Hegel's Big Event

In Hegel"s account of the French Revolution in Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit, i a particular, short-lived, and contingent historical event-an event that burst onto the scene abruptly, as if from out of nowhere, and which seemed possible only in the specific socio-political conditions of French society at the timecomes to be transfigured into an autonomous "shape of spirit." ii As such, this event lays claim to having a necessary place within Hegel"s systematic, dialectical account of the essential forms of human society: it is here conceived as a self-determining, comprehensive, and conclusive embodiment of what it is to be a community of human agents in the world, and in that sense takes itself to be the universal, absolute standard by which all other attempts at socio-cultural organization are to be measured. iii Part of what is at issue in the background of Hegel"s account, then, is understanding how it is that a finite historical event, marked essentially by the contingency and spatio-temporal singularity that characterizes all events in history, can take on such infinite, universal proportions, such that what happened then and there, to those particular individuals, is conceived as having in some sense happened to us all-as having happened to human history itself, as it were. Put in other terms, how can a particular historical event, situated within history and given determinate motivation and meaning precisely by its being thus situated, in effect come to transform the very character of what ultimately matters in history as such, such that, on Hegel"s account, we who live in its train cannot but relate to all historical events-whether those that come after it, or, indeed, even those that come before-in and through it? For, even though the Phenomenology ultimately presents us with a dialectical critique of the Revolution, and thus claims to demonstrate the internal tensions that propel history to move beyond the Revolution"s operative vision of what is at stake in the human sphere, the fact that Hegel here casts the Revolution as an autonomous shape in its own right-and not, for instance, as just a passing moment within the developing narrative of the Enlightenment in its struggle with Faith, or as a mere anomaly within the ongoing narrative of European absolutism iv -itself suggests that he takes something of universal proportions to have occurred in the Revolution, something that gives us a decisive, indispensable, and irrevocable insight into the nature of the human spirit generally. v This issue concerning the purportedly universal proportions of certain finite and contingent events is of explicit concern for Hegel in the context of his encounter with Christianity. Given the core doctrine of the Incarnation, on Hegel"s account Christianity cannot fail to grapple with the question of what significance to give to the fact that the birth, life, and death of Christ were actual events situated within the flow of human history. vi Though Christianity lays claim to being a universal religion, concerned with the salvation of all humans as such, and though it regards the conversion into faith as something every individual can and must undergo in order to be saved, this conversion and this salvation are possible only because of something that actually happened at some contingent point in time, and because to live now is precisely to live after Christ, in the radically new field of possibilities-the new world-that the events of his actual life and death alone opened up. Indeed, not only do these particular historical events make faith historically possible, they also serve to define a key part of the content of faith: conversion to Christianity seems to involve, not only recognizing the actual event of Christ"s life and death, but also recognizing that this event is like no other, in that it transformed the very import and direction of human history as a whole, in that it became the reference point in relation to which the overall contours of all historical events were from then on to be articulated. To live in Christ is, as it were, to keep the event of His life alive, to transform this singular event of the Incarnation into the universal medium-into an enduring historical epoch-in terms of which all other events get their ultimate meaning. vii So while we might think of Christianity as bound to maintain a sharp divide between this world and the world beyond-such that the finite world of historical events is dismissed as inconsequential and inessential in relation to an infinite, unchanging beyond viii -Hegel sees implicit in Christianity the seeds of a rich and far-reaching conception of history according to which certain events of this world are, in spite of their finitude and sensuous immediacy, themselves capable of taking on such universal, all-encompassing proportions.

