Papers by Wilson Mendonça
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Oct 5, 2023
Chalmers's two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the... more Chalmers's two-dimensional argument against materialism (aka the zombie argument) is arguably the most ingenious attempt to ground a view about fundamental reality on epistemic considerations. From the conceivability of a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but that is deprived of phenomenal consciousness (a zombie), the argument draws on the interplay of the primary and the second intensions of the zombie hypothesis to infer the metaphysical possibility of a zombie world, and thus the falsity of physicalism about phenomenality. By means of a detailed reconstruction of the two-dimensional argument, the paper tries to isolate its most central assumption: that the role played by an epistemic scenario (an intentional object) in the verification of the zombie hypothesis is played by a nonintentionally individuated metaphysical world (the zombie world) considered as actual. The paper argues that no non-viciously circular case for this assumption has been made. Thus, the two-dimensional argument is at best inconclusive.
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2002
lhe paper takes assue with a widely accepted view of mental causatton Tlus is the view that menta... more lhe paper takes assue with a widely accepted view of mental causatton Tlus is the view that mental causation is either reduable to physical cau sation or ultrmately untenable, because mcompauble with the causal completeness of physics The paper examines, first, why recent attempts to save the phenomena of mental causation by way of the nouon of supervement causauon fail The result of t/us exammauon is the clarm that cmy attempted spectficauon of the most baste causal factars wluch supposedly underhe a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connectums wah the effect m quesuon By contrast, the specification of these factors ai a higher-level would allow establishmg such connecuons The paper doses with a discussion of how the view of autonomous lugher-level causation grounded on countofactual relations can be made compatible with the physicalistic comnutment to a complete specification of the particular causes of any physical effect exclusively in phys-:cal terms
Abstracta, Dec 1, 2004
The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between c... more The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between causation and explanation. The first is usually conceived as an extensional relation connecting particulars individuated non-intentionally, while the second would concern only rational, intensional links between true propositions (facts). Close examination of the particularistic strategy employed to account for the way causal explanation depends ontologically on causation shows that it fails in at least two cases: (i) explanations involving negative facts and (ii) explanations by stative predications. This also reveals that the usual assumption of token-states as a new type of particular causes designated by the nominalization of the sentential expression of stative facts is not independently motivated. Moreover it goes against the plausible distinction between enabling conditions and triggering causes. The paper closes with the claim that facts can be genuine causes and effects.
Wittgenstein e os números
O Que nos faz pensar, Apr 1, 1991
Dewey's Metaphysics of Mind
Abstracta, Sep 1, 2007
In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘... more In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”. On a first approach, that doesn’t look very innovative to our contemporary materialist convictions. Indeed, Kim argues persuasively that a central claim of emergentism—concerning the irreducibility of emergent properties—is irremediably at odds with a view of mental causation that follows from some very plausible physicalist assumptions. This is “the problem of downward causation.” I intend to show that Dewey’s brand of emergentism actually allows an adequate reply to the very important worry formulated by Kim.
Veritas, Apr 25, 2016
Este artigo está licenciado sob forma de uma licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internaciona... more Este artigo está licenciado sob forma de uma licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que a publicação original seja corretamente citada.
Filosofia Unisinos, Dec 13, 2017
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.... more This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Relevance
Facta Philosophica, 2002
... André Fuhrmann. FG Philosophie. Universität Konstanz. 784534 Konstanz, Germany.andre.fuhrmann... more ... André Fuhrmann. FG Philosophie. Universität Konstanz. 784534 Konstanz, Germany.andre.fuhrmann@uni-konstanz.de. Wilson P. Mendonça. Instituto da Filosofia e Ciências Sociais. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro. Largo de São Francisco de Paula, 1. ...
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy, Aug 5, 2011
RESUMO O trabalho identifica algumas questões críticas em tentativas recentes de tratar o objeto ... more RESUMO O trabalho identifica algumas questões críticas em tentativas recentes de tratar o objeto da moralidade como uma ficção. Sobre o pano de fundo de uma distinção entre cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo moral exclusivamente em termos da natureza do estado mental expresso pelo enunciado moral, independentemente do conteúdo semântico do enunciado (§ 1), o trabalho mostra um deficit estrutural no argumento da intransigência proposto por Kalderon a favor do ficcionalismo moral hermenêutico (§ 2). Mediante a reconstrução dos passos que levam do cognitivismo irrealista ao ficcionalismo moral revolucionário, argumenta-se que não é claro como uma moral fictícia concebida por Joyce poderia ainda ter uma influência adequada na conduta cooperativa e na resolução de conflitos de interesses (§ 3). Ademais, a diferenciação entre a interpretação de dicto e a interpretação de re da conexão necessária entre o juízo moral e a motivação revela as lacunas no argumento internalista comum a favor do não-cognitivismo e no argumento da bizarrice em favor do cognitivismo irrealista (§ 4). O trabalho é encerrado com algumas observações sobre o recurso à teoria humiana das razões normativas na tentativa de justificação da teoria do erro invocada pelo ficcionalismo moral revolucionário (§ 5). Palavras-chave: metaética, cognitivismo moral, ficcionalismo hermenêutico e revolucionário, internalismo motivacional, internalismo de razões.
