Papers by Heath Williams
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2022
I begin this paper by demonstrating that there is a perceived overlap between phenomenology and t... more I begin this paper by demonstrating that there is a perceived overlap between phenomenology and the personal level. This perception has recently played a decisive role in evaluating phenomenological contributions to discussions within cognitive science, for example, on topics of social cognition. In this paper, I aim not only to understand what might be meant by associating phenomenology with the personal level, but to cast this association in a critical light. I show that the personal level is essentially an explanatory level, whereby perceptions and mental state terms (paradigmatically, belief and desire) explain purposive action. I then separate the notion of consciousness from the notion of the personal level. To do so, I advance Wittgenstein's private language argument in conjunction with Sellars' account of how the meaning of mental state terms derives from their explanatory function. Using the Wittgenstinian/Sellarsian picture as guide, I show that characterising personal level explanations by reference to conscious experiences imputes excess baggage over and above the commitment to a unique explanatory level. Yet, for many, 'phenomenology' is the level of conscious experience. I argue that it is when the extra baggage of assuming that we are aware of our explanatory, personal level mental states is coupled with the controversial claim that phenomenology is tantamount to the verbalisation of conscious states that the ill begotten association between them is arises.
Husserl Studies, 2022
Husserl's early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This l... more Husserl's early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This lack represents an oversight, which we here redress. In contrast to currently accepted interpretations, we demonstrate that Husserl does not adhere to the much maligned deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation. Instead, via a close reading of early Husserlian texts, we reveal that he presents a unificationist account of scientific explanation. By doing so, we disclose that Husserl's philosophy of scientific explanation is no mere anachronism. It is, instead, tenable and relevant. We discuss how Husserl and other contemporary thinkers draw theoretical inspiration from the same source-namely, Bernard Bolzano. Husserl's theory of scientific explanation shares a common language and discusses the same themes as, for example, Phillip Kitcher and Kit Fine. To advance our novel reading, we discuss Husserl's investigations of grounding, inter-lawful explanation, intramathematical explanation, and scientific unification.
Synthese, 2021
This paper shows that Husserl is not guilty of Sellars' myth of the sensory given. I firstly show... more This paper shows that Husserl is not guilty of Sellars' myth of the sensory given. I firstly show that Husserl's account of 'sensations' or 'sense data' seems to possess some of the attributes Sellars' myth critiques. In response I show that, just as Sellars thinks that our 'conceptual capacities' afford us an awareness of a logical perceptual space that has a propositional structure, Husserl thinks that 'acts of apprehen-sion' (Akt der Auffassung) structure sensations to afford us perception that is similarly propositionally structured. Not only this, but there is much affinity and shared motivation between Husserl and Sellars accounts of the sensory stratum. Reflection on phenomenological considerations prevents Sellars from denying phenomenal non-conceptual content, whilst Husserlian 'sense data' are technical designations; dependant parts of perceptual experience grasped in abstraction, necessary for providing a reflective/philosophical account of empirical knowledge. I show that both Husserl and Sellars assert that the proper description of phenomenal content affords it the function of presenting properties of spatial objects during perception, and reiterate the well-known fact that Husserl thinks that perception is of 'conceptually' apprehended spatiotemporal objects (not sense data).
The Qualitative Report, 2021
I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “... more I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine (such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead of importing them from philosophical phenomenology.
