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Data, Operationalization, and Method
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Political Science
Comparative Politics

Capturing Ethnicity: The Case Of Ukraine

Profile image of Henry HaleHenry HaleProfile image of Olga OnuchOlga Onuch

2018, Post Soviet Affairs

https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452247
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Abstract

Building on past survey-based studies of ethnic identity, we employ the case of Ukraine to demonstrate the importance of taking seriously the multidimensionality of ethnicity, even in a country that is regarded as deeply divided. Drawing on relational theory, we identify four dimensions of ethnicity that are each important in distinctive ways in Ukraine: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality. Using original survey data collected in May 2014, we show that the choice of one over the other can be highly consequential for the conclusions one draws about ethnicity's role in shaping attitudes (e.g., to NATO membership), actions (e.g., participation in the Euromaidan protests), and the anticipation of outgroups' behavior (e.g., expectations of a Russian invasion). Moreover, we call attention to the importance of including the right control variables for precisely interpreting any posited effects of ethnicity, making specific recommendations for future survey research on ethnic identity in Ukraine.

FAQs

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AI

What dimensions characterize Ukrainian ethnicity according to the research?add

The paper identifies four dimensions: individual language preference, language embeddedness, ethnolinguistic identity, and nationality, each influencing political attitudes.

How do different measures affect findings on ethnicity's political impact in Ukraine?add

Using various measures can lead to different conclusions; for instance, 25% oppose Russian as a state language, dropping to 15% with a work language measure.

What unique methodology was used in assessing Ukrainian ethnicity in the study?add

The study applies stratified, multi-stage sampling of 2,015 individuals, achieving a response rate of 51% via original survey methods.

What correlation exists among the indicators of Ukrainian ethnicity measured?add

The paper reports correlation coefficients ranging from 0.222 to 0.803 among various ethnicity indicators, confirming a degree of interrelation.

What does the research suggest about ethnicity's impact on expectations of invasion?add

The study finds ethnicity does not significantly shape expectations of a Russian invasion, with only 36% expressing concern in May 2014.

Figures (9)
Independent Variables
Independent Variables
Figure 2. Full effects of ethnicity on probability (%) of..
Figure 2. Full effects of ethnicity on probability (%) of..

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Ethnic Self-Identification in Ukraine, 1989–2001: Why More Ukrainians and Fewer Russians
Ihor Stebelsky

This paper analyses the changes in ethnic self-identification of the population of Ukraine from the last (January 1989) Soviet census to the first (December 2001) Ukrainian census. It begins with a comparison of the census data and describes the remarkable changes observed. Given the incomplete nature of published data on international migrations and their differentiation by ethnic groups in the inter-census period, the paper applies a method to fill in the gaps and calculate net migration balances for each ethnic group. Also, since no data is available on the net reproductive rates for separate ethnic groups in Ukraine, it sets out a method to estimate net reproduction rates for Ukrainians and Russians in the inter-census period. Using these methods, it establishes that differences in net migration on the one hand and the differences in net reproduction on the other contributed 11.1 and 4.4 percent of the growth in the share of Ukrainians and 6.8 and 5.2 percent in the sizeable decline in the share of Russians. The remaining lion's share is a shift in identity among members of ethnically mixed (mainly Russian-Ukrainian) families. Mothers of ethnically mixed families, identifying the ethnicity of their newly born, contributed 11.4 percent to the Ukrainian gain and 9.2 percent to the Russian loss. The remaining 73.1 percent of the Ukrainian gain and 78.8 percent of Russian loss resulted from lifetime identity shift from Russian to Ukrainian, the most likely candidates being members of Russian-Ukrainian families. INTRODUCTION The first population census of Ukraine reveals a major ethnic shift in the population of that newly independent country. According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, despite a decline in the population as a whole, the number of people who declared their nationality as Ukrainian actually increased since the last Soviet census. 1 While their numbers increased from 37.4 to 37.5 million, or by 122.6 thousand, the number of those who declared their

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The Ukrainian–Russian Linguistic Dyad and its Impact on National Identity in Ukraine
Nadiia Bureiko

Europe-Asia Studies, 2019

This essay asks what place language holds in the composition of Ukrainian national identity and whether the use of Ukrainian and Russian across Ukraine indicates a split in identity. Despite acknowledging the potential of these two languages to generate political cleavages, the essay shows that language controversies have not necessarily impeded the population's attachment and loyalty to the Ukrainian state. Moreover, the increasingly civic nature of Ukrainian national identity-particularly since Euromaidan-appears to be an important factor that allows people to speak Russian and still identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation. In the present essay the notion of 'Europe' is understood as a set of common values-democracy, market economy, respect for the rule of law and human rights-upon which the EU is constructed.