Hegel sees history as the dialectical movement of Spirit. This dialectical movement involves the thesis, the antithesis and the synthesis. At the thesis, Spirit is an abstract entity which embodies its antithesis. Spirit becomes real through its antithesis of human consciousness. Man, the opposition of Spirit, helps the Spirit to actualize its self purpose of freedom. When the Spirit finally attains its purpose it becomes the synthesis. This process continues but in higher form than the first. For inherent in every synthesis (which in turn becomes the thesis) is its antithesis, then to synthesis. This paper critically analyzes the underlying assumptions of Hegel’s conception of history with the philosophical tool of criticism. With the tool of criticism, we aim to show that history as a dialectical movement of Spirit is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the details of human history. It is necessary because it acknowledged the history of human society; but is not sufficient because it fails to conceive history in light of man creating his own history rather it conceived history as Spirit actualizing Self-knowledge. This paper draws much insight from Karl Marx in establishing that history is made by man and for man and not by any absolute spirit.

Plurilogue, vol.4 (1), 2014

τὰ γενόµενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων Most commentary on Kant's and Hegel's writings 1 on history focuses on their substantive claims about progress, especially the nature and plausibility of these claims. 2 Very little attention is devoted to the concept of history both philosophers employ, namely, the concept of a whole composed of what Herodotus calls "that which is brought about [τὰ γενόµενα] by human beings"). 3 Such neglect is perhaps explicable on the grounds that philosophical history belongs to a discipline outside philosophy, such as the history of historiography, or that philosophical history does not deserve serious philosophical attention because, by allowing reference to a unified domain of human action, it facilitates illegitimate claims about this whole, for example, claims about progress. 4 Yet, Kant's and Hegel's basic philosophical 1 Citation to Kant is to the Akademie edition [=AA], by volume and page number with the exception of the first Critique [=KrV], cited according to the original A and B editions. Citation to Hegel is to Werke, (ed.) M. Moldauer and K. Markus. Frankfurt, by volume and page number.

2020

Does Hegel offer us some means of philosophically analysing contemporary crises, such as the prospect of an environmental catastrophe? Do the categories related to Hegelian dialectics offer a philosophical outlook on contemporary antagonisms, such as the, apparently, severed relationship between man and nature, the critical present and an uncertain future? In order for us to approach these questions, as well as the initial question about the end of all questions that Hegelianism seems to put forward, we need to carefully watch, observe and expose, from within its workings, how Hegelian thinking develops such questions, from what place Hegel thinks and begins to think these questions, and consider the implications and possible shortcomings of his speculative thinking in our present and future contexts. In order for us to carve a path towards these various questions, in order to prepare a thorough theoretical engagement with Hegel’s contemporary relevance, we first have to aptly and excessively analyse Hegel’s philosophical thinking. This latter requirement will be the purpose of this study. What is Hegelian thinking, how does it operate, from what place does it speak? Tracing the origin of the speculative dialectic back to Hegel’s early theological ideas, we will slowly unravel, against the backdrop of Kant and Schelling, how, for Hegel, the Fall, the most radical negativity, unhappiness, catastrophe, crisis or abandonment, is always already the expression of its Aufhebung, sublation, elevation and redemption. It is this eschatological core of his thinking which we will focus on in this study and, tentatively, push towards its limits. We will then critically consider the aptitude of Hegelianism as a contemporary philosophical paradigm. In a present which sees the future through uncertain eyes, which can still only half-imagine a looming crisis so apocalyptic that it radically ungrounds prior assumptions of progress, knowledge and historical direction, can Hegel offer us a future, that is, a future that is other than the one we have, collectively, like a Spirit blind to its own actions, set in motion?

Colloquium, 2007

The author tries to show in this paper the sense in which history can be considered ideological, using the framework of Georg Hegel. The ideological sense of history is neither factual in the descriptive sense nor panoramic as in tracing the chronological flow of events from the past to the present, but goes beyond these into a rational, metaphysical interpretation of history. For Hegel, the Absolute Spirit is the substance of the universe which manifests Itself through historical men who serve as agents for the accomplishment of Its ultimate aim.

Review of Politics

In a prominent passage of his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel understands his own time as the-per se critical-time of a transition to something new, as the time of the work of an ongoing transformation: "It is," Hegel states, "not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and transition to a new period.