19th and 20th-century European philosophy

Resumen: El presente artículo analiza la relación de Walter Benjamin con la fenomenología desde sus tempranos años de formación universitaria hasta la publicación de su tesis de habilitación no aprobada, El origen del Trauerspiel alemán (1928). Tomando por hilo conductor la doctrina del Eidos, proponemos que en la recurrencia de este topos es posible cifrar tanto su interés inicial por la escuela fenomenológica como las claves de su posterior distanciamiento. Para probar nuestra hipótesis, rastrearemos las referencias a la fenomenología en la preocupación benjaminiana por la cuestión del eidos siguiendo un orden cronológico y deteniéndonos particularmente en dos hitos: el fragmento nunca publicado Eidos und Begriff (1916) que toma por interlocutor al fenomenólogo Paul F. Linke, y la presencia del término esencialidad [Wesenheit] en el "Prólogo epistemocrítico" al libro sobre el barroco. En este último, los remanentes de la fenomenología se manifiestan de mano de una figura en sí misma heterodoxa, Jean Héring, cuya definición de la esencialidad permitirá apreciar las correspondencias y divergencias de Benjamin con la fenomenología antes de distanciarse definitivamente de esta corriente.

Traditional humanism assumes that the human nature is captured by defining the human being as "rational animal." Heidegger, in his Letter on Humanism, dismisses by arguing that this reduces existence within metaphysics. Derrida demonstrates how even post-metaphysical attempts at humanism, such as Heidegger's, remain haunted by the logic of presence, exclusion, and différance. The paper argues that humanism lies not in metaphysical certainty but in its openness to critique, reinterpretation, and reinvention which implies that the question of the human is unfinished, fragile, and ethically urgent. With this reinterpreted humanism, philosophy can then appropriately respond to the ethical, political, and ecological challenges of contemporary life.

Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, first published in 1953, is known for its incisive analysis of the Western understanding of Being, its original interpretations of Greek philosophy and poetry, and its vehement political statements. This companion to the Introduction to Metaphysics presents an overview of Heidegger’s text and a variety of perspectives on its interpretation from more than a dozen highly respected contributors. In the editors’ introduction to the book, Richard Polt and Gregory Fried alert readers to the important themes and problems of Introduction to Metaphysics. The contributors then offer original essays on three broad topics: the question of Being, Heidegger and the Greeks, and politics and ethics.

Included here: Table of Contents, Introduction, Index.

This article suggests that the writings of Bernard Lonergan could and should provide a sound foundation for seminary training in Africa in first cycle philosophy and second cycle theology. A benevolent eclecticism seems to be the pervading spirit in setting up a syllabus in these seminaries. The scholastic framework which once provided an overall coherence in both philosophy and theology has rightly had its day and been abandoned, but it is replaced by a wellmeaning eclecticism of contemporary authors, popular ideas, lots of reading and learning but from different perspectives, leaving the student in an overall state of perplexity. I am suggesting that the mode of doing both philosophy and theology has shifted from a theoretical mode to a mode of interiority. Theories relate things to one another; a theoretical philosophy relates definitions, divisions, concepts, proofs, principles to one another in a coherent and systematic way, the way of the scholastics. Interiority by contrast relies on an intimate familiarity with how the mind works, how the desire to know leads to understanding and knowing in all its complexity and nuance. Philosophy should answer four questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do that? What actions or decisions follow? Answering these questions gives you a personal foundation for working in theology. The many subjects of theology in themselves lack coherence and are in need of a guiding and unifying framework of what you are doing when you theologize. There are many advantages to be gained by using the framework thinking of the writings of Bernard Lonergan to unify and organize the curriculum for philosophy and theology.

