Papers by Mariela Aguilera
Núm. 49-50, 2024
Heredero de una tradición intelectualista, McDowell sostiene que los animales nohumanos carecen d... more Heredero de una tradición intelectualista, McDowell sostiene que los animales nohumanos carecen de orientación hacia el mundo externo debido a que la noción de experiencia depende de una segunda naturaleza, a la que ingresamos por medio del lenguaje. Esta concepción resulta desafiada por los distintos avances teóricos sobre la mente animal. El objetivo de este trabajo es esbozar una posición filosófica alternativa a la de McDowell. Para ello, tomaremos la propuesta de Bermúdez, extensible a los animales no-humanos, quien sostiene que la experiencia supone una dimensión temporal. A partir de algunos estudios empíricos sobre navegación espacial y memoria episódica, sostendremos que los animales no-humanos no sólo evidencian compresión temporal sino además satisfacen una versión desintelectualizada de las condiciones exigidas por McDowell, para trazar la distinción entre objetivo y subjetivo.
Cartographic systems and non-linguistic inference
Philosophical Psychology, Jan 25, 2016
Abstract It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against th... more Abstract It is often assumed that the capability to make inferences requires language. Against this assumption, I claim that inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. On the contrary, certain cartographic systems could be used to explain some forms of inferences, and they are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. By arguing that certain maps, as well as sentences, are adequate for inferential processes, I do not mean to neglect that there are important differences between maps and sentences. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to highlight interesting distinctions that might affect the way that cartographic thinking works.
Nombres: Revista de Filosofía, Aug 2, 2012
Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 2011
Charter y Heyes (1994) sostienen que la idea de conceptos animales no tiene sentido debido a que ... more Charter y Heyes (1994) sostienen que la idea de conceptos animales no tiene sentido debido a que es incongruente con las teorías psicológicas actuales sobre conceptos (teoría definicional, de prototipos y de ejemplares). Pero, como se sostiene aquí, el problema de los conceptos animales está vinculado con el problema de las condiciones de posesión de conceptos, el cual ha sido ampliamente estudiado por teorías filosóficas de conceptos. Las teorías psicológicas, en cambio, se han centrado en la naturaleza psicológica de los conceptos y son, por tal motivo, inadecuadas para responder esta cuestión. Ello no implica, sin embargo, mantener totalmente separadas la labor de dichas disciplinas. Por el contrario, sostengo que el pluralismo de conceptos-inspirado por desarrollos empíricos recientes de la psicología de conceptos-permite articular estos dos tipos de teorías. Es de esperar, finalmente, que del debate sobre conceptos animales se sigan consecuencias metodológicas sobre las investigaciones psicológicas. Animal Concepts: Psychological Theories, Pluralism and Division of Labor. Charter and Heyes (1994) claim that the idea of animal concepts has no sense since it cannot fit with any of the current psychological theories of concepts (prototype, exemplar and definitional theories). But, as I claim, the problem of animal concepts is related to the problem of conditions of concept possession, which has been widely studied by philosophical theories. Psychological theories of concepts have focused on the nature of concepts; so they are inadequate for answering such problem. Nevertheless, it does not mean the labors of both disciplines must be unrelated. Instead, by adopting pluralism about concepts-inspired by recent empirical research on psychology of concepts-it is possible to articulate both disciplines. Besides, some methodological consequence on psychology of concepts should follow from the debate on animal concepts.
