Abduction, Deduction, Induction

This study was written few months ago at the suggestion of
L’institute for Epistemological Studies Europe (IESE) in
Belgium, and it was written in Arabic, and considering its
importance, I decided to translate it into English.
The question of methods is related to the crisis of scientific
research in general: each time research has worsened, the
historical trinity: the “knowing subject”, the “subject”
and the method were present. Where the scientific crisis is
often, firstly, interpreted historically as a crisis in research
methodology, secondly, followed by the knowing-subject,
and finally by the subject of knowledge.

This work pays tribute to the work of Professor Magnani by analyzing and applying his Eco-Cognitive Abduction Model (also known as the EC-Model) to introduce axiological values’ role in the generation of scientific hypotheses. For this purpose, the cognitive dimension of the researcher is proposed in this work as a complementary factor to better understand the scientific paradigm shift. In particular, it is assumed that the experience of discovering a surprising fact that neither current theories nor methodologies can account for generates a state of radical ignorance that can provoke in the agent the emotion of anguish in the face of the imperative need to find a solution. Faced with ignorance as the only available evidence of the fact that triggers anguish, the agent’s abducted hypotheses will be much more fragile than usual because they contain very distant elements, which will imply a more significant commitment to the interpretation of the scientific discipline involved, as well as to the agent’s own vision of how the paradigm should be understood. This fragility, however, does not undermine the process but revitalizes the discipline in crisis with novel proposals that motivate suggestive new lines of investigation.

Towards the middle of the eighteenth century Hume asked: Why should we accept non-deductive inferences? Strangely enough he didn’t ask the corresponding question: Why should we accept deductive inferences? This was not due to an oversight but rather to the belief, widespread even today, that there is a basic difference between deductive and nondeductive inferences: while non-deductive inferences cannot be justified, deductive inferences can be justified. The question of the justification of deductive inferences is all the more important as it is strictly connected with the question: What is a deductive inference? and a non-deductive inference? The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to these questions.

Human thoughts and behaviors, though complex, exhibit identifiable patterns that are observable across various contexts. This article introduces the concept of a "microlect," a specialized sub-language that emerges within natural language to focus on specific subjects. A microlect is characterized by key terms and core sentences that adhere to grammatical rules. Beyond linguistic behavior, the concept of microlect extends to general human actions, where the keys are physical motions and the cores are combinations of these motions, both constrained by social or behavioral rules. These microlects represent the diverse human Ways of Being. The study of these patterns is termed "microlectics," which seeks to systematically observe and classify them. This paper aims to initiate this study, proposing that microlectics can be understood as a meta-meta-narrative-a framework that encompasses and synthesizes previous narratives of human behavior. It is suggested that microlectics may represent the final meta-narrative framework needed to understand the broad spectrum of human expression.

This paper explores mathematical creativity through the lens of Charles Sanders Peirce's concept of abductive reasoning. Peirce, who defined mathematics as the study of pure hypotheses and their consequences, saw abduction as the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, the only logical operation that introduces new ideas. We argue that mathematical creativity, with its focus on generating novel and meaningful ideas, patterns, and solutions, is intrinsically linked to abduction and takes place through diagrammatic reasoning. Mathematicians, faced with surprising facts or observations, engage in abductive reasoning to propose new theorems or conjectures that explain these phenomena. This creative leap, going beyond deductive and inductive reasoning, lies at the heart of mathematical discovery. We illustrate this process with examples from contemporary mathematics, including Wiles' proof of Fermat's Last Theorem and Perelman's resolution of the Poincaré Conjecture.  Furthermore, we connect Peirce's notion of diagrammatic reasoning to mathematical creativity, highlighting the role of experimentation and observation in this process. Finally, we link our approach to Fernando Zalamea's advocacy for a "synthetic philosophy of contemporary mathematics" that engages directly with the creative practices of mathematicians.

The notion of nihilism does not take center stage in Flusser's philosophy as other concepts, like existentialism, phenomenology, communication, translation, telematics or technical images, but it plays a major role at the beginning of his intellectual adventure and persistently keeps resurfacing in various guises at different stages of his intellectual development. This is a consequence of its role as an intellectual midwife in Flusser's formative years, the 1940s and 1950s. 2

This essay focuses on the role of nihilism in the development of Vilém Flusser’s work, a notion that plays a major role at the beginning of his intellectual adventure and keeps resurfacing in various guises and different moments. Nihilism is linked to certain people and the work of certain philosophers: to his friend Alex Bloch and the work of Albert Camus, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Vicente Fereira da Silva. It appears in The History of the Devil, the autobiography Bodenlos and Vampyroteuthis Infernalis. Nihilism is connected to a series of topics: the forces of negativity and denial, the absurdity and groundlessness of human existence, the meaninglessness of life and the temptation of suicide, the concept of nothingness in Jewish thinking and the void in Oriental philosophy, the devil and the diabolical abyss, Mephistopheles and the infernal octopus at the bottom of the sea, and finally the zero-dimensionality of pixels and the principle of entropy. Flusser repeatedly spoke of himself in Mephistophelian terms and called his life in Brazil a diabolical existence. Samson Flexor painted a portrait of Vilém Flusser that strongly accentuated the diabolical side of his person. Louis Bec’s various species of Vampyroteuthis Infernalis represent different sides of Flusser’s thinking.

