Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to analyse Wittgenstein’s later reflections on contradiction. In this case, I will focus on his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, comparing them with his Lectures held in Cambridge in 1939 and On Certainty, which contains ideas that belong to the last year and a half of his life. Furthermore, I will discuss two excerpts from the Remarks (§79 in section II and §8 in section V): these will be helpful to understand whether or not contradictions are acceptable according to Wittgenstein’s point of view. As a matter of fact, through a thorough examination of these excerpts, it is possible to argue that, in Wittgenstein’s opinion, a contradiction is not always a problem to avoid, but rather a natural and appropriate way to describe the surrounding world. To conclude, a brief parallel between Wittgenstein and Dialetheism will be proposed, more specifically in regard to a passage from In Contradiction by G. Priest, to show how Priest’s particular position about the contradiction’s ontological foundation could represent a key to interpret these two excerpts from the Remarks that I am going to analyse.

The aim of this paper is to understand how the mature Wittgenstein’s production could be fruitful to pursue the goal of Irigaray’s early work, which consists in the subversion of the western symbolic order and its monosexuate culture, connoted by a phallocentric dialectic that negates the “other” of the sexual difference in the name of a constant mirroring of the male sex. As a result, the female sex is devalued and represented only in relation to the former. To battle an order that doesn’t make room for women, Irigaray proposes the mimesis technique, that consists in reaffirming in a positive way the characters that in the phallocentric culture have been attributed to the female sex – especially the corporeal dimension – to unveil the “disruptive excess” of the female. I take the argument of private language of the mature Wittgenstein’s production as productive for the mimesis strategy that Irigaray proposes, due to the fact that it enables a positive rehabilitation of the corporeal, which is no longer downgraded and subordinated to the mental. Starting from this argument, I try to show that with his particular conception of the human soul – that is connected with the analysis of how we come into contact with other people – he is trying to overcome the mind-body divide – and hierarchy – to understand the person as a whole of different and correlated capacities that exceed just the intellectual ones.

Resumen: En este artículo intentaremos esbozar la crítica realizada por Carla Lonzi, fe- minista italiana y autora de Escupamos sobre Hegel, texto confrontado a la división de ro- les de género defendida por el filósofo de Stuttgart dentro de la partición del Estado ético –y por tanto del Estado europeo moderno– entre la vida pública y la privada. Para ello, se analizará en profundidad el tema de la diferencia sexual dentro del sistema hegeliano, para mostrar cómo la diferenciación social y política entre los roles masculino y femenino es fundada por el filósofo de Stuttgart como un hecho planteado por la necesidad del con- cepto, que luego se traduce en una forma natural y social. Posteriormente, nos adentrare- mos en el pensamiento de Carla Lonzi, vinculando sus ideas a lo que luego se denominará feminismo de la diferencia sexual, cuyo desarrollo debe mucho a las reflexiones de Lonzi. En este sentido, intentaremos esbozar su crítica a la división política de roles de género implementada por Hegel, para luego mostrar el aspecto constructivo de la obra de Lonzi: encontrar un espacio para las mujeres como mujeres, independientemente de la antítesis patriarcal masculino-femenino y público-privado, a partir precisamente de la experiencia de la mujer soltera, que en el sector privado vuelve a proponer –y por lo tanto también puede subvertir– una realidad que también es pública.

Abstract: In this article we will attempt to outline the critique made by Carla Lonzi, Italian feminist and author of Let’s Spit on Hegel, a text confronting the division of gender roles de- fended by the Stuttgart philosopher within the partition of the ethical state –and there- fore of the modern European state– between public and private life. To this end, the issue of sexual difference within the Hegelian system will be analyzed in depth, in order to show how the social and political differentiation between male and female roles is founded by the Stuttgart philosopher as a fact posed by the necessity of the concept, which is then trans- lated into a natural and social form. Subsequently, we will delve into the thought of Carla Lonzi, linking her ideas to what will later be called feminism of sexual difference, whose development owes much to Lonzi’s reflections. In this sense, we will try to outline her cri- tique of the political division of gender roles implemented by Hegel, to then show the con- structive aspect of Lonzi’s work: finding a space for women as women, independently of the patriarchal masculine-feminine and public-private antithesis, starting precisely from the experience of the single woman, who in the private sector re-proposes –and there- fore can also subvert– a reality that is also public.