Theory and Psychology, 2021
In this article, I show that Husserl's account of empathy supports embodied simulation theory. Bo... more In this article, I show that Husserl's account of empathy supports embodied simulation theory. Both Husserl and embodied simulation accounts of intersubjectivity face the difficulty of accounting for the relations of similarity and difference between self and other, but there is ample neurological data available to the simulationist to establish the relations of similarity and difference, and Husserlian concepts provide a useful interpretive framework for this data. I then respond to the criticism that the theory of embodied simulation involves imitation and is therefore indirect and nonperceptual. Yet, some extra process must distinguish perceptual intersubjectivity from nonsocial perception, and the most direct additional process possible is the interbodily resonances of the kinaesthetic system endorsed by both simulationists and Husserl. Husserl gives an account of kinaesthetic sensations amounting to a phenomenological description of embodied simulation. This article exemplifies phenomenological correlationism whereby cognitive science and phenomenology serve to enlighten one another. Keywords direct social perception, embodied simulation, kinaesthesis, mirror neurons, phenomenology and cognitive science an exact web, every line of direction miraculously the same, but the one worsted, the other silk.-Coleridge, The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Vol. 2 [AQ: 1] Phenomenology is the first-person study of the structures of conscious experience, whilst contemporary psychology is the third-person, empirical study of the mind. There is a long history of interaction between the two ranging from hostility to cooperation. The relation between cognitive science and phenomenology has been in question since the early 1980s (Dreyfus & Hall, 1982). More recently, spearheaded by works such as The
Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2020
I begin this paper by outlining two senses of "phenomenology." First, the "what it is like" or "a... more I begin this paper by outlining two senses of "phenomenology." First, the "what it is like" or "analytic tradition" sense: the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware. Second, the "Continental" sense: the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness. I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge. First, Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness, states of awareness, and the human person. The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features. Second, via the method of "sense explication," the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly "aware" of. The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked, leading to equivocation. Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the "what it is like" sense when they make certain "phenomenological" arguments concerning social cognition, yet Spaulding's ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology. Also, it is only phenomenology in the "what it is like" sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology. Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience, constituting a type of (non-causal) subpersonal explanation. Keywords awareness, phenomenological reflection, passivity and the unconscious, genetic phenomenology, the simple phenomenological argument, subpersonal psychology
This paper makes a phenomenological contribution to the distinction between personal and subperso... more This paper makes a phenomenological contribution to the distinction between personal and subpersonal types of explanation. I expound the little-known fact that Husserl gives an account of personal level explanation via his exposition of our capacity to express the understanding of another's motivational nexus when we are in the personalistic attitude. I show that Husserl's unique exposition of the motiva-tional nexus conveys its concrete, internally coherent, and intentional nature, involving relationships amongst the sense contents of acts of consciousness. Moreover, the motivational nexus is a generative space of possibility and choice. I show that, for these reasons, motivational explanation is not causal, nor deductive nomological, nor does it (or should it) reduce to subpersonal explanation. I finish with the comment that the uniqueness of personal level explanation points towards the possibility that the human sciences (including psychology) ought also employ types of explanations not found in natural sciences.
Grazer PS, 2019
This article provides an overview of Edmund Husserl's lesser known account of high-level imaginat... more This article provides an overview of Edmund Husserl's lesser known account of high-level imaginative empathy. The author discusses Husserl's solution to what we might call the 'generalizability problem'; if empathy is conceived as a relation whereby the understanding I have of my own mind allows me to understand your mind (as some versions of simulation theory and Husserl contend), then how does empathy account for potential differences between us? The author also discusses some features that make empathy more generalizable than might be initially thought, as well as its limits. A second major aim is to use this exegesis of Husserl to show a variety of overlaps between his theory and high-level simulation theory. The author also shows how Husserl's phenomenological theory provides a compelling response to critiques of high-level simulation from authors that utilize a hybrid cognitive science/phenom-enological approach (i.e. Gallagher and Zahavi).
Mind and Matter
This article defends mirror-neuron based embodied simulation (MNBES) from four criticisms. First,... more This article defends mirror-neuron based embodied simulation (MNBES) from four criticisms. First, the charge that MNBES cannot account for action understanding because it cannot account for the propositional attitude of intention fails, because embodied simulation proffers a "bottom-up" account of action understanding. Second, like much neurological science, MNBES is underwritten by an assumed correlation between cognitive functional processes (i.e. simulation) and neurological mechanisms (i.e. mirror neurons), and to demand mirror-neuron theorists close the explanatory gap asks too much. Third, MNBES has been criticized because it fails to provide an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of social cognition, but I show that neurological accounts, like most empirical science, do not aim to meet this philosophical standard. In the final section I argue that the shared representation of goals supervenes on mirror-neuron activity.