Hermeneutics can play a key role in advancing human well-being, but its potential remains underexplored. In this paper, I discuss the importance of Inner Development Goals relative to sustainable development to address global challenges from a humanistic, hermeneutical perspective. I propose specific criteria necessary for the fulfilment of a 'sustainability in first person' approach and link it to a widespread acknowledgement of the necessity of stepping into action through holistic, experiential methods. Hermeneutical action is defined as action accompanied by, and following from, the recognition feeling of truth. I conclude by proposing elements for a transformative learning program in the form of construction of Mini-Theories of Evolution, a development of the practice "Thinking at the Edge", devised by the philosopher Eugene T. Gendlin. The program would allow hermeneutics to bridge the divide between theories of evolution, philosophical thought and concrete personal actions towards sustainability. The two dimensions of Being and Action would interact in a process-oriented version of an organic, evolutionary philosophical practice. Effective action towards authentic goals would be signaled in an open language through the shift to the verb "to Be" in conclusions that otherwise use the logical operator "=" among two terms of a formula.

"Wild pigs (Sus scrofa) in the early Holocene were nimble,
fierce combatants for humans who sought them out for sport,
as rites-of-passage and as flesh food in the hinterlands of their
isolated agrarian settlements. In contrast, pigs-as-pork in the
Anthropocene have been reduced to unhealthy indolence while
awaiting slaughter in industrial factory farms.
Of late, improving the welfare of pigs-as-pork in factory
farms has become a major campaign issue among organized
ammaI welfare activists. They also aim to improve pig-human
relations in general by restoring a prevailing human perception
that narrowly values 'pigs-as-pork' to a pre-Modern agrarian
perception that more broadly values pigs 'as-pigs' This humane ideation challenges an inhumane dominant 'pigs-are-pork' paradigm that is
presently shared worldwide by most factory farmers and a general public.
This Modern 'pigs-as-pork' paradigm is deeply entrenched and has thus
far proved not readily amenable to change "

Scurt rezumat



Voi încerca să creionez un scurt rezumat care poate fi de folos cititorului precizând principalele argumente ale lucrării și concluziile la care am ajuns, omiţând însă mai multe aspecte particulare şi de detaliu rezultate din raportarea critică la exegeza kantiană sau chiar la unele teme kantiene secundare scopului considerat.

În această lucrare mi-am propus o evaluare a argumentelor transcendentale ale Criticii raţiunii pure din perspectiva analizelor contemporane discutate în  Kant-Forschung. În primul capitol am prezentat diferite interpretări aduse acestui tip de argument. Dintre acestea, două se remarcă cu precădere. Pe de o parte, Körner şi Strawson aduc o critică formală ce priveşte structura argumentului, iar de cealaltă parte Baum identifică speciile argumentului transcendental, anume: expuneri, deducţii şi dovezi. În lumina acestor consideraţii, m-am referit în capitolele următoare la expunerile intuiţiilor, deducţia categoriilor şi dovezile principiilor intelectului pur, sub condiţia criticii formale adusă de cei doi exegeţi menţionaţi. Am  avut în vedere argumentul transcendental atât din perspectiva structurii sale formale cât şi din perspectiva conţinutului şi domeniului său specific

Atât Körner cât şi Strawson consideră nevalid argumentul transcendental, ceea ce nu aşează Critica raţiunii pure într-o poziţie prea favorabilă. Temeiul adus este strict formal. Dacă se pleacă de la condiţionat şi se deduce condiţia sa, nu avem nici o garanţie că acea condiţie este necesară, ea poate fi doar suficientă. Pentru a fi necesară trebuie dovedit şi faptul că nu există alte condiţii care să implice condiţionatul. Necesitatea concluziilor este de primă importanţă în deducţia categoriilor, întrucât ceea ce se stabileşte este realitatea obiectivă a unor concepte. Celelalte două tipuri de argumente transcendentale le-am interpretat în mod diferit, astfel încât această critică formală nu li se aplică. Le voi prezenta pe rând.

Primul tip de argumentare transcendentală, în ordinea Criticii raţiunii pure este expunerea intuiţiilor. În această privinţă am argumentat, contrar direcţiilor de interpretare clasice, că Estetica transcendentală aduce argumente aparent circulare, dar valide. Interpretările pe această temă pot fi grupate în două categorii: pozitive, care încearcă diferite reconstrucţii ale argumentelor aşa încât ele să nu fie circulare, sau negative, care subliniază caracterul circular şi conchid asupra inutilităţii lor. Consider că interpretarea conceptului de spaţiu, ca un tip anume de concept, ce are drept conţinut  şi obiect unic – intuiţia spaţială, permite aprecierea argumentelor drept clarificări ale notelor acestui concept. Această interpretare evită problemele cu care se confruntă exegeza tradiţională. Clarificările conceptelor nu fac altceva decât să expună notele sale. Ceea ce face ca argumentarea să pară circulară este confuzia dintre obiect şi conţinutul conceptului. Conceptul de spaţiu este a priori pentru că intuiţia de spaţiu este a priori, dar această intuiţie este de fapt obiectul conceptului, astfel că, o clarificare a conceptului de spaţiu este totuna cu o prezentare a notelor intuiţiei. Acelaşi este şi cazul conceptului de timp. Aceste argumente nu pot fi judecăţi sintetice, deci judecăţi care să fie temeiuri ale caracteristicilor acestor concepte, pentru că aceasta ar însemna ca ele să spună mai mult decât conţine subiectul, adică ar trebui să afirme despre intuiţie mai mult decât se ştie despre ea, ceea ce este absurd. Această interpretare a conceptului de spaţiu şi a argumentării Esteticii transcendentale evită obiecţiile aduse de Körner şi Strawson.

