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Outline

Title
Abstract
What Do the Theories of Perception Study?
Why Study the Theories of Perception?
Neisser's Analysis-By-Synthesis Model
How to Study the Sensory World of Other Beings?
What is the Subject of the World of Other Species?
References
All Topics
Philosophy
Epistemology

Perception Theories

Profile image of Andrej DémuthAndrej Démuth

Abstract

If we want to learn something about the reality we meet, we should know something about the way we capture it or how the meeting with reality is constructed. This work, however, doesn’t just look at a neuroanatomical, cognitive–psychological description of receptors and mechanisms of sensory reception, but also offers deeper thoughts about the conditions and mainly about the consequences of higher cognitive processes tied to perception. The text thus walks a line between general and cognitive psychology and philosophical epistemology while trying to map not only the origins of percepts, what influences them, but mainly where and how our perception convictions originate and the total concept of reality we live in. The obvious intention of this exploration is not only to present a package of basic facts and theories, but also to encourage the reader to think about and to problematize the perception processes and consequences.

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The Value of Perception
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019

This paper develops a form of transcendental na€ ıve realism. According to na€ ıve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental na€ ıve realism, the na€ ıve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so on. Rather, na€ ıve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards na€ ıve realism is that it promises to make the na€ ıve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental na€ ıve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in 'Freedom and Resentment', and suggests one way of understanding the claim that na€ ıve realism is immune to falsification. 1. Transcendental Na€ ıve Realism According to the version of the na€ ıve realist theory of perception that I will take as representative, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational: veridical perceptual experiences are constituted at least in part by the mind-independent objects and properties in our environment that they are experiences of. Because on this view veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational, a particular perceptual experience could not have occurred if the subject had not been perceptually related to precisely those elements of their environment. 1 In this respect, na€ ıve realist theories of perception differ from common kind theories of perception, like sense-datum or representationalist theories, which allow that how things are with the subject is constitutively independent, at least on a particular occasion, of how things are in their environment. According to common kind theories, it is possible for the subject to have fundamentally the same kind of experience whether or not the environment This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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*Perception* (2021 Introduction)
Adam Pautz

Routledge, 2021

Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naïve realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics.

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PERCEPTION THEORY
Tolulope Akinsulire

Perception refers to a process by which people select, organize and interpret sensory stimulation into a meaningful and coherent picture of the world. It is pertinent to note that over the years, there have been various communication theories developed to nullify the assertions of the Magic Bullet theory, with the Perception Theory being one of them. It is in this wise that this paper seeks to review the Perception theory, taking into cognizance, its historical development, core assumptions, strengths, criticism and its application to research.

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Three Paradigms of Perception A Comparative and Critical Analysis
Meenal M Katarnikar

Russian academic Scopus journal Voprosy philosophii, (pp. 130-138) РОССИЙСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК ИНСТИТУТ ФИЛОСОФИИ РАН ВОПРОСЫ ФИЛОСОФИИ, No.7, , 2025

Knowledge, a ‘sine-qua-nun’ of a human person, involves and is constituted by cognitive, rational, mental, logical as well as socio-religious dimensions of human existence, though its epistemic aspect is predominant in its analysis and taxonomy undertaken by the philosophical systems. In order to have an authentic grasp on the cognitive-epistemic taxonomies across the cultures, a discussion on perception, especially sense-perception or empirical perception can be a good case study. This paper proposes to explore and analyse three paradigms of empirical perception expounded in the Classical Indian Philosophical tradition, viz. the Nyāya, the Buddhist and the Jaina paradigms. According to the Nyāya paradigm, perception is that true, unmistaken and determinate cognition, which is obtained through the contact between sense-organs and the objects. Along with the other features, the emphasis of this theory is on determination of the object. According to the Buddhist paradigm, the cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. In addition to other important features, the fulcrum of this theory is sensation or indeterminate perception. The Jaina paradigm offers a process analysis of sense-perception and, technically speaking, makes an attempt to reconcile the Nyāya and the Buddhist theories. It is interesting to find that all the three theories understand sense-perception as the most direct knowledge and despite that, present diverse structures of perception. An intense understanding of the three reveals that these differences may be due to the different understanding and articulation of the Subject-Object-Knowledge interrelationship. This paper ventures into problematizing the notion of perception on the backdrop of the mutual relationship between the Subject and the Object resulting in perceptual cognition. ****************** Key Words: Perception, Pratyakşa, Pramāņa, Subject-Object-Knowledge relationship, Prāmāņyavāda

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The Epistemology of Perception
Nico Silins

