Value Rationality

Against the background of the general decline in union membership in Western countries, this study analyses factors influencing an individual's choice whether to join a trade union. The focus is on the effects of workplace union density and individual political attitudes. Micro data covering the entire Danish workforce combined with European Social Survey data enable for the first time the statistical analysis of the effect workplace union density has on union recruitment. Workplace union density is used to measure the power of social custom in workplace union membership, constituting an instrumental motive for joining the union. Self-placement on a political left-right scale measures political attitude which is assumed to constitute a value-rational motive. The statistical results indicate that workplace union density is the main predictor of whether or not an employee is going to join a union, even when other variables such as gender, occupation and industry worked in are taken into consideration. In addition, the results indicate that political attitude is also an important factor. 2 Résumé Dans le contexte du déclin général de l'affiliation syndicale dans les pays

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.

There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism.  I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON.  The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled.  I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion.  I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.

Unsurpassed in its ambition and historical scope, Max Weber's legal sociology centers around the four "categories of legal thought" that follow from his distinction between formal and substantive modes of rationality and irrationality in the conduct of lawfinding and lawmaking activity. At the same time, Weber's general sociology is built around four ideal types of possible meaningful conduct by individual actors, ranging from the instrumentally rational to the affective. Despite its visibility, the lack of meaningful connection Weber makes between these two categorical schemes has never adequately been remedied or even explained by his inheritors. This article seeks to do both by arguing that a clearer perspective can be gained on Weber's sociology of law by reconstructing his categories of legal thought in terms of his ideal types of meaningful action. Considered, instead, as ideal types of legal action by juristic actors in the course of undertaking lawmaking and lawfinding activity, Weber's categories of legal thought not only are rendered more intelligible but also more powerful in scope. For viewed in this way, Weber's choice of conceptually segregating the categories of legal thought from his general sociology of meaningful action is revealed as a precocious, even if ultimately unsuccessful, tactic for solving the problem of judicial legislation. In this way, Weber's legal scholarship was not just sociological but driven by much of the same concern that continues to preoccupy scholars of legal theory and jurisprudence into our own day. Therefore, the limitations of his solution are not simply of historical interest but vitally relevant to understanding the ongoing difficulties that have plagued our own contemporary attempts at elaborating an adequate philosophy of legal reason.

This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action.  Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’.  In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others.  I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question.  For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’.  For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.

I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself.  The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one value can objectively outweigh or outrank another.  This is so even when the only values under consideration are self-interested ones.

Self-interested motives are typically assumed when addressing migration causation. However, values, such as those from religion, can also motivate migration. This study develops a theoretical framework of religiously motivated migration. Inasmuch as values are derived from and reinforced within groups, religions with strong cohesion are more likely to act on one of three value-based religious migration motivations: sacred command, context conducive for religious practice, and awareness of potential membership losses from competition. This theoretical framework is demonstrated through Amish-Mennonite migration. Generalizability is suggested from a brief review of the Puritans, Jews, Muslims, Mormons, and Russian Mennonites.

G. H. von Wright used to warn against the consequences of the crisis of reason to human condition. Inspired by the ideas of Aristotle, M. Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno, he elaborated the issue of how overcoming the crisis of reason requires providing a philosophical critique of the role of reason itself. As an important feature of this critique, I would point out the way von Wright modifies the idea of goodness in respect with accepting or denying a given type of rationality, insofar as the latter concerns our " attempts at orientation " in the world in von Wright's sense. In this context, I will analyze how what the Finnish philosopher calls powerless optimism and provocative pessimism are two mutually dependent modus vivendi.

This book contributes to the developing dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences. It focuses on a central issue in both fields, i.e. the nature and the limitations of the rationality of beliefs and action. The development of cognitive science is one of the most important and fascinating intellectual advances of recent decades, and social scientists are paying increasing attention to the findings of this new branch of science that forces us to consider many classical issues related to epistemology and philosophy of action in a new light.

Analysis of the concept of rationality is a leitmotiv in the history of the social sciences and has involved endless disputes. Since it is difficult to give a precise definition of this concept, and there is a lack of agreement about its meaning, it is possible to say that there is a ‘mystery of rationality’. What is it to be rational? Is rationality merely instrumental or does it also involve the endorsement of values, i.e. the choice of goals? Should we consider rationality to be a normative principle or a descriptive one? Can rationality be only Cartesian or can it also be argumentative?  Is rationality a conscious skill or a partly tacit one? This book, which has been written by an outstanding collection of authors, including both philosophers and social scientists, tries to make a useful contribution to the debates on these problems and shed some light on the mystery of rationality. The target audience primarily comprises researchers and experts in the field.

The two problems are:

a) Does one ever have sufficient reason for what one does; and if not, should this be a cause for concern? If, when reasons for action conflict, reaching a decision is always a non sequitur, then it looks as though in such situations the answer is: No.  But would it even be desirable to act according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason?  It can be argued that, unless one can give sufficient reason for one’s actions, one can never really justify them; nor will rational persuasion be possible.  On the other hand, the idea that there is only one rational thing to do in any given situation seems oppressive, almost totalitarian.

b) Is deliberation an inherently self-deceptive operation? Is the deliberator compelled to treat an irrational procedure with no right outcome as though it were the intelligent engagement with a problem that has a correct answer? And if so, what will become of deliberation once this is fully realised?  Less nihilistically, what would a maximally rational decision be like?