같은 전체 문헌의 주제는 ATh에서 바울과 거짓 제자들의 대립 구도로 이어지면서 ATh 역시 부활에 대한 옳고 그른 견해에 대해 논하고 있다는 점을 알려준다. 3) 마지막으로 ATh는 테클라가 반복적으로 죽음과 ‘육신’의 부활을 경험하는 것으로 그림으로써, 신이 연약하고 죄를 만들어 내는 인간의 육신조차도 부활시킬 것에 대한 믿음을 역설한다. 특히 테클라가 스스로 남장을 하고 길을 떠나는 것은 그녀가 인간의 육신이 만들어 내는 정욕과 그로 인한 죄, 그리고 죽음의 위협을 피하여 금욕적 현재를 살 수 있는 능력을 획득하였음을 의미한다. 이처럼 ATh는 테클라라는 여성의 이야기를 통하여 육신의 부활이라는 이후 ‘정통(orthodox)’ 기독교의 핵심적인 교리가 된 믿음을 제시하고 있다.

The Acts of Paul and Thecla (ATh; in the Acts of Paul), a second-century early Christian text, has often been understood as challenging the early church’s gender hierarchy and promoting women’s religious authority. With this assumption, ATh’s literary motifs such as Thecla’s proposal to cut her hair or wearing a masculinely fashioned robe for her mission were interpreted as her rejection of inferior femininity and acquisition of religious authority. Scholarly attempts that read ATh by primarily focusing on gender, however, have often neglected another important subject that is being discussed in the ATh, the theme of the bodily resurrection. In this article, by rereading ATh in consideration of the early Christian debates on the bodily resurrection, I argue that ATh is a text written to support the belief of the bodily resurrection that later became the ‘orthodox’ Christian view. Within this broader theological agenda of the text, Thecla’s transvestite symbolizes her acquisition of future bodily resurrection and ability to live a chaste life escaping from bodily passions, sins, and death.

The paper contributes to the discussion regarding the Corinthian opponents of the resurrection of the dead (1 Cor 15:12). In particular, it attempts to reexamine the thesis of the Epicurean framework of this controversy. The first part focuses on the main lines of interpretation of 1 Cor 15:12 and the presentation of the Epicurean thesis. It is followed by an analysis of Paul's polemical statements against the thesis of his Corinthian opponents, "there is no resurrection of the dead" (1 Cor 15:12; cf. vv. 19, 29-34, 35). It is assumed that Paul clearly says that his opponents deny a bodily resurrection and future life-there is nothing after death. The third part of the paper reconsiders some hermeneutic factors concerning the identity of the Corinthian opponents of the resurrection. 1 Cor 15 contains terminological and ideological parallels to Epicureanism, especially, by way of opposition. Yet, the valuation of these data remains an open question.

In this article, firstly, I discuss why it is important to have an exegetically sound biblical view on the resurrection for the attractiveness of the church. To attain this, theology in both the Catholic and the Protestant tradition-should change its approach of eschatology as focusing on "going to heaven when you die" to a view of "participating in a new creation". Secondly, I will give some examples of how the biblical message about the resurrection thus understood can make the mission of the church strong enough to have its own relevant and attractive alternative narrative in a world of competing narratives.

The demonstration of the suitability of the flesh for incorruptible and eternal existence constitutes one of the cornerstones of the defense of the traditionally understood resurrection dogma. The objective of the article (The human body and immortality) is to present the argumentation in favor of it from Methodius of Olympus in De Resurrectione II, 19-25 (in GCS 27, 371-382). The author recalls some examples taken from the world of nature (botanical, zoological, astronomical), from the artistic field and from biblical history not only to illustrate the possible longevity of bodies in earthly existence, but also to prove that God, shaper of the body , he has destined man for immortality. Applying the principle of divine omnipotence to the resurrection of the flesh does not constitute a senseless loophole for Methodius, but an attempt to assume, within the confines of a rationality nourished by the data of the Christian faith, an element which, although understandable for reason, nevertheless exceeds.

De resurrectione (The Resurrection), a work by Methodius of Olympus, written shortly before the alleged martyrdom of the Author (probably in 311), was the first to present in a profound and organic fashion the orthodox response to a number of eschatological positions of Origen and his followers, which were based on a common Platonic philosophical background. The value of this dialogue consists above all in a new way of reasoning that will continue and be developed in successive centuries. The task of this research is to outline the fundamental anthropological categories used by Methodius to defend the reasonableness of faith regarding the resurrection of the flesh. Particular attention will be placed on the argument which is based on Scriptures as well as that based on the natural sciences of the time (cosmology, medicine). By referring to them, the Olympian tried to prove the existence of elements that, beginning with the prenatal development of each person, shape the human body in an unrepeatable way. According to him, the individual elements of the body, unlike the humoral mass, are 'personal' and therefore the resurrection, implicating physical categories, is possible, just and worthy of God. This concept allows Methodius to maintain the material and formal identity between the earthly body and the risen one. The Author juxtaposes this concept to that of the eidos used by Origen, which he considers imprecise, insufficient and incongruous. According to him, the glorious transformation and spiritualization of the risen body does not imply an abandonment of matter, or material qualities, but rather the gain of incorruptibility, immortality and impassibility in full communion with the Holy Spirit.

