Papers by Richard Swinburne
Faith and Reason
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 5, 1984
Different theologians give different accounts of the kind of faith that is necessary for the prac... more Different theologians give different accounts of the kind of faith that is necessary for the practice of a religion such as Christianity. For some, it is simply belief that there is a God (and that he has done various actions); for others, it is trust in God. This book analyses the nature of belief and of trust, and considers when belief and trust are rational. It concludes that the practice of a religion requires a faith that involves both trust and belief, but a fairly weak kind of belief. The book reaches this conclusion by analysing the purposes for practising a religion: the attainment of salvation for oneself and others, and the rendering of due worship and obedience to God. Someone's religious practice is rational insofar as she has reason for believing that practising her religion is the best way to achieve these purposes, and that these purposes are greatly worthwhile.
Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne, 2011
Jak daleko siêgnê pamiêci¹, zawsze myla³em kategoriami chrzecijañskimi; pamiêtam te¿, ¿e od najm³... more Jak daleko siêgnê pamiêci¹, zawsze myla³em kategoriami chrzecijañskimi; pamiêtam te¿, ¿e od najm³odszych lat siê modli³em. Poniewa¿ ani mój ociec, ani matka, nie byli chrzecijanami, jakikolwiek ludzki wk³ad w ten proces nale¿y przypisaae najwczeniejszym wp³ywom wychowawczym, w czasie, którego ju¿ nie jestem w stanie sobie przypomnieae. Gdy ju¿ przeszed³em przez brytyjsk¹ szko³ê niepubliczn¹, odby³em s³u¿bê wojskow¹ i zosta³em przyjêty na studia w Uniwersytecie Oksfordzkim w 1954 r., bycie chrzecijaninem uwa¿a³em za najwa¿niejsz¹ rzecz w moim ¿yciu. Przy tym uwielbia³em spieraae siê na argumenty i pasjonowa³y mnie wielkie pytania teoretyczne. Sk³oni³o mnie to do podjêcia studiów licencjackich z filozofii, nauk politycznych i ekonomii (z naciskiem na filozofiê). Dom rodzinny, szko³a, s³u¿ba wojskowa (któr¹ spêdzi³em ucz¹c siê mówiae po rosyjsku, przypuszczalnym jêzyku wroga w przysz³ej wojnie), a nade wszystko mój uniwersytet to by³y miejsca o wysokim poziomie intelektualnym, gdzie styka³em siê z wszelakimi osi¹gniêciami i bie¿¹cymi pogl¹dami nowoczesnego wiata akademickiego. Pogl¹dy te, tak mi siê wydawa³o, by³y zasadniczo antychrzecijañskie, a etyka wyrafinowanych intelektualistów bardzo mocno ró¿-ni³a siê od etyki tradycyjnych chrzecijan.
Creeds
Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 12, 1991
Omnipotent
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 11, 1993
Arguments pour l’existence de Dieu
Odile Jacob eBooks, 2003
Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 22, 2018
Phenomenal conservativism in epistemology is a view which endorses the principle of credulity: na... more Phenomenal conservativism in epistemology is a view which endorses the principle of credulity: namely, the principle that every belief with which a person finds himself is a justified belief (one which the believer is justified in having) in the absence of any evidence that the belief is false (which might take the form of evidence that the belief has been produced by an unreliable process). This chapter investigates the senses of ‘belief’, ‘justified’, and ‘evidence’ on which this doctrine is true, and the senses in which it is false. It concentrates in particular on the many different senses in which a belief can be said to be ‘justified’ or ‘rational’; and it applies these results to religious claims concerning religious experience.
The Life and Moral Teaching of Jesus
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 9, 2003
Jesus led a morally perfect life, teaching and healing (probably performing miracles), and died a... more Jesus led a morally perfect life, teaching and healing (probably performing miracles), and died as a result of an unjust judicial verdict. He taught the importance of supererogatory love, prayer, and repentance; and that there would be a judgement that would separate the good from the bad. Almost inevitably, there are one or two incidents in the life of Jesus and one or two aspects of his teaching, about the morality of which we have some doubts; but there are so few such incidents and aspects that we reasonably doubt our moral intuitions about them.
Anomalies and Scientific Theories. By Willard C. Humphreys. (San Fransisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co.1968. Pp. 318. No price given)
Philosophy, Apr 1, 1969
Teleological Arguments
Oxford University Press eBooks, Mar 25, 2004
The Miracle of Theism
The Journal of Philosophy, 1985
Faith and the Existence of God: Arguments for the Existence of God
Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture series, Mar 1, 1988
Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for grant... more Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. (It would involve a self-contradiction to assert the premises but deny the conclusion.) What I shall call a ‘correct’ inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P-inductive argument the premises make the conclusion probable (i.e. more probable than not); in what I shall call a correct C-inductive argument, the premises add to the probability of the conclusion (i.e. confirm it, make it more probable than it was; but do not necessarily make it overall probable). Arguments only show their conclusions to be true if they start from true premises; arguments of the above types which work (i.e. are valid or correct) and do start from such premises I will call sound arguments. Arguments are only of use to show to an individual that the conclusion is true if he already knows the premises to be true. Most of what I shall have to say today concerns arguments with respect to which there is no doubt that the premises are true.
