Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism

Erkenntnis (forthcoming)

This paper introduces a new approach to the theory of truthmaking. According to this approach, there are multiple forms of truthmaking. Here, I characterize and motivate a specific version of this approach, which I call a ‘Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking.’ It is suggested that truthmaking is a plural, variegated phenomenon wherein different kinds of truths, e.g., positive truths, negative truths, counterfactual truths, etc., are made true in different ways. While the paper only aims to lay the groundwork for a Pluralist Theory of Truthmaking, I show how the theory can be applied to positive and negative truths. The upshot of this application is that truthmaking pluralism allows us to provide negative truths with ‘non-suspicious’ truthmakers. Finally, it is argued that Truthmaker Maximalists would do well to endorse truthmaking pluralism, as it offers a new strategy for upholding Maximalism while diminishing controversial ontological commitments.

In C. D. Wright and N. J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.): New Waves in Truth (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 2010., 2010

When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle. (inv) The nature of truth is uniform or invariant across discipline or sector of discourse.

Erkenntnis, 2014

This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present and develop a positive account according to which the different forms of pluralism are intimately related. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will investigate the connection between alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. I will argue that a certain version of alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism. Second, I will connect alethic pluralism and logical pluralism to metaphysical pluralism. I will suggest that the former two are at least partly founded on the latter.

Note: This paper has now been split into two: "On moderate pluralism about truth and logic" and "On the normative variability of truth and logic". Abstract: According to moderate truth pluralism, truth is both One and Many. There is a single truth property that applies across all truth-apt domains of discourse, but instances of this property are grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to the law might be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. In recent work Michael Lynch has suggested that a commitment to moderate truth pluralism supports logical pluralism. Lynch's intended form of logical pluralism is significantly different from the kind of logical pluralism that has received considerable attention due to the work of Jc Beall and Greg Restall. This paper has four objectives. The first objective is to present Lynch's argument from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism and to explain the difference between Lynch's intended form of logical pluralism and Beall and Restall's logical pluralism. The second objective is to give a general argument to the effect that there can be no path from moderate truth pluralism to logical pluralism. Moderate truth pluralists should be monists about logic. This point is argued on the assumption that logic is topic neutral. This is an assumption that Lynch takes on board. The third objective is constructive in nature. I offer an account of what moderate truth pluralists should say about logic. I suggest that, just like moderate truth pluralists are committed to a distinction between truth proper and 'quasi-truth', they should endorse a distinction between logic proper and 'quasi-logic'. Quasi-truth is truth-like in the sense that instances of quasi-truth ground instances of truth. Quasi-logic is logic-like in the sense that it concerns arguments that are necessarily truth-preserving. However, while logic proper concerns argument types all of whose instances are necessarily truth-preserving, quasi-logic concerns argument types whose instances are necessarily truth-preserving for some domains. I suggest that moderate truth pluralists should be monists about truth proper and logic proper but pluralists about quasi-truth and quasi-logic. Fourth, I discuss the normativity of logic and quasi-logic. I suggest that truth and logic are (at least) normative in the sense of underwriting instrumental rationality and discuss how this plays out in a framework that combines logic and quasi-logic. I suggest that there is no difference in the source of normativity of logic and quasi-logic. They are both normative in the sense of being instruments to achieving truth, the goal of cognition. Word count (including abstract): 8,591 2

Here I aim at developing a pragmatist approach to the normativity of logic in the context of logical pluralism

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2020

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a).1 Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible.

In J. Wyatt, J. Kim, M. P. Lynch, N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth, 2nd ed. MIT Press., 2020

Moderate pluralism is the dominant view in the truth pluralism debate. This paper aims to show that austere pluralism—a form of strong truth pluralism—should be taken seriously as a contender in the pluralist landscape. We do three kinds of work to level the playing field. First, we argue that moderate pluralism conveniently takes advantage of the dual nature of their view, switching back and forth between their distinctively monist and distinctively pluralist commitments depending on the issue or task at hand (Sect. 2). Crucially—and perhaps somewhat ironically—the plurality of truth-grounding properties plays an ineliminable role in explaining the metaphysical unity of truth, a key feature of moderate pluralism—and a monist one at that (Sect. 3). Second, we introduce and articulate austere pluralism, a novel form of strong pluralism (Sect. 4) and show that it is entirely adequate for capturing the core idea of pluralism (Sect. 6.1) and can deal with the problem of mixed compounds and the problem of mixed inferences, two challenges usually regarded as stumble blocks for austere pluralism (Sect. 5). Third, we argue that austere pluralism fares better than moderate pluralism with respect to ontological parsimony, an important theoretical virtue (Sect. 6.2).

Philosophia Scientiae, 2008

Le pluralisme aléthique est la conception suivant laquelle il y a plus d'une manière pour des propositions d'être vraies. Cet article étudie trois manières de comprendre cette idée et argumente que chacune a des faiblesses significatives. Je conclus en suggérant une issue au pluraliste qui lui permette de construire une position plus plausible.

In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common " pluralizing tendency " with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated interface between metaphysical and formal truth theories, pointing to several promising questions that arise here.

Synthese, 145: 1–28, 2005

ABSTRACT: A novel alternative to traditional inflationary approaches, second-order alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems---such as its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and the criteria problem for platitude-based strategies---that need to be solved before it can become an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth.