4th Amendment Rights

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is a legal principle in criminal li4ga4on that prohibits evidence obtained through illegal means or in contraven4on of law from being admissible in court as evidence. The doctrine is based on the idea that evidence obtained or derived via improper means such as an illegal search, seizure, illegal wiretap, torture, is tainted, hence inadmissible in court. It primarily discourages law enforcement agencies from using illegal methods of gathering evidence and as well safeguard the fundamental right of people. The admissibility of illegally obtained evidence is subject to the applicable prac4ce in different jurisdic4ons based on their legal systems. For this piece, will be considering United States, United Kingdom, China, and Nigeria.

Surveillance methods in the United States operate under the general principle that "use precedes regulation." While the general principle of "use precedes regulation" is widely understood, its societal costs have yet to be fully realized. In the period between "initial use" and "regulation," government actors can utilize harmful investigative techniques with relative impunity. Assuming a given technique is ultimately subjected to regulation, its preregulation uses are practically exempted from any such regulation due to qualified immunity (for the actor) and the exclusionary rule's good faith exception (for any resulting evidence). This expectation of impunity invites strategic government actors to make frequent and arbitrary uses of harmful investigative techniques during preregulation periods. Regulatory delays tend to run long (often a decade or more) and are attributable in no small part to the stalling methods of law enforcement (through assertions of privilege, deceptive funding requests, and strategic sequencing of criminal investigations). While the societal costs of regulatory delay are high, rising, and difficult to control, the conventional efforts to shorten regulatory delays (through expedited legislation and broader rules of Article III standing) have proved ineffective. This Article introduces an alternative method to control the costs of regulatory delay: locating rights to be "protected" and "free from fear" in the "to be secure" text of the Fourth Amendment. Courts and most commentators interpret the Fourth Amendment to safeguard a mere right to be "spared" unreasonable searches and seizures. A study of the "to be secure" text, however, suggests that the Amendment can be read more broadly: to guarantee a right to be "protected" against unreasonable searches and seizures, and possibly a right to be "free from fear" against such government action. Support for these broad readings of "to be secure" is found in the original meaning of "secure," the Amendment's structure, and founding-era discourse regarding searches and seizures. The rights to be "protected" and "free from fear" can be adequately safeguarded by a judicially-created rule against government "adoption" of an investigative method that constitutes an unregulated and unreasonable search or seizure. The upshot of this Fourth Amendment rule against "adoption" is earlier standing to challenge the constitutionality of concealed investigative techniques. Earlier access to courts invites earlier judicial regulation, which, in turn, helps curb the rising costs of regulatory delay.

This brief explains how the certiorari system used by the U.S. Supreme Court to deny about 99% of the petitions is unconstitutional because the Judges Act of 1925 violates Article III, the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

* LLB (Hons) (Nigeria); BL (Nigeria); LLM (Dalhousie); LLM (Calgary); PhD Candidate at the Marine and Shipping Law Unit, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. This article is an expanded adaptation of my research paper in the Graduate Seminar in Legal Theory course at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law. My instructors for this paper were Professors Sara Bagg and Greg Janzen. I am grateful to the Adelaide Law Review editorial team.

Atty. Debra Brown presented her argument for certiorari squarely before the Supreme Court of the United States. Her presented question, "Whether FNMA as an instrumentality of the U.S. Government and/or state government can take private citizens' property without due process of law constituting a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution..." was docketed 9/27/23. Response due 10/27/23.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution functions as a shield against excess governmental or police power by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Since its ratification, legal challenges have tempered this shield by frequently disputing the application of investigative processes and tools, including those that bypass the traditionaland simpleranalysis that focused on physical trespass. But recent technological advancements have prompted novel challenges and have forced the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt a parallel inquiry that evaluates society's expectations of privacy as an alternate path to invoke the Fourth Amendment's protections apart from any physical trespass. As revolutionary technology continues to present unique issues, this 200-year-old shield manifests a reflective luster as if polished by years of legal discourse that reveals the priorities of those who would interpret its text. Viewing the Fourth Amendment's shield as a mirror illustrates not only the thoughts of the drafters that revolved primarily around protecting property interests but also the expectations of modern society with its insistence on promoting privacy. And where the drafters channeled their outrage against the loathsome writs of assistance in colonial times, later Americans continued to denounce the similarly invasive general warrants and attempts by investigators to expand the tools in their arsenal beyond constitutional bounds, especially in the surveillance context. Yet, the problems posed by new technology upon privacy concerns are best resolved by relying on the core principles supporting the Fourth Amendment, previous U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and current societal perspectives regarding privacy as a top priority proven by recently enacted legislation both foreign and domestic. By applying a similar method to address advancing communication technology and its use as a surveillance tool in Carpenter v. United States, the Court turned this shield-becomemirror upon society to conclude that cell phone location information deserves Fourth Amendment protection because of its untiring comprehensiveness and its uniquely detailed nature. Moreover, nearly every American adult carries a cell phone with them almost all the time, making it possible to create a timestamped map of any cell-phone-carrying-individual's movements KEYWORDS

This case was originally assigned to the Rhode Island Federal District Court of Criminal Appeals; where on January 16, 2015, Judge Woodstock dismissed Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.  The Appellant, Peter Griffin, (“hereinafter, Appellant”) was convicted of two counts of production of obscene materials containing child pornography, the depiction of obscene material of a person under 17 years of age, in violation of § 18 U.S.C. § 2252- Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors (Possession, distribution and receipt of child pornography)18 U.S.C. § 2252A- certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography. 
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress on the grounds that Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police conducted a warrantless search of his premise/apartment without his consent.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Herring v. United States authorizes police to defeat the Fourth Amendment’s protections through a process we call evidence laundering. Evidence laundering occurs when one police officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. When courts admit the evidence based on the good faith of the second officer, the original constitutional taint disappears in the wash. In the years since Herring was decided, courts have allowed evidence laundering in a variety of contexts, from cases involving flawed databases to cases stemming from faulty judgments and communication lapses in law enforcement teams. Courts typically zero in on individual officer behavior, or limit their review to a single incident rather than considering the entire course of conduct. In so doing, they have taken the concept of good faith...

Data breach: a double-edged sword infringing both, the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial with reference to admissibility of illegally obtained evidence Post the landmark judgement in Dobbs v. Jackson that overturned the famous Roe v. Wade judgement of 1973, legal issues surrounding 'data breach' and admissibility of 'illegally obtained' evidence arise. This article aims at examining if evidence obtained from leaked data, or data breach should be admissible in criminal proceedings and how it will affect the accused's rights to a fair trial. To that end, the article will analyse how data breach is violative of the right to privacy, and how, such data breach results in digital information being used as evidence that is obtained illegally.

In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Arizona v. Gant, lower courts continue to debate whether Gant represents an overhaul of the search incident to arrest doctrine or is instead a minor tweak. This Note argues that the answer lies somewhere in the middle. It proposes that courts conduct a more searching inquiry into whether an arrestee has a reasonable possibility of access to the area searched at the time of the search, rather than apply the more lenient standard that some courts have adopted. This middle ground is more faithful to the policy considerations underpinning the search incident to arrest doctrine, while additionally providing the proper balance between officer safety and defendants' rights.

This paper contributes to the discussion on effective regulation of facial recognition technologies (FRT) in public spaces. In response to the growing universalization of FRT in the United States and Europe as merely intrusive technology, we propose to distinguish scenarios in which the ethical and social risks of using FRT are unattainable from other scenarios in which FRT can be adjusted to improve our everyday lives. We suggest that the general ban of FRT technologies in public spaces is not an inevitable solution. Instead, we advocate for a risk-based approach with emphasis on different use-cases that weighs moral risks and identifies appropriate countermeasures. We introduce four use-cases that focus on presence of FRT on entrances to public spaces (1) Checking identities in airports (2) Authorisation to enter office buildings (3) Checking visitors in stadiums (4) Monitoring passers-by on open streets, to illustrate the diverse ethical and social concerns and possible responses to them. Based on the different levels of ethical and societal risks and applicability of respective countermeasures, we call for a distinction of public spaces between semi-open public spaces and open public spaces. We suggest that this distinction of public spaces could not only be helpful in more effective regulation and assessment of FRT in public spaces, but also that the knowledge of different risks and countermeasures will lead to better transparency and public awareness of FRT in diverse scenarios.