Racionalidad e inferencia en animales sin lenguaje
En este trabajo caracterizo tres concepciones sobre la racionalidad y evaluo si son adecuadas par... more En este trabajo caracterizo tres concepciones sobre la racionalidad y evaluo si son adecuadas para dar cuenta de ciertas formas de racionalidad animal . Por un lado, el intelectualismo considera que ser racional involucra procesos inferenciales, para lo cual se requieren capacidades meta-representacionales y competencia linguistica. Por otro lado, el naturalismo concibe la racionalidad en terminos de conductas adaptativas. Por ultimo, el enfoque pragmatista ofrece una vision de la racionalidad como ajuste entre percepciones e intenciones. Si bien estos dos ultimos enfoques ofrecen una nocion de racionalidad extensible a animales no humanos, sostengo que no permiten dar cuenta de ciertos comportamientos en primates que ademas involucran procesos de inferencia. Para ello, presento algunos estudios desarrollados en etologia congnitiva y psicologia comparada, que no pueden ser adecuadamente explicados en terminos de representaciones percetuales. Por el contrario, estos comportamientos involucran capacidades representacionales percetuales mas complejas asi como un conocimiento conspicuo del entorno, ya sea fisico o social. Por medio de este analisis, me ocupo de la tesis, defendida tanto por el naturalismo como por el pragmatismo, de que para dar cuenta de la racionalidad animal no es necesario postular procesos de inferencia. En oposicion a esta tesis, defiendo la necesidad de articular una nocion de racionalidad y de inferencia adecuada para dar cuenta de dichos proceso en criaturas carentes de lenguaje. Finalmente, senalo algunas dificultades y futuros lineamientos para contuinar con esta investigacion.
Cartographic systems and animal inference
PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2012
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), Feb 1, 2020
In our daily lives, we can find that different kinds of representational media are employed in no... more In our daily lives, we can find that different kinds of representational media are employed in normative ways, to express different kinds of rules. Sometimes, this is overlooked by the primacy of discursive representations in our normative practices. However, a look into these practices often shows that they are more complex and richer, and particularly that they include more than one kind of representation. Regarding this, this paper will be focused on the capacity and limitations of different kinds of representational media to express normative contents, that is, to express the content of rules. keywords correction conditions, nonlinguistic representation, deontic pictures, instrumental maps 1 Acknowledgments: Previous versions of this paper were presented in the Conference Normative Drawings and Deontic Artifacts (Cagliari), in the Workshop on Language, Context & Cognition (Valparaíso), and in the Seminar Mental maps, paper maps, and e-maps, (EHESS, ENS), Paris. I want to thank the audiences for their interesting discussion and feedback. Also, I am in debt with the Concepts and Perception Research Group (CIFFYH), especially with Daniel Kalpokas and José Giromini for their helpful comments. Finally, I am grateful for the suggestions of the anonymous referee.
Cartographic Systems and Nonlinguistic Inference
PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2012
Análisis Filosófico, Nov 1, 2018
In "Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought", Burge claims that animals of different specie... more In "Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought", Burge claims that animals of different species are capable of making deductive inferences. According to Burge, that is why propositional thought is extended beyond the human mind to the minds of other kinds of creatures. But, as I argue here, the inferential capacities of animals do not guarantee a propositional structure. According to my argument, propositional content has predicates that might involve a quantificational structure. And the absence of this structure in animal thought might explain some of the differences with the propositional content of human thought.
Synthese, Jan 3, 2021
Since Tolman's paper in 1948, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that cartographic rep... more Since Tolman's paper in 1948, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that cartographic representations play an important role in cognition. These empirical findings align with some theoretical works developed by philosophers who promote a pluralist view of representational vehicles, stating that cognitive processes involve representations with different formats. However, the inferential relations between maps and representations with different formats have not been sufficiently explored. Thus, this paper is focused on the inferential relations between maps cartographic and linguistic representations. To that effect, I appeal to heterogeneous inference with ordinary maps and sentences. In doing so, I aim to build a model to bridge the gap between cartographic and linguistic thought.
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Apr 28, 2020
A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic... more A great number of investigations suggest that cognition involves both linguistic and cartographic representations. These researches have motivated a pluralist conception of cognition; also, they have been used to clarify how maps differ from linguistic representations. However, the computational processes underlying the interphase between both kinds of representations deserve further attention. In this paper, I argue that, despite their differences, cartographic representations coexist and interact with linguistic representations in interesting ways.