Al doilea tip de argumentare transcendentală este deducţia. Acest termen e folosit de Kant într-o manieră diferită de ceea ce se înţelege astăzi prin „deducţie”. Scopul şi strategia deducţiei transcendentale a categoriilor a generat multe controverse, ce pornesc de la paragraful 21 al Ediţiei B, numit de Viorel Colţescu „paragraful cezurii”. În tradiţia exegetică se pot identifica două direcţii. Prima interpretare, oferită de Adickes – Paton  consideră că paragrafele §§15 – 20 încheie deducţia validităţii obiective a categoriilor, iar paragrafele §§22 – 26 demonstrează condiţiile subiective ale aplicării categoriilor. A doua interpretare, oferită de Erdmann şi De Vleeschauwer consideră că până la paragraful §20 se demonstrează validitatea obiectivă a categoriilor „plecând de sus”, adică de la intelect, iar în paragrafele ultime se argumentează „plecând de jos”, adică de la sensibilitate. Aceste interpretări se confruntă cu numeroase probleme, dintre care pot fi menţionate două. Mai întâi, paragraful §21 anunţă explicit că prima parte este doar începutul deducţiei, apoi, argumentarea părţii secunde pornind „de jos”, adică de la senzaţie, nu îşi găseşte corespondenţa în textul Criticii. În capitolul al treilea am argumentat, pornind de la textul Criticii, că diferenţa dintre cele două părţi ale deducţiei este dată de semnificaţia diferită atribuită aprehensiunii. Astfel, întreaga argumentare anterioară paragrafului §21 constă în raportarea categoriilor la o conştiinţă empirică, indiferent de maniera în care este dată această aprehensiune, făcând deci abstracţie de modul în care diversul este dat[1]. În partea a doua se argumentează valabilitatea categoriilor cu privire la intuiţiile sensibile, adică raportate la o aprehensiune intuitivă sensibilă, spaţio-temporală. Raportarea categoriilor la intuiţia sensibilă este necesară pentru a le înfăţişa drept condiţii ale experienţei. Fără această argumentare, fiind doar condiţii ale unificării unui divers în genere, ele au valabilitate obiectivă, dar nu rezultă de aici că pot avea şi realitate obiectivă, cu alte cuvinte, nu rezultă că sunt constitutive unui obiect spaţio-temporal, adică unui lucru. Revenind la critica formală a argumentului transcendental, categoriile devin condiţii de posibilitate, adică surse necesare ale cunoaşterii, în măsura în care nu există alternative de a constitui cunoştinţe. Universul de discurs avut în vedere de Kant este dat de distincţia intelectului discursiv de cel intuitiv. Prin eliminarea posibilităţii celui din urmă, care presupune crearea obiectului simultan conceperii sale, categoriile rămân singura posibilitate de a ridica o judecată la nivelul de cunoştinţă, de unde rezultă şi necesitatea lor.

O particularitate aparte prezintă dovezile intelectului pur.  Ele nu fac decât să exemplifice şi să explice funcţionarea principiilor. Principiile intelectului pur nu au nevoie de o legitimare, adică de o deducţie transcendentală cum a fost cazul categoriilor, deoarece valabilitatea lor obiectivă şi adevărul lor rezultă din modul în care au fost deduse. Prin reflecţia asupra aplicării categoriilor la intuiţii, schemele transcendentale oferă premisele aflări principiilor, astfel încât, chiar dacă dovezile ce însoţesc principiile nu sunt convingătoare, judecăţile respective nu pierd nimic. Aceste principii sunt judecăţi absolut a priori, căci rezultă din forme care sunt la rândul lor a priori. Din această perspectivă, critica formală a argumentului transcendental nu atinge principiile intelectului pur. Se pot aduce însă obiecţii privind conţinutul acestor principii. Astfel, am încercat reconstruirea dovezii anticipaţiilor percepţiei prin identificarea gradului realului în obiectul transcendental, şi nu în senzaţie, pentru a evita în acest fel caracterul psihologic şi, deci, empiric, al formulării principiului.

Un alt principiu, care a generat multe interpretări este cel al cauzalităţii. L-am interpretat ca pe un principiu a priori universal, care condiţionează orice lege empirică, dar pe care nu o poate deduce în întregime. Cu alte cuvinte, pentru a spune că „orice lucru mecanic degajă căldură” trebuie ca principiul „orice schimbare să aibă o cauză” să fie adevărat şi să stea la baza acestuia, dar cunoscând numai principiul cauzalităţii nu se poate deriva nimic despre vreo legătură empirică. Este nevoie de „un semn al experienţei” pentru acest lucru, cum se exprimă Kant.