Concebida no direito americano, a teoria da inadmissibilidade das provas obtidas por meios ilícitos foi incorporada no direito brasileiro por obra da jurisprudência. Diante disso, a evolução história mostrou certa instabilidade quanto à extensão da aplicação da teoria. Na recente Reforma do Código de Processo Penal, a matéria foi finalmente legislada no artigo 157, com a previsão da vedação do uso das provas obtidas por meios ilícitos e das provas ilícitas por derivação, com as exceções previstas no próprio preceito. No geral, consolidou-se na lei a jurisprudência mais recente do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) sobre a matéria. Palavras-chave: Provas ilícitas. Reforma. Código de Processo Penal. 1 INTRODUÇÃO Em 15 de dezembro de 2004, poucos dias após a aprovação da Reforma do Poder Judiciário por meio da Emenda Constitucional nº 45/2004, reuniram-se no Palácio do Planalto os chefes dos três Poderes para firmarem o Pacto de Estado em favor de um Judiciário mais rápido e republicano, por meio do qual foi selado um compromisso institucional em torno de algumas medidas prioritárias para aprimoramento do sistema judicial e, em especial, da prestação jurisdicional oferecida no Brasil. O documento trazia ainda um pacote de projetos de lei tidos como prioritários dentro do objetivo de reformar o Judiciário, tornando-o mais ágil e mais aberto à sociedade. Eram projetos que viabilizavam mudanças de paradigmas profundos na legislação  Doutorando em Direito Penal (UFPE). Mestre em Direito Constitucional (UFRN). Especialista em Direito Tributário (IBET). Professor da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Juiz Federal da 3ª Vara da Seção Judiciária do Rio Grande do Norte. Membro do Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Rio Grande do Norte (TRE/RN). Membro do Conselho Científico da Revista FIDES.

This publication (the Manual) is the third edition of "Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations" and updates the previous version published in September 2002. During this sevenyear period, case law related to electronic evidence has developed significantly. Of particular note has been the development of topics such as the procedures for warrants used to search and seize computers, the procedures for obtaining cell phone location information, and the procedures for the compelled disclosure of the content of electronic communications. In addition, as possession of electronic devices has become the norm, courts have had the opportunity in a large number of cases to address questions such as the application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to electronic devices. Nathan Judish took primary responsibility for the revisions in this Manual, under the supervision of Richard Downing. Tim O'Shea and Jared Strauss took responsibility for revising Chapters 1 and 5, Josh Goldfoot for revising Chapter 2, Michelle Kane for revising Chapter 3, and Jenny Ellickson for revising Chapter 4. Scott Eltringham provided critical support to the editing and publishing of this Manual. Further assistance was provided by (in alphabetical order

Although the use of torture and other illegal means to gather evidence was prohibited in China in 1979, legislators did not begin to embrace exclusionary rules until the turn of the 21st century. However, this legislative promise has yet to be fulfilled in practice as few defendants request that illegally obtained evidence be excluded and even fewer judges approve such requests. Even if such a request is granted by the court, it remains highly unlikely that the outcome of the case will change. Such discrepancies between legislative endeavors and judicial practice might suggest that torture and other illegal means of acquiring evidence are not routine practice in China, that the Chinese culture tends to trust the government and to prefer substantive truth over procedural fairness, and places public interest above individual interests. As a result, the future of China's exclusionary rules will depend upon transformation of China's legal culture in addition to practical application of the corresponding changes to the law. As an effective measure to defer police wrongdoings, exclusion of illegal evidence in criminal procedure, ever since articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Mapp versus Ohio, 1 has emerged to be a core institution in any regime with genuine rule of law. The People's Republic of China (China), with the longest uninterrupted legal history in the world, has a legal legacy of obtaining evidence by coercive measures, and nowhere in its 2,000-year-plus documented history has seen the practice of excluding such evidence. After the Communist Party initiated the "Open-up and Reform" policy in late 1970s and endeavored to embrace universal principles and institutions of rule of law and human rights protection, legal academia