Tausende von biografischen Büchern und Artikeln wurden über Nietzsche geschrieben. Auch über seine Persönlichkeit wurde viel geschrieben. Ich behaupte, dass der Schlüssel zum Verständnis seiner Persönlichkeit, seiner Selbstwahrnehmung, seines Lebensstils und seiner Beziehungen zu anderen in meiner These liegt, dass er ein Narzisst war.
Seit seiner frühen Kindheit, nach dem traumatischen Ereignis des frühen Verlusts des Vaters, wurde Nietzsche als spezielles Kind behandelt und ihm wurde beigebracht, sich das Lob und die Anerkennung seiner Familienmitglieder durch seine intellektuellen Leistungen zu verdienen. Es ist belegt, dass es ihm nicht gelang, sich von seiner Mutter (und auch seiner Schwester) zu trennen und sich somit zu individualisieren. Sein übersteigertes Selbstgefühl wurde durch das glühende Lob seines Professors Ritschl im dritten Semester seines Philologiestudiums noch verstärkt, und noch mehr dadurch, dass er im Alter von nur 24 Jahren eine Professur in Basel erhielt, ohne eine Doktorarbeit geschrieben zu haben. In Basel wurde er als junges Genie gefeiert und hatte schnell die Freundschaft des berühmten Komponisten Richard Wagner erworben.
Durch mangelnde Selbstwirksamkeit und durch die Ausübung seines übersteigerten Selbstgefühls, indem er für eine kulturelle Reform in Deutschland auf der Grundlage seiner Philosophie und Wagners Musik warb, hatte er jedoch innerhalb weniger Jahre seine akademische Karriere ruiniert. Nach zahlreichen Abwesenheiten vom Lehrbetrieb hatte er im Alter von 35 Jahren schließlich seine Stelle aufgegeben und wurde allmählich von der Mehrheit seiner Freunde und Bekannten verlassen. Das einsiedlerische Leben, das er von da an führte, mit viel weniger sozialen Kontakten, hatte zu einer Schwächung seiner Wahrnehmung der Realität und zu einer starken Zunahme seiner Grandiosität geführt, die sich in seinem Glauben an die Bedeutung von sich selbst und seinem Werk ausdrückte.Er hatte sich selbst und sein Werk in grandiosen Begriffen gedacht und geglaubt, dass sein Werk in Zukunft über Jahrtausende hinweg eine ähnliche Bedeutung haben würde wie die Schriften der großen Weltreligionen.
Er wurde von seinen Mitschülern und Freunden aus Schulpforta und dem Studium als überwachsam und herrschsüchtig in persönlichen Beziehungen beschrieben.Er hatte seine Freunde idealisiert und sich nach dem Ende ihrer Beziehung negativ (Abwertung, Abwurf) über mehrere von ihnen geäußert (z. B. Rohde, Wagner, Rée, Salomé).
Mit seiner dokumentierten Tendenz zu äußerster Härte und seinem Befürworten der Vernichtung der Schwachen hatte er einen klaren Mangel an Empathie gezeigt.

''Der Autor des Buches, Bojan Viculin, ist eine Seltenheit: Er sagt, wie es ist, unerschütterlich, und riskiert dabei Spott und Schlimmeres. Seine gut begründete These lautet, dass Nietzsche ein wütender, wenn auch zusammengebrochener Narzisst war. Das schmale Buch ist daher nicht nur eine gründliche Darstellung von Nietzsches Leben, sondern auch eine makellose Einführung in den aktuellen Wissensstand über pathologischen Narzissmus.
Viculin verdichtet auf 160 Seiten ein Berg an Informationen und Anekdoten über den zunehmend dementeren Nietzsche: seine Beziehungen, wie sie waren, seinen Lebensstil, Wutanfälle, Drogenmissbrauch, Karriere, seine Epoche, mangelnde Empathie und seinen Schreibstil. Mit der Hartnäckigkeit eines Detektivs verfolgt Viculin den umherziehenden und ziellosen Nietzsche über die Stationen seines Kreuzweges und die wilden Landschaften seines Schreibens.
Das Buch liest sich wie ein Thriller und ist in seiner Argumentation unerbittlich. Eine wunderbare Lektüre.''

Sam Vaknin
Professor der Psychologie und Autor von Malignant Self-love: Narcissism Revisited

In this chapter, I examine religious perspectives on habit and show why they matter to philosophy. I argue that religious perspectives on habit provide a rich though still overlooked resource for understanding the influence of habit on human life. I will be focusing on Christian mysticism and its legacy in modern thought. Mystical texts view passivity as the highest state. The loss of the feeling of subjectivity is construed positively in mysticism as a prerequisite for union with God. In mysticism, habit is crucial because it allows a person to let go of the will in order to receive spontaneous revelations and insights. Christian mysticism thus introduces habit as a timely critique of subjectivity and power. For this reason, in what follows I will be thinking with the mystical account of habit as a critique of the "selfpossessed Enlightenment subject" (Coleman, 2014: 12). Three examples are discussed: Augustinian mysticism (especially Quietism and the early modern tradition of contemplative prayer), French spiritualism (focussing on Maine de Biran's and Félix Ravaisson's theories of habit), and the contemplative turn in recent philosophy (represented, here, by Pierre Hadot, Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch). Religion and habit are closely connected. In English (as in Latin) the word "habit" (habitus), can be used metonymically for the religious life, as when referring to the distinctive clothing of a monk or a nun as their habit. These exterior habits, worn by members of monastic orders, are in turn the outward sign of an interior habituation. A religious dons their physical habit and conforms to a tradition of dress in order to reflect an inner conforming to a spiritual tradition-a conforming achieved by years of repeatedly performing a set of daily prayers, meditations and contemplations. The connection between religion and habit, then, is metaphysical as well as physical, with mind and body converging on the deepest level (Breen, 2010: 43-44; Agamben, 2013: 15-16). As in the case of physical repetition, through spiritual repetition, the aim is for the individual to desist from active "effort" in order to invite passive "grace." In the same way that bodily habit decreases the need to pay attention to what one is doing, daily prayer, meditation and contemplation are spiritual exercises designed not to increase mental effort but to decrease it, achieving a state that is more like waiting than willing (Marno, 2014: 154). In the context of the religious life, to act out of habit is often presented as a virtue, rather than a vice; here, habit facilitates the relaxing of mental effort crucial when allowing the mind to

Bonjour à tous et merci d'être présents. Merci à mes collègues, qui ont décidé d'organiser cette journée d'étude et de me la dédier. (C'est un honneur auquel je suis sensible, avec un peu de distance ironique.) J'ai contribué au choix du thème d'étude : « Philosophie et non-savoir ». Et ceux qui me connaissent savent que ce n'est pas un hasard puisque je suis « celle qui ne sait rien ». J'ai beaucoup réfléchi à ce que je pourrais vous dire en « introduction ». À vrai dire, sans l'amicale pression de Jean-Paul Resweber, je n'aurais rien dit d'autre que « bonjour et merci ». Mais Jean-Paul m'a suggéré de dire au moins quelques mots de l'ordre d'une « autobiographie intellectuelle ». J'ai fini par trouver ça intéressant, même si je demeure incapable de procéder à ce genre d'exercice. Ce qui m'intéresse, c'est de témoigner, devant les étudiants ici présents, de la difficulté de l'étude -et des études de philosophie. Je vais surtout évoquer mes rapports conflictuels avec le « savoir ». J'ai toujours été ce qu'on appelle « une bonne élève », ce qui n'est pas nécessairement un compliment, puisque la bonne élève, c'est un peu l'imbécile de service, la conformiste, etc., même si la réussite scolaire et universitaire facilite bien la vie. Bonne élève, donc, mais... il y avait pourtant nombre de moments d'ennui, c'est, hélas, inévitable (Ah ! les cours de géologie en 4 e ! Ce n'est que très longtemps après que j'ai pu concevoir que cette discipline pouvait être passionnante). Un beau jour, au lycée, j'ai compris que la seule façon de ne pas m'ennuyer, quand il s'agissait des disciplines avec lesquelles je n'avais pas d'affinités, pour lesquelles je n'avais pas de désir, c'était de décider de m'y intéresser quand même. M'y intéresser pour ne pas m'ennuyer, m'y intéresser non pas pour les « apprendre », mais pour « comprendre » -à vrai dire, pour exercer la pensée. L'exercer, au sens de la pratiquer autant qu'au sens de l'entraîner et la développer. Rétrospectivement, je crois avoir saisi quelque chose de ma situation d'élève. Les disciplines que je « n'aimais pas » étaient celles où il s'agissait seulement d'apprendre et de savoir -au moins apparemment. Les disciplines que j'aimais étaient celles où on me demandait -sans que ce soit Petite adresse aux étudiants Le Portique, Cahiers du Portique n°15 | 2018

Based on the differences between Heidegger's immanent ontology and Levinas' transcendent ethics, the paper submits that there is a structural contradistinction also between the Levinasian notion of caress and the Heideggerian notion of God's passage. Whereas for Levinas caress signifies the ethical difference within the subject, the inner dehiscence of the ego, it is not clear that Heidegger's ontological difference can properly account for desire or an ethically deep encounter between persons via the notion of 'co-belonging'. Only the 'God's passage' might come closer to the infinity of caress qua the fundamental ambiguity of the divinity's simultaneous flight and advent. But what is the farthest away cannot be caressed. There is no agape in the divinity's passage. However, there is something the two notions both share: that salvation is not achievable.

This excerpt from The Secret Codes of the Mind: Introduction to Philosophy (Vol. I) includes the preface and the complete table of contents for all six volumes. The six-volume academic series offers a comprehensive and structured introduction to philosophy, integrating methodological, historical, and conceptual approaches.
Volume I presents the foundations of philosophical inquiry. It defines philosophy and its historical development, outlines its major branches—metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic, and political philosophy—and introduces key methodological approaches, including dialectical, analytical, phenomenological, and existential methods. It also examines core philosophical categories such as being, causality, truth, unity, and diversity, and explores fundamental concepts including consciousness, matter, space, time, and freedom, with references to thinkers such as Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Charles Peirce.
Designed for students, educators, and independent scholars, this volume lays the conceptual and methodological groundwork for the entire six-volume series.

Intitulé « La Révolution psychique ou Freud et Bergson, une nouvelle approche de la conscience face à l’émergence des neurosciences au XIXe siècle », ce mémoire s’attache à étudier l’évolution de la notion de conscience au XIXe siècle, à un moment charnière où les avancées des neurosciences tendent à en proposer une compréhension objectivable et mesurable. À travers l’analyse des pensées de deux figures majeures, Sigmund Freud et Henri Bergson, j'ai essayé d’interroger la manière dont ces deux figures, issues de champs disciplinaires différents — la psychanalyse et la philosophie —, réagissent à ce tournant scientifique et proposent, chacun à leur manière, une autre lecture de la conscience et du psychisme.

