We are embodied souls and ensouled bodies

2021

Referring to neurological structures and functions within the brain, as well as thought operations and behaviors coming from the brain, this short paper distinguishes between the Body and the Soul, and between the Soul and the Spirit. Materialists, attempting to describe the fully functioning human being, argue there is only Body. Dualists argue there is only Body and Soul. The Spiritual/Tripartite view is that humans exist as Body, Soul, and Spirit. There are scientific indications, as well as literary/philosophical/theological indications that human beings exist at all three levels. The scientific indications come from brain scans, thought operations, and complex behaviors. The Soul develops from the Body, and the Spirit develops from the Soul, but that does not mean that (once formed) they can be reduced to one another. This paper attempts to move the reader from a “substance” orientation (materialism) to a “functional” orientation (measurable abilities). Reductionistic materialism does violence to the functional integrity of the human being. What hangs over this whole discussion is the materialistic “substance” metaphysics of the 1600s. Unless you can specify a tangible, measurable “substance”, then whatever you are talking or writing about is not really “real.” This position is, of course, nonsense. Anyone who knows about the electro-magnetic forces, clouds, speeds, positions, transformations, sudden appearances and disappearances in particle physics knows that the era of a “single observable stuff universe” is long over. What supplies a much more complete, understandable, and satisfying perspective is a functional orientation, where the focus shifts from “material substances” to “observable functions and outcomes.” This is the descriptive orientation of this paper. Yet, often, if you bring this up this newer orientation, you will instantly be called “unscientific.” What is truly “unscientific” is refusing to question assumptions and refusing to look at life through anything but a “substance” lens. If ever we are to have what Abraham Maslow called “a Science of Persons”, we are going to have to get past our obsession with material “substance” and accept/welcome an Analysis of Functions.

Analecta Husserliana

Springer eBooks, 2015

The categories of body and soul as inheritors of modern Cartesian dualism, but above all of Christian cosmology, are a crucial point of departure for the analysis of religiosity in Latin America. A strong presence in religious and secular traditions, where modern canonical dualism is a relative empirical fact, gives an account of effective processes of secularization and modernization in the region in which a relative specificity for the soul and another for the body are recognized. However, the articulation between body and soul in so-called "popular" subaltern religiosity and in the new spiritualities poses a challenge for the canonical versions, accounting for exceptional processes of religious modernization that show new and old modes of negotiation between the body and soul.

Didaktikos: Journal of Theological Education, 2018

In the article, I lay out reasons why the question of human constitution still matters in religious education.

Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics, 2019

Unity of mind, body, soul, spirit is necessary for our thriving, for actualising our potentials, for being an exemplar, for living a truly human life. We all bear the potential 'megalopsychia', to be an exemplar. As part of our being humans we can equally flourish physically, mentally, and spiritually. In order to actualise our true selves, those of us engaged with the life of mind need to explore the life of body and vice versa. Because we cannot excel in one field if we ignore another dimension of our existence. It is only a book review here, am yet to develop my full paper.

