Keith Allen

University of York, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Books by Keith Allen

A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour

Oxford University Press, 2016

Introduction to A Naive Realist Theory of Colour (OUP 2016)

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Causation and Modern Philosophy

Papers by Keith Allen

Home Dissatisfaction, Body Image, and Sociocultural Attitudes: An Exploratory Study

Housing, Theory and Society, 2023

This article explores home dissatisfaction using methods modelled on those used to understand neg... more This article explores home dissatisfaction using methods modelled on those used to understand negative body image and its causes. We found that a substantial proportion of UK participants (13–39%) expressed dissatisfaction with their homes. Although the strongest association was between home dissatisfaction and reported physical problems, there was evidence that dissatisfaction is also predicted by experiencing pressure from the media and your family to improve your home, as well as reporting a greater tendency to compare your home to others’. The results of the study provide initial evidence for a sociocultural explanation of home dissatisfaction, analogous to sociocultural explanations of body dissatisfaction.

Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision

Synthese

Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘the’ common-sense conc... more Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of the phenomenon of interest. Debates about the nature of perception tend to take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, consistent with Direct Realism. This conception is often accorded an epistemic default status. We draw on philosophical and psychological literature on naïve theories and belief fragmentation to motivate the hypothesis that untutored common sense encompasses conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions: there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy epistemic default status. To examine this hypothesis, a survey administered an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli to lay participants. We found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs about vision. Against common assumptions, Direct Realist beliefs are no...

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Fragmented and conflicted: Folk beliefs about vision

by Keith Allen and Eugen Fischer

Synthese, 2023

Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as 'the' common-sense conc... more Many philosophical debates take for granted that there is such a thing as 'the' common-sense conception of the phenomenon of interest. Debates about the nature of perception tend to take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, consistent with Direct Realism. This conception is often accorded an epistemic default status. We draw on philosophical and psychological literature on naïve theories and belief fragmentation to motivate the hypothesis that untutored common sense encompasses conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist conceptions: there is no such thing as 'the' common-sense conception of vision that could enjoy epistemic default status. To examine this hypothesis, a survey administered an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli to lay participants. We found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs about vision. Against common assumptions, Direct Realist beliefs are not clearly dominant, and consistent adherence to Direct Realism is not the norm, but the exception. These findings are consistent with recent accounts of belief fragmentation. They forcefully challenge common methodology in philosophical debates about the nature of perception and beyond.

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The Value of Perception

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019

This paper develops a form of transcendental na€ ıve realism. According to na€ ıve realism, verid... more This paper develops a form of transcendental na€ ıve realism. According to na€ ıve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental na€ ıve realism, the na€ ıve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. Rather, na€ ıve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards na€ ıve realism is that it promises to make the na€ ıve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental na€ ıve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in 'Freedom and Resentment', and suggests one way of understanding the claim that na€ ıve realism is immune to falsification. 1. Transcendental Na€ ıve Realism According to the version of the na€ ıve realist theory of perception that I will take as representative, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational: veridical perceptual experiences are constituted at least in part by the mind-independent objects and properties in our environment that they are experiences of. Because on this view veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational, a particular perceptual experience could not have occurred if the subject had not been perceptually related to precisely those elements of their environment. 1 In this respect, na€ ıve realist theories of perception differ from common kind theories of perception, like sense-datum or representationalist theories, which allow that how things are with the subject is constitutively independent, at least on a particular occasion, of how things are in their environment. According to common kind theories, it is possible for the subject to have fundamentally the same kind of experience whether or not the environment This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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In Vision It Is Groups, Rather Than Maps, That Determine How We Perceive the World

Vision

This paper presents the results of a study that used a speeded counting task to adjudicate betwee... more This paper presents the results of a study that used a speeded counting task to adjudicate between two competing theories of how perceptual representations of visual objects are derived. Boolean map (BM) theory assumes that there are strict limits on conscious awareness, such that we only have serial access to features on the same dimension (e.g., red and green). This theory contrasts with views that emphasize the early grouping of features, and which assume that feature processing is interactive and underpins figure/ground segregation as a necessary precursor to object perception. To test between these theories, we report performance in a speeded counting task in which participants were asked to judge which of two shapes was more prevalent. Displays contained squares and circles that appeared in either of two colors, with color and shape distinctions either perfectly correlated (i.e., compatible) or not (i.e., incompatible). BM theory predicts no influence of the relative coinciden...

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In Vision It Is Groups, Rather Than Maps, That Determine How We Perceive the World

by Keith Allen and Dale Cohen

Vision, 2022

Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2016

it is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but als... more it is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. one influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would 'see' an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a 'no blocker' condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.

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The nature of shape constancy mechanisms as revealed by shape priming

Journal of Vision, 2018

Five shape priming experiments are reported in which the target was either a five-or six-sided li... more Five shape priming experiments are reported in which the target was either a five-or six-sided line-drawn figure and participants made a speeded two-alternative forced-choice judgment about the target's number of sides. On priming trials, the target was preceded by a briefly presented smaller line figure (the prime) and performance on these trials was gauged relative to a noprime condition. In the first two experiments, primes were rendered invisible by the presentation of a backwards visual noise mask, respectively for a short (;40 ms) or long duration (;93 ms). No reliable priming effects arose under masked conditions. When these experiments were repeated without the mask, participants were speeded when the prime and target were related by a rigid through-the-plane rotation but not when the prime was a nonrigid, stretched version of the target. The same pattern of priming effects arose when, in a final experiment, novel irregular shapes were used. Collectively, the data reveal the operation of shape constancy mechanisms that are particularly sensitive to shape rigidity. The findings suggest that the visual system attempts to secure a correspondence between the rapid and successive presentations of the prime and the target by matching shapes according to a rigidity constraint.