Le statut fictionnel du discours philosophique sera abordé à partir, non pas de sa spécificité, mais de son appartenance au genre du discours. La structure fictionnelle du discours philosophique ne tient donc pas à la détermination de l’épithète philosophique. C’est en tant que discours que la philosophie revêt nécessairement une structure fictionnelle. Une fois cette appartenance de la philosophie au genre du discours élaborée, le discours sera analysé à partir de son enjeu communicationnel. Tout discours engage en effet une communication, laquelle implique la production nécessaire de fictions de la part de l’émetteur et du récepteur du message. Ce qui est communiqué dans le discours — le message donc — n’est constitué que des productions fictionnelles qui circulent à son compte. Et le discours philosophique ne fait pas exception. Ainsi, il conviendra de décrire les deux attitudes possibles face à la reconnaissance de la structure fictionnelle du discours philosophique : ou bien cette structure fait l’objet d’un déni et les philosophes continuent de faire comme s’il existait un message en dehors des fictions qui le constituent, ou bien cette structure est assumée et donne lieu à une reconfiguration de la communauté philosophique, humble et fragmentée.

La these principale de cet ouvrage est que l’histoire du langage constitue l’histoire de l’homme. Le langage est entendu comme « la forme de l’etre-la de l’homme » (die Form des menschlichen Daseins). La theorie critique de Kant sert de cadre methodologique a l’entreprise de Lohmann, lequel s’attache a analyser la « structure transcendantale » du langage. Le point de depart est que « langage » et « pensee » sont a l’origine les deux faces du meme phenomene : le logos. Dans le logos se trouvait reuni ce qui se dissociera plus tard et que les grammairiens latins nommeront ratio et oratio. En effet, avant d’etre celle d’un individu et d’apparaitre comme detachee de celui-ci, la pensee se serait lentement extraite de la communication langagiere collective », cette « conscience inconsciente » qu’etait le La forme linguistique articulee est quelque chose qui ne serait devoile a la conscience de l’homme qu’ulterieurement, grâce a la « reflexion », ce retour par la pensee sur le langage. Ce...

Response to the following prompt from advanced graduate seminar on Levinas' Totality and Infinity, spring 2017, Professor Wayne J. Froman:

Explain as thoroughly as possible, in the context of Section I of Totality and Infinity, what Levinas means by the following two headings of parts of Section I, subsection A: "Transcendence is Not Negativity," and "Metaphysics Precedes Ontology."

ABSTRACT:
In Section I, subsection A of Totality and Infinity, Levinas elaborates on two critical points, as illustrated in the subsection titles: transcendence is not a negativity, and metaphysics precedes ontology. Regarding the former, we might begin by noting Levinas’ distinction between “autrui,” or what he regards as a “personal Other, the you”; in short, the other person, in common language. This is sometimes contrasted with “autre,” which usually—although not always—refers, or can refer, to other things, such as objects. In short it refers to anything which is other (TI 24-25). The relation to a person bears, in particular, a special kind of relation for Levinas, one which we often encounter, and which we have seen described, as a relation which is not a relation. It cannot be totalized, it cannot be reduced to something comprehended, it will always have an excess that cannot be grasped in a fundamental sense. Throughout Totality and Infinity, the relation that is not a relation, due to the non-totalizing ability of the relation, helps illustrate the distinction between totality and infinity. We may recall, for instance, that totality is associated with the reduction of the other to the same. Levinas considers this reduction to the same as characteristic of a significant part of the Western philosophical and intellectual tradition, which, as we will see, is prominent in his view of ontology. The human-to-human relation that is not a relation, with respect, for instance, to the excess mentioned, will help bring out what he means by transcendence is not a negativity. Again, as has been demonstrated in earlier parts of the Totality and Infinity, this has to do with what Levinas is calling an ethical relation. Following this, we will see how this reduction to the same, which ontology is not exempt from on Levinas’ critique, provides some background for his view that metaphysics precedes ontology. Along the way, this paper will provide some speculations and potential areas to explore future critiques, particularly with respect to Levinas’ views, both implicitly and explicitly, concerning Heidegger and Husserl, respectively.

Este trabajo se propone analizar la crítica de Walter Benjamin al escrito de habilitación de Heidegger, La doctrina de las categorías y del significado en Duns Escoto. Este objetivo se llevará a cabo a partir de un contraste entre el escrito de Heidegger y el ensayo que Benjamin escribe por la misma época titulado Sobre el lenguaje en cuanto tal y sobre el lenguaje del hombre. Asimismo, se estudiarán las razones que conducen a Benjamin a comentar críticamente la tesis de Heidegger desde dos perspectivas: el problema de la traducción y la recuperación heideggeriana del neokantismo. Atendiendo a la rehabilitación de la escolástica y de la fenomenología en los comienzos del siglo XX, se intentará reconstruir un debate implícito entre los autores hacia 1916 para dar cuenta de la distancia entre la concepción lógica del lenguaje de Heidegger y la concepción teológica del lenguaje de Benjamin.