În încheiere, pot spune că argumentarea transcendentală, deşi întâmpină dificultăţi, poate fi susţinută, însă fiecare argument în parte trebuie considerat într-un context mai amplu, corelat cu celelalte elemente ale discursului kantian.



[1] „eu trebuie să fac abstracţie de modul cum este dat diversul pentru o intuiţie empirică”, [B144]

The capability of a computational system to deal with unexpected, changing situations and limited perception of the environment is becoming more a more relevant, in oder to make systems flexible and more reliable. Multi-agent Systems offer a computing paradigm where properties such as autonomy, adaptability or flexibility are basic in the construction of agent-based solutions. However most of current implementations are not flexible enough to cope with important changes in the environment or information loss. In this paper we propose to ...

Dans une perspective de clarification, cet article revient sur la liaison existant entre les concepts d'abduction et d'hypothèse. Il vise d'une part à préciser et établir la logique de l'inférence abductive en la replaçant dans la philosophie pragmatiste de Peirce à qui l'on en reconnaît d'ailleurs la paternité et, d'autre part, à démontrer la compatibilité des modes de raisonnement abductifs avec les outils tant qualitatifs que quantitatifs. Il s'agit donc de mener une réflexion épistémologique et méthodologique centrée sur l'oeuvre de Peirce pour en présenter sa pièce maitresse qu'est l'abduction et illustrer la fécondité de cette démarche à l'aide d'un exemple concret « doublement abductif » qui s'incarne dans l'analyse textuelle de 244 projets de collaboration technologique noués dans le cadre de l'initiative paneuropéenne Eurêka. Mots clés ABDUCTION, PIERCE, MÉTHODE, LOGIQUE

Our purpose in this paper is to propose the concept of "artificial Kansei/sensibility". In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has been the focus of many people, but here we propose the basic concept of "artificial Kansei/sensibility" as a superordinate concept of artificial intelligence (AI). AI is good at deductive and inductive reasoning. Deep learning and machine learning are often performed based on deductive or inductive reasoning. Furthermore, AI cannot deal with abduction. The concept of artificial Kansei/sensibility proposed in this paper provides a methodology that can handle abduction and transilient inference, so that our new concept will extend current AI technology to treat GAN(Generative Adversarial Networks) .

Our purpose in this paper is to propose the concept of "artificial Kansei/sensibility". In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has been the focus of many people, but here we propose the basic concept of "artificial Kansei/sensibility" as a superordinate concept of artificial intelligence (AI). AI is good at deductive and inductive reasoning. Deep learning and machine learning are often performed based on deductive or inductive reasoning. Furthermore, AI cannot deal with abduction. The concept of artificial Kansei/sensibility proposed in this paper provides a methodology that can handle abduction and transilient inference, so that our new concept will extend current AI technology to treat GAN(Generative Adversarial Networks) .

This text presents a thoughtful and nuanced exploration of how we understand and categorize phenomena in our world. It divides observable phenomena into four categories: Mechanistic, Contingent, Stochastic, and Super Random. Each category represents a different level of predictability and understandability, from the highly predictable and understandable (Mechanistic) to the completely unpredictable and inexplicable (Super Random). The author uses everyday examples, like the operation of a coffee maker, to illustrate these concepts, making the discussion relatable and clear. The text reflects on how these categories are not always mutually exclusive and how real-world situations often involve elements from multiple categories.

I show that James Joyce’s Ulysses makes use of “a department of knowledge belonging to the order of what is not as opposed to what is critical resolution at the empirical level.” John Deely discusses in his “Editorial Afterward” to Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot a discipline that is “ruled by intrinsic demands indifferent to subjectivity in its individual  (though not in its social) dimensions.” The discipline is one that “is grounded in the signifying wherein the here and now acquires coherence of structure, and what may be absent or non-existent becomes part of the texture of present experience.” It is one that is grounded in a “transcendence of the given distinguishing cognitive life from merely assimilative and physically bound processes of material individuality.” John Poinsot, or John of St. Thomas, O.P.,  born in 1589, studied subjects such as metaphysics, logic, epistemology, political philosophy, and ethics including those of Aristotle and Aquinas. Deely’s presentation of Poinsot’s semiotics opens a perspective wherein fiction or art, according to Joyce, can be a cognitive process rather than mimesis. Aristotle’s statement that “tekhne mimeitai ten physin” should be rewritten as “The artistic process is like the natural process,” according to Joyce in his aesthetic notebooks (1903-04). The next entry in Joyce’s notebook states that “the act of apprehension includes at least two activities—the activity of cognition or simple perception and the activity of recognition.” The most “complete” form of apprehension includes satisfaction. An aesthetic object “must be trebly ‘beautiful.’” He concludes, “the quality of beauty in itself must involve three constituents to encounter each of these three activities [of apprehension].” Joyce does not distinguish between life and art because they involve one another through satisfaction. I state that there is an overlap in Joyce’s rewrite of conventional aesthetic theory and Poinsot’s semiotics. I show how the three parts of Ulysses enact the three activities of apprehension, a process that is not based on mimesis. The first part has no awareness of itself as a completed work of art but is aware of itself as a part of a larger process, or larger whole. The second part of the novel has only an awareness of itself as an object, but not as a completed object [of art]. The third part of the novel is much like the third activity in apprehension, wherein the third encounters aspects of the first and second activities. In effect, Ulysses is like the “discipline” of Poinsot. It can be grounded and it can transcend itself and show the “apparent intersubjectivity of objects in discourse.”

