Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception

1 We focus on the visual case, leaving it to the reader to consider how the discussion generalizes to other modalities. 2 concerned how the transition from introspective beliefs to external--world beliefs could be rational. 2 In this entry, we assume without argument these positions are mistaken. We begin from the assumption that experiences (such as the one you have when you see the mustard) can justify external world beliefs about the things you see, such as beliefs that the mustard jar is in the fridge, and that the justification experience provides does not have to rely on justification for introspective beliefs. From now on, we often let it remain implicit that we are talking about external world beliefs, when we talk about the kind of beliefs that experiences justify. 3 Our main question is this: what features of experiences explain how they justify external world beliefs? The grammar of the question might suggest that experiences suffice all by themselves to provide justification for external world beliefs. But don't read this into the grammar of the phrase "experiences justify beliefs". We can distinguish between the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P, and the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P without help from other features it only contingently has. We clarify our question further in Part I, where we explain why we have chosen this point of departure, and highlight a range of theses about the role of experience in providing different types of justification. In Parts II and III, we consider the role of features of experience falling into two broad categories: constitutive features of experience, including its phenomenal character, its contents, its status as attentive or inattentive (sections 3--7); and causal features of experience such as its reliability, and the impact of other mental states on its formation (sections 8--10). Along the way, we discuss the relationships between visual experience and seeing (sections 1 and 8), and we contrast perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge (section 9).

Acta Psychologica, 2006

Phenomenal causality is an illusion built on an incomplete perception. It is an illusion because we can have visual impressions of causality when no interaction between objects is actually taking place. It is an illusion built on an incomplete perception because causality as we understand it neglects some factors involved in objective descriptions of interactions between objects in terms of the laws of mechanics. So, why don't we perceive object interactions in accordance with the laws of mechanics? I Wrst consider what kinds of things can and cannot be causes perceptually, arguing that active objects can be causes and non-moving objects cannot be. Then, I argue that causal understanding originates with what we have the most direct experience of, our own actions on objects, and extends out from this point of origin to other domains of causality by a form of schema matching the interpretation of stimulus input by matching to abstracted stored representations of experiences. Schema matching raises the possibility of many more kinds of phenomenal causality than have hitherto been considered, and I conclude by suggesting some possibilities.

Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved [Acta Analytica 20 (3): 11-31 (2005)] Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability.

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1984

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2011

Beginning with the research of Albert Michotte, investigators have identified simple perceptual events that observers report as causal. For example, suppose a square moves across a screen and comes to a halt when it makes contact with a second square. If the second square then begins moving in the same direction, observers sometimes report that the first square ''pushed'' the second or ''caused it to move.'' Based on such reports, Michotte claimed that people perceive causality, and a number of psychologists and philosophers have followed his lead. This article examines Michotte's hypothesis by comparing it with its chief rival: Observers possess representations of pushings, pullings, and other events in long-term memory. A Michottean display triggers one of these representations, and the representation classifies the display as an instance of pushing (or pulling, etc.). According to this second explanation, recognizing an event as a pushing is similar to classifying an object as a cup or a dog. Data relevant to this debate come from infant and animal studies, cognitive and neuropsychological dissociation experiments, and studies of context effects and individual differences. However, a review of research in these paradigms finds no reason to prefer Michotte's theory over its competitor.

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1998

If we want to learn something about the reality we meet, we should know something about the way we capture it or how the meeting with reality is constructed. This work, however, doesn’t just look at a neuroanatomical, cognitive–psychological description of receptors and mechanisms of sensory reception, but also offers deeper thoughts about the conditions and mainly about the consequences of higher cognitive processes tied to perception. The text thus walks a line between general and cognitive psychology and philosophical epistemology while trying to map not only the origins of percepts, what influences them, but mainly where and how our perception convictions originate and the total concept of reality we live in. The obvious intention of this exploration is not only to present a package of basic facts and theories, but also to encourage the reader to think about and to problematize the perception processes and consequences.

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Some theorists have recently raised doubts about much of the experimental evidence purporting to demonstrate the existence of unconscious perception. In our (2019) in this journal, we argued some of these considerations are not decisive. Phillips (forthcoming a) replies thoughtfully to our paper, concluding that he is unconvinced by our arguments. Phillips maintains that the view that perception is invariably conscious remains, as he puts it, the "default" hypothesis both within the folk understanding and experimental study of perception. There is much to agree with in Phillips' piece, but there remain some substantive points of disagreement, which we outline here.

2010

Since antiquity, visual theorists have variously proposed that perception (usually vision) results from unconscious inference. This paper reviews historical and recent theories of unconscious inferences, in order to make explicit their commitments to inferential cognitive processes. In particular, it asks whether the comparison of perception with inference has been intended metaphorically or literally. It then focuses on the literal theories, and assesses their resources for responding to three problems that arise when visual perception is explained as resulting from unconscious inference: the cognitive machinery problem, the sophisticated content problem, and the phenomenal problem. Comments University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-01-04. This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/9 Perception as Unconscious Inference* Gary Hatfield University of Pennsylvania Consider for a...

Acta Analytica

Two arguments Paul Snowdon has brought against the causal theory of perception are examined. One involves the claim that, based on the phenomenology of perceptual situations, it cannot be the case that perception is an essentially causal concept. The other is a reductio, according to which causal theorists’ arguments imply that a proposition Snowdon takes to be obviously non-causal (A is married to B) can be analyzed into some sort of indefinite ‘spousal connection’ plus a causal ingredient. I conclude that neither argument is sound. The reason that Snowdon’s critiques fail is that, since causal theories need not be about ‘effect ends’ that are internally manifest to perceivers, no such ostensibly separable, non-causal property as it being to S as if he were perceiving O need be an essential element in a causal theory of perception.