In an attempt to legitimize traditionally understood metaphysics, I define it as a reference to the absolute horizon. The metaphysical (in a broader sense: philosophical) relation to the horizon is pure activity, oriented on the one hand toward its most primordial sources, and on the other toward its ultimate grounds. In this way, it not only refers to the absolute horizon but even brings it into presence. It is also the most fundamental form of relating to it: born in the space it opens—it originally recognizes and inhabits it.

According to Nancy, intelligibility of human existence (or singularity) takes the form of spacing, i.e., opening up of a meaningful situation where entities and singularities are ‘discretely’ gathered together, i.e., where they both limit and disclose one another as belonging to the same space. For Nancy, spacing presupposes sharing it with others since ‘singularities’ are nothing but communicable attempts at spacing the world; as such, spacing is “public or political” in nature because there is no universal law of singularities other than their free communication and their ability to gather a situation together. The main goal of this article is to look at the notion of antagonism from the standpoint of Nancy’s political philosophy; namely I will argue that the contingent world gives rise to antagonistic sharings, which cannot “essence” together but which can be shared only at the expense of one another. This would achieve two goals. First, the article will explicate a number of problematic assumptions that Nancy remains committed to, especially his one-sided emphasis on the importance of transformation. Second, it will develop his approach by accounting for the productive role that the ontic dimension of everyday politics plays in spacing without undermining the significance of the ontological difference around which his account is built. This will arrive at an account of an ecosystem of the “space[s] of meaning” with a fragile balance between differentiation and taking for granted. An ecosystem of sharing presupposes not only something that is to be shared but also the normative expectation regarding what is ought to be shared and what is not.

This translation is of an unpublished text by Bernard Stiegler. Indications in the text make clear that it was very probably written in 2017, which is to say, between the publication of Dans la disruption in 2016 and Qu’appelle- t-on panser? 1. L’immense régression in 2018. It is also clear that it is a fragment of a larger work, which currently remains unknown, but which may have been a draft of the first volume of Qu’appelle-t-on panser?, which was in a way doubly postponed by each of the first two volumes of that work which were published. Typographical errors (mostly transposed letters) have been silently corrected, and the parts that have been struck through are presented that way in the French original. Note also that the final, unenumerated section, “Absence of epoch and post-truth”, seems, in its initial couple of paragraphs, to be in the form of notes by the author to himself.

Hegel had a theory of the “event” long before Badiou. Across his works Hegel has much to say about history and the philosophy of history. But he also has a good deal to teach us about the “event” per se, or Begebenheit. In ways hitherto unknown, this term in Hegel puts before us the problem of thinking history philosophically—which philosophy you care to use in the face of events of every magnitude. Badiou’s “event” is examined briefly in this Hegelian context, as well as the distinction between theory and philosophy as such.

This paper critically examines the contemporary decline of education and the exaggerated perception of artificial intelligence (AI), contextualised through significant philosophical insights of the nineteenth century. It argues that the systematic erosion of critical thinking, cultural literacy, and aesthetic appreciation has produced a populace susceptible to manipulation and unable to discern genuine intellectual quality, thereby fostering the illusion of sophisticated AI.

La lectura catastrófica de la historia que hizo Benjamin, su estética de las ruinas, su visión del ángel de la historia y su análisis de la decadencia se inspiraron en el pesimismo del siglo XIX, por un lado, y en su sentido del lenguaje, por el otro. Es imposible entender su catastrófica interpreta-ción del progreso sin el fuerte aporte del romanticismo y el nietzscheanismo. Pero ¿nos ayuda la comprensión de Ben-jamin de la historia y la naturaleza, su inversión en la ter-minología romántica y nietzscheana, en la época del An-tropoceno? ¿Seguimos atrapados entre la decadencia y la totalidad lingüística? Sobre la base de los trabajos teóricos recientes mencionados anteriormente, los cuatro argumen-tos principales de este capítulo son tanto históricos como analíticos. En primer lugar, en línea con los tres textos mencionados anteriormente, sostengo que un componente clave de la retórica de la catástrofe del siglo XXI, incluido el Antropoceno, sigue una crítica romántica, posnietzs-cheana y benjaminiana del progreso.

This essay seeks to explore how a free relationship can be developed through consideration of the different understandings of the essence of technology that Heidegger presents in 'A Question Concerning Technology'. This paper was written for King's College London.

Derrida's deconstruction is closely related to Heidegger's programme of Destruktion, philosophy of difference and formulation of the claim of transcending metaphysics. In spite of the similarities and differences of Destruktion and deconstruction, Heidegger's thinking proves to be unavoidable for Derrida. Nevertheless Derrida's deconstruction can be interpreted as the deconstruction of the Heideggerian Destruktion. This study will outline the central points of the philosophy of Destruktion and deconstruction.