Fitzhugh, K. 2014. Character mapping and cladogram comparison versus the requirement of total evidence: does it matter for polychaete systematics? Memoirs of Museum Victoria 71: 67-78. The practice of partitioning data for the inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses has become a routine practice in biological systematics. Two popular approaches: (i) mapping 'morphological' characters onto 'molecular' phylogenies, and (ii) comparing 'morphological' and 'molecular' phylogenies, are examined in light of what is known as the requirement of total evidence. Inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses, indeed all taxa, occur by a type of non-deductive reasoning known as abduction. The intent of abduction is to offer at least tentative causal accounts that explain character data. The rational acceptance of abductively derived hypotheses is subject to conditions of the requirement of total evidence as a matter of the evidential support for those hypotheses. It is shown that both character mapping and comparisons of cladograms using partitioned datasets are procedures that severely reduce the credibility of phylogenetic hypotheses. This problem is alleviated by acknowledging the formal structure of the why-questions we ask in relation to character data, for which phylogenetic hypotheses serve as answers.

We present a dynamic approach to Peirce's original construal of abductive logic as a logic of conjecture making, and provide a new decidable, contractionfree and cut-free proof system for the dynamic logic of abductive inferences with neighborhood semantics. Our formulation of the dynamic logic of abduction follows the philosophical and scientific track that led Peirce to his late, post-1903 characterization of abductive conclusions as investigands, namely invitations to investigate propositions conjectured at the level of pre-beliefs.

Patients in the Western world are presenting more and more complex cases, with an increase in many people having multiple longterm conditions. Most junior doctors are still trained in linear diagnostic models based on a person have one or two conditions rather than many interacting issues. The approach has not been adjusted for the changes in social issues, or to accommodate the different
way people communicate. To support trainee doctors develop the skills for treating patients with multiple long-term conditions,
Peninsula medical school developed a model of multimorbid communication to use for GPs/family doctors, known as SHERPA.
The SHERPA model of multimorbid consultation specifically stands for Sharing Evidence Routine for a Person-Centred Plan for Action. The framework is partly an extension of Sackett’s principles of clinical decision making in Evidence Based Medicine, but with
substantial emphasis on co-design and the facilitation of two-way conversations between doctor and patient. The SHERPA model
involves both verbal communication, as well as the creation of diagrams, mapping together key elements of the patient’s experience,
often used to help the patient plan their care through visualisation. In this paper, drawing from the works of Stjernfelt, I provide a
semiotic explanation of this consultation model, linking it to the iconic turn in semiotics, and expansion of the use of diagrams as
multimodal communication tools. We use semiotics to establish a mechanism for our medical communication model beyond an
understanding in purely clinical terms. It helped us describe the multiple modes of communication used in consultations

Robert Larmer and Alvin Plantinga have argued that modern physics is compatible with the idea that the physical universe is open to God's supernatural action and that such action would not involve any violation of laws of nature. Thus, they have concluded that supernatural miracles are compatible with modern science. I argue that their line of reasoning is based on an incorrect interpretation of conservation laws and that supernatural miracles would involve violations of laws of nature.

Orte of the challenges Kuhn's work poses to philosophy of science concems the insight that theory-choice and, accordingly, theory-change is governed by a more complex and subtle procedure than anticipated. In particular, this procedure is claimed to inevitably and justifiedly leave room for individual preferences so that theory-choice fails to be determined unambiguously by criteria with epistemic bearing. This methodological uncertainty can be labeled as Kuhn-underdetermination. Unlike Duhem-Quine underdetermination, it does not require empirical equivalence but rather refers to a situation in which alternative theories have their strengths and faults in different areas and in different respects so that no clear overall picture emerges. Overarching methodological theories can be construed as attempts to overcome the limits set by Kuhn underdetermination. In this perspective, theories like Lakatosianism and Bayesianism provide mies for epistemic judgments that are intended to make a clear evaluation of the credentials of rivaling scientific theories possible. The two methodological theories are supposed to serve as guidelines for methodological judgment or at least to explain with hindsight why a particular theory was picked. However, an closer scrutiny the two methodological theories founder in this tack of accounting for theory choice decisions. The criteria of excellence they specify are kable to uncertainties of the saure sort as the more traditional virtues they are intended to replace. The paper proposes an alternative picture: methodological theories suggest general maxims and mies that guide the confirmation process rather than provide criteria for specific theorychoice decisions. Methodological theories serve to connect and unify such maxims and rules. Traditionally, lists of methodological virtues are drawn up ad hoc. One could easily add further criteria or delete others. By contrast, methodological theories provide a coherent approach to appreciating scientific theories and comparing their explanatory achievements. And they give a rationale for why these rules rather than others deserve to be preferred.

This paper discusess how management of technology can be made more critical and a new method of reasoning is incorporated into this dicsipline to stimulate more widely application. Management of technology is found as a discipline that practitioners or academics need to have in order to be able to manage and improve technology. It relies on two streams of reasoning called deduction and induction. These two reasoning methods tends to neglect the human need to make sense and therefore fails to stimulate critical ...

