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From pre-representational cognition to language 1

Profile image of Jordan ZlatevJordan Zlatev
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110207507.2.197
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Abstract
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The paper explores the contested nature of representations in cognitive science, focusing on the distinction between pre-representational and representational cognition. The authors aim to clarify the role of representations in language and cognition, proposing a conceptual analysis that underlines the properties and significance of true representations. The discussions invoke various works that debate the embodiment approach against traditional representational theories, culminating in insights on language's representational requirements.

Figures (7)
Table 1. Comparison of mental representation and pre-representational cognition along a number of dimensions. As shown in Table 1, the two sorts of cognition have complementary properties, and an account of human certain “higher” animals, involves bot we have here emphasized their differences in order to make a clear conceptual distinction, we need to mention two caveats, less we be accused of “dichotomizing”. First, since men and ontogenetically later than pre-representational cognition, they can be said to “emerge” from it, and hence cognition, and possibly even that of h types and their coordination. While al representations are evolutionarily will not be completely independen from their pre-representational, “bod above, any particular form of “higher cognition”, such as language use, wil ily” roots. Second, and as implied
Table 1. Comparison of mental representation and pre-representational cognition along a number of dimensions. As shown in Table 1, the two sorts of cognition have complementary properties, and an account of human certain “higher” animals, involves bot we have here emphasized their differences in order to make a clear conceptual distinction, we need to mention two caveats, less we be accused of “dichotomizing”. First, since men and ontogenetically later than pre-representational cognition, they can be said to “emerge” from it, and hence cognition, and possibly even that of h types and their coordination. While al representations are evolutionarily will not be completely independen from their pre-representational, “bod above, any particular form of “higher cognition”, such as language use, wil ily” roots. Second, and as implied
Table 2. Studies of computer simulations of dynamical categorization. The first column shows the corresponding categories that the “creatures” formed on the basis of physical motion. The second column shows a specification of the differences in conceptual terms. It is only our interpretation that links the two. To understand this better, we offer a brief summary of how the “creatures” in the first two studies of Table 1 performed classification through dynamical categorization. It is worth having in mind the similarities with Gibson’s (1962) psychological experiment involving blind touch mentioned earlier: in both cases perception is performed through self-guided motion and exploration.
Table 2. Studies of computer simulations of dynamical categorization. The first column shows the corresponding categories that the “creatures” formed on the basis of physical motion. The second column shows a specification of the differences in conceptual terms. It is only our interpretation that links the two. To understand this better, we offer a brief summary of how the “creatures” in the first two studies of Table 1 performed classification through dynamical categorization. It is worth having in mind the similarities with Gibson’s (1962) psychological experiment involving blind touch mentioned earlier: in both cases perception is performed through self-guided motion and exploration.
‘igure 1. Part of a 2-dimensional environment showing (a) rectangles and triangles and (b) the spatial trail of a “creature”, shown as a line. The black parts of the figures represent points of touch between creature and objects (for details, see Morimoto and Ikegami 2004)
‘igure 1. Part of a 2-dimensional environment showing (a) rectangles and triangles and (b) the spatial trail of a “creature”, shown as a line. The black parts of the figures represent points of touch between creature and objects (for details, see Morimoto and Ikegami 2004)
Figure 2. The design of the neural network that controlled the artificial creature’s “behavior” (Adapted from Morimoto & Ikegami 2004) output neurons (L, F and R). The most active output neuron determines the next action of the creature: turn right (R), go straight (F), or turn left (L). The weights of the connections were not fixed, but adapted by a process of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949), to allow predicting the sensory stimuli of one step in the future. This plasticity enables dynamic switching from one navigation mode to another: “wandering”, “exploring objects” and “filling in” (for details, see Morimoto & Ikegami 2004).
Figure 2. The design of the neural network that controlled the artificial creature’s “behavior” (Adapted from Morimoto & Ikegami 2004) output neurons (L, F and R). The most active output neuron determines the next action of the creature: turn right (R), go straight (F), or turn left (L). The weights of the connections were not fixed, but adapted by a process of Hebbian learning (Hebb 1949), to allow predicting the sensory stimuli of one step in the future. This plasticity enables dynamic switching from one navigation mode to another: “wandering”, “exploring objects” and “filling in” (for details, see Morimoto & Ikegami 2004).
Table 3. Classification of the mappings in 1269 quasi-synaesthetic metaphors, based on Day (1996: Table 7), see text for discussion. When Day (1996) subtracted the instanses when a sense modality was used as source from those when it was used as target, he arrived at the “sensory ranking” given in (1):
Table 3. Classification of the mappings in 1269 quasi-synaesthetic metaphors, based on Day (1996: Table 7), see text for discussion. When Day (1996) subtracted the instanses when a sense modality was used as source from those when it was used as target, he arrived at the “sensory ranking” given in (1):
Table 4. Classification of 35 projections in synaesthetic 25 subjects, analyzed by Cytowic (1989), adapted from (1996: Table 5), see text for discussion. Using the same method of “subtraction” provided the ranking given in (2), which, however, given the small number of subjects and projections shoud not be taken as too seriously. Nevertheless, it clearly shows that there are both similarities between quasi-synaesthetic metaphors and actual synaesthesia, above all that Hearing is most often “interpreted” as something else, and differences: above all the ranking of Vision.
Table 4. Classification of 35 projections in synaesthetic 25 subjects, analyzed by Cytowic (1989), adapted from (1996: Table 5), see text for discussion. Using the same method of “subtraction” provided the ranking given in (2), which, however, given the small number of subjects and projections shoud not be taken as too seriously. Nevertheless, it clearly shows that there are both similarities between quasi-synaesthetic metaphors and actual synaesthesia, above all that Hearing is most often “interpreted” as something else, and differences: above all the ranking of Vision.
Figure 4. From Life to Language. Autopoiesis and intrinsic value preserving the identity of the organism, essential properties of life, constitute the primary basis for cognition and consciousness. The interconnectedness of dynamical categories along common quality dimensions provides an internal meaning space. Bifurcations of this space, possibly arising from self-other separation in overt or covert imitation gives rise to bodily mimesis and mimetic schmeas, which are consciously accessible mental representations. These are imagistic and affect-laden, and can be said to ground language (L) in ontogeny and phylogeny. Only the highest two layers involve mental representations.
Figure 4. From Life to Language. Autopoiesis and intrinsic value preserving the identity of the organism, essential properties of life, constitute the primary basis for cognition and consciousness. The interconnectedness of dynamical categories along common quality dimensions provides an internal meaning space. Bifurcations of this space, possibly arising from self-other separation in overt or covert imitation gives rise to bodily mimesis and mimetic schmeas, which are consciously accessible mental representations. These are imagistic and affect-laden, and can be said to ground language (L) in ontogeny and phylogeny. Only the highest two layers involve mental representations.

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