This article tries to analyze the concept of experience in Walter Benjamin's work. We propose to go on a journey returning by the same way that went on. That is to say, disentangling the conceptual warp from the last writings of Benjamin in "On concepts of History" to his article of 1916. This proposition is not intended to be original but it simply tries to put in act Benjamin's words "first indicate which layers have been gone over to get to that from which the findings proceed". 2

This chapter introduces the problematic governing and shaping the collection Subjective Agency and Poststructuralism—namely, the question of the relationship between subjective agency and poststructuralism—and provides an overview of the contributing chapters to demonstrate their coherence.

COLOQUIO DE TREILLES: FILOSOFÍA DE LA AURORA TEmAS FILOSóFICOS y RECONSTRUCCIóN gENéTICA EN AURORA DE F. NIETzSChE Congreso celebrado en Tourtour (Francia), del 19 al 24 de septiembre de 2003, organizado por La Fondation des Treilles. <www.hypernietzsche.org/events/treilles2> Resumen de las ponencias D'Iorio, Paolo (Paris/münchen): «Introducción a los trabajos». Como continuación del primer coloquio sobre Nietzsche organizado en 2001 en La Fondation de Treilles que trataba sobre Cosas humanas, demasiado humanas, en 2003 nos hemos dedicado al análisis del segundo libro de la trilogía del espíritu libre, Aurora. Pensamientos sobre los prejuicios morales. El coloquio «Filosofía de la Aurora» ha tenido entonces como objetivo la estructura y la génesis de esta obra de Nietzsche, para extraer de ello una serie de consideraciones históricas y de interpretaciones filosóficas que han intentado responder a tres cuestiones: el

Talk given on December 17, 2024, as part of the Talk Series "Etica della letteratura" organized by Professor Nicolini at the Literature and Philosophy Department (DILEF) of the University of Florence.
This talk reexamines the concept of Stimmung in its transition from a Romantic internal, immaterial category to a material and external phenomenon in the works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Hermann Bahr. By tracing the historical evolution of Stimmung - from its Romantic roots as a subjective state to its reinterpretation through theories of the nerves and atmospheric materiality - the talk highlights how Hofmannsthal and Bahr advanced a novel poetics that re-materialized Stimmung. This proves that they were the first in modern Europe to propose an atmospheric paradigm that reconceptualizes human experience as fundamentally intertwined with the physical world, challenging traditional Western dichotomies between self and environment.

«Nuestras libertades se definen a la vez gracias al Estado y contra él». Lo decía Raymond Aron en su última conferencia en el Collège de France hace casi cincuenta años, en 1978. Una contradicción sólo aparente que permite entender el delicado equilibrio en que se mueve la mentalidad liberal, en permanente tensión entre extremos que se oponen mutuamente pero que tienen en la existencia del otro su propia condición. Efectivamente, durante siglos hemos concebido nuestras libertades como una resistencia frente a los abusos de un poder que, dejado a su propia inercia, tendería de forma natural al despotismo. Y sin embargo, al mismo tiempo esperamos del Estado que garantice esas libertades, ya que privadas de protección jurídica no pasarían de ser una mera declaración formal. La convicción de lo delicado de este difícil equilibrio forma parte de la tradición liberal occidental.

Philosophical attempts atreforming ontology have moved from delimiting large universal substances  or  totalities  toward  mapping  formal  modelsthrough  time.  Most  of  these endeavors establish irreducible difference as their primary assumption. Alain Badiou’s ontological  proposal  is  doubtless  one  of  the  most polemical.  Known  for  hisinitialformulation  concerning  ontology  beingmathematics,  Badiou  brought significant adjustments to his claim in 2018. In this paper, we argue that this sizeable overhauling was enabled by the multilayered conditional logic structuring his philosophical system. We contend that without such a logic, no philosophical proposal on radical difference and its material emergence can be taken as a real possibility. The ontology maps a radically formal, event-conditioned  theory,  distributed  throughsubject-types.  The  theory  ofconditions provides the parametersbywhich to validate this claim

What does Martin Heidegger say about sex or gender? According to most accounts, including Derrida’s influential essay “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Heidegger makes a marginal reference to sex in a 1928 Marburg lecture later translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26). However, an earlier allusion to sexual difference appears in a 1923 Freiburg lecture, translated as Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity (GA 63) where he explains why he uses the term “Dasein” instead of “man” in his existential analytic. “Man” carries his own historical baggage, representing a living being endowed with reason, as well as a pregiven understanding of what it means to be a person. This latter definition has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition where “man” is created in the image of God as the first born of many “brethren.” In a perplexing move, Heidegger then cites biblical passages to highlight the sexed emergence of man in Genesis as he poses the question, “Problem: What is woman?” (GA 63, 22/18). This chapter untangles what it means for Heidegger to ask such a question, particularly as he leaves it unanswered and seemingly negligible in his pursuit of a hermeneutics of facticity.

