The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy

The longstanding competition between India and Pakistan has not only controlled the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia but has also had catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Instead of encouraging peace, education, and progress, the two nations have engaged in proxy wars, supported militant groups, and encouraged

The longstanding competition between India and Pakistan has not only controlled the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia but has also had catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Instead of encouraging peace, education, and progress, the two nations have engaged in proxy wars, supported militant groups, and encouraged

The longstanding competition between India and Pakistan has not only controlled the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia but has also had catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Instead of encouraging peace, education, and progress, the two nations have engaged in proxy wars, supported militant groups, and encouraged

Pakistan, with over 60% of its population under the age of 30, possesses a demographic dividend that remains largely untapped in the realm of global diplomacy. This paper explores the concept of youth diplomacy as a form of soft power, emphasizing the potential of Pakistan's young population to reshape the country's global image and influence. Youth diplomacy, through global platforms, education, and digital networks, provides young Pakistanis with the opportunity to challenge stereotypes and promote positive national narratives. However, institutional barriers, including a lack of governmental frameworks, financial constraints, and urban-rural disparities, have hindered the full engagement of youth in international diplomatic spaces. By recognizing the strategic value of youth diplomacy and addressing these barriers, Pakistan can unlock its greatest asset—its young population—as a catalyst for enhancing its soft power on the world stage.

Pakistan faces another nationalist uprising in Baluchistan, driven by grievances over sharing of the proceeds from its resources. Effective governance and a credible dialogue with Baluch leaders are required to stem further polarisation. Commentary PAKISTAN IS once again facing calls for independence from Baluch nationalists in its largest province, Baluchistan, which is undergoing another spell of violence. Fiercely tribal and nationalist, the Baluch people, like those of other smaller provinces in Pakistan, resent the Punjabi-dominated state structure and have expressed their reaction with repeated armed movements in support of calls for greater autonomy or complete independence. The Pakistani government's response has been typically to blame a foreign power (meaning India) or the sardars (tribal chiefs) for the uprising. Besides calls for independence the Baluch demand control over resources. While nationalism may drive Baluch yearning for self-rule, complaints about inadequate compensation for resources extracted from the province are central to their grievances against Islamabad. For instance Baluchistan gets only two percent of the profit from its major copper mines. The natural gas drawn from Sui since 1954, which has driven the Pakistan economy, was only provided to users in Baluchistan in the 1980s. Strategic location While much of the province remains undeveloped the new Gwadar town development, adjacent to the port, has turned into a land grab for outsiders who want to make it a high-end resort. Further, the development of two new cantonments in Baluchistan have angered locals. The killing and callous disposal of the body of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a Baluch leader resisting military intrusion, has fanned the unrest in Baluchistan. The rallying cry for Baluch now is to remove the cantonments and bring former President and Army Chief General Musharraf to trial for the killing of Bugti. Baluchistan, constituting 43 percent of Pakistan but with just 4% of the population, is strategically located, providing the shortest land link to Afghanistan and to western China. It has 700 kilometres of Arabian Sea coastline and is mineral-rich with potentially some of the biggest mines of gold and copper besides natural gas. Baluchistan is the logical route for the Iran-Pakistan-India energy corridor. Allegedly the home of 'Quetta Shura' RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU.

This dissertation delves into China's naval strategy in the South China Sea (SCS), with a focus on the growing use of non-military maritime assets, such as the coast guard and the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), in grey zone operations. Despite China's denial of aggressive intentions, the deployment and evolution of these assets maintain regional tension, with concerns over potential escalation. Distinctively, the study investigates the relationship between China's history, the SCS, and maritime grey zone operations, aiming to uncover Beijing's motivations rooted in the Chinese unrestricted warfare theory, characterized by asymmetrical and unconventional tactics. The research seeks to answer questions on China's territorial claims, the maritime strategy's connection to regional resources, trade, security, and its effectiveness amidst neighboring countries' responses.