Even while Calvin affirms the reality of the resurrection of the flesh, Christ's resurrection does only very limited work in Calvin's theological imagination. It is only revelatory and applicatory of a transformative event previously occurred. For Calvin, the full measure of salvation is obtained in Christ's death, not in his resurrection. Christ's resurrection makes us aware of this salvific reality, and allows us to be drawn into it, but it does not inaugurate a salvific transformation itself. Moreover, while Calvin holds that Christ's resurrection is a guarantee and model for our resurrection, embodiment plays no role in his eschatological vision.

In this work, J. D. Atkins employs a combination of reception-history analysis and redaction criticism to challenge modern theories that Luke 24 and John 20 are apologetic responses to incipient docetism. He subjects second-century parallels used to support these theories to the same redaction-critical scrutiny as the Gospels and finds that the editorial and apologetic concerns of the evangelists differ fundamentally from those of antidocetic writers: neither Luke nor John aims to prove the physicality of the resurrection. Both instead draw attention to the fulfillment of prophecy. The author also argues that the apostles' doubt was not an apologetic device and that the bodily demonstrations of touching and eating predate docetism. Early docetists appeal to the Gospels as apostolic testimony but insist on a non-literal hermeneutic in which Christ performs physical actions "in appearance only."

The article offers a comparison of Paul’s teaching about resurrection in 1Cor 15 and the passage about the resurrection of the dead in 2nd Baruch (Syriac apocalypsis of Baruch, sBar), ch. 49–52. The focus is on the remarkable parallels (resurrection is understood as transformation of the bodies) and the differences regarding eschatology as well.

Tertullian's four writings on marriage (two letters " To His Wife, " " Exhortation to Chastity, " and " On Monogamy ") have often disturbed his modern readers. In them, he does not applaud marital monogamy, but suggests that sexual intercourse and childbearing are ungodly, potentially damning enterprises. This paper aims to situate these treatises in conversation with his soteriology. It shows how these writings register tensions that emerge in his claim that the fleshly body will endure in the resurrection, but sexual desire will not. Sexual difference, it argues, is at once central to his soteriological equation, and yet one that exceeds his attempts to define it. Tracing Tertullian's view of salvation of the flesh, this paper in particular illustrates how his persistent coding of the flesh as feminine works to retain sexual difference, and leads to his promotion of " monogamy, " and not as we might expect, virginity, as the figure of the resurrected life. The paper reveals that when early Christian theorizing about the resurrected body not only had to negotiate the complexities that the sexually differentiated body implied, but also had potentially broad implications to authorize or undermine particular conceptions of gender roles as well as social and familial arrangements.

N.T. Wright has offered a proposal to Christian philosophers where it is apparently possible to hold the belief in the intermediate state-resurrection of the body and an ontological holism in the same sense at the same time. I argue that this not only creates a basic contradiction in Wright's ontological paradigm, but also it is not a coherent and tenable proposal despite the fact one might eventually find a potential solution to such a quandary.

Theorists are always speaking about the coming of the Lord and how the Christian Church will be escorting Him from Heaven, because it was Raptured seven years earlier. They say that wherever it says “the coming of the Lord” it is not speaking about the Rapture, but of the final coming of the Lord to rule and reign on earth for only 1000 years. This is the major tenet of their Pre-Millennial mythology.  But where does it specifically say in the Bible that the Christian Church escorts the Lord from out of heaven at His coming?  Let’s review the verses that use the words come or coming, with their reference to the Lord’s arrival on earth, to get clear answers to this very important question.

According to Grégoire de Nysse, the corporeity is a constituent dimension of mankind. The real opposition is not to be seen between the body and the mind but rather between the Creator and the creatures. Christ, the Word made flesh, that died and resurrected for us, opens our eyes to the limits and the meaning of our corporeity. He completes it through resurrection. Amid conflicting philosophical trends, the author focuses on one of the main intuition of philosophy (“what is the most important can not be seen with one’s eyes”) without discrediting our current body nor making it an end in itself. Unlike pagan tendencies that always lie dormant in ourselves, we can rejoice because the slavery of corruption (Ro. 8, 21) is at end. Our body is growing and Chronos, ? by Christ, doesn’t devour his children any more.

Selon Grégoire de Nysse, la corporéité est une dimension constitutive de l’homme, et la vraie opposition n’est pas à mettre entre corps et esprit, mais entre (re)Créateur et créatures. Le Christ, Verbe fait chair, mort et ressuscité pour nous, nous ouvre les yeux sur les limites et le sens de notre corporéité présente ; et il l’achève par la résurrection. Au milieu de courants philosophiques opposés, notre auteur fait ainsi droit à une intuition majeure de la philosophie (« l’essentiel est invisible pour les yeux ») sans pour autant discréditer notre corps actuel, ni en faire un absolu. Au rebours des tendances païennes qui sommeillent toujours en nous, nous pouvons nous réjouir car il est fini, « l’esclavage de la corruption » (Ro. 8, 21). Notre corps est en croissance et Chronos, assumé par le Christ, ne dévore plus ses enfants.