Value pluralism

Cet article souhaite comparer les poétiques de Rushdie et Glissant,
en se focalisant d’abord sur leurs réflexions sur l’art du roman, puis en
analysant un cas d’étude par auteur : Tout-monde pour Glissant et Quichotte pour Rushdie. Pour ce qui concerne Tout-monde, nous nous concentrons sur le traitement des chronotopes et la déconstruction de la narration cause-effet. En revanche, l’étude de Quichotte se concentre sur la réécriture de la tradition et la rupture de la barrière entre fiction et réalité.

Given $\ mu,\;\ eta: X\ rightarrow [0, 1] $ we study when the equality $ I_ {\ mu}^{T}= I_ {\ eta}^{T} $ holds, $ T $ being a continuous t-norm, and $ I_ {\ theta}^{T} $ the elemental preorder:\\\[I_ {\ theta}^{T}(y/x)= sup\{z\;;\; T (\ theta (x), z)\ leq\ theta (y)\}.\]

RESUMO O filósofo político e historiador das ideias Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) é considerado um dos principais intelectuais do século XX. Russo-judeu naturalizado britânico, Berlin ofereceu importantes contribuições nos debates sobre liberdade e pluralismo de valor. Como não era um escritor sistemático, seu trabalho se tornou amplamente conhecido a partir do trabalho do também filósofo britânico Henry Hardy (1949), que desde a década de 1970 é o principal editor das obras de Isaiah Berlin. Nesta entrevista, publicada originalmente no portal Estado da Arte, do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo, no dia 17 de fevereiro de 2019, Hardy comenta e interpreta importantes temas abordados por Berlin e que permanecem em destaque no debate contemporâneo. Palavras-chave: Isaiah Berlin. Pluralismo de valor. Religião e contemporaneidade. Conflitos entre religioso e secular.
ABSTRACT The political philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) is considered one of the leading intellectuals of the 20th century. Russian-Jewish-born British-naturalized, Berlin offers important contributions to the debates on freedom and value pluralism. As he was not a systematic writer, his work became widely known from the work of the British philosopher Henry Hardy (1949), who since the 1970s has been the main editor of the works of Isaiah Berlin. In this interview, originally published on the Estado da Arte website, of the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo, on February 17, 2019, Hardy comments and interprets important topics addressed by Berlin and which remain highlighted in the contemporary debate.

The present synthesis of current personal values theories is a way to structure the relevant models and their validation studies, if they have any. The aim of the paper is to identify the stage of validation of these theories. Each one is described, their validation studies for the scales are presented, where applicable and prudent interpretation of differences is made. The present synthesis of current personal values theories is a way to structure the relevant models and their validation studies, if they have any. The aim of the paper is to identify the stage of validation of these theories. Each one is described, their validation studies for the scales are presented, where applicable and prudent interpretation of differences is made. The review presents the different frameworks used mainly for research and those used for therapy. When it comes to analysing human behaviour, decisionmaking, and social interaction, having a clear and correct understanding of personal values is completely essential. The purpose is to investigate important theories of personal values, with a particular emphasis on the differences between them. The research illustrates the main characteristics of these frameworks across a variety of situations by conducting a comparative analysis of these frameworks' comparative analysis. The aim of this review is to evaluate the validity and criticism of these theories by analysing empirical research. We also provide insights into potential future research paths and practical ramifications in the areas of social policy and human development.

Cultural ecosystem services (CES) reflect peoples' physical and cognitive interactions with nature and are increasingly recognised for providing non-material benefits to human societies. Whereas coasts, seas, and oceans sustain a great proportion of the human population, CES provided by these ecosystems have remained largely unexplored. Therefore, our aims were (1) to analyse the state of research on marine and coastal CES, (2) to identify knowledge gaps, and (3) to pinpoint research priorities and the way forward. To accomplish these objectives, we did a systematic review of the scientific literature and synthesised a subset of 72 peer-reviewed publications. Results show that research on marine and coastal CES is scarce compared to other ecosystem service categories. It is primarily focused on local and regional sociocultural or economic assessments of coastal ecosystems from Western Europe and North America. Such research bias narrows the understanding of social-ecological interactions to a western cultural setting, undermining the role of other worldviews in the understanding of a wide range of interactions between cultural practices and ecosystems worldwide. Additionally, we have identified clusters of cooccurring drivers of change affecting marine and coastal habitats and their CES. Our systematic review highlights knowledge gaps in: (1) the lack of integrated valuation assessments; (2) linking the contribution of CES benefits to human wellbeing; (3) assessing more subjective and intangible CES classes; (4) identifying the role of openocean and deep-sea areas in providing CES; and (5) understanding the role of non-natural capital in the co-production of marine and coastal CES. Research priorities should be aimed at filling these knowledge gaps. Overcoming such challenges can result in increased appreciation of marine and coastal CES, and more balanced decision-supporting mechanisms that will ultimately contribute to more sustainable interactions between humans and marine ecosystems.