Maritim luftmakt har siden luftmaktens tilblivelse falt mellom forsvarsgrenenes fokus og doktriner. Dette på grunn av kamp mellom forsvarsgrener om innflytelse og makt, så vel som teoretikeres og utdanningsinstitusjoners naturlige interesse for enten sjømakt eller luftmakt. Forfatteren argumenterer her for at maritim luftmakt må forståes som både sjømakt og luftmakt. Det foreslås i denne artikkelen et helhetlig teoretisk rammeverk hvor sjømaktsteori legger grunnlaget for å forstå den maritime luftmaktens mål og hensikt. Basert på dette utledes et naturlig sett med kapabiliteter: Informasjonsutnyttelse, overflate-, undervannsog luftkrigføring, samt styrkeprojeksjon. Fra disse kapabilitetene, som er varige og robuste, sorteres både varige og nye roller av utøvd luftmakt-avhengig av situasjon og teknologisk utvikling. For å forstå maritim luftmakt er det fundamentalt og vel så viktig å forstå det sjømilitaere filosofiske teoretiske grunnlaget som å forstå den tekniske og taktiske utøvelsen av luftmakt, og vice-a-versa.

Executive summary
Il peso sempre più crescente della Cina come attore internazionale pone da diversi anni nuove sfide di carattere politico-strategico ai decisori politici ed economici. La continua ascesa del Paese asiatico ha portato ad un’intensificazione degli attriti e veri e propri scontri diplomatici tra il Paese asiatico ed i suoi vicini e con gli Stati Uniti, l’attuale unica superpotenza mondiale. Le forme e le modalità tramite cui le pretese e gli obiettivi strategico-tattici sono stati perseguiti hanno seguito innumerevoli forme. Questo report vuole analizzare uno degli strumenti, se non lo strumento, attraverso il quale la Repubblica Popolare Cinese ha deciso di ritagliarsi uno spazio internazionale da lei ritenuto consono al peso ed al potere politico-economico guadagnato e che prevede di avere anche in futuro, ovvero la Military Civil Fusion Strategy.

For decades, China has been called a Dragon. Verily like a Dragon, China under its Communist Party burns its target nations' Comprehensive National Power (CNP) before unleashing its Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), if needed. This is book is based on the lessons it has learnt form its inception wherein it realised that needed to subvert the masses with its ideology to gain political control. In its extrapolation, it contends that it does not need a very strong PLA to dominate or coerce many nations of the Indo-Pacific region, except, India, Japan, Australia, and the USA. Of late, since the war in Ukraine has pinned NATO and EU to Europe it hopes to be able to manage the EU. This book focusses on this aspect of Chinese Grand Strategy of gaining /coercing influence and power in the region, without any major conflict.

The terrorist economic impact evaluation (TEIE) model is a new model to evaluate the intensity of terrorism to measure the economic cost in a state (province) of any country within a specific period of time. The TEIE-model examines the measurement of terrorist attacks action with the help of terrorist attacks intensity rate, terrorist attacks death rate, terrorist attacks injuries rate and terrorist attacks property damage. This TEIE-model is the comprehensive indicator to quantify the terrorist attacks action to measure the human and capital loss of a state of a country. This model also applies to the states (provinces) of Pakistan economy. This model helps the policy makers to gauge the intensity of terrorism to measure at state level. The TEIE-model uses dynamic approach to examine economic cost at state level of any economy.

Higher education plays a vital role in developing the knowledge economy and producing skilled workers to empower human resources for the country. Like many other developing countries, Pakistan is struggling hard to improve the quality of higher education for sustainable development and participation in global progress. Since the last decade, Higher Education Commission Pakistan is committed to upgrading the quality of education, and for this purpose, HEC has designed Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) to assure quality for affiliated institutions. The main objective of the study was to evaluate R&D practices in affiliated institutions of Pakistan. The study was descriptive in nature, and a questionnaire based on Minimum Quality Standards was used to collect data from faculty members (n-168) of 28 affiliated institutions by using multistage sampling. The results indicated that affiliated colleges of two provinces, Punjab and Khyber Pohutukawa, were better in research and development pra...