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Related topics

  • Sociology
  • Political Sociology
  • Ethnic Studies
  • Eastern European Studies
  • Comparative Politics
  • Political Behavior
  • Public Opinion
  • Eastern Europe
  • Social Sciences
  • Political Science
  • Sociology of Identity
  • Ukrainian Studies
  • Post-Soviet Studies
  • Public Opinion (Political Science)
  • Language and Identity
  • Political Behaviour
  • Post-Socialism
  • Politics of Ukraine
  • Ethnic Conflict and Civil War
  • Post-Communism
  • Ethnicity & Ethnic Conflicts
  • Policy Preference Formation
  • Political Identity
  • Russian-Ukrainian Relations
  • Post-Communist Studies
  • Politics and International relat...
  • Ethnicity and National Identity
  • Ukrainian Language
  • Ethnicity and Identity Politics
  • Ethnicity and Nationality
  • Transition in Central and Easter...
  • Linguistic Identities

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    Evolving Dynamics of Societal Security and the Potential for Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
    David J. Galbreath

    Europe-Asia Studies

    In this essay we argue that changes in political structures in post-Soviet Ukraine have affected the potential for conflict during transition. Relying on organisational theory to determine the potential for conflict in Ukraine, we argue that this potential is structurally determined by the changing character of societal relations within and beyond Ukraine. The potential for conflict was always present in post-Soviet Ukraine, but this essay examines the facts of when, how and why conflict happened, and how it was related to weak state institutions, centre-periphery relations and an unsettled relationship with Russia. Relying on our analytical framework, we conclude that the conditions for further conflict greatly outweigh the conditions for peace. UKRAINE HAS FACED MANY CHALLENGES SINCE INDEPENDENCE. It has set out to be both Western and Eastern, often, as Taras Kuzio (2003) has shown, vacillating between East and West in foreign policy and foreign relations while maintaining complex, fraught relationships with both. Like many former Soviet countries, it has struggled through political, economic and even social transition (Smith 1999) and found ways to manage all these challenges, even arriving at what appeared to be a tenuous status quo (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2013). Nevertheless, by 2014 Ukraine was at war against what it called 'Russian-backed terrorists' and launching an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) that would challenge the country territorially and politically. The potential for conflict was always present in post-Soviet Ukraine. This essay is about the facts of when, how and why it occurred. Ukraine has faced many challenges, but while the conflict is commonly portrayed as ethnolinguistic in essence, it is actually far more complex, even though the Russian government and media present the war as protecting the rights of Russians in the 'near

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    Identity, war, and peace: public attitudes in the Ukraine-controlled Donbas
    Olexiy Haran

    Eurasian Geography and Economics

    Contrary to Russia's expectations, military intervention into Ukraine only strengthened the Ukrainian civic nation. As a number of polls demonstrate, since 2014 there is a growing trend that the vast majority of Ukrainians, also in the government-controlled areas of the Donbas, identify themselves, first and foremost, as Ukrainian citizens. Regional and local identity is not their primary choice anymore and there are clear indicators of a strong civic identity that favors a unitary Ukraine. The lack of progress for a solution of the conflict in the Donbas impacts upon Ukrainian public opinion which, in turn, puts pressure on the Ukrainian authorities: there is a wide acceptance of a diplomatic solution to the conflict and readiness for some compromises but the reintegration of the occupied territories should take place according to prewar conditions, without any federalization of Ukraine. Also, without establishing a stable security regime in the Donbas there is little support for an implementation of the political part of the Minsk-2 agreement. However, closer to the frontline, the more Ukrainians are ready for compromises. The promise of peace by new President Volodymyr Zelenskyy puts a question on what compromises his team may accept and justify in the eyes of Ukrainians.

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    The linguistic situation on the Ukrainian Black Sea coast – Ukrainian, Russian and Suržyk as “native language”, “primary code”, frequently used codes and codes of linguistic socialization during childhood
    Gerd Hentschel

    Russian Linguistics

    The study analyses the linguistic situation in the three Ukrainian oblasts on the Black Sea coast using survey data collected from 1,200 respondents before the Russian attack on Ukraine. At the end of the 18th century, this region was the core of a “new Russian” governate during Tsarist times. Previously, the region had been ruled by Tatars and there were neither Russian nor Ukrainian settlements. From the 19th century onwards, the Ukrainian and Russian population dominated. Since the annexation of the Crimea, these oblasts represent a crucial part of the Kremlin’s plan to establish an “expanded New Russia (Novorossiya)” under Moscow’s control – extending along the Ukrainian-Russian border and the northern Black Sea coast, reaching from Xarkiv to Odesa. This area is clearly at the forefront of Russia’s current war goals since controlling it would allow them to establish the strategically important land bridge to Crimea.Linguistically, the area undoubtedly belongs to those regions of...

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    The Displaced as ‘Ordinary Citizens’: Exploring Variation in the Political Attitudes of the Displaced from Donbas
    Gwendolyn Sasse

    Europe-Asia Studies, 2020

    Based on original survey data, this essay analyses the political attitudes of individuals displaced by the war in eastern Ukraine. We systematically compare attitudinal differences and similarities along three axes: the displaced relative to the resident population; the displaced in Ukraine relative to the displaced in Russia; and the displaced from the (non-)government-controlled areas relative to the resident population in the (non-)government-controlled areas of Donbas. This fine-grained comparative analysis highlights the variety of attitudes held by the displaced, similarities in attitudes across displacement locations, and the effect of war casualties on attitudes and self-declared political interest. WAR AND DISPLACEMENT FUNDAMENTALLY DISRUPT PEOPLE'S everyday lives. These disruptions are likely to shape attitudes and behaviour, but social scientists tend to lack the data to study the attitudes of those who are most directly affected by war. Beyond a focus on the needs, health and rights of the displaced, or their views on issues directly related to the war-for example, their self-reported identities and perspectives on inter-group relations or proposals for peace-we lack a good understanding of the views of these individuals on a wider range of political issues. What do people experiencing war and displacement think of democracy or the direction their country is headed in, and how interested are they in politics in general? Including these issues in the discussion prevents us from reducing the people exposed to war and displacement to these experiences. Painting a fuller picture of their attitudes also provides us with an insight into some of the more long-term political challenges linked to war and displacement.

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