The so-called “weak thought”, theorized by the Italian postmodernist philosopher Gianni Vattimo (born in 1936), considered one of the most important Italian philosophers, has dismantled the main concepts on which Western philosophy was based (that is, the notion of Truth, God, Reason, an absolute foundation to thought, etc.). This philosophy, which is inspired by Nietzsche’s nihilism, by Heidegger, and by the philosophy of hermeneutics and deconstruction, offers a critical starting point not only to rethink, in a less rigid way, our Western culture, its philosophy, and its problems, but also the ethical principles and educational values that guide human life. Sport - as a human phenomenon and philosophical problem characterized by the presence of values, norms, behaviors, and rules that involves the action of human beings who interact and communicate “in” and “by” the game - can also be read in the light of this emerging philosophical theory. The aim of this study is to demonstrate ...

In this symposium contribution on Alexandre Lefebvre’s Liberalism as a Way of Life, I explore the insight that many individuals in liberal democracies derive their personal values—such as equality, fairness, and autonomy—not from religious or philosophical doctrines, but from the liberal political order itself. Drawing on liberalism’s nonteleological and pluralistic orientation, I argue that liberalism, as compared with comprehensive doctrines, is less deep insofar as it does not offer an ordered vision of final ends, leaving to each individual to select those ends. There are, I claim, many good liberal ways of life. I next explore liberalism’s “social thesis”, emphasizing the need for a supportive social and cultural environment to cultivate autonomy before reflecting on the challenge of liberalism’s self-preservation in a pluralistic society. The essay concludes by raising questions whether public institutions should promote liberal values as enabling conditions for self-direction rather than as final ends.

The objective of this paper is to recognize and categorize the various ways that ecosystem services researchers perceive the concept and purpose of ecosystem services (ES). To do so, we employed the discourse analysis approach of Q methodology, where 33 researchers ranked 39 statements on ES derived from the literature. Factor analysis of the Q sorts allowed for the interpretation of five main perspectives on ES: a pragmatic view on nature conservation, seeing ES as useful tool ("Non-Economic Utilitarian"), a strongly value-focused perspective with a skeptical view on ES ("Critical Idealist"), an opposition to a utilitarian approach to nature conservation but seeing ES as more encompassing approach ("Anti-Utilitarian"), a focus on a methodological rather than a critical approach to ES ("Methodologist"), and a rather economic approach to environmental decision-making, in which ES is a useful tool ("Moderate Economist"). We see this plurality as illustrating both the potential of the ES concept to serve as a boundary object for collaboration, but also the threat of ineffective collaboration due to the lack of a common conceptual ground. However, as pluralism can be fruitful if handled transparently, we suggest the need for open dialogue about underlying assumptions when using a value-laden concept like ES.

A cosmopolitan perspective includes both a reflective openness to the world and a loyalty to inherited traditions and practices. Sustaining this perspective includes important educational challenges surrounding the development of a sense of belonging and a balanced stance toward the old and the new. Perhaps this is most explicit with the difficulties of moving to a foreign country, where one attempts to adapt to unfamiliar cultural practices, while still preserving aspects of one's own cultural background and identity. This presentation examines the difficulties found in creating this cosmopolitan stance by focusing on the possible conflicts and tensions between the familiar and the foreign. Using John Dewey's ideas concerning growth, education and personhood as a conceptual platform, it proceeds to map out possible responses to such difficulties. A proper understanding of his notions of self, interest and moral growth can help alleviate the conflicts inherent in the cosmopolitan stance. Examples drawn from the personal experiences of those living in other cultures are introduced to help illustrate the value of this Deweyan approach to cosmopolitanism.