1 We focus on the visual case, leaving it to the reader to consider how the discussion generalizes to other modalities. 2 concerned how the transition from introspective beliefs to external--world beliefs could be rational. 2 In this entry, we assume without argument these positions are mistaken. We begin from the assumption that experiences (such as the one you have when you see the mustard) can justify external world beliefs about the things you see, such as beliefs that the mustard jar is in the fridge, and that the justification experience provides does not have to rely on justification for introspective beliefs. From now on, we often let it remain implicit that we are talking about external world beliefs, when we talk about the kind of beliefs that experiences justify. 3 Our main question is this: what features of experiences explain how they justify external world beliefs? The grammar of the question might suggest that experiences suffice all by themselves to provide justification for external world beliefs. But don't read this into the grammar of the phrase "experiences justify beliefs". We can distinguish between the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P, and the claim that an experience can justify a belief that P without help from other features it only contingently has. We clarify our question further in Part I, where we explain why we have chosen this point of departure, and highlight a range of theses about the role of experience in providing different types of justification. In Parts II and III, we consider the role of features of experience falling into two broad categories: constitutive features of experience, including its phenomenal character, its contents, its status as attentive or inattentive (sections 3--7); and causal features of experience such as its reliability, and the impact of other mental states on its formation (sections 8--10). Along the way, we discuss the relationships between visual experience and seeing (sections 1 and 8), and we contrast perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge (section 9).

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Introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception
Mohan Matthen

Mohan Matthen (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, 2015

Perception is the ultimate source of our knowledge about contingent facts. It is an extremely important philosophical development that starting in the last quarter of the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to change how they think of perception. The traditional view of perception focussed on sensory receptors; it has become clear, however, that perceptual systems radically transform the output of these receptors, yielding content concerning objects and events in the external world. Adequate understanding of this process requires that we think of perception in new ways—how it operates, the differences among the modalities, and integration of content provided by the individual senses. Philosophers have developed new analytic tools, and opened themselves up to new ways of thinking about the relationship of perception to knowledge. The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception is a collection of entries by leading researchers that reviews these new directions in philosophical thought. The Introduction to the Handbook reviews the history of the subject from its beginnings in ancient Greece to the nineteenth century, and the way that science and philosophy have together produced new conceptions during the last hundred years. It shows how the new thinking about perception has led to a complex web of theories.

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Sensation and Perception
Leendert Spruit

Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences, 2020

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Theories of Perception
Lanre Akinpelu

In order to receive information from the environment we are equipped with sense organs eg eye, ear, nose. Each sense organ is part of a sensory system which receives sensory inputs and transmits sensory information to the brain. A particular problem for psychologists is to explain the process by which the physical energy received by sense organs forms the basis of perceptual experience. Sensory inputs are somehow converted into perceptions of desks and computers, flowers and buildings, cars and planes; into sights, sounds, smells, taste and touch experiences. A major theoretical issue on which psychologists are divided is the extent to which perception relies directly on the information present in the stimulus. Some argue that perceptual processes are not direct, but depend on the perceiver's expectations and previous knowledge as well as the information available in the stimulus itself. This controversy is discussed with respect to Gibson (1966) who has proposed a direct theory of perception which is a 'bottom-up' theory, and Gregory (1970) who has proposed a constructivist (indirect) theory of perception which is a 'top-down' theory.

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Elements of a Phenomenological Theory of Perception
Gianfranco Soldati

Rivista Di Filosofia, 2013

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Two psychologies of perception and the prospect of their synthesis
Sergei Gepshtein

Two traditions have had a great impact on the theoretical and experimental research of perception. One tradition is statistical, stretching from Fechner's enunciation of psychophysics in 1860 to the modern view of perception as statistical decision making. The other tradition is phenomenological, from Brentano's “empirical standpoint” of 1874 to the Gestalt movement and the modern work on perceptual organization. Each tradition has at its core a distinctive assumption about the indivisible constituents of perception: the just-noticeable differences of sensation in the tradition of Fechner vs. the phenomenological Gestalts in the tradition of Brentano. But some key results from the two traditions can be explained and connected using an approach that is neither statistical nor phenomenological. This approach rests on a basic property of any information exchange: a principle of measurement formulated in 1946 by Gabor as a part of his quantal theory of information. Here the indivisible components are units (quanta) of information that remain invariant under changes of precision of measurement. This approach helped to understand how sensory measurements are implemented by single neural cells. But recent analyses suggest that this approach has the power to explain larger-scale characteristics of sensory systems.

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