German criminal procedure law places great emphasis upon judgements made pursuant to the "substantive truth." Therefore, exclusion of evidence tends to be an anomaly as it compels the trial court to disregard certain evidence, which implies that the court must base its judgement on something less than the whole truth. German law does provide for the exclusion of evidence in some situations, but its effect is limited to preventing the trial court from explicitly relying on the inadmissible evidence as a basis for the judgement. That said, in most cases the judges nevertheless remain aware of the excluded evidence. Under German law there is absolute protection of conversations between individuals in intimate relationships as a result of the protection of core privacy. If such conversations are captured and stored during surveillance they cannot be used unless related to past or future crimes. If evidence is obtained by violating this law, the approach of most German courts is to weigh the individual privacy interests against the interests of the justice system in having access to all available information. If the violation was intentional, however, the evidence is typically excluded. Section 136a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides that statements obtained through the use of prohibited means of interrogation, such as force, threats, and illicit promises, cannot be used as evidence.

Reasonable expectation of privacy is discussed in the context of searches conducted without the warrants usually required by the Fourth Amendment but with the consent of a third party, who is not the target of the search. Case law on this issue is neither consistent nor clear-cut. Psychological theory and research clarify this issue by establishing closer correspondence between legal concepts and assumptions and individuals' actual behaviors and social expectations. The key legal components of reasonable expectation of privacy are delineated, with regard to third-party consent: "common authority" areas versus "exclusive use" areas and the assumption of risk doctrine. Next, the psychological theory and research on interpersonal relations and human territorial functioning are reviewed as they relate to the legal components of privacy regulation. Taken together, the legal criticisms of this warrant exception category, and possible discrepancies between the legal assumptions concerning interpersonal and territorial functioning among co-residents and the actual behaviors and expectations suggested by psychological theory and research, raise questions about its validity. This article discusses legal perceptions of reasonable expectation of privacy in third-party consent searches. We begin with a review of the legal assumptions concerning privacy expectations in third-party consent searches. In the next section, after considering some of the major court decisions concerning key components of reasonable expectation of privacy, we review the psychological theory and research on interpersonal relations and human territorial functioning as they * Portions of this article were presented in a symposium at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York City, August 1987. We thank Carol M. Wemer and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft. Requests for reprints and other correspondence should be sent to Dorothy Kagehiro,

College. Many thanks to Professor Elizabeth Boals for her valuable insights and guidance throughout the writing and editing processes. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of the staff of the American University Law Review. Finally, I am most grateful to my parents and Emma for their boundless support and encouragement.

Homeowners across the United States are fighting U.S. Bank and their attempts to steal homeowner properties using thousands of fraudulent Trusts overseas in the Cayman Islands. This is the case of an American Homeowner opposing a motion to dismiss filed by Locke Lord, Llp., Attorneys in California claiming to represent the U.S. Bank acting as a Trustee for this LSF9 Master Participation Trust and their alleged servicers Caliber Home Loan, Inc.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Herring v. United States authorizes
police to defeat the Fourth Amendment’s protections through a process we
call evidence laundering. Evidence laundering occurs when one police
officer makes a constitutional mistake when gathering evidence and then
passes that evidence along to a second officer, who develops it further and
then delivers it to prosecutors for use in a criminal case. The original
constitutional taint disappears in the wash.

Courts have allowed evidence laundering in a variety of contexts, from
cases involving flawed databases to cases stemming from faulty judgments
and communication lapses in law enforcement teams. Courts typically zero
in on individual officer behavior, or limit their review to a single incident,
rather than considering the entire course of conduct. In so doing, they make
visible the individualistic view of police work that is implicit in much of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. This atomistic perspective, however, fails to
appreciate the realities of modern policing, which depends heavily on
teamwork and delegation. At the same time, the increased emphasis on
police intentions and on balancing the costs and benefits of exclusion
brings our courts into closer alignment with courts elsewhere in the world.

The general conversation today about the USA PATRIOT Act and its historical and legal significance must be contextualized with reference to a series of 1970s U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the U.S. Border Patrol that directly undergird the PATRIOT Act. The Supreme Court long ago turned the U.S. borderlands adjoining Mexico into a permanent racial camp, and the borderlands is the "home," as it were, of the permanent state of legal, racial exceptionalism. This problem must be theorized as structural in nature, rather than historical or contingent, in order to confront the matter of exceptional sovereignty at its constitutional foundations. Readings of the Supreme Court decisions regarding Japanese American internment and of Charles Mills's Racial Contract provide a context for the elaboration of this problem. A final reflection on José Antonio Burciaga's poem "Green Nightmares" suggests an idea for justice at the limit of sovereign authority that must be relentlessly exposed in order to begin to imagine a future deracialized polity.