The conventional approach to Isaiah Berlin's writings has been to treat them discursively, as philosophical texts. While such approaches are insightful, there is more to Berlin's writings than his arguments. Among his literary strategies is a comparative approach that involves the use of metaphors, similes, and analogies. As I will argue, Berlin's use of metaphor constitutes a core component of his work, where his meaning is often suggestive more than precise. Berlin's intention seems to be to exhibit those aspects of experience reflective of uncertainty, where our choices are not determined by necessity. Such an intention ostensibly exhibits his value pluralism, as well as an oft-neglected sensitivity to the forms of language. By resorting to metaphors Berlin accomplishes several things: he shows how the intelligibility of experience is partially imagistic, he illustrates how meaning can be structured comparatively but nondiscursively, and he exemplifies the importance of these things for decision making.

Abstract
At the heart of this papers, we passionately delve into the central ideas proposed by the eminent and brilliant philosopher, John Finnis, within the realm of human rights. His voice resonates as an intellectual beacon, guiding generations of thinkers at the University of Oxford's Faculty of Law in the United Kingdom. However, in an act of courage and openness, we embark on the journey of debate and critical examination of these ideas, with the aspiration of weaving more heterodox and audacious perspectives.

We do not present our words as an absolute assertion of truth in these profound matters but as a humble acknowledgment that critique and refutation are the lifeblood of the history of legal philosophy. We firmly believe that this constant intellectual tension enriches and diversifies our perspectives, enabling us to transcend our own limitations and approach a deeper understanding of the complexity inherent in human rights.

Let it be emphasized that our intention is not to challenge or diminish Professor John Finnis. On the contrary, we consider critique, when expressed with respect and erudition, as the purest homage we can offer to exceptional thinkers. It is a testament to the enduring vitality of legal philosophy and a tribute to the tireless pursuit of truth and justice in the world. Ultimately, in our quest for continual intellectual growth and a profound understanding of human rights, this work stands as a testament to the transformative power of criticism and dialogue in the construction of a fairer and more equitable world.  P.S. A special greeting to my dear God the Heavenly Father, the blessed Jesus Christ, and the Immaculate Virgin Mary, without condolence to my legendary father, Don Santos Vera Sandoval and my Masters Martha Minow-Adolfo Pérez Esquvei. May Hashem bless and reward you forever. Shalom. Sincerely, Luis David Fernández Zambrano.
Director of the Chair "Culture for Peace and Human Rights"
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires (UBA – Argentina)

A key assumption fuelling optimism about the progress of large language models (LLMs) in accurately and comprehensively modelling the world is that the truth is systematic: true statements about the world form a whole that is not just consistent, in that it contains no contradictions, but coherent, in that the truths are inferentially interlinked. This holds out the prospect that LLMs might in principle rely on that systematicity to fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies in the training data: consistency and coherence promise to facilitate progress towards comprehensiveness in an LLM's representation of the world. However, philosophers have identified compelling reasons to doubt that the truth is systematic across all domains of thought, arguing that in normative domains, in particular, the truth is largely asystematic. I argue that insofar as the truth in normative domains is asystematic, this renders it correspondingly harder for LLMs to make progress, because they cannot then leverage the systematicity of truth. And the less LLMs can rely on the systematicity of truth, the less we can rely on them to do our practical deliberation for us, because the very asystematicity of normative domains requires human agency to play a greater role in practical thought.

Over the past two decades the academic literature on global distributive justice has generated a proliferation of positions regarding the question of how to conceive a globally just distribution of goods. One important development within this global justice debate is the emergence and increasing influence of several Pluralist theorists of global justice-including, perhaps most prominently, Fraser, R. Miller, and Risse. This article argues that Pluralists have not yet sufficiently engaged with the difficulty of how their conceptions of global justice could satisfy the publicity condition. This condition requires that the demands of justice must be publicly known to be recognized and fulfilled. This article explains why meeting this condition is especially difficult for the Pluralists. Then, it outlines an Integrated Pluralist position which, by placing special emphasis on global background justice, can meet the publicity condition. This position "integrates" concerns of justice emerging from a plurality of sites of justice. Thereby it follows "Integrationist" approaches to global justice-like those of Caney and Walton-which claim that the contents of justice of a given site of justice must not be determined in isolation from the grounds and contents of other sites of justice.

This essay contends that the elements of well-being are plural, partly objective, and separable. The essay argues that these elements are pleasure, friendship, significant achievement, important knowledge, and autonomy, but not either the appreciation of beauty or the living of a morally good life. The essay goes on to attack the view that the plural elements of well-being must be combined in order for well-being to be enhanced. The final section argues against the view that, because anything important to say about well-being could be reduced to assertions about these separable elements, the concept of well-being or personal good is ultimately unimportant.