Pensamientos de primer orden
Crítica, Dec 11, 2013
Maps, Language, and the Conceptual–Non-Conceptual Distinction
Grazer Philosophische Studien, Nov 17, 2020
To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck (2007) draws on an apparent dichotomy between lingui... more To make the case for non-conceptualism, Heck (2007) draws on an apparent dichotomy between linguistic and iconic representations. According to Heck, whereas linguistic representations have conceptual content, the content of iconic representations is non-conceptual. Based on the case of cartographic systems, the authors criticize Heck’s dichotomous distinction. They argue that maps are composed of semantically arbitrary elements that play different syntactic roles. Based on this, they claim that maps have a predicative structure and convey conceptual content. Finally, the authors argue that, despite their differences, maps and sentences can logically interact with each other through heterogeneous inferences. These considerations not only challenge the view that conceptual content and inferential processes necessarily involve linguistic representations; furthermore, they provide a new perspective for thinking about maps, their semantics and syntax, and their interaction with linguistic systems.
First order thoughts
Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premis... more Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación y la generalidad. Si bien ninguna de ellas conlleva el pensamiento de segundo orden, en forma conjunta reflejan importantes aspectos del pensamiento conceptual.One argument for the interdependence of language and concepts relies on the assumption that concept possession involves second order thoughts, which in turn are language dependent. This paper focuses on a recent version of this argument formulated by José Luis Bermúdez. It claims that even though second orde...
Animal Concepts: Psychological Theories, Pluralism and Division of Labor
Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento, 2011
Charter and Heyes (1994) claim that the idea of animal concepts has no sense since it cannot fit ... more Charter and Heyes (1994) claim that the idea of animal concepts has no sense since it cannot fit with any of the current psychological theories of concepts (prototype, exemplar and definitional theories). But, as I claim, the problem of animal concepts is related to the problem of conditions of concept possession, which has been widely studied by philosophical theories. Psychological theories of concepts have focused on the nature of concepts; so they are inadequate for answering such problem. Nevertheless, it does not mean the labors of both disciplines must be unrelated. Instead, by adopting pluralism about concepts –inspired by recent empirical research on psychology of concepts– it is possible to articulate both disciplines. Besides, some methodological consequence on psychology of concepts should follow from the debate on animal concepts.
Razonando con mapas: la planificación de recorridos como regla instrumental
Capítulo 21 Cognición animal
La naturaleza del pensamiento de los animales
¿Cómo piensan los animales? ¿Tienen conceptos? ¿Cuál es la naturaleza del pensamiento animal? ¿Cu... more ¿Cómo piensan los animales? ¿Tienen conceptos? ¿Cuál es la naturaleza del pensamiento animal? ¿Cuáles son las diferencias y similitudes entre el pensamiento animal y el pensamiento humano? ¿Cómo han de explicarse tales diferencias?
Flexibilidad cognitiva e inferencia
Some philosophers, such as Davidson and McDowell, c laim that rationality involves a contrast bet... more Some philosophers, such as Davidson and McDowell, c laim that rationality involves a contrast between the subject ive and the objective, be - tween mind and world. For these authors, such contr ast merges into reflective thought, through linguistic competence. Millikan, i nstead, has argued that rationality can be placed within non linguistic cre atures, which exhibit a first contrast between mind and world by means of behavio ral flexibility, as a result of cognitive integration and affordances. In this p aper, I will identify what I call “cognitive flexibility”—a middle ground between reflective thought and behavioral flexibility. Cognitive flexibility paves the route to another sort of process-rationality, which results from reasoning a nd inference. Moreover, I argue that certain kinds of primates are rational i n this way through instru - mental reasoning
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2019
In our daily lives, we can find that different kinds of representational media are employed in no... more In our daily lives, we can find that different kinds of representational media are employed in normative ways, to express different kinds of rules. Sometimes, this is overlooked by the primacy of discursive representations in our normative practices. However, a look into these practices often shows that they are more complex and richer, and particularly that they include more than one kind of representation. Regarding this, this paper will be focused on the capacity and limitations of different kinds of representational media to express normative contents, that is, to express the content of rules.
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Papers by Mariela Aguilera