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2007
According to the dominant view on causation, particular, spatial-temporally locatable events, whi... more According to the dominant view on causation, particular, spatial-temporally locatable events, which can be designated by singular terms and definite descriptions, are the only genuine relata of the causal relation. This supports and is supported by the accepted dicothomy between explanation, conceived of as an intensional relation between facts or truths, and the natural, extensional relation of causation. The paper takes issue with this view and makes a case for the legitimacy of the notion of fact-causation: the relata of many relations expressed by the sentential connector '(The fact) C causes (the fact) E' can be genuine causes and effects (I). The extended view on causation is then applied to the problem of mental causation. Assuming the truth of physical realizationism, the paper explores the connection between causal efficacy and counterfactual relevance of properties. It is shown that, at least in many cases, the right counterfactual links required by causation can be found only at the level of the realized facts, not at the most basic level of realizing facts (II). Finally, given the similarities between the defense of nonreductive physicalism sketched here and the more immodest attempts to vindicate scientifically the claims of metaphysical materialism, justly criticized by Van Fraassen as manifestations of 'false consciousness', it is considered whether and how the paper's main argument can avoid Van Fraassen's charge (III).
Manuscrito, 2002
It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting... more It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate the notion of supervenient causation in a nonreductive framework fails. The upshot of this examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect in question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher level would allow establishing such connections. The paper closes with a discussion of how this view of autonomous causation at the higher-level can coexist with the notion of a complete specification of the causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms.
Como ficcionalizar a moral um roteiro
Trans/Form/Ação
Resumo: De acordo com uma abordagem proeminente na semântica formal contemporânea, a verdade das ... more Resumo: De acordo com uma abordagem proeminente na semântica formal contemporânea, a verdade das asserções morais depende de uma perspectiva normativa sobre os fatos do mundo. A implementação dessa abordagem, conhecida como contextualismo indexical, trata a dependência da verdade moral vis-à-vis a perspectiva moral correspondente em analogia com a dependência contextual característica de sentenças contendo termos indexicais. Alternativamente, a perspectiva moral é vista como configurando as circunstâncias de avaliação nas quais o conteúdo expresso pela ocorrência de uma sentença moral é avaliado como verdadeiro ou falso. A versão moderada dessa visão alternativa (o contextualismo não indexical ou relativismo moderado) considera que a verdade da ocorrência de uma sentença moral em um contexto de uso é determinada pela avaliação do seu conteúdo na “circunstância do contexto”: a circunstância de avaliação representada pelo mesmo conjunto indexado que representa o contexto de uso. A ver...
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Jul 19, 2012
The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which ... more The claim that at least some of our mental states have qualitative, phenomenal features to which we have privileged cognitive access is intuitively plausible. Nevertheless, the claim is considered by many philosophers to be incompatible with a physicalist ontology. Some radical physicalists prefer simply to deny the existence of the qualitative character of our mental states, whereas other physicalists try to reinterpret the knowledge of the phenomenal character of our experience as the acquisition of an ability, i.e., as a sort of know-how in opposition to the acquisition of an information (know-that). The paper presents and examines critically some recent attempts to compatibilize the sui generis nature of phenomenal knowledge with the materialist claim that the content of this sort of knowledge is constituted entirely by physical facts.
Fisicismo N�o-Reducionista: Uma Atitude Sem Conte�do Cognitivo? Sobre O Desafio De Bas Van Fraassen
Dewey's Metaphysics of Mind
Abstracta, Sep 1, 2007
In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘... more In Experience and Nature Dewey makes “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’ theory of mind”. On a first approach, that doesn’t look very innovative to our contemporary materialist convictions. Indeed, Kim argues persuasively that a central claim of emergentism—concerning the irreducibility of emergent properties—is irremediably at odds with a view of mental causation that follows from some very plausible physicalist assumptions. This is “the problem of downward causation.” I intend to show that Dewey’s brand of emergentism actually allows an adequate reply to the very important worry formulated by Kim.
Programas e promessas: sobre o (ab-)uso do jargao computacional em teorias cognitivas da mente
Manuscrito Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 1989
Como ficcionalizar a moral um roteiro
The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between c... more The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between causation and explanation. The first is usually conceived as an extensional relation connecting particulars individuated non-intentionally, while the second would concern only rational, intensional links between true propositions (facts). Close examination of the particularistic strategy employed to account for the way causal explanation depends ontologically on causation shows that it fails in at least two cases: (i) explanations involving negative facts and (ii) explanations by stative predications. This also reveals that the usual assumption of token-states as a new type of particular causes designated by the nominalization of the sentential expression of stative facts is not independently motivated. Moreover it goes against the plausible distinction between enabling conditions and triggering causes. The paper closes with the claim that facts can be genuine causes and effects.
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2002
This paper takes issue with a widely accepted view of mental causation. This is the view that men... more This paper takes issue with a widely accepted view of mental causation. This is the view that mental causation is either reducible to physical causation or ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal completeness of physics The paper examines, first, why recent attempts to save the phenomena of mental causation by way of the notion of supervenient causation fail The result of t/us examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect m question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher-level would allow establishing such connections. The paper doses with a discussion of how the view of autonomous higher-level causation grounded on counterfactual relations can be made compatible with the physicalistic commitment to a complete specification of the particular causes of any physical effect excl...
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Papers by Wilson Mendonça