I. Każde teoretyczne ujęcie wykładni prawa (w szczególności -każda normatywna koncepcja wykładni), jak również każda dostatecznie wykształcona praktyka interpretacyjna przyjmuje, często jedynie implicite, czy też nawet w sposób nieuświadomiony, określone filozoficzne założenia dotyczące tego, czym jest język, a także pewne aksjologiczne założenia dotyczące dobrego państwa i społeczeństwa, określające m.in. stosunek do faktu pluralizmu wartości. Mogłoby się wydawać, że ze względu na inny przedmiot założenia te nie są ze sobą powiązane (dotyczą one czegoś innego). Celem niniejszego artykułu jest jednak wskazanie, że chociaż założenia te nie są ze sobą bezpośrednio powiązane (dotyczą przecież innych sfer rzeczywistości), to jednak występują między nimi pewne relacje, które powodują, że przy rozstrzyganiu teoretycznych zagadnień związanych z wykładnią prawa przyjęcie określonych założeń dotyczących języka łatwiej pogodzić można z określonymi założeniami dotyczącymi pozytywnego bądź negatywnego stosunku do faktu pluralizmu wartości. Ze względu na cel opracowania należy w pierwszej kolejności ogólnie scharakteryzować dwie alternatywne ogólne teorie komunikacji za pośrednictwem języka, a także związki między nimi a sposobem rozstrzygania teoretycznych zagadnień z zakresu wykładni prawa. Poniżej zostaną scharakteryzowane dwie modelowe teorie przedstawiające określone wizje języka i komunikacji za jego pomocą, na które składać się będą określone założenia z zakresu filozofii języka. Pierwszą z nich będzie wizja strukturalistyczna (model strukturalistyczny), drugą zaś -nominalistyczna (model nominalistyczny). Rozróżnienie tych dwóch wizji będzie miało charakter pewnego uproszczenia i typologii, można bowiem wskazać wiele rozwiązań pośrednich (polegających na akceptacji niektórych założeń składających się na pierwszą z tych wizji, niektórych zaś innych należących do drugiej z nich). Na potrzeby niniejszego opracowania użyteczne jest jednak wskazanie pewnych wzorcowych i przeciwstawnych względem siebie rozwiązań (typów poglądów), aby lepiej widoczne były podstawowe kontrowersje. Ze względu na ograniczoną objętość opracowania odpowiednie dwie wizje (modele) języka zostaną scharakteryzowane skrótowo (można powiedzieć "hasłowo") za pomocą wyszczególnienia podstawowych składających się na

En el presente proyecto de grado titulado “Diseño de una carretilla con elevación manual a través de un pistón hidráulico de simple efecto con capacidad de carga de 500 kilogramos”, se desarrolló bajo la modalidad de proyecto factible apoyado en una investigación descriptiva de campo. A través de este, se busca evitar que los trabajadores de todas las industrias, especialmente aquellos que se encargan de transportar y/o elevar cargas de mercancía, tales como despachadores de equipaje, trabajadores de fabrica, trabajadores de construcción, entre otros se incline, ya que este tipo de labor puede producir enfermedades profesionales en la columna vertebral dejando consecuencias como: Lumbalgia, Ciática y Hernia discales. Para realizar la fase diagnostica se aplicaron las técnicas de la observación directa, entrevista no estructurada y información documental. En cuanto a la factibilidad técnica y económica se realizó un estudio de los materiales y los elementos mecánicos que va a tener dicha carretilla indicando una tabla de costo de materiales y mano de obra para la construcción de la misma. Por otra parte en la fase de diseño se consideraron los parámetros idóneos desde el punto de vista de ingeniería que cumpliera con la capacidad máxima de elevación de 500 kg, obteniendo como conclusión un proyecto adaptados a las necesidades musculo-esquelética que eviten enfermedades profesionales en los trabajadores que realizan esta labor.