AP 84-3 juillet-septembre 2021© Centre Sèvres. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. Reproduction interdite. 141 Bulletin de littérature hégélienne XXXI (2021) 1 Liminaire Le Bulletin de littérature hégélienne de 2021 comprend trente-cinq recensions d'ouvrages en langue allemande, anglaise, italienne et française. Plusieurs changements interviennent dans l'équipe qui l'anime, avec le départ de Francesca Menegoni, Jean-Michel Buée et David Wittmann, et l'arrivée de Luca Illetterati. Je remercie chaleureusement les trois premiers d'avoir oeuvré avec dévouement et une remarquable efficacité à l'organisation du Bulletin pendant de longues années, en me réjouissant que Jean-Michel Buée et David Wittmann restent disponibles pour des travaux de recension et de traduction. Le Bulletin ne manquera pas de faire régulièrement appel à leur grand savoir ! Par ailleurs, Luca Illetterati, professeur à l'Université de Padoue, accepte de prendre en charge la responsabilité qui était celle de Francesca Menegoni, à savoir de nous donner des avis experts s'agissant de la production italienne. Je le salue et le remercie pour le travail utile qu'il a déjà effectué pour ce numéro. Deux mille vingt et un marque le bicentenaire officiel de la publication des Principes de la philosophie du droit (lequel ouvrage est paru en 1820, mais porte l'année 1821 sur sa page de garde). Les manifestations hégéliennes ont eu lieu pour la plupart « à distance », comme on dit désormais. Ces conditions souvent rocambolesques ont obligé les participants à faire la démonstration de leur patience et de leur humour. Parmi les colloques très réussis, je citerai celui organisé par Élodie Djordjevic et Denis Baranger, en juin 2021 dans le cadre de l'Université Paris-II Panthéon-Assas, sur les deux cents ans des Principes. Les interventions ont été enregistrées et sont accessibles sur le site de l'Institut Michel-Villey. Le colloque a fait intervenir de nombreux juristes, qui ont pu jeter un regard original sur l'oeuvre. Il a été l'occasion d'examiner non seulement les 1. Le présent Bulletin, placé sous la responsabilité de Gilles Marmasse, a été préparé avec Victor Béguin (secrétaire) ainsi qu'Annette Sell et Luca Illetterati (correspondants étrangers). Ont également participé à la rédaction de la présente livraison :

Within contemporary philosophical discourse we find different thinkers that, with the aim to criticize Western dominant thought, by them addressed as ‘phallocentric’, directly refer to Hegelian texts. This paper will present one author who have openly spoken out a feminist critique of Hegelian thought, and in particular of the sexual division described by the Stuttgart philosopher, culminating in the ethical state – representing the constitution of the modern state – with the confinement of the feminine within the domestic sphere and, conversely, the liberation of the masculine within community political life. The thinker who will be analyzed is the Italian activist and philosopher Carla Lonzi, author of the renowned Sputiamo su Hegel (Let’s Spit on Hegel) and precursor of the Italian sexual difference feminism. The author confronted the political division implemented by Hegel within the ethical state between the two sexes, trying to show how Hegel’s work strongly contributed to the...

The aim of this paper is to draw an analogy between Judith Butler and the late Wittgenstein, mainly focusing on their investigations around the possibility of understanding and actualizing “the different”, i.e., what is not contemplated in our system of thought. This attempt is articulated through a double dynamic. On the one hand, both authors recognize the impossibility of detaching oneself from a certain conceptual system, within which we are formed as thinking subjects. Indeed, thinking about forms of life and cultural modalities different from ours is not something easy, as it is impossible to abstract and alienate ourselves from the very conceptual scheme and language games in which our reflections are formulated. On the other hand, while recognizing these difficulties, both authors affirm a possibility of change, albeit progressive and limited, in our forms of thought. For Butler, as she claims in The Psychic Life of Power (1997), this happens thanks to the subject’s repetition of actions, that, even if they necessarily take place within a system of power, can produce constant and progressive modifications of it. For Wittgenstein, this opportunity of change is made possible by the contingency of our linguistic games, as they are not universally necessary. The awareness of this possibility allows us to think about different linguistic forms and forms of life and, thus, to approach what is different. Object of analysis will be the method used by the later Wittgenstein to carry out this operation, referring mainly to Marilena Andronico’s studies on the descriptive and, mainly, on the imaginative method in Wittgenstein.

