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Philosophy
Phenomenology

Husserlian empathy and embodied simulation

Profile image of Heath WilliamsHeath Williams

2021, Theory and Psychology

https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320966640
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Abstract

In this article, I show that Husserl's account of empathy supports embodied simulation theory. Both Husserl and embodied simulation accounts of intersubjectivity face the difficulty of accounting for the relations of similarity and difference between self and other, but there is ample neurological data available to the simulationist to establish the relations of similarity and difference, and Husserlian concepts provide a useful interpretive framework for this data. I then respond to the criticism that the theory of embodied simulation involves imitation and is therefore indirect and nonperceptual. Yet, some extra process must distinguish perceptual intersubjectivity from nonsocial perception, and the most direct additional process possible is the interbodily resonances of the kinaesthetic system endorsed by both simulationists and Husserl. Husserl gives an account of kinaesthetic sensations amounting to a phenomenological description of embodied simulation. This article exemplifies phenomenological correlationism whereby cognitive science and phenomenology serve to enlighten one another. Keywords direct social perception, embodied simulation, kinaesthesis, mirror neurons, phenomenology and cognitive science an exact web, every line of direction miraculously the same, but the one worsted, the other silk.-Coleridge, The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Vol. 2 [AQ: 1] Phenomenology is the first-person study of the structures of conscious experience, whilst contemporary psychology is the third-person, empirical study of the mind. There is a long history of interaction between the two ranging from hostility to cooperation. The relation between cognitive science and phenomenology has been in question since the early 1980s (Dreyfus & Hall, 1982). More recently, spearheaded by works such as The

Key takeaways
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  1. Husserl's account of empathy enhances embodied simulation theory, bridging phenomenology and cognitive science.
  2. The article critiques the perception-imitation dichotomy in embodied simulation, emphasizing direct intersubjective perception.
  3. Mirror neurons play a crucial role in embodied simulation, providing neural mechanisms for social cognition.
  4. Husserl's phenomenological concepts clarify intersubjective relations of similarity and difference, enriching simulation theory.
  5. The integration of first-person experience into empirical psychology fosters interdisciplinary collaboration.

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