La filosofía, a comienzos del siglo XXI, lejos de haber desaparecido, como tantas veces se pronosticó, parece gozar de plena vitalidad. Uno de los rasgos que la caracterizan es, sin duda, la diversidad de enfoques, escuelas y posiciones, así como la aparición de nuevas disciplinas y subdisciplinas, cada vez más especializadas. La filosofía no ha escapado a la fragmentación del conocimiento en especialidades cada vez más restringidas que afecta a todas las ciencias. La era de los grandes sistemas filosóficos parece haber quedado atrás para siempre. En esta situación, es imposible ofrecer en un volumen un esquema siquiera somero y sumamente general de los contenidos de la filosofía actual. En vez de ello, solo es posible brindar una muestra que, si es representativa, podrá dar al lector una idea verosímil de cómo es la práctica filosófica de nuestros tiempos. Eso es lo que hemos intentado
en esta obra, compuesta por una secuencia cuidadosamente
seleccionada de trabajos producidos por miembros del Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.
Todos los capítulos que la integran han sido escritos teniendo en vista al lector que no es especialista en el respectivo tema y desea tener un panorama del estado de la cuestión y de las perspectivas de una determinada área de la filosofía.
Por esa razón hemos evitado los trabajos de carácter técnico o puramente histórico. También nos hemos preocupado especialmente porque la muestra ofrecida fuera lo suficientemente amplia y balanceada: ante todo, que incluyera temas de filosofía teórica y de filosofía práctica y, además, que estuvieran representadas tanto las tradiciones analíticas como las continentales, para usar dos etiquetas que todavía están en vigencia, pero que rápidamente van perdiendo su relevancia en un mundo caracterizado por la interacción mutua de las tradiciones, el eclecticismo y la desaparición del espíritu de escuela o de secta.
Queremos agradecer especialmente a Claudia D’Amico, quien siendo directora del Departamento de Filosofía comenzó la preparación de esta obra a comienzos de 2008.
También colaboraron en ese momento Marcelo Mendoza Hurtado y Fermín Álvarez Ruiz, secretario Académico y secretario Administrativo del Departamento, respectivamente.
Pudimos concluir la tarea gracias al trabajo inicial de todos ellos. Finalmente, agradecemos a las autoridades de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires por haber originado la idea de la colección “Libros de Filo” y por haber aceptado incluir esta obra en la misma.

Process and Personality, originally deposited in 1964 at brandeis university, is in the public domain. Published by mediastudies.press in the public domain series Original formatting, spelling, and citation styles retained throughout, with occasional [sic] to indicate an uncorrected error. mediastudies.press | 414 W. Broad St., Bethlehem, PA 18018, USA New materials are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 (cc by-nc 4.0

Resumen: El propósito de este texto es aclarar la dirección, los alcances y los límites del análisis filosófico según lo concibe Peter Strawson en Análisis y metafísica. Para el autor el análisis filosófico asume la forma de una metafísica descriptiva, esto es, de una teoría que exhibe cuáles son, y cómo se relacionan, los distintos elementos que componen nuestro esquema conceptual ordinario. Para lograr tal teoría descriptiva se debe adoptar un estilo de análisis que el autor denomina conectivo, cuya meta es identificar cuáles conceptos, al interior de nuestro esquema son básicos o fundamentales. A este fin deberán aplicarse tres criterios: generalidad, irreductibilidad y no contingencia.

This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralismwhether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some particular normative or political response (no). I have nothing to add to this debate, and that I have no pretensions to resolving it. In this article, I will discuss Wittgenstein's work as if it were intended to convey a theory (or two) about language, for two reasons: first, that is how the work presents itself to me, even after seriously considering the arguments of the therapeutic school; second, the focus of this article is the literature on the normative/political significance of Wittgenstein's work, and most of that literature (though not all, as I discuss below) takes the theory approach to interpretation. However, one main contention of this article is that the theoretical and therapeutic schools ought to converge in their assessments of the normative and political significance of Wittgenstein's writings, so that while my approach is theoretical, my conclusions are also therapeutic. On the view argued below, both schools ought to conclude that Wittgenstein's work has no normative or political consequences whatsoever. A second main contention of this article is that coming to a correct understanding about the normative and political implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy will shed some much-needed light on the problem of value pluralism. Since the publication of Isaiah Berlin's celebrated essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in 1958, political theorists and philosophers have been grappling with the idea that moral values can irreconcilably conflict with one another, not only between competing value systems, but also within the conscience of an individual. 10 This idea has led to an enormous volume of writing trying to assess and extend Berlin's insight. 11 Two great questions have motivated this research. (1) Are values plural in the way that Berlin suggests? (2) Does value plurality lead to, reveal, or require as a response some substantive normative duty (for example, Berlin's suggestion that plurality reveals an obligation to respect negative liberty), or does it lead to moral relativism (a situation in which we lack a principled reason to judge any value or system of values as morally better or worse than any other)?