The importance of evidence in every trial cannot be overemphasized. Human right is no less important. However, the two, evidence and human rights co-exist during trials in law courts. Hence, the relationship. The relationship is apparent when the process through which a piece of evidence came to be, tramples upon a given human right. For instance, the process of obtaining a material piece of evidence by the police, school administrators or even individuals, etc., through search and seizure often tramples upon the human right to privacy guaranteed under the constitution of most 21 st century democracies. While some of those democracies have taken steps under their laws to as much as possible limit the apparent clash, especially as it relates to the admissibility of these evidence obtainable by trampling upon human rights, some have done very little or nothing. Here, U.S.A. and Nigeria are comparable. This paper therefore, attempts to inquire into the laws of the two democracies, particularly relating to the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence with a view to arguing that while U.S.A. has taken steps under its law of evidence to reconcile the apparent clash between the process of obtaining evidence and human right to privacy, Nigerian laws have not only neglected to take any step but infact, encourages the clash. This paper adopts the method of legal deduction and philosophical argumentation as its tools of presentation.

China  has  introduced  exclusionary  rules  in  the  2012  Criminal  Procedure  Law  (CPL)  by  means  of  new  justice  reforms.  Some  reformers hold that China protects and ensures the accused’s rights to  remain  silent  or  privilege  against  self-incrimination,  based  on  the  new  rule  of  excluding  illegally  obtained  evidence  in  the  CPL.  Differently,  some  argue  against  them  that  China  cannot  actually  exclude  all  forms  of  illegally  obtained  evidence,  particularly  evidence  extorted  through  undue  pressure  or  coercion,  which  is  at  the  core  of  reasons  leading  to  injustices  in  practice.  It  is  very  necessary for more reformers to focus on such evidence from a new perspective of undue coercion, in order to fill in the gap between the above actual needs and legal requirements.

This is the case brief my partner and I wrote for the Carpenter v. United States Supreme Court case for our American Constitutional Law class. We wrote this brief on behalf of the petitioner, Timothy Carpenter. The relevant question presented is whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment. We argue that the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to consider how the third-party doctrine should not aply to cellphones and records detailing CSLI. In other words, we argue that pre-digital cases pertaining to the third-party doctrine do not govern this case. We also assert that seizing or searching cell site location information (CSLI) is unreasonable without a warrant.

Courts and most commentators interpret the Fourth Amendment to safeguard a mere right to be “spared” unreasonable searches and seizures. A study of the amendment's “to be secure” text suggests it can be read more broadly: to guarantee a right to be “protected” against unreasonable searches and seizures, and possibly a right to be “free from fear” against such government action. Support for these broader readings is found in the original meaning of “secure,” the amendment’s structure, and founding-era discourse on searches and seizures. A new interpretive emphasis on "secure" would provide various doctrinal benefits, most notably in regards to standing limitations and the exclusionary rule.

In 2009, in Arizona v Gant, the United States Supreme Court significantly changed the Fourth Amendment norms governing police searches of vehicles incident to arrest. To date, there is no known empirical study of police practices and policies regarding these norms. This survey study aims to fill this " gap " by surveying police chiefs from large, populated U.S. cities concerning their perceptions of police practices and policies in the area of vehicle searches, in particular vehicle searches incident to arrest. Specifically, the study aims to examine chiefs' perceptions of the frequency

