Conceivably Wrong: Defusing Chalmers’s Zombie Argument

Filosofia Unisinos, 2020

A zombie world is a possible world in which all the microphysical truths are identical to the truths in our world, but no one is phenomenally conscious. A zombie is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who has none of the phenomenal conscious experiences of the individual in our world. An inverted is an individual in a possible world whose microphysical truths are not only identical to the microphysical truths of an individual in our world, but who also has phenomenal conscious experiences. These experiences, however, are qualitatively different from the ones of the individual in our world. The first premise of Chalmers’ conceivability argument against materialism is that a zombie world, a zombie and an inverted are ideally conceivable. This paper rejects this premise in claiming that: given that current physics does not allow philosophers to establish a clear concept of the physical...

Acta Analytica, 2019

In this paper I argue that the first and the third premises of the zombie-argument cannot be jointly true: zombies are either inconceivable beings, or the possible existence of them does not threaten the physicalist standpoint. The tenability of the premises in question depends on how we understand the concept of a zombie. In the paper I examine three popular candidates to this concept, namely zombies are creatures who lack consciousness, but are identical to us in their a) functional organization, b) entire physical makeup, and c) microphysical structure. The main aim of the paper is to argue that none of these conceptions conveys a consistent zombie-concept to us, which, at the same time, would be dangerous for physicalism. In the conclusion I argue that the source of this failure can be found in the logical fallaciousness of the argument, namely the premises simply presuppose the truth of the conclusion.

Problemos, 2023

In this paper, I present a novel objection to Chalmers's "master argument" against the privileged strategy of 'type B' physicalists to account for the explanatory gap (the "phenomenal concepts strategy"). Specifically, I argue that the second horn of the master argument gets wrong why zombies cannot have our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. Zombies cannot have a kind of mental state that we have. If something must have all of our psychological attributes to share our epistemic situation, then zombies cannot serve the purpose of the second horn of the dilemma. By way of background, I begin by briefly outlining a related argument against physicalism, also advanced by D. Chalmers-the "conceivability argument." I highlight some of the primary challenges with this argument and present additional criticisms. Finally, through a brief examination of panprotopsychism, I consider what lies ahead if Chalmers's arguments are conceded. I conclude that the phenomenal concept strategy is a sound explanation for why the conceivability of zombies likely does not imply their metaphysical possibility.

Philosophical Studies, 2008

If zombies were conceivable in the sense relevant to the 'conceivability argument' against physicalism, a certain epiphenomenalistic conception of consciousness-the 'e-qualia story'-would also be conceivable. But (it is argued) the e-qualia story is not conceivable because it involves a contradiction. The non-physical 'e-qualia' supposedly involved could not perform cognitive processing, which would therefore have to be performed by physical processes; and these could not put anyone into 'epistemic contact' with e-qualia, contrary to the e-qualia story. Interactionism does not enable zombists to escape these conclusions.

Semiotic Studies, 2021

D. Chalmers and J. Perry both construe phenomenal concepts as irreducible to descriptive concepts of physical properties or properties, which logically supervene on them. But they draw different conclusions from this point. D. Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" argues that the epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical properties shows that the former cannot be ontologically identified with the latter. J. Perry in "Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness" claims that we can identify phenomenal properties with physical ones without being committed to reductionism. In this paper I am going to examine Chalmers' and Perry's views on meaning and necessity, especially with respect to identity statements, in order to find where exactly their ways of thinking about the content of phenomenal concepts.

The paper focuses on some aspects of Charmers’ philosophy of mind, namely, his argument in favor of the existence of the so-called zombies. Zombies are supposed to be weird philosophical creatures endowed with all human physical properties though lacking conscious experiences and qualia. We argue against the logical possibility of conceiving zombies, thus weakening Charmers’ dualism

Teorema, 43(3), 2024

In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural sciences and that depends on an uncertain appeal to the possibility in principle of a future unified physics. I conclude that the uncertain character of these assumptions calls for a reassessment, not only of the implications of this type of argument for methodological naturalism but also of the role such arguments play in the study of consciousness.

Actual Problems of Mind, 2019

In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish's attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers' reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers' claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entai-lment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2023

Chalmers's two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.