Horizon, 2020
Ingarden's phenomenology of aesthetics is characterised primarily as a realist ontological approa... more Ingarden's phenomenology of aesthetics is characterised primarily as a realist ontological approach which is secondarily concerned with acts of consciousness. This approach leads to a stark contrast between spatiotemporal objects and literary objects. Ontologically, the former is autonomous, totally determined, and in possession of infinite attributes, whilst the latter is a heteronomous intentional object that has only limited determinations and infinitely many "spots of indeterminacy. " Although spots of indeterminacy are often discussed, the role they play in contrasting the real and literary object is not often disputed. Through a close reading of Ingarden's ontological works and texts on aesthetics, this essay contests the purity of Ingarden's ontological approach and the ensuing disparity between real and literary object, particularly on the question of spots of indeterminacy. I do this by demonstrating the following five theses: 1) Ingarden's claim that the real object has an infinitude of properties belies an epistemology, and we should instead conclude that ontologically the real object's properties are finite. 2) Ingarden's a priori argument that absent properties of real objects are ontologically determined is unsound. 3) The radical difference between the infinitude and finitude of givenness and absence of the real and the literary object ought to be relativised. 4) Indeterminacies within the novel are concretised in much the same way that absent properties of real objects are intended. 5) Literature makes claims that have a truth value that we can attribute to their author. Key words: Ingarden's aesthetics, Ingarden's ontology, real and literary objects, spots of indeterminacy, finitude and infinitude, truth in literature. * My thanks to the two anonymous reviewers and Michela Summa for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. © HEATH WILLIAMS, 2020 704 HEATH WILLIAMS АНАЛИЗ «РАДИКАЛЬНОГО» РАЗЛИЧИЯ МЕЖДУ РЕАЛЬНОСТЬЮ И ЛИТЕРАТУРОЙ ХЭЙТ ВИЛЬЯМС Доктор философии, научный сотрудник. Департамент философии (Чжухай), Университет Сан Ят-Сен. Феноменология эстетики Ингардена характеризуется, прежде всего, реалистичным онтоло-гическим подходом, который вторичен по отношению к актам сознания. Этот подход приво-дит к принципиальному различию между пространственно-временными и художественными объектами. Онтологически первый автономен, полностью детерминирован и обладает опре-деленными атрибутами в то время, как последующий акт-гетерономный интенциональный объект, имеет лишь ограниченные определения и бесконечно много «моментов неопреде-ленности». Хотя моменты неопределенности часто обсуждаются, роль, которую они играют в противопоставлении реального и литературного объекта, зачастую не оспаривается. После скрупулезной работы с онтологическими работами Ингардена и его текстов по эстетике, ав-тор этого эссе ставит под сомнение чистоту онтологического подхода Ингардена и вытекающее из этого несоответствие между реальным и литературным объектом, особенно в отношении «моментов неопределенности». Я обосновываю свою позицию, приводя следующие пять тези-сов: 1) Утверждение Ингардена о том, что реальный объект обладает бесконечным количеством свойств, противоречит эпистемологии, и вместо этого мы должны заключить, что онтологиче-ские свойства реального объекта конечны. 2) Априорный аргумент Ингардена по поводу того, что отсутствующие свойства реальных объектов онтологически детерминированы, не обосно-ван. 3) Радикальное различие между бесконечностью и конечностью данности или отсутствия реального и литературного объектов должно быть релятивировано. 4) Неопределенности в ро-мане конкретизируются примерно так же, как и отсутствующие свойства реальных объектов. 5) В литературе выносятся истинностные утверждения, которые мы приписываем автору. Ключевые слова: эстетика Ингардена, онтология Ингардена, реальный и литературный объек-ты, моменты неопределенности, конечность и бесконечность, истина в литературе.