Heidegger states, “Hermeneutics is itself not a philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration’” (GA 63, 20/16). I place the object of sex/gender  facticity before today’s philosophers, situating the “Problem: What is woman?” within the context of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, namely to rediscover the question of being. Captured in the eponymous title Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity is the insight that the study of being (ontology) can only be carried out as an interpretive non-objectifying process (hermeneutics) of our existence at a particular time in history (facticity). What does it mean to exist as a certain sex or gender during a particular time? How are sex and gender related to the question of being and the ontological difference? How are we defining sex and gender and to which term does Heidegger refer? Throughout this chapter, I will examine a few instances where Heidegger reckons with the sex/gender question. By posing the inquiry, “Problem: What is Woman?” within the parameters of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, I suggest that sex and gender must be fluid categories insofar as such properties describe the “whatness” of our existence rather than the “how” of our world-forming. That is, Dasein is neutral with respect to these categories as such attributes only show up after a time reckoning with an original position of care-lessness. I also suggest that Heidegger privileges sex/gender facticity in undergirding such neutrality as he contests Christian origin stories of the flesh (GA 63) and evolutionary theories associated with the Lebensphilosophie of his time (GA 26).  Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib further upholds sex and gender fluidity.

In this work, and in line with the attention international researchers have
devoted to Heidegger’s major works to contribute to the elucidation of his
teachings, we intend to establish a hypothesis based on Heidegger’s secondary literature in his thought—following his speeches, presentations,
lectures, letters, notes, interviews, etc. Thus, the hypothesis of this work aims to prove the foundation of Heidegger’s teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age—specifically, by posing questions on the Essence of Modern Age Science, the Essence of Action in the Modern Age, and the Essence of Technic in the Modern Age. In this context, this essay explores the main phenomena of modernity emphasized by Heidegger in his secondary works to demonstrate the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age and thereby prove the Metaphysical Foundation of the Modern Age’s essence of Modern Age science, the essence of action in the Modern Age, and the essence of technic in the Modern Age. The ultimate goal is to synthesize fragments from various Heideggerian works of secondary literature to point out, in one place, what Heidegger taught at a higher level in his major works: how the Modern Age, in all its fundamental phenomena and in the entirety of its richness/deficiencies, delivers its foundations within Modern Age Metaphysics.

1945-ös hazaérkezését követően Lukács György a magyar szellemi és kulturális élet egyik meghatározó alakjává vált – nemcsak filozófusi, hanem a kultúrpolitikát befolyásoló minőségében is. 1945-ben a hatvanéves Lukács számára egy aktív alkotói korszak következett: egyetemi tanár lesz, folyóiratot alapít, cikkei mellett műveinek magyar nyelvű (újra)kiadása is folyamatos. A filozófiatörténet-írás számára Lukácsnak ez a korszaka mégis vakfoltnak számít: filozófusi tevékenysége és hatása leginkább tanítványi körének és kortársainak visszaemlékezéseiből, anekdotákból ismerhető meg – vagy túlzottan negatív, vagy túlzottan pozitív fényben feltüntetve Lukács szerepvállalását. Felmerül továbbá egy másik dilemma is, miszerint filozófiai teljesítményként értékelhetjük-e Lukács 1945-1955-ig terjedő gondolkodói tevékenységét. Ezt az időszakot Lukács életművében javarészt az irodalmi és irodalompolitikai kérdések uralták, így szükségesnek látszik a rekonstrukció során az irodalomtörténeti kitekintés is. Már ebből a rövid felvezetőből is kitűnhet, hogy Lukács hazaérkezésétől 1955-ig tartó korszakának rekonstrukciója még a magyar filozófiatörténet-írás egyik elmaradt feladata. A tanulmány arra tesz kísérletet, hogy ennek a periódusnak a töréspontjait felvázolja, és Lukács filozófusi, kultúrpolitikai szerepvállalását rekonstruálja a magyar filozófiatörténet tükrében.

The report focuses on the history of the Italian version of «Logos» Journal. We consider the evolution of the Journal, gives an overview of the main directions of its activity, described the concept of its main participants. Particular importance is attached to the «Russian track» in the history of the Italian «Logos». First of all, we tell about an article by the Italian Law scholar Giuseppe lo Verde, titled “The Philosophy of the Trinity by Serge Bulgakov” (La filosofia dellaTrinità di S. Bulgakow). Lo Verde discusses a very complex and important topic in Bulgakov’s thought — his Trinitarian Ontology. If by 1938 the philosophy of fr. S. Bulgakov was actually not understood by his Russian contemporaries, because of the so called  “controversy about Sophia” (Sophiology), then for European reader the Trinitarian Ontology of Russian philosopher turned out to prove relevant. Bulgakov was the only Russian thinker discussed in a separate article in an Italian Philosophical publication of a long-standing tradition and а broad international renown.