This text is an attempt to implement a feminist reading of Hegelian philosophy. In particular, the activity of mimesis proposed by Luce Irigaray, one of the greatest exponents of feminism of sexual difference, is applied to the Hegelian philosophy of nature. To implement this practice, several steps are necessary. Firstly, to develop an ontological explanation of nature capable of demonstrating the constitutively 'excessive' character of nature in relation to the concept, which maintains a fidelity to Hegelian thought and retains the speculative character of the relationship between Idea and nature. Secondly, to analyse Irigaray's concept of mimesis, consisting in that 'conscious masquerade' through which it is possible to unhinge the 'phallocentric' order from within, thus opening the space for a symbolic order for woman as a subject Other. Finally, to interrogate the symbolic link posed by Hegel-as well as by western culture in general-between woman and nature, in order to apply the exercise of mimesis to the Hegelian philosophy of nature. Indeed, if nature is symbolically linked to woman then, given the ontological explanation of nature presented here, the possibility of a symbolic reading of Hegel arises which gives space for an essence different to that of the concept to appear.

Back over the Sexual Contract. A Hegelian Critique of Patriarchy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, .  pp. Lorenzo Rustighi presents his latest text as "a book dedicated to the concept of patriarchy in modern social contract theories" (), and therefore dedicated to the study of the interaction between "patriarchy" and "democracy", meaning the latter term in its modern meaning as deriving from the theories of the social contract. The text presents itself as an attempt at an application of the Hegelian reading to the theory of the social contract (which the author reports around the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant), starting from a problematizing perspective towards the pervasiveness of patriarchal thought, and therefore leveraging feminist reflections towards a particular kind of contract, the sexual one. Rustighi, therefore, examines in the text the theory of the social contract, which sees its starting point with Hobbes' Leviathan, and which, according to the author, places a point of rupture with the previous forms of thinking in politics. This is because we move from the question of governancelinked to matters of justice, happiness and virtueto that of powerunderstood as the elimination of all previous issues in the name of an ethically indifferent policy, based on the assumed (authorized) and immediate identity between individual will and collective will. In this situation, the great contradiction of modern democracy arises, in which "pure heteronomy re-emerges, as a factor of constant democratic destabilization, from democracy's postulate of pure autonomy" (). In this sense, starting from the thought of De Gourges, the author notes how the contradiction proper to every democracy consists in the constant re-emergence of that difference that the contractual logic wants to eliminate instead, and that it cannot therefore understand. At the heart of Rustighi's analysis we find the articulated difference in terms of sexual difference. In this sense, the attention to feminist criticisms of modern political concepts, starting from De Gouges, allows the author to underline the emergence of that difference and partiality that has no place within the theories of the social contract. In this way, it becomes possible for the author to analyze the concept of sexual difference in order to show the relational link between patriarchy and politics, so as to be able to show, in contrast to authors like Pateman, the impossibility of a rigid division (intellectual, Hegel would say) between subjection and freedom, between private and public. This allows the author to argue that understanding patriarchy as a "problem" to be undermined by modern politics, does not help to understand the intrinsic dynamics of the logic of such politics, which instead are internally connected with patriarchal rationality. The analysis of these concepts and arguments develops in the text through the comparison of the author with different philosophical currents. In chapter , Rustighi analyzes "the enigmatic status of motherhood" () and its role played in the foundation of the concept of "power" in Thomas Hobbes. The maternal relationship is implicitly understood

This chapter explores the parallel approaches of Hegeland Wittgenstein to the concept of social habits,f ocusing on how such habits, once internalized, influenceindividual and collective behavior within acommunity.Itexamines the immediate manner in which habits are acquired, questioninghow one can critically detach from ahabit that has become second nature. The analysis is structured into three parts: Hegel'sp erspective on the anthropological and ethical dimensions of habit; Wittgenstein'si nterpretation of habits through the lens of 'form of life' and 'rule-following;' and ac omparative discussion thath ighlights the twoa uthors' shared philosophical analyses. It will be sustained that both philosophers challenget he immediacy of social habits by proposingt hatp hilosophical inquiry can alienate us from entrenched habits,t hereby enablingt heir criticalr eassessment and potential transformation. This insight underlines the role of philosophy in questioning and revisingt he obvious and familiara spectso fl ife.

Oltre duecento anni prima che Jacques Derrida divenisse famoso per la sua teoria della decostruzione, i Neri nelle Americhe stavano decostruendo il discorso bianco occidentale nazionalista, che celebrava l'alba della democrazia. Testi come l'Appeal di David Walker e il Sermon di John Marrant proponevano dei controdiscorsi che chiedevano se l'Occidente potesse davvero rivendicare la superiorità razziale in società così dipendenti, in così tanti modi, dagli schiavi Neri. Oggi, attivistɜ e studiosɜ delle minoranze sessuali, razziali ed etniche stanno ancora decostruendo questo discorso che rifiuta di comprendere la democrazia e lo schiavismo Nero (Black chattel slavery) come intrinsecamente incompatibili l'una con l'altra. Le vecchie abitudini sono dure a morire. Malgrado un numero vertiginoso di avanzamenti tecnologici, sociali e politici, il discorso occidentale sul Nero (per non menzionare