We present a dynamic approach to Peirce's original construal of abductive logic as a logic of conjecture making, and provide a new decidable, contractionfree and cut-free proof system for the dynamic logic of abductive inferences with neighborhood semantics. Our formulation of the dynamic logic of abduction follows the philosophical and scientific track that led Peirce to his late, post-1903 characterization of abductive conclusions as investigands, namely invitations to investigate propositions conjectured at the level of pre-beliefs.

Bayesian theory now incorporates a vast body of mathematica l, statistical and computational techniques that are widely applied in a panop ly of disciplines, from artificial intelligence to zoology. Yet Bayesians rarely ag ree on the basics, even on the question of what Bayesianism actually is. This book is about the basics — about the opportunities, questions and problems that face B y sianism today. So what is Bayesianism, roughly? Most Bayesians maintain th t an individual’s degrees of belief ought to obey the axioms of the probability calculus. If, for example, you believe to degree 0.4 that you will be rained on tomorrow, then you should also believe that you will not be rained on tomorrow to degree0.6. Most Bayesians also maintain that an individual’s degrees of bel ief should take prior knowledge and beliefs into account. According to the Bayesian conditionalisation principle, if you come to learn that you will be in Manchester tomorrow (m) then your degree of belief in being...

Theory-generating abductions introduce new (theoretical) concepts into their conclusion. This form of abduction underlies all uncertain inferences from (singular or general) empirical facts to theoretical hypotheses that explain these facts by unobserved or unobservable entities and properties, expressed by theoretical concepts. Theory-generating abductions are discriminated from speculative postfacto abductions by two scientific rationality criteria: unification and independent testability. A particularly important form of theory-generating abductions in science is common cause abductions that explain correlated empirical dispositions in terms of common theoretical causes. These abductions play also an important

This piece of work would never have emerged in its present form, were it not for the support of many. In particular, I want to thank my love Nel, for being there and complementing me; my daughter Ada for bringing her liveliness into our home: her look on the world was and is a constant inspiration; my supervisor Joke for allowing me to pursue my own path in these muddy waters; my co-supervisor Bert for his detailed and constructive remarks on every part of this thesis; the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science for giving me a four years grant; its current and former employees for their many useful comments and ideas over the years; my friends, they mean more to me than they realize; and finally, the world itself, for being such an intriguing and fascinating place to dwell in.

En la actualidad el análisis científico de las cuestiones probatorias se centra en la etapa jurisdiccional… ofrecimiento, admisión, valoración, estándares de prueba son algunos de los temas más tratados en la literatura respectiva, sin embargo, se advierte poca producción respecto del razonamiento probatorio en la etapa preliminar del proceso penal, la investigación. Un proceso penal se diferencia de otros en la medida en que conlleva una fase previa a la postulatoria que sirve para establecer la pretensión punitiva del Estado. En el presente trabajo se propone la implementación de una herramienta metodológica que conlleva en una mejor medida salvaguardar el fin primigenio de la investigación, el esclarecimiento del hecho. Abordar la investigación desde la perspectiva del razonamiento abductivo implica desarrollar la misma asumiendo el razonamiento probatorio desde estos momentos iniciales.

was the greatest of our American philosophers, the parent of our country's distinct contribution to philosophy: pragmatism. A great scientist, a master logician, what captured my interest was his understanding of creativity. He provided it with its own logic. Normally we associate logic with induction and deduction, both of which he deepened our understanding of, but there is a preconceptual moment, an intuitive insight in the advance of knowledge, a leap which these traditional logical forms fail to capture. Peirce called it abduction, and articulated its logic.

In this lecture, first I discuss general aspects of qualitative projects: project planning, thereafter the traditional workspace for hermeneutic textual analysis as a blueprint for software systems such as ATLAS.ti. The last part discusses grounded theory as a comprehensive strategy for the discovery of new theories.

This chapter (Ch. 9) addresses noetic contemplation through Coleridge’s higher logic, or rather ‘Noetic’, of the ‘tetrad’, relating absolutes (the Trinity, reality, being, the good, etc.), and his pentad, relating non-absolutes (human institutions, natural powers, and phenomena).

Section 9.1 argues that these forms ‘tautegorically’ represent Coleridge’s metaphysics and compares these forms to C. S. Peirce’s ‘abductive’ logic.

Section 9.2 discusses Coleridge’s historical sources, mainly Schelling and other Naturphilosophen.

Section 9.3 argues that Coleridge crucially differs from Schelling here with a divergent conception of the indifference-point, or Coleridgean mesothesis, and its relation to the Absolute.

Section 9.4 illuminates Coleridge’s neglected distinction between his tetracti, which are always and entirely noetic, constellating absolutes (ideas or powers), and his pentads, which are either noetic, containing an absolute term, or logical, constellating only non-absolutes.

Section 9.5 pauses for transitional remarks before the pentads are interpreted in Chapter 10 with respect to the humane value of contemplation and the realization of ideas.

