This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain o... more This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied (a position I call ‘No-Futurism’). The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version of the problem of cross-temporal relations regarding cross-temporal normative relations. I then consider and reject various solutions to the problem available to No-Futurists. The upshot of the discussion is that which ontology of time we choose sets constraints on the kinds of explanations we may offer for our future-directed obligations.
Abrahamic Reflections on Randomness and Providence
In this chapter, we outline the various problems that ontological randomness is supposed to prese... more In this chapter, we outline the various problems that ontological randomness is supposed to present to God’s providence, as understood by traditional monotheistic religions. We begin by defining various notions of randomness and identify putative examples. We then outline three conceptions of divine providence: Super Meticulous, Meticulous, and General Providence. We go on to articulate the problems that randomness is thought to pose for God’s providence, especially problems concerning God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. We explore how the different conceptions of God’s providence fare with respect to these problems and gesture toward some possible responses.
This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is... more This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call truth-value-maker theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.
This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain o... more This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied (a position I call 'No-Futurism'). The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the 'problem of cross-temporal relations' that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop a version of the problem of cross-temporal relations regarding cross-temporal normative relations. I then consider and reject various solutions to the problem available to No-Futurists. The upshot of the discussion is that which ontology of time we choose sets constraints on the kinds of explanations we may offer for our future-directed obligations.
The second sentence on page 317 reads "The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how ... more The second sentence on page 317 reads "The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., <there are no unicorns> of something could be (or even needs to be) made true by the existence of some entity". This sentence should read "The challenge is that, prima facie, it is hard to see how a negative truth, e.g., <there are no unicorns> that is concerned with the non-existence of something could be (or even needs to be) made true by the existence of some entity".
Two sorts of claims are ubiquitous in philosophy: claims that something is essentially the way it... more Two sorts of claims are ubiquitous in philosophy: claims that something is essentially the way it is and claims that something is socially constructed. The purpose of this essay is to explore the relation between essentialist and social constructionist claims. In particular, the focus will be on whether socially constructed items can have essences or essential properties. In section 1, I outline a number of views about the nature of social construction. In section 2, I outline a number of views about essence. In section 3, I consider ways in which certain claims about social construction may be thought to challenge certain claims about essences. Section 4 then offers rejoinders to these challenges and attempts to point the way toward reconciling constructionist and essentialist claims.
This essay answers the question 'What is systemic racism?' by answering two more basic questions:... more This essay answers the question 'What is systemic racism?' by answering two more basic questions: (1) What is a social system? And (2) How can a social system be racist? Understanding the nature of institutions and social structures helps answer question (1). Question (2) is answered by distinguishing three general ways that a social system can contribute to racial oppression.
In this commentary piece, I argue that Asay's accounts of truth and truthmaking in A Theory of Tr... more In this commentary piece, I argue that Asay's accounts of truth and truthmaking in A Theory of Truthmaking give no role to the idea that truth depends on being. In fact, some of the positions taken in the book are in tension with this idea that has been central to truthmaker theory. I consider how three aspects of Asay's account relate to the idea that truth depends on being.
A recent presentist strategy has been to deny that truths about the past need presently existing ... more A recent presentist strategy has been to deny that truths about the past need presently existing truthmakers. These presentists don't deny that such truths need grounding; they hold that each truth about the past is true because of how the world was, not how it is. This paper argues that this position faces two problems, one of which can be overcome by adopting a certain view of the property of truth for propositions about the past. The second problem cannot be solved. The upshot is that this form of presentism is not a theory of truthmaking for propositions about the past. Rather, it is a theory about why such truths need no present grounding that is motivated by a novel theory of truth.
This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-Maximalism. The central feature of the view is... more This paper defends a new version of truthmaker non-Maximalism. The central feature of the view is the notion of a default truth-value. I offer a novel explanation for default truth-values and use it to motivate a general approach to the relation between truth-value and ontology, which I call 'Truth-Value-Maker' theory. According to this view, some propositions are false unless made true, whereas others are true unless made false. A consequence of the theory is that negative existential truths need no truthmakers and that positive existential falsehoods need no falsemakers.
Ásta's Categories We Live By is a superb addition to the literature on social metaphysics. In it ... more Ásta's Categories We Live By is a superb addition to the literature on social metaphysics. In it she offers a powerful framework for understanding the creation and maintenance of social categories. In this commentary piece, I want to draw attention to Ásta's reliance on explanatory individualism-the view that the social world is best explained by the actions and attitudes of individuals. I argue that this reliance makes it difficult for Ásta to explain how many social categories are maintained and why certain categories are reliably available to us and so resistant to change. These explanatory deficiencies could be overcome, I argue, by eschewing explanatory individualism and positing social structures to figure in structural explanations of the maintenance and availability of social categories.
Is the existence of ontological (non-epistemic) randomness incompatible with God’s providence ove... more Is the existence of ontological (non-epistemic) randomness incompatible with God’s providence over the created world? In this chapter, we outline the various problems that randomness is supposed to present to God’s providence, as understood by traditional monotheistic religions. We begin by defining various notions of randomness and identify putative examples. We then outline three conceptions of divine providence: Super Meticulous, Meticulous, and General Providence. We go on to articulate the problems that randomness is thought to pose for God’s providence, especially problems concerning God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. We explore how the different conceptions of God’s providence fare with respect to these problems and gesture towards some possible responses.
A prominent way of explaining how race is socially constructed appeals to social positions and so... more A prominent way of explaining how race is socially constructed appeals to social positions and social structures. On this view, the construction of a person's race is understood in terms of the person occupying a certain social position in a social structure. The aim of this paper is to give a metaphysically perspicuous account of this form of race construction. Working on an analogy with functionalism about mental states, I develop an account of a 'race structure' in which various races (Black, White, Asian, etc.) are functionally defined social positions. Individual persons occupy these social positions by 'playing the role' characteristic of those positions. The properties by which a person plays a race role, are the realizers for one's race. I characterize the social construction of a person's race in terms of a realization relation that satisfies a 'subset' condition on the social powers of raced persons. Races, on this view, are functionally defined, multiply realizable social kinds. The final section of the paper outlines some explanatory benefits of the account.
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