A prova ilícita é aquela cujas condutas empreendidas para sua obtenção, formação ou utilização violam prescrições de direito material, ou direitos fundamentais materiais. A inadmissibilidade de uma prova relevante, determinada pela aplicação de uma regra de exclusão de finalidade extraprocessual, implica necessária inobservância do direito fundamental à prova da parte que requer sua admissão e possível óbice à averiguação fidedigna dos fatos relevantes para a causa. O Artigo 5º, inciso LVI, da Constituição Federal de 1988, contém uma regra (não um princípio) de inadmissibilidade, no processo, das provas ilícitas, que tem por escopo proteger bens jurídicos e por fundamento a capacidade de coibir a adoção de condutas antijurídicas através de um efeito profilático. Tratando-se de uma regra (e não de um princípio), uma vez que preenchido o suporte fático da norma, ela deve ser aplicada por subsunção (não por ponderação), o que não exclui a possibilidade de, ao momento da sua aplicação, verificar-se uma hipótese de superabilidade. A teoria da ponderação de interesses parte de premissas adequadas à noção de superabilidade, contudo, os interesses (razões) a serem ponderados no caso concreto não podem ser determinados somente pela importância do bem jurídico sobre o qual incidirão os efeitos da sentença e daquele que foi afetado pela prova ilícita, sendo imprescindível considerar o caráter prospectivo e complementar da proteção conferida pela regra constitucional de exclusão de provas. Não existem boas razões para restringir a aplicação do Artigo 5º, inciso LVI, da Constituição Federal, ao âmbito do processo penal, ou aos casos em que a obtenção, formação ou utilização da prova implica violação de direitos fundamentais; é praticada por um agente estatal; ou é praticada pela própria parte que requer sua admissão. Também não existem bons argumentos para criarem-se requisitos de legitimidade para requerer a exclusão da prova ou aproveitar os efeitos da exclusão. Entretanto, caracterizam hipóteses de superabilidade os casos em que aquele que obtém, forma ou utiliza uma prova ilícita possui motivos razoáveis para acreditar na juridicidade da conduta por ele empreendida; ou sequer planeja obter meios de comprovação através das condutas adotadas, promover a aplicação da regra não representa qualquer benefício, apenas prejuízos, ao mesmo tempo em que excepcioná-la não implica redução da capacidade de coibir do efeito profilático. Por fim, considera-se que a incorporação da teoria dos frutos da árvore venenosa ao direito brasileiro é medida que representa o resguardo da capacidade protetiva da regra constitucional de exclusão de provas, sendo com ela compatível a exceção de fonte independente; passível de compatibilização a exceção de descoberta inevitável; e incompatível a exceção de purgação da mácula.

FACTS This case takes place within Baltimore, Maryland in the early 1800s. Because of recent major economic changes, there was constant construction and excavation taking place. As entrepreneurs had created new buildings, the city began to repair its worn streets. While most of Baltimore's residents welcomed the growth, a group of wharf owners had problems arise from the development. The city's street construction altered the flow of streams coming into Baltimore Harbor. That redirection of water, the wharf owners argued in a letter to the city, led to the accumulation of sand and earth near their wharves, causing the surrounding water to become too shallow for large ships. Since the livelihood of the wharf owners depended on accommodating thesis large ships, which unloaded goods on the shares for storage in nearby warehouses, the owners wanted the city to dredge the harbor at its expense, but the city paid no heed to their request. John Barron and John Craig owned a particularly profitable wharf in the eastern section of the city, When they acquired the wharf it enjoyed the deepest water in the harbor and was therefore capable of servicing the largest ships. As the city's construction continued, sand and silt deposits had rendered the water in front of their wharf so shallow that their business had lost nearly all of its value. In 1822 they brought city representatives to county court in Maryland, asking for $20,000 in damages. The court ordered the city to pay them $4,500. When a state appellate court reversed the county court's decision, a determined Barron appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Reasonable expectation of privacy is discussed in the context of searches conducted without the warrants usually required by the Fourth Amendment but with the consent of a third party, who is not the target of the search. Case law on this issue is neither consistent nor clear-cut. Psychological theory and research clarify this issue by establishing closer correspondence between legal concepts and assumptions and individuals' actual behaviors and social expectations. The key legal components of reasonable expectation of privacy are delineated, with regard to third-party consent: "common authority" areas versus "exclusive use" areas and the assumption of risk doctrine. Next, the psychological theory and research on interpersonal relations and human territorial functioning are reviewed as they relate to the legal components of privacy regulation. Taken together, the legal criticisms of this warrant exception category, and possible discrepancies between the legal assumptions concerning interpersonal and territorial functioning among co-residents and the actual behaviors and expectations suggested by psychological theory and research, raise questions about its validity. This article discusses legal perceptions of reasonable expectation of privacy in third-party consent searches. We begin with a review of the legal assumptions concerning privacy expectations in third-party consent searches. In the next section, after considering some of the major court decisions concerning key components of reasonable expectation of privacy, we review the psychological theory and research on interpersonal relations and human territorial functioning as they * Portions of this article were presented in a symposium at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York City, August 1987. We thank Carol M. Wemer and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft. Requests for reprints and other correspondence should be sent to Dorothy Kagehiro,