This paper explores the surprising resonance between Martin Heidegger’s situated ontology—focused on practical immer-
sion in shared worlds—and artificial intelligence (AI) systems that transcend formal constraints through data-driven learn-
ing. Heidegger's understanding of truth and thinking as emerging through contextual engagement parallels how machine
learning algorithms rely on real-world interactions to develop advanced functions. The analysis advocates integrating
Heideggerian perspectives with John Dewey’s consequentialist ethical orientation, emphasizing that responsibility must
be sensitive to the evolving societal impacts of actions rather than fixed by a priori principles. This pragmatic approach
calls for policy frameworks as adaptable to societal changes as the AI systems they govern. To illustrate this, the paper
develops a reinforcement learning model that balances utilitarian and deontological ethical considerations in promoting
social participation through AI. This model demonstrates how philosophical concepts can be integrated into algorithm
design and assessment, resulting in participatory, transparent, and inquiry-driven policy frameworks attuned to the situ-
ational impacts of AI systems rather than rigid constraints.

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Is the primary function of an educator to elucidate and convey their own knowledge? French philosopher Jacques Rancière demonstrates that an incidental experiment by Joseph Jacotot presents an alternative paradigm: the ignorant schoolmaster. In his work The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation [Le maître ignorant: cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle], Rancière posits that the ignorant schoolmaster is equally, if not more, capable of instructing students compared to the knowledgeable educator. Rancière examines two educational methodologies: the conventional approach of the knowledgeable educator who explicates and imparts knowledge, and the experimental approach of the ignorant schoolmaster who refrains from explanation and primarily focuses on verifying attentiveness. By providing a brief analysis of these two methodologies, this article aims to demonstrate how Rancière’s work can be utilized to construct a model for articulating the implicit theoretical principles in educational practices. This model is predicated on the following premise: by taking either a successful or a problematic educational practice as an example, one can articulate the theoretical principles inherent within it. The article hopes to facilitate a shift in focus from practices to principles, thereby offering a novel perspective on educational practices and enabling its theoretical explication.........

[In Dutch: Bestaat de kernactiviteit van de meester erin om zijn eigen kennis uit te leggen en over te dragen? De Franse filosoof Jacques Rancière laat zien dat een gelegenheidsexperiment van Joseph Jacotot ons een ander voorbeeld aanreikt: de onwetende meester. In zijn boek De onwetende meester: vijf lessen over intellectuele emancipatie (Le maître ignorant: Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle) stelt hij dat de onwetende meester evengoed of zelfs beter in staat is leerlingen iets te leren dan de wetende meester. Rancière neemt in feite twee onderwijspraktijken als voorbeeld: de traditionele praktijk van de wetende meester die uitleg geeft en kennis overdraagt en de experimentele praktijk van de onwetende meester die geen uitleg geeft maar vooral gericht is op de verificatie van aandacht. In dit artikel wil ik op basis van een korte analyse van deze twee praktijken laten zien hoe we uit Rancière’s boek een model kunnen afleiden voor het articuleren van de theoretische principes die impliciet in onderwijspraktijken werkzaam zijn. Dit model is gestoeld op het volgende uitgangspunt: door een succesvolle of juist problematische onderwijspraktijk als voorbeeld te nemen kunnen we de theoretische principes articuleren die erin werkzaam zijn. Dit schept de mogelijkheid om de focus van de van de praktijken naar de principes te verleggen. Hierdoor wordt de onderwijspraktijk op een nieuwe manier inzichtelijk en kunnen we haar theoretisch expliciteren.]

This course sets forth your independent research in intercultural philosophy. If you have some basic knowledge in European continental philosophy and Chinese philosophy and are looking forward to learning the implications of the intercultural dialogue between these big traditions, the course demonstrates how intercultural philosophy can be applied as a powerful way of philosophizing with real case studies. In the course you will acquire the necessary tool kits for initiating your own research in the field.

In Neo-Existentialism Markus Gabriel argues that much contemporary theorizing about the mind is incoherent because it overlooks one of the conditions of its own intelligibility, namely our reflexive understanding of ourselves as distinct from objects and (other) animals. He agrees with Kant and Hegel that the very idea of a naturalistic theory of ourselves as “minds” rests on a category mistake. I agree, but I reject the rationalism that Gabriel takes from the idealist tradition and enlists in support of his argument. I defend in its stead a more traditional form of existentialism according to which existence should be understood as fundamentally recalcitrant to reason. I conclude by observing that if idealism rests on the thesis that the words “thought” and “intelligibility” refer to nothing peculiar to human understanding, but just mean things being some way or other, then it is a mere terminological maneuver, not a philosophical innovation.