This paper addresses the question of how nature should be philosophically studied within a Hegelian framework. The focus is epistemological: it examines the relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences in the constitution of natural categories. I argue that this relationship is neither strictly a priori nor strictly a posteriori but unfolds through a speculative interplay between an a priori philosophical principle of unity and an a posteriori attentiveness to empirical discovery. To support this view, I engage with prominent positions in the secondary literature – namely, Alison Stone’s strong a priorism and John Burbidge’s a posteriorism. After addressing two key problems in these interpretations, I show how both mistakenly attempt to read Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature through the rigid Kantian dichotomy of a priori and a posteriori, which speculative thought seeks to overcome. Drawing on the work of Brigitte Falkenburg, Cinzia Ferrini, and Sebastian Rand, I propose that natural categories should be understood as the result of empirical content that is reorganized, a posteriori, in accordance with an a priori principle of systematic unity. This interpretation not only aligns with Hegel’s own texts but also highlights the dynamic and active character of his philosophy.

In this paper, we will analyze Hegel's concept of the concrete universal in the context of his political thought. In particular, we will analyze it as it appears in the realm of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) of Objective Spirit, Hegel's notion of a socio-political world. In the first section of the paper, we will examine the relationship of interdependence and reciprocity between the universality of institutions and the particularity of individual citizens, focusing on how Ethical Life must always be conceived as a concrete universal which is dynamic, active, in motion, and thus vitalized by individual demands. Specifically, we will explore how Ethical Life indeed requires customs, and hence social practices or 'habits', but, as we shall see, these must always remain subject to revision, and the particular should never be entirely absorbed into the universal, lest the latter become a dead mechanism, a merely abstract principle. To illustrate this point, the second section of the paper will draw a parallel between social custom, on the one hand, and habit (Gewohnheit) as a moment of the Subjective Spirit, on the other. This comparison will show how the ethical community risks ossifying its Spirit if a social order becomes overly formal, as Hegel asserts in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. The third section of the paper takes up the tragic character of Antigone in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to demonstrate how the particular, with its individual demands, must always challenge the universal tendency to become formal and abstract. We will see how such an analysis of the concrete universal in the Hegelian political sphere leads to a reflection with feminist implications which must go beyond Hegel himself, precisely to remain faithful to the dynamism of his philosophy.

In this paper, an attempt will be made to analyze the time of sexuate difference, so as to understand (a) in what consists a temporal characterization that takes into account sexu- ate difference, (b) which temporal dimension is proper to sexuate difference. In particular, in order to do so, I will try to outline what sexuate difference means in Luce Irigaray’s thought, analyzing how this term departs from the common distinction between sex and gender, while taking into serious consideration the relationship with nature and culture. Next, I will outline patriarchal time and the time of sexuate difference, showing how the former is unable to guarantee an authentic encounter with the other of sexuate difference, as it does not promote a dialectical relationship between the subject and the surrounding world. On the contrary, the time of sexuate difference opens to a different temporal possi- bility, where past, present and future encounter meaningful resignifications in their mutual relationship. Finally, I will ask what is the time, in the sense of epoch, of sexuate difference, showing its constitutively future-directed character.

In this paper, I defend that enactivism uses phenomenological terminology, such as "Constitution" and "world" equates with the notions of "enaction" and "world" but whose outcome may have the meaning of what Husserl calls "species relativism" in Logical Investigations. The effect of this maneuver forgets the meaning of the Husserlian expression "a priori of the life-world" as such is used in Crisis of the European Sciences.

El papel de lo trascendental en la propuesta de Zahavi y Gallagher sobre la naturalización de la fenomenología. ABSTRACT In the context of the current approaches that strive for the naturalization of phenomenology, we find the mutual enlightenment (Gallagher, 1997; Zahavi, 2010, 2013) which poses the need for both phenomenology and cognitive science take advantage of its link, enlightening its investigations mutually. However, to achieve this goal, transcendental phenomenology must be bracketed and it is proposed to proceed through its psychological version although, at the same time, it is pointed out that phenomenology loses everything philosophically interesting when leaving its transcendental​ dimension (Zahavi, 2004, 2010, 2013). In this talk, I want to show that this tension puts in check the role of phenomenology within this proposal and that, consequently it could be philosophically incompatible with the Husserlian versión of phenomenology.