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What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience

Mind & Language, 2021

What is the experience of someone who is "colourblind" like? This paper presents the results of a... more What is the experience of someone who is "colourblind" like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of a variety of coloured stimuli, both with and without EnChroma glasses-glasses which, the manufacturers claim, enhance the experience of people with common forms of colour blindness. More generally, the paper provides a case study in the nascent field of experimental philosophy of experience.

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Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism

Philosopher's Imprint, 2019

ABSTRACT: This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of naive realist ... more ABSTRACT: This paper has two aims. The first is to use contemporary discussions of naive realist theories of perception to offer an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception. The second is to use consideration of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception to outline a distinctive version of a naive realist theory of perception. In a Merleau-Pontian spirit, these two aims are inter-dependent.

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Ideas

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013

Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Forthcoming in dialectica. Please refer to the final version. According to naïve realist (or prim... more Forthcoming in dialectica. Please refer to the final version. According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections. 1. NAÏVE REALISM AND REVELATION The naïve realist theory of colour can be understood as the conjunction of two theses: MIND-INDEPENDENCE: colours are properties of material objects, light sources, etc. whose essential nature is constitutively independent of the experiences of perceiving subjects; DISTINCTNESS: colours are sui generis properties that are distinct from properties described in the vocabulary of phy...

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What is it like to be colour-blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience

by Keith Allen and Eugen Fischer

Mind & Language, 2021

What is the experience of someone who is 'colour-blind' like? This paper presents the results of ... more What is the experience of someone who is 'colour-blind' like? This paper presents the results of a study that uses qualitative research methods to better understand the lived experience of colour blindness. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of a variety of coloured stimuli, both with and without EnChroma glasses-glasses which, the manufacturers claim, enhance the experience of people with common forms of colour blindness. More generally, the paper provides a case study in the nascent field of experimental philosophy of experience (Ex-XPhi).

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Reflective Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception across Sensory Modalities

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition... more Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean-style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice's case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain stimulation). They found that a substantial minority agreed that seeing occurs in the Non-Blocker cases, and that in the Blocker cases significantly less agreed that seeing occurs. They thus hypothesized that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition than with a causal condition. This paper continues this line of enquiry with two new experiments. The paper investigates the generality and robustness of Roberts et al.’s findings by expanding the sense modalities tested from only vision to audition and olfaction as well. The paper also uses Gricean-style thought experiments as a case study for investigating the “reflection defense” against the negative project in experimental philosophy. Our results replicate and extend Roberts et al.'s study and support their hypothesis that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition. They also provide an empirical reason to doubt the reflection defense.

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Cavendish and Boyle on Colour and Experimental Philosophy

Experiment, Speculation and Religion in Early Modern Philosophy, 2019

Margaret Cavendish was a contemporary critic of the mechanistic theories of matter that came to d... more Margaret Cavendish was a contemporary critic of the mechanistic theories of matter that came to dominate seventeenth century thought, and the proponent of a distinctive form of non-mechanistic materialism. Colour was a central issue both to the mechanistic theories of matter that Cavendish opposed and to the non-mechanistic alternative that she defended. This paper considers the form of colour realism that Cavendish developed to complement her non-mechanistic materialism, and uses her criticisms of contemporary views of colour to try to better understand the experimental approach to natural philosophy associated with writers like Hooke and Boyle. I argue that Cavendish's discussion of colour in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy helps to show that there was a close connection between experimental philosophy and mechanistic theories of matter, and that, at least in the middle of the seventeenth century, experimental and speculative forms of mechanism were not mutually exclusive.

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Should We Believe Philosophical Claims on Testimony

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2019

This paper considers whether we should believe philosophical claims on the basis of testimony in ... more This paper considers whether we should believe philosophical claims on the basis of testimony in light of related debates about aesthetic and moral testimony. It is argued that we should not believe philosophical claims on testimony, and different explanations of why we should not are considered. It is suggested that the reason why we should not believe philosophical claims on testimony might be that philosophy is not truth-directed.

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The nature of shape constancy mechanisms as revealed by shape priming

The Journal of Vision, 2018

Five shape priming experiments are reported in which the target was either a five- or six-sided l... more Five shape priming experiments are reported in which the target was either a five- or six-sided line-drawn figure and participants made a speeded two-alternative forced-choice judgment about the target's number of sides. On priming trials, the target was preceded by a briefly presented smaller line figure (the prime) and performance on these trials was gauged relative to a no-prime condition. In the first two experiments, primes were rendered invisible by the presentation of a backwards visual noise mask, respectively for a short (∼40 ms) or long duration (∼93 ms). No reliable priming effects arose under masked conditions. When these experiments were repeated without the mask, participants were speeded when the prime and target were related by a rigid through-the-plane rotation but not when the prime was a nonrigid, stretched version of the target. The same pattern of priming effects arose when, in a final experiment, novel irregular shapes were used. Collectively, the data reveal the operation of shape constancy mechanisms that are particularly sensitive to shape rigidity. The findings suggest that the visual system attempts to secure a correspondence between the rapid and successive presentations of the prime and the target by matching shapes according to a rigidity constraint.

Folk Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception

Ergo, 2016

It is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but als... more It is widely held by philosophers not only that there is a causal condition on perception but also that the causal condition is a conceptual truth about perception. One influential line of argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to a style of thought experiment popularized by Grice. Given the significance of these thought experiments to the literature, it is important to see whether the folk in fact respond to these cases in the way that philosophers assume they should. We test folk intuitions regarding the causal theory of perception by asking our participants to what extent they agree that they would ‘see’ an object in various Gricean scenarios. We find that the intuitions of the folk do not strongly support the causal condition; they at most strongly support a ‘no blocker’ condition. We argue that this is problematic for the claim that the causal condition is a conceptual truth.

Keith Allen

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