Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutiv... more Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham's arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions.
Preface xiii Acknowledgments xv Thucydides i History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.40: Pericles' Fu... more Preface xiii Acknowledgments xv Thucydides i History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.40: Pericles' Funeral Oration Plato Apology Crito '.'. .....' The Republic 29 Book 1 Book 2 from Book 3 from Book 4 from Book 5 from Book 7 Book 8 ! from Book 9 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics from Book I from Book 2 Politics '. '. '.' ., Book 1 Book 2 '. Book 3 : Book 4 from Book 5 184 from Book 7. , Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince (written 1513, published 1532) 198 Dedication Chapter 5: Concerning the way to govern cities or principalities which lived under their own laws before they were annexed Chapter 6: Concerning new principalities which are acquired through one's own arms and ability Chapter 7: Concerning new principalities which are acquired either through the arms of others or by good fortune '. 200 Chapter 8: Concerning those who have obtained a principality through wickedness Chapter 9: Concerning a civil principality '. Chapter 10: Concerning the way in which the strength of all principalities ought to be measured 207 Chapter 11: Concerning ecclesiastical principalities 207 Chapter 12: Of the different types of troops and mercenaries Chapter 13: Concerning auxiliary, mixed, and citizen soldiers 211 viii THE BROADVIEW ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT: ESSENTIAL READINGS
The Key Thinkers series is aimed at undergraduate students and offers clear, concise and accessib... more The Key Thinkers series is aimed at undergraduate students and offers clear, concise and accessible edited guides to the key thinkers in each of the central topics in philosophy. Each book offers a comprehensive overview of the major thinkers who have contributed to the historical development of a key area of philosophy, providing a survey of their major works and the evolution of the central ideas in that area.
The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving t... more The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: 1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; 2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; 3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; 4) whether intensional contents are individuated by external or internal conditions; and 5) given that conceptual content is determined externally, whether the possession conditions for concepts are external or internal. The final part of the paper examines the relationship between representation and consciousness, arguing that any account of mental representation, though necessary for a complete account of consciousness, cannot be sufficient for it. Forthcoming: Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Manuscrito Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 2004
Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to th... more Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to the knower than does the external furniture of the world. The 'raw feels' of thought were often said to be 'given', while what we might call the content of that thought-for example, claims about the external world-was thought only more or less doubtfully true; and this was often said to be because we are 'directly' or 'non-inferentially' confronted by qualia or experiences, whereas all other properties or objects are only mediately 'connected' to the perceiver. The modern turn in philosophy-spearheaded by Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Ryle and others-away from classical empiricism to today's 'postpostivistic' philosophy, has apparently involved the rejection of this once familiar assumption. I argue a) that the rejection of a certain kind of epistemological foundationalism does not entail the rejection of phenomenal individuals tout court; and b) that qualia are in fact, in some epistemologically significant ways, given (pace Sellars et al.).
It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorio... more It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to be, roughly, either uninformative or unsound. I illustrate this conclusion through a consideration of David Chalmers' modal argument against physicalism.
The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought, Volume 2: The Twentieth Century and Beyond
... Document Type. Book. Publication Date. 9-30-2008. Journal. Philosophy Publications. Notes. Dr... more ... Document Type. Book. Publication Date. 9-30-2008. Journal. Philosophy Publications. Notes. Dr. Samantha Brennan was a co-editor of this book. The book is not available online here. If you are affiliated with The University of Western ...
The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought, Volume 1: From Plato to Nietzsche
... Suggested Citation. Andrew Bailey, Samantha Brennan, Will Kymlicka, Jacob Levy, Alex Sager, a... more ... Suggested Citation. Andrew Bailey, Samantha Brennan, Will Kymlicka, Jacob Levy, Alex Sager, and Clark Wolf. The Broadview Anthology of Social and Political Thought, Volume 1: From Plato to Nietzsche. , 2008. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/samanthabrennan/14. ...
This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is... more This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical (e.g. Nagel, Chalmers, Jackson), and those who implicitly or explicitly treat qualia as contentful but nonphenomenal physical properties (e.g. Dretske, Lycan, Armstrong, Tye).
Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to th... more Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to the knower than does the external furniture of the world. The 'raw feels' of thought were often said to be 'given', while what we might call the content of that thought-for example, claims about the external world-was thought only more or less doubtfully true; and this was often said to be because we are 'directly' or 'non-inferentially' confronted by qualia or experiences, whereas all other properties or objects are only mediately 'connected' to the perceiver. The modern turn in philosophy-spearheaded by Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Ryle and others-away from classical empiricism to today's 'postpostivistic' philosophy, has apparently involved the rejection of this once familiar assumption. I argue a) that the rejection of a certain kind of epistemological foundationalism does not entail the rejection of phenomenal individuals tout court; and b) that qualia are in fact, in some epistemologically significant ways, given (pace Sellars et al.).
In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Ham... more In its recent history, the philosophy of mind has come to resemble an entry into the genre of Hammer horror or pulpy science fiction. These days it is unusual to encounter a major philosophical work on the mind that is not populated with bats, homunculi, swamp-creatures, cruelly imprisoned genius scientists, aliens, cyborgs, other-worldly twins, selfaware computer programs, Frankenstein-monster-like Blockheads, or zombies. The purpose of this paper is to review the role in the philosophy of mind of one of these fantastic thought-experiments the zombie and to reassess the implications of zombie arguments, which I will suggest have been widely misinterpreted. I shall argue that zombies, far from being the enemy of materialism, are its friend; and furthermore that zombies militate against the computational model of consciousness and in favour of more biologically-rooted conceptions, and hence that zombie-considerations support a more reductive kind of physicalism about consciousness than has been in vogue in recent years.
It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorio... more It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to be, roughly, either uninformative or unsound. I illustrate this conclusion through a consideration of David Chalmers' modal argument against physicalism.
Philosophical zombies are theoretically stipulated creatures which are outwardly, behaviourally, ... more Philosophical zombies are theoretically stipulated creatures which are outwardly, behaviourally, even physiologically indistinguishable from normal human beings, but which lack consciousness. The possibility of zombies is appealed to in contemporary philosophy of mind to show either a) that consciousness is not essential for intelligence, or b) that physicalism must be false and some form of metaphysical dualism or neutral monism true. In this paper I argue that the notion of zombies which are physiologically identical with human beings while lacking consciousness is incoherent, and so physicalism with respect to consciousness should be considered immune to zombie-based attacks (and is in fact bolstered by their failure). However, I argue that the notion of functional zombies is not incoherent in the same way and that these two results favour a biologically, rather than computationally, oriented approach to the problem of consciousness.
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Papers by Andrew Bailey