Phenomenological Studies
A recent development in intersubjectivity studies is the phenomenologically inspired direct perce... more A recent development in intersubjectivity studies is the phenomenologically inspired direct perception model of empathy. This paper will contribute to contemporary debates on intersubjectivity by clarifying exactly why Husserl sometimes described empathy in terms which suggest it is direct, and whether we ought to adopt the terminology of directness. I argue that, for Husserl, terming empathy 'direct' does not mean that experience of the other's mind in empathy is akin to my experience of my own mind, but this does not justify terming empathy 'indirect'. For Husserl, 'direct' is a term which denotes simple, intuitive and temporally immediate acts, and empathy fits this description. Also, Husserl requires a distinction between direct and indirect forms of intersubjectivity, and empathy must be classed as the former. Lastly, despite its direct nature, empathy still requires a degree of mediation or else it could not be an act of intersubjectivity at all, and the mediating factor that must be present is the body of the other. Thus, in this paper I will justify the description of empathy as a direct form of experience, while simultaneously clarifying the presence-in-absence structure of empathy.
Human Studies
Zahavi and Gallagher’s contemporary direct perception model of intersubjectivity has its roots in... more Zahavi and Gallagher’s contemporary direct perception model of intersubjectivity has its roots in the phenomenological project of Edmund Husserl. Some authors (Smith 2010; Krueger, 2012; Bohl and Gangopadhyay, 2014) have utilised, and criticised, Husserl’s model of direct empathic perception. This essay seeks to correct certain misunderstandings of Husserl notion of direct empathic perception and thus, by proxy, clarify the contemporary direct perception model, through an exegesis of Husserlian texts. In the first half of this essay I clarify the analogy between the directness of regular material object perception and the directness of empathic perception via a clarification of Husserl’s notion of co-presence. I argue that contemporary renditions of Husserl’s account which stress the dis-analogy between these two types of perception (Smith 2010; Krueger 2012) are based on a superficial and incorrect rendering of Husserl’s notion of co-presence. In the second half of this essay I clarify the notion of verification. I argue that, for Husserl, behaviour does not verify mental life. Instead, empathic verification occurs via the relation between concepts and intuitions. In my conclusions I show how contemporary authors misunderstand the fundamental nature of Husserl’s account of empathy because of the downgraded status of psychic life within contemporary cognitive science.
Abstract: Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great import... more Abstract: Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great importance on first-person descriptions, exactly what this entails goes undefined. I will seek to answer what’s involved in phenomenological description, with reference to Husserl. I define phenomenological description according to its genus and differentia. I compare description in the natural sciences with description in phenomenology. I discuss how the basic particulars for Husserlian phenomenological description stem from the intentional relation – particularly the distinction between noesis and noema. I discuss the pivotal role of reflection in phenomenological description. I further argue that a phenomenological description is more than a statement which utilises the ‘I-[verb]’ template. The final section analyses the difficulties inherent in describing intersubjectivity and argues these difficulties may have influenced Husserl’s early, descriptive account of this topic.
Keywords: description; phenomenological description; Husserl; intersubjectivity.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, No. 7–8, 2016, pp. 254–77
A. Cimino, C. Leijenhorst, Phenomenology and experience
Phenomenological Reviews
A. Simmons, E. Hackett, Phenomenology in the 21st Century
Phenomenological Reviews, 2016
Journal Articles by Heath Williams
Husserl Studies, 2022
Husserl's early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This l... more Husserl's early picture of explanation in the sciences has never been completely provided. This lack represents an oversight, which we here redress. In contrast to currently accepted interpretations, we demonstrate that Husserl does not adhere to the much maligned deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation. Instead, via a close reading of early Husserlian texts, we reveal that he presents a unificationist account of scientific explanation. By doing so, we disclose that Husserl's philosophy of scientific explanation is no mere anachronism. It is, instead, tenable and relevant. We discuss how Husserl and other contemporary thinkers draw theoretical inspiration from the same source-namely, Bernard Bolzano. Husserl's theory of scientific explanation shares a common language and discusses the same themes as, for example, Phillip Kitcher and Kit Fine. To advance our novel reading, we discuss Husserl's investigations of grounding, inter-lawful explanation, intramathematical explanation, and scientific unification.
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Papers by Heath Williams
Keywords: description; phenomenological description; Husserl; intersubjectivity.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, No. 7–8, 2016, pp. 254–77
Journal Articles by Heath Williams