The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to in... more The language of conscious and unconscious goals is rooted in a folk-taxonomy that is likely to inhibit progress in cognitive science. Severing the commitment to this taxonomy would allow Huang & Bargh (H&B) to consider a wider variety of representational forms with motivational force and to entertain the intriguing possibility that variations in the number of active-but-redundant representations account for variance in social behavior.
This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension,
which purports to show ... more This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension,
which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have
instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are
articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition
as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of
generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of
their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current state of cognitive science, I conclude
that we have no reason to think memory or cognition are generic natural kinds that
can ground an argument for cognitive extension.
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments... more This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition -which appeals to Occam's razor -is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identification of a mark of the cognitive; proposed marks are briefly (and inconclusively) surveyed in the final section.
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the caus... more Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by , and the author himself. The final section considers general objections to the causal approach.
In "Functionalism and the Independence Problems," Darren Bradley defends functionalism against th... more In "Functionalism and the Independence Problems," Darren Bradley defends functionalism against three objections, engaging directly with my development of the first, in particular. In this brief response, I argue that Bradley's rejoinders do not shield functionalism from the brunt of my criticisms.
286 INDEX Tedrake, R., 8 Telepresence, 207. See also Control; Coupling Tetris, viii, 48, 70-75, 7... more 286 INDEX Tedrake, R., 8 Telepresence, 207. See also Control; Coupling Tetris, viii, 48, 70-75, 77-80, 85, 93,117, 137,153, 214, 221, 238, 279. See also Dovetailing Thelen, E., xxiv-xxv, 10,125,129,165, 233~235, 241, 247 Thompson, A., 211 Thompson, E., ...
This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for exten... more This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for extended cognition. It is concluded that the Parity Principle does not, by itself, demarcate cognition and that another mark of the cognitive must be sought. The second section of the paper advances two arguments against the extended view of cognition, one of which – the conservatism-or-simplicity argument – appeals to principles of theory selection, and the other of which – the argument from demarcation – draws on a systems-based theory of cognition. The final section contests the claim, made by Andy Clark, that empirical work done by Wayne Gray and colleagues supports the extended view.
In Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension (Clark 2008), Andy Clark bol... more In Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension (Clark 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about the hypotheses of extended cognition and extended mind. In particular, Supersizing fails to make the case for the extended view as a revolutionary thesis in the theoretical foundations of cognitive science.
In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understandi... more In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understanding of the mind but, instead, suggest (along with a variety of other results) a massively representational view. According to this massively representational view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental representations or derive their content from them. Moreover, many behavioral phenomena associated with attention and consciousness are best explained by the coordinated activity of units with redundant content. I finish by arguing that this massively representational picture challenges the reliability of a priori theorizing about consciousness.
When a subject acquires a concept, one of her cognitive vehicles comes into an appropriate causal... more When a subject acquires a concept, one of her cognitive vehicles comes into an appropriate causal or informational relation to whatever that concept is a concept of. Social interaction helps in significant ways to ground this relation. I expound, then apply this perspective to a philosophical problem concerning conceptual content: Frege's puzzle. The socially interactive processes of language-learning and concept acquisition depend heavily on the mastery of reliable inferences involving the terms learned and concepts acquired. As a side effect, we are inclined to think that patterns of inferential relations constitute content itself. Thus, we are inclined to think that a subject's differing ways of thinking about the same object-i.e., her possession of two cognitive vehicles that refer to the same object but which participate in different patterns of subjectively drawn inferences-correspond to differences in mental, or conceptual, content. I argue that this is an illusion, an understandable one caused by the difficulty of language-learning and concept acquisition and the concomitant need to rely on inferential patterns to get ourselves into the appropriate causal and informational relations to the things represented by our thoughts and words. The illusion is strengthened, I claim, by the way in which subjects acquire the very concept of content.
I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objec... more I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott ([1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding the nature of realization. I argue that not all things that realize a state or property are realizers of that state or property: the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitous elements in x -elements that play no particular role in the realization of y -whereas the relation x is a realizer of y does not. I then criticize a rejoinder that, in effect, builds such gratuitous elements into the antecedents of the laws of a science of the realized properties.
The Best Test Theory of Extension (BTT) offers a solution to the disjunction problem. According t... more The Best Test Theory of Extension (BTT) offers a solution to the disjunction problem. According to BTT, the extension of a natural kind term t in a given subject S's language of thought (LOT) consists of the members of the natural kind that has the highest success rate relative to t. We calculate the success rate of natural kind K relative to S's term t by dividing the number of times members of K have caused S to token any LOT term whatsoever into the number of times members of K have caused S to token t.
According to Jerry Fodor's atomistic theory of content, subjects' dispositions to token mentalese... more According to Jerry Fodor's atomistic theory of content, subjects' dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor's appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects' various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. And while Fodor has recently qualified his atomism, the cognitively holistic nature of dispositions continues to undermine his view.
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Papers by Rob Rupert
which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have
instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are
articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition
as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of
generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of
their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current state of cognitive science, I conclude
that we have no reason to think memory or cognition are generic natural kinds that
can ground an argument for cognitive extension.