Modern explainable AI (XAI) methods remain far from providing human-like answers to ‘why’ questions, let alone those that satisfactorily agree with human-level understanding. Instead, the results that such methods provide boil down to sets of causal attributions. Currently, the choice of accepted attributions rests largely, if not solely, on the explainee’s understanding of the quality of explanations. The paper argues that such decisions may be transferred from a human to an XAI agent, provided that its machine-learning (ML) algorithms perform genuinely abductive inferences. The paper outlines the key predicament in the current inductive paradigm of ML and the associated XAI techniques, and sketches the desiderata for a truly participatory, second-generation XAI, which is endowed with abduction.

Abductive conclusions are drawn in a special, co-hortative mood (Peirce’s ‘investigand’). Abductive conclusions are representative interpretants that represent abduction (or retroduction) as a form of reasoning that can convey a general conception of the truth. The truth is not asserted; abduction merely delivers the idea of a matter of course, rendering that idea comparatively simple and natural, hence assuring us of its justified assertibility. Hence abductive reasoning is at home in addressing ‘How Possible’-questions in science. Abductive reasoning concerns the question of how things might, could or would conceivably be such that they can be plausibly asserted. Peirce took all reasoning to be diagrammatic and representable using the graphical method of logic. Yet no examples have previously been found in his large manuscript corpus of what such non-deductive graphs might look like. This paper proposes a new interpretation of a sole exception, a sketch of two graphs from a reject...

Abstract: New users learning to use text-processing systems, especially those who are using self-study materials without expert supervision, must often make sense of actions and events in situations where they have little basis, in prior knowledge or current information, for ...

The current generation has a series of technological tools that facilitate multivariate analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, inferring using inductive and deductive methods interchangeably, that is, applying the abductive method to propose solutions to transgenerational problems is a responsibility of the Anthropocene era, responsibility inescapable.

While in his Science of Logic, Hegel employed neither diagrams nor formulae, his reinterpretation of Aristotle’s syllogistic logic in the “Subjective Logic” of Book III strongly suggests a diagrammatic dimension. Significantly, an early diagram depicting a “triangle of triangles” found among his papers after his death captures the organization of categories to be found in The Science of Logic. Features of this diagram help us understand Hegel’s logical project as an attempt to retrieve features of Plato’s thinking that are implicit within Aristotle’s syllogistic logic. It is argued that parallels between Hegel’s modification of Aristotle’s syllogistic figures and Peirce’s functional alignment of those syllogistic figures with his three inference forms—deduction, induction, and abduction—suggest modifications of the traditional “square of opposition” into a logical hexagon as found in recent discussions. However, Hegel had conceived of Aristotle’s syllogism as a distorted version of the “syllogism” thought by Plato to bind the parts of the cosmos into a unity as described in the dialogue Timaeus. In accord with this, it is argued that seen in the light of Hegel’s platonistic reconstruction of Aristotle’s logic, such logical hexagons should be understood as two-dimensional projections of a logical polyhedron.

In this paper I aim to defend a twofold thesis. On one hand, I will support, against Perini [7], the indispensability of diagrams when structurally complex biomolecules are concerned, since it is not possible to satisfactorily use linguisticsentential representations at that domain. On the other hand, even when diagrams are dispensable I will defend than they will generally be more effective than other representations in encoding biomolecular knowledge, relying on Kulvicki-Shimojima's diagrammatic effectiveness thesis [4][11]. Finally, I will ground many epistemic virtues of biomolecular diagrams (understandability, explanatory power, prediction and hypothesis evaluation) on their cognitive-computational indispensability and their semantic-epistemic effectiveness.

We advance efforts to explicate and improve inference in qualitative research that iterates between theory development, data collection, and data analysis, rather than proceeding linearly from hypothesizing to testing. We draw on the school of Bayesian “probability as extended logic,” where probabilities represent rational degrees of belief in propositions given limited information, to provide a solid foundation for iterative research that has been lacking in the qualitative methods literature. We argue that mechanisms for distinguishing exploratory from confirmatory stages of analysis that have been suggested in the context of APSA’s DA-RT transparency initiative are unnecessary for qualitative research that is guided by logical Bayesianism, because new evidence has no special status relative to old evidence for testing hypotheses within this inferential framework. Bayesian probability not only fits naturally with how we intuitively move back and forth between theory and data, but ...

Peirce regards mathematics as an informative science capable of really increasing our knowledge. This means that mathematics is not limited to conceptual analysis but possesses a real object of investigation. The core of Peirce's view of mathematics is that mathematical reasoning is not developed through general concepts alone but deals with an unavoidable element of individuality. The conclusion of a deductive inference can contain information that is not at all present in its premises and can only come into being through concrete work on the part of the mathematician. Peirce describes this work as observation and experimentation on individual diagrams. While the idea of an individual element in mathematics is already present in Kant (and can also be traced back to Aristotle), the different location Peirce assigns it attests to a marked difference in their conceptions, the basis of which lies in the difference between Kant and Peirce in categorial analysis. Peirce's semiotic approach to mathematics involves a shift from the plane of the object denoted to that of the sign itself. This holds true for geometric as well as algebraic inferences, which Peirce can equate in this respect. In both cases, the individual element of mathematics is thus to be found within the diagram itself with no reference to the object denoted. While the diagram is in any case a token, this cannot explain its essential individuality, to which end the indexical juxtaposition of its parts should be examined.