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2013

In Body, Mind and Human Life, Joel B. Green is approaching the challenges to the biblical interpretation in constructing a biblical theological anthropology in the context of modern neuro-scientific advances by dialoguing through the interface of science and theology. His expertise in neuroscience is brought to bear on his reflections as he keeps biblical hermeneutics in constant dialogue with the current neuro-philosophy that integrates neurosciences with the traditional concerns of the philosophy of mind. Main outline and content: In Chapter 1, Green is attempting a basic survey of the notion of human identity as conceived within the biblical as well as scientific worldviews. He further identifies that the materialistic or dualistic conceptions are not conducive to the construction of a theological anthropology as they stand discredited by the recent neuroscientific explorations and hence establishes that a monistic conception is both biblical and also as most viable. In Chapter 2, Green deals with the problem of " identity, " especially the theological significance of the creation of humanity in the divine image, and, he highlights the notion of " embodied relationality " for the human identity through his hermeneutical method. For this purpose, he is evaluating evidences from the biological sciences and neuropsychology in answering the questions of human distinctness from other creatures and gathers evidences from the biblical materials in order to reflect on the significance of the communitarian aspect of human identity. In Chapter 3, he takes up the challenges posed by neurobiological and neuro-philosophical advancements to the traditional theological affirmations of sin, original sin, free will, and especially the difficulties surrounding the relationship between human volition and responsibility. In Chapter 4, Green sets out to explore the concept of conversion and salvation as a " journey " where he identifies the pivotal role of the local community of believers and he identifies this communitarian construction as inevitable for our construal of the mission of the church in the world. In Chapter 5, he continues to probe the dominant body-soul dualism as it was considered indispensable to answer the eschatological questions about the continued identity of a human person after physical death into the afterlife. He especially pays attention to the reality of the total decay of the human body after death, and its implications for the traditional Christian belief in an embodied resurrection. He is relying on a monistic conception of human constitution and a spiritual understanding of resurrected embodiment to conceive the continued identity.

1996

1The doctrines of the New Church deal at some length with practical explanations for mystical phenomena. This is not to say that they claim to offer the last word on these matters, but only that they offer the prospect that these are understandable;

Leaven, 2010

B arbie turned fifty in March 2009. What a cultural icon she has been! In those fifty years she has pursued over 100 careers including president, astronaut, professional baseball player, doctor, concert pianist and the current totally styling "tattoo Barbie." She's an empowering force: a doll that can do anything. As I have looked at her in all her various expressions T am well aware that the one fundamental thing about Barbie that has not changed in fifty years is her body-no doubts there. No matter what her race, her hairstyle, her clothing, her career, Barbie's body has remained unchanged. Although there is not a male doll equivalent to Barbie, there are bodybuilders such as Arnold Schwarzenegger or quarterbacks such as Tony Romo who represent a traditional cultural image of a male body. Perhaps we are not the ideal body, but we are all bodies. We embody God in our femaleness and our maleness. To embody God through our bodies has implications for our ministries. What is it that we embody when we embody our God? Studies focused on aspects of embodiment seem to be increasing in the academy, in such fields as religion, anthropology, psychology, politics and philosophy. A lot of us have images of God that may go back to our childhood-images of a powerful, almighty being, sitting on a throne, commanding all the powers of the universe. We may even fear the wrath and coldness of such a God, as Job did when he said, "He has torn me in his wrath, and hated me; he has gnashed his teeth at me ... " (Job 16.9). Let's shift our focus of God to what is revealed through God's "incarnated" son. To the extent that it is possible to know something about God, our best chance of doing so is through God incarnating "godness" through Jesus Christ. That incarnation shows us a loving God in a lived body, a body that is vulnerable, emotional and even disabled. Vulnerable! Does God embody vulnerability? The sixth chapter of the Gospel of John has an interesting statement mixed in between Jesus' feeding of the five thousand and his walk on the sea. This is the last Galilean miracle recorded in both John and Mark, and no doubt it aroused a lot of attention, which could have led to an uprising, and could have given authorities a reason to arrest Jesus legally. I The text says, "When Jesus realized that they were about to come and take him by force to make him king, he withdrew again to the mountain by himself' (John 6.15). He wants to be by himself-alone-away from both the crowds and his intimate group of apostles. This is only one of several accounts in the New Testament of Jesus wishing to be alone. He's vulnerable. He's going to be arrested and ultimately die soon. He needs I. Raymond Brown.

Routledge Companion to Jewish Philosophy, 2024

This paper examines the question of what we are, maps the possible answers, and locates those answers in certain classical Jewish sources. It then develops a distinctively Jewish approach to that question-an idiosyncratic version of dualism-that hasn't been seriously explored in the general philosophical literature. After defending its Jewish bona fides, the paper motivates it based on more neutral philosophical considerations. It will emerge that there's a well-motivated, deeply Jewish, and heretofore neglected contender on the question of human ontology.