Quito, Febrero del 2011 CERTIFICACIÓN Certifico que el presente trabajo fue desarrollado por el señor JUAN CARLOS ARELLANO BELTRAN bajo mi supervisión, el trabajo practico se encuentra desarrollado en su totalidad, operativo y sin problema alguno.

There is now a worldwide consensus on the firm existence of a human right to freedom from slavery. This consensus gives rise to what was thought to be an irrefutable argument that the right to be free from slavery is a jurisprudential universal, with no competent legal system or government able to deny its existence or permit derogation from its tenets. This argument is now being tested by the ideologies, policies and actions of Muslim insurgencies in Iraq, Syria and Nigeria, each claiming that the enslavement of non-believing combatants and war captives and slave trading in such persons is permitted under Islamic law. This article considers the implications of these claims for the future of Islamic law and for its relationship with the world’s legal systems, particularly international humanitarian law. It posits that the claims of these insurgencies, while glaringly out of step with modern views of chattel slavery, should be taken seriously and actually have a great deal of support...

Pluralism in Contract Law LEON TRAKIVANt INTRODUCTION Theoretical debate over the formation of contracts is legendary.' Is the foundation of contracts tied to the subjective wills of parties who make promises to each other, or is it about reasonable inferences arising from promisebearing conduct that courts impute to the parties? Are promises giving rise to contracts grounded in morality? Is the formation of contacts about regulating contractual t-B.Com., LL.B. (Cape Town) LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard).

Bu makalede Isaiah Berlin'in "The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas" adlı kitabı incelenecektir. Berlin bu kitapta temel olarak faşizm, çoğulculuk, ütopya ve kültür tartışmalarına yer vermiştir. Berlin bu tartışmalar merkezinde ütopyaların neden uygulanamaz olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Berlin için ütopyalar çeşitliliğin olmadığı durağan toplumlardır. Ütopyalar gelecek toplum idealleri için şimdiyi görmezden gelir. Ütopyalarda yeniliğe ve değişikliğe yer yoktur. Berlin bu nedenle kitabında ütopyalardan ziyade neden kültürel çeşitliliğe hizmet eden liberal öğretilere sarılmamız gerektiği üzerinde durur. Geçmişte faşizm ve komünizm gibi ideolojiler gelecekte iyi bir toplum önerisi sunmuştu. Ancak bu idealler daha çok kan ve şiddet olarak geri döndü. Berlin'in bu kitabı hem bu ideolojileri hem de mükemmel toplum ideallerini sorgulamamız açısından farklı bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır.

Showing that a proclaimed perfectionist like Raz - whose rationale is often contested as illiberal - consistently follows a reasoning resembling greatly that of a celebrated liberal like Mill, could considerably strengthen the case to use perfectionism as part of a compelling liberal strand. The analysis of their distinctive theoretical features elucidates the holistic manner with which their conception of human flourishing informs all the constituent parts of their liberalism as well as its crux, personal autonomy. Against their contemporary interpretations, it is argued that a comprehensive conception of the good dominates Mill's perception of liberalism and that Raz's robust perfectionist arguments follow a logical sequence permeating not only his overall liberal stance but also his position on value-pluralism. By situating the mutual comprehensive understanding of their key liberal concepts and highlighting its advantages compared to the prevalent 'neutralist strand&...

, and participants of the Australasian Political Studies Association, and the Department of Political Science seminar at ANU for comments on an earlier draft. I would particularly like to thank the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University. Finally, I would like to thank an anonymous referee for some particularly useful comments and criticism.

Indagaciones sobre modos de conocimiento y existencia social Claros, Luis (coord.) Pluralismos: Indagaciones sobre modos de conocimiento y existencia social-La Paz: Postgrado en Ciencias del Desarrollo (cides-umsa) Bolivia, 2024. 324 p. gráf.; 23 cm-(cides-umsa) isbn 978-9917-34-027-0 (edición impresa) 1. Ciencias sociales-Bolivia; 2. Filosofía, 2024; Pluralismo antropológico, jurídico, económico, multiespecie; Diversidad sexual; Pluralismo y epistemología-Bolivia; 3. Ensayos, i. Claros, Luis (coord.), ii.