Think, 2008
The first six articles in this issue of THINK have the theme "Good without God". Here, Richard Sw... more The first six articles in this issue of THINK have the theme "Good without God". Here, Richard Swinburne argues that the existence of God is not a precondition of there being moral truths, but his existence does impact on what moral truths there are. Suppose that there is a God of the kind affirmed by Christianity, Judaism and Islam. What difference does that make to morality? I shall argue that the existence and actions of God make no difference to the fact that there are moral truths, but that they make a great difference to what those moral truths are. Actions may be (objectively) morally good, bad, or indifferent. Among good actions are those which are obligatory (that is, are duties), and ones which go beyond obligation and which are called 'supererogatory'. I am obliged to pay my debts, but not to give my life to save that of a comradesupremely, supererogatorily, good though it is that I should do so. Likewise among bad actions, there are those which it is obligatory not to do -these are wrong actions; and there are bad actions which are not wrong, and which I call 'infravetatory'. It is wrong to rape or steal, yet (plausibly) it is bad but not wrong (barring special circumstances) to 'waste one's talents' or sit by oneself watching soft pornographic DVD's. By saying that some action is 'objectively' good, bad or whatever, I mean that it is so, whether or not the agent believes it to be so. If I have borrowed £100 from you, I have an obligation to repay you the £100, whether or not I believe that I have that obligation. By saying that some action is 'subjectively' good or whatever, I shall mean that the agent believes that it is objectively good or whatever. Our subjective obligations are to fulfill what we
Faith and Philosophy, 2005
Faith and Philosophy, 1996
Organon F, Jan 22, 2019
Much recent neuroscientific work, and in particular the programme initiated by Benjamin Libet, se... more Much recent neuroscientific work, and in particular the programme initiated by Benjamin Libet, seeks to show "the causal closure of the physical"-that mental events never cause physical events, and in particular that our intentions never cause brain events and thereby our intentional bodily actions. But no one is justified in believing any scientific theory unless they are justified in believing that it successfully predicts certain events. Someone is justified in believing that certain events predicted by some theory did occur, if they apparently remember having perceived these events or if some other scientist apparently testifies that they have perceived these events. But we believe our apparent memories of our past perceptions of events because we believe that perceiving those events has caused brain events which have caused our present apparent memories of them; and we believe the apparent testimony of others because we believe that their intentions to testify have caused brain events in them which in turn have caused the words of their testimony to come out of their mouths. So someone could only justifiably believe the theory that mental events never cause physical events if they believe that either their past perceptions or the intentions of other scientists to tell them what they perceived, both of which are kinds of mental events, have caused brain events, which are physical events. So that theory is self-defeating; no one could ever be justified in believing it, or more generally be justified in believing the theory of the causal closure of the physical.
Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology
The Philosophical Review, Apr 1, 1995
Contemporary science presents us with the remarkable theory that the universe began to exist abou... more Contemporary science presents us with the remarkable theory that the universe began to exist about fifteen billion years ago with a cataclysmic explosion called 'the Big Bang'. The question of whether Big Bang cosmology supports theism or atheism has long been a matter of discussion among the general public and in popular science books, but has received scant attention from philosophers. This book sets out to fill this gap by means of a sustained debate between two philosophers, William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith, who defend opposing positions. Craig argues that the Big Bang that began the universe was created by God, while Smith argues that the Big Bang has no cause. The book consists of alternating chapters by Craig and Smith, with each chapter being either a criticism of a preceding chapter or being criticized by a subsequent chapter. Part One consists of Craig's arguments that the past is necessarily finite and that God created the Big Bang, and Smith's criticisms of these arguments. Part Two presents Smith's arguments that Big Bang cosmology is inconsistent with theism and Craig's criticisms of Smith's argument. The authors' arguments are based on Einstein's theory of relativity, and there is also a discussion of Stephen Hawking's new quantum cosmology.
Miracles
The Philosophical Quarterly, Oct 1, 1968
Duty and the Will of God
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dec 1, 1974
For a theist, a man's duty is to conform to the announced will of God. Yet a theist who makes... more For a theist, a man's duty is to conform to the announced will of God. Yet a theist who makes this claim about duty is faced with a traditional dilemma first stated in Plato's Euthyphro—are actions which are obligatory, obligatory because God makes them so (e.g. by commanding men to do them), or does God urge us to do them because they are obligatory anyway? To take the first horn of this dilemma is to claim that God can of his free choice make any action obligatory or non-obligatory (or make it obligatory not to do some action). The critic claims that the theist cannot take this horn, for God cannot make bad actions good.
The Irreducibility of Causation
Dialectica, May 23, 2005
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Papers by Richard Swinburne