Peirce regards mathematics as an informative science capable of really increasing our knowledge. This means that mathematics is not limited to conceptual analysis but possesses a real object of investigation. The core of Peirce's view of mathematics is that mathematical reasoning is not developed through general concepts alone but deals with an unavoidable element of individuality. The conclusion of a deductive inference can contain information that is not at all present in its premises and can only come into being through concrete work on the part of the mathematician. Peirce describes this work as observation and experimentation on individual diagrams. While the idea of an individual element in mathematics is already present in Kant (and can also be traced back to Aristotle), the different location Peirce assigns it attests to a marked difference in their conceptions, the basis of which lies in the difference between Kant and Peirce in categorial analysis. Peirce's semiotic approach to mathematics involves a shift from the plane of the object denoted to that of the sign itself. This holds true for geometric as well as algebraic inferences, which Peirce can equate in this respect. In both cases, the individual element of mathematics is thus to be found within the diagram itself with no reference to the object denoted. While the diagram is in any case a token, this cannot explain its essential individuality, to which end the indexical juxtaposition of its parts should be examined.

Éthique de l'indice dans le récit d'énigme « De la trace au tracé » : cette formule lapidaire, que j'emprunte à la critique Annie Combes, retrace elle-même, toute en esquisse, la démarche que se donne le récit d'énigme classique. Au commencement était la trace, véridique ou mensongère, fortuite ou délibérée, laissée par l'Autre du crime-victime, suspect ou coupable. On connaît ses déclinaisons, classiques au point qu'elles ont été largement pastichées : l'incontournable empreinte de pas, la cendre de cigarettes, la bribe de papier où se laisse lire un message incomplet... Parfois, pourtant, elles se font plus subtiles, telle la trace in absentia, dont la disparition constitue en soi un fléchage : c'est le célèbre dialogue entre Sherlock Holmes et Watson sur le chien de garde qui n'a pas aboyé pendant la nuit du crime et dont le silence titille l'oreille de Holmes 1. La trace serait donc ce « petit rien », ce déchet du geste criminel, éraflant à peine l'ordre des choses sur la scène du crime, mais que le grand détective est capable de ressaisir et de porter à la dignité du signe. Ce faisant, comme l'a démontré Carlo Ginzburg dans son essai séminal, « Signes, traces, pistes » 2 , il confère à l'insignifiant une portée intellectuelle, heuristique ; penser la trace doit permettre d'énoncer en dernier lieu une vérité sur le réel qu'elle a aidé à reconstituer. Dans cette visée herméneutique, la trace, comme le fragment romantique, fait signe vers une totalité absente, mais qu'il est possible de refaire surgir du néant. Pour autant, une certaine tension demeure entre la trace et le tracé, la manifestation première concrète et son devenir-indice dans la lecture à laquelle procède le détective. Sans l'intervention de ce dernier, qui la

A proposta deste breve texto é apresentar de forma clara as teses gerais do artigo “Defending Abduction” de Ilka Niiniluoto, publicado na Philosophy of Science em 1999. Em geral, é possível sintetizar que Niiniluoto buscou apresentar uma conceitualização e sistematização do conceito de abdução na história da filosofia a partir da obra de Charles S. Peirce, indicando convergências e desenvolvimentos filosóficos. No presente artigo busco apresentar o contexto em que o texto do autor se insere, bem como os tópicos trabalhados pelo filósofo e sua interessante forma de abordagem analítica. Por fim, na conclusão, indico alguns possíveis desdobramentos e críticas pertinentes ao texto de Niiniluoto, sobretudo quanto a identificação entre o raciocínio abdutivo e o argumento da inferência da melhor explicação de Gilbert Harman, além da tese advogada por Niiniluoto, inspirado por Peirce, a respeito do caráter evolutivo da ciência como algo natural graças aos nossos instintos animais inatos.

We start from the premise that the retroductive mode of reasoning is not well understood in the theorizing and research process. Retroduction and abduction, less well known and rarely acknowledged in scientific contributions, stems from our perception that advances in sciences are not limited to deductive and inductive reasoning alone, but that retroductive and abductive reasoning equally contribute to acquisition of knowledge in the research process. Our contribution is linked to a caveat linked to Kuhnian thinking) that: knowledge is time-constrained, and that as paradigms are overthrown, the theoretical landscape reshapes to reify new knowledge claims anchored on newer grand, middle and subsequently, substantive theories relevant to a researcher's context (discipline, research setting). We limit our contribution in improving research practice to epistemological concerns and how individual researchers can better improve how they conceptualize research problems and develop theory through retroduction and abduction. We link our contribution to the epistemological arena, since the general understanding of how scientists reason and formulate explanations is still surprisingly limited, yet prescriptions for methodological rigor are the norm and essential in research.

Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.

Corroboration or confirmation is a prominent philosophical debate of the 20th century. Many philosophers have been involved in this debate most notably the proponents of confirmation led by Hempel and its most powerful criticism by the falsificationists led by Popper. In both cases however the debates were primarily based on the arguments from logic. In this paper we review these debates and suggest that a different perspective on falsification versus confirmation can be taken by grounding arguments in cognitive psychology.