Questions about cybersecurity and civil rights live in a space of antiquated and inadequate law, disparate, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting jurisdictions, weak enforcement mechanisms, and weak incentives for international collaboration. Even were notions of civil rights that fit earlier forms of political life capable of adaptation to new technologies of commerce, expression, conflict, and exploration, the means to secure such rights are lacking. This chapter argues that, under these circumstances, the efforts of ethicists, legal scholars, and policy makers are helped by reframing central questions about issues including personal privacy, freedom of expression, internet access, the intellectual property claims of individual and corporate persons, and political action in the language of civic virtues as better fitting life in the cyberworld.

La presente ponencia expone una visión de una Teoría General del Derecho necesaria para dar fuerza a la disciplina institucionalizada del derecho en un contexto cada vez más cosmopolita como es el de la “globalización”, y tratará sus posibles implicaciones.
La parte primera replantea la posición de la disciplina del derecho en torno a sus objetivos y a su naturaleza, así como el papel de la teoría del derecho, como parte teórica, a la hora de contribuir a la buena salud de ésta. La parte segunda aclara algunas cuestiones que se han venido planteando sobre esta concepción de la Teoría General del Derecho: (i) las implicaciones de la “globalización”; (ii) el significado de “Teoría General del Derecho” en ese contexto; (iii) la relación entre Teoría del Derecho, Filosofía Jurídica y los enfoques sociológicos del derecho; finalmente, (iv) la importancia del concepto de “derecho no estatal”. La parte tercera ilustra con ejemplos concretos algunas de las implicaciones de los posibles temas y aspectos propuestos por este modelo dentro las áreas de la teoría del derecho que se pueden caracterizar como analíticas, normativas, empíricas y críticas, así como un análisis crítico de los presupuestos y postulados que generalmente fundamentan los trabajos en campos dominantes como el derecho comparado, el derecho internacional público, el derecho religioso y los estudios socio-jurídicos.

We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality.

We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality.

If we want to take firm the importance of universal principles in Bioethics, but at the same time we want to take seriously the importance of cultural diversity and pluralism, it is necessary to adopt a multifaceted approach. In the article I argue that a possible way out is a sort of hermeneutic approach, in order to reduce the ambivalence that stems from the dual recognition of cultural diversity and universal value of human rights. Through this approach conflicting principles and traditions can be harmonized within a common framework, at least to some extent. Such an approach, in my perspective, can be implemented as a strategy of interpretation, which can hold together different conceptions and common principles.

In 1994, George Crowder published an article in Political Studies in which he argued that there was no convincing case for justifying liberalism on the basis of value pluralism (Crowder, 1994). The article attracted a forceful rejoinder from Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams, to which Crowder himself later responded (Berlin and Williams, 1994; Crowder, 1996). Changing tack, Crowder now believes only that Berlin and others have not argued successfully from pluralism to liberalism, and this new book length treatment is his effort to make the case. The result is a busy, stimulating, readable book that makes some interesting suggestions, but leaves the most difficult questions untouched. Plural values, Crowder maintains, are universal, incommensurable and conflicting F a characterization that is not controversial. More interesting is his attempt to draw substantive conclusions from the truth of pluralism: in particular, the possibility of rational choice between values. There are two ways this works. On a particularist view, attention to one's background conception of the good helps provide normative standards for decision. So (to use Crowder's example), as an academic I have more reason to go to the library than the beach even though both of these are worthwhile things to do. There is something to this contextualist approach, but it works more easily for individual choice than it does for states that have to enforce a common policy in the face of rival conceptions of the good. Hence we need a universal argument from pluralism to liberal norms too. One such argument is famously offered by Berlin. Value pluralism, he maintained, gives us reason to champion choice over other values, and this in turn privileges liberalism. Crowder criticizes this on the grounds that choice itself is only one value among many in a pluralist universe. But, he claims, Berlin also has a second, implicit, argument: that pluralism implies an anti-Utopian attitude to politics in which trade-offs and compromises have to be made, and that a liberal outlook best answers to this ineradicable feature of our political experience. This argument is more successful, but does not necessarily support liberalism since there are other outlooks also compatible with anti-Utopianism. This leads Crowder to discuss John Gray's pragmatist and John Kekes's conservative philosophies. Kekes maintains that since pluralism rules out any compelling case for privileging any values over any others, we have no