The use of GPS surveillance technology for prolonged automated surveillance of American citizens is proliferating, and a direct split between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits on whether warrants are required under the Fourth Amendment for such use of GPS technology is bringing the issue to a head in the Supreme Court. A Petition for Certiorari is pending in the Ninth Circuit case which held that warrants are not required, and a second Petition is likely from the Government in the D.C. Circuit case holding that warrants are required. In this paper, we argue first, that where a technology enables invasion of interests at the heart of the Fourth Amendment’s concern -- protection of citizens from arbitrary government intrusions into their private lives -- the Court’s precedents require warrants to prevent abuse, and second, that the type and scope of information collected by prolonged automated GPS surveillance enables governments to monitor a person’s political associations, their medical c...

London, UK.
ABSTRACT
The issue in relation to the admissibility of confessions and improperly obtained evidence in the English criminal law has been the subject of substantial debate. The focus of the controversy is on the reason why the English law cases appear to stick to the principle of inclusion of improperly obtained evidence. The court in R v Leatham for example, demonstrated their desire to include any evidence even if it were stolen. Although the coming of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in 1984 was an opportunity to change the approach, the courts chose not to take it; this approach has been subjected to intense scrutiny and criticisms by legal scholars. Professor David Ormerod, for example, has argued that in admitting evidence the need to protect the ‘’public from crime ought to be balanced against a general principle of procedural fairness.’’ 
The controversies surrounding how evidence is admitted in the English courts and its concomitant effects on the fairness of the proceedings have triggered the interest of the writer in this area of law. Allowing the inclusion of improperly obtained evidence by the English court, the question that readily comes to mind is: to what extent is the method to improperly obtained evidence sufficiently balanced in the English law, or should an exclusionary rule extended to include the fruit of the poisonous tree principle be adopted?

Passed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the U.S.A. Patriot Act has many provisions which could be called into question under the Constitution. The main question at issue is whether it violates the 4th Amendment provisions requiring probable cause or a warrant for search and seizure, or can suspicion of terrorism become a new standard by which law enforcement can tap phone lines, search and seize private property, and not even notify the person that their property has been searched. The 6th Amendment right to a speedy and public trial is also in question because of the long period of time allowed to detain suspected terrorists without charging them. It raises the issue of whether it is constitutional for congress to pass a law that allows the FBI to confiscate property in order to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities@ and to prohibit the owner of the property from telling anyone it has been confiscated. This pertains to the due process clause of the 5th Amendment and the 1st Amendment right to freedom of speech. It also raises 14th Amendment concerns of equal protection under the law because it proscribes a lower level of legal protection to foreigners than it does to native citizens.

This law review article compares the rules of evidence regarding unlawful searches and seizures in the United Nations, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Russian Federation. It accounts for both de facto and de jure application of these laws by each group/nation's respective governing bodies.

The 4 th Amendment to the Constitution explicitly prohibits law enforcement officers from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures" without probable cause, long understood as a collection of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime is being or has been committed. But the Court did not address the question of whether information from anonymous sources can constitute probable cause until the middle of the 20 th century. In a line of cases spanning almost 40 years, the Court put a greater burden on police to show probable cause based on anonymous tips, even when supported by independent investigation, with a stringent two-prong standard known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test, only to remove that burden in Illinois v. Gates.

Over the past several years military and intelligence personnel of the United States have tortured captives, gained information from other’s torture of captives, or sent captives to be tortured. Even aside from statutory law and international treaties and conventions to which the United States is party, prohibition of torture by agents of the state is implicit in the very fabric of US political society as embodied in the Constitution, especially the Fifth Amendment. The rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment derive from English common law with its long and venerable history. Further, common law rights and protections permeate all of Anglo-American law. The Fifth Amendment plays a central role in these legal safeguards. Historical and analytic accounts of both the Fifth Amendment and torture may shed light on recent revelations of the use of torture.