¿Qué significa alteridad animal? ¿Cuáles son las estructuras que constituyen la animalidad y cómo ellas pueden ser comprendidas a la luz de la filosofía? ¿Cómo puedo, por otro lado, determinar estructuras naturales que le pertenecen como tal? Varios autores desde diversas perspectivas filosóficas han arrojado luz sobre el significado y contenido de estas preguntas. Por un lado, la fenomenología de Husserl ha esclarecido la manera en la cual el sentido alteridad se constituye en la empatía, a través de una extrapolación del sentido más primario de mi experiencia reducida a la esfera de mi propiedad (Eigenssphäre) hacia la alteridad del otro que me aparece corporalizado (Husserl 1979; HUA XIV; San Martín, 2007; Osswald, 2012; Cabrera, 2013; Staehler, 2008; Ciocan, 2017) Por otro lado, el enactivismo autopoiético, enfoque de las ciencias cognitivas con profundas y reconocidas raíces fenomenológicas, ha establecido conceptos “naturales” a partir de los cuales podemos comprender la estructura biológica de los seres vivientes, a saber, autopoiesis, adaptatividad y creación de sentido (Weber & Varela, 2002; Varela et al. 2016; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2005). En esta ponencia, sostengo que el planteamiento sobre la alteridad animal en ambos enfoques depende de una consideración radical de la corporalidad en cuanto que esta nos permite establecer estructuras empíricas y trascendentales a partir de las cuales podemos comprender cómo se desenvuelve la experiencia del animal en cuanto alteridad.

La domesticación puede ser entendida como un entrecruce entre seres humanos y animales. Fenomenológicamente hablando, esta corresponde a un caso en el cual los animales adquieren ciertos rasgos humanos que surgen a partir de la convivencia que se da entre ellos y los seres humanos. En la ciencia encontramos casos de orangutanes, tales como el de Chantek y Puti, los cuales adquirieron ciertas capacidades de lenguaje no verbal a partir de su exposición en diversos grados a contextos humanos. No obstante, tales capacidades dependían de la fuerza y la riqueza de tal convivencia. En este trabajo quiero mostrar el modo en que la domesticación, entendida como este entrecruzamiento entre la vida humana y animal, puede tener consecuencias ontológicas y éticas para la constitución de las subjetividades animales y humanas dependiendo de la fuerza y la riqueza de su convivencia.

Palabras clave: domesticación, entrecruzamiento, convivencia, constitución, apuntar.

Domestication is understood as a criss-cross between humans and animals. Phenomenologically speaking, this phenomenon is a case in which animals acquire certain human traits that arise from the mutual coexistence between animals and human beings. Science has shown a case of two orangutans, namely, Chantek and Puti, who acquired certain non-verbal language capacities from the exposition in different degrees to human contexts. Nonetheless, such capacities depended on the force and richness of the coexistence between animals and human beings. In this paper, I want to show how domestication, understood as a criss-cross between human and animal life, could have ontological and ethical consequences for the constitution of animal and human subjectivities depending on the force and richness of the mutual coexistence between both of them.

El mundo es un concepto de difícil interpretación en la fenomenología de Husserl. Por un lado, dicho concepto es caracterizado como el mundo de la vida o el mundo de la cultura en su sentido más pleno (Husserl, 2008a, 288; HUA VI, 191). Este mundo puede ser pensado en el plural aunque, sin embargo, exhibe al mismo tiempo tanto un modo de ser que es de carácter horizóntico, como otro de carácter apriórico, los que, en suma, lo hacen poseer una progresión y unidad ante las cuales "el plural carece de sentido" (Husserl, 2008a, 185; HUA VI, 146). Por otro lado, el mundo también es caracterizado como siendo una adquisición subjetiva y, por consiguiente, implica un red de constitución dinámica que llega a ser lo que es a partir de la progresión desde un premundo [Vorwelt] a un mundo [Welt] (Walton, 2015; Bower, 2015). De tal manera, el mundo en Husserl aparece bajo distintas determinaciones que, incluso, pueden parecer contradictorias (Carr, 1970). En este trabajo, utilizando una diferenciación que realiza Walton (2015) entre los órdenes de la constitución y la dación, propondré que es posible reconstruir el concepto de mundo y, de este modo, aclarar su "problematicidad" (Carr, 1970). De esta manera, mostraré que tal problematicidad surge debido a una indiferenciación de los diversos estratos de la constitución del mundo, los que se articulan en investigaciones genéticas y generativas que expresan distintos niveles del análisis de dicho concepto. Concluiré que sin esta distinción que conduce a distintos niveles de análisis, se obtiene una comprensión insuficiente del concepto tal como es desarrollado por Husserl en las distintas etapas de su obra. Palabras Clave: Mundo, mundo de la vida, horizonticidad, a priori del mundo, consistencia, progresión.