Higher education plays a vital role in developing the knowledge economy and producing skilled workers to empower human resources for the country. Like many other developing countries, Pakistan is struggling hard to improve the quality of higher education for sustainable development and participation in global progress. Since the last decade, Higher Education Commission Pakistan is committed to upgrading the quality of education, and for this purpose, HEC has designed Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) to assure quality for affiliated institutions. The main objective of the study was to evaluate R&D practices in affiliated institutions of Pakistan. The study was descriptive in nature, and a questionnaire based on Minimum Quality Standards was used to collect data from faculty members (n-168) of 28 affiliated institutions by using multistage sampling. The results indicated that affiliated colleges of two provinces, Punjab and Khyber Pohutukawa, were better in research and development pra...

The Islamist attack on the twin towers changed the world, but Pakistan’s strategic culture did not change. President Musharraf publicly withdrew support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, and declared discontinuation of cross-border infiltration in Indian-held Kashmir. In reality, support continued to certain sections of the Afghan Taliban, and acts of terrorism in India, exemplified the facetious transformation in strategic culture. The confusion in stance left a void in strategic culture and the strategic environment. Pakistan’s strategy of sub-conventional warfare has led to a backlash inside the country, in the form of Islamist subversion of the rule of law. The failure of the state to formulate a coherent counterterrorism policy has given way to non-state actors. This policy void has endangered the country’s national identity and territorial integrity. In the absence of such a policy, Islamism festers. Resultantly, the state is faced with an Islamist take over. This has consequenc...

Six years ago, the RAND Corporation reviewed the prospects for war between the United States and China. Possible theaters of conflict were the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, the South China Sea, cyberspace, and India. We concluded that, while armed conflict between the two countries was not likely, the possibility was real enough to require prudent policies and effective deterrent measures. We also cautioned that those measures would become more demanding as Chinese capabilities grew. For the United States, this would mean assuming greater risks in the future to achieve the same objectives as in the past. Events since have confirmed these judgments. The range and capabilities of Chinese air and sea defenses have continued to grow, making U.S. forward-basing more vulnerable and the direct defense of U.S. interests in the region potentially more costly. As these trends continue, the United States will find itself gradually pushed more toward the threat of horizontal or vertical escalation for deterrence, with the attendant risks of counter-escalation. Neither the United States nor China is likely to employ nuclear weapons, but even an initially localized conflict could quickly spread into the economic, cyber, and space realms, doing considerable damage to both sides. The United States may be able to reduce or delay such reliance on escalatory responses by shifting to less vulnerable platforms: longer-range precision-strike drones and vessels to carry longer-range drones and submarines, along with the further dispersal of bases and force flows. The United States can also encourage and help allies and partners in the region to increase the range and capabilities of their own air and sea defenses. Barring unforeseen technological developments, however, it will not be possible for the United States to rely indefinitely on the direct defense of its regional interests. Unless China commits naked and large-scale aggression-which, to be clear, is not indicated by the current pattern of its use of force-the United States will likely want to focus on deescalating localized clashes and removing bones of contention. We recommend, therefore, that the United States move sooner rather than later-before its power position in the region diminishes further-to constructively engage China across a range of potential flash points. Such engagement might include more-energetic efforts to promote the resolution of conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea; encouragement of improved cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan; and more-extensive consultations with China on Korea issues, including possibilities for denuclearizing North Korea, formally ending the Korean War, and Sino-American collaboration in the event of a North Korean regime collapse. The United States should maintain a dense network of diplomatic relationships with China while strengthening channels for crisis communications, including regular leader-to-leader, military-to-military contacts.

The strength of this book is the author has succeeded in explaining the geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese dream by looking at the problem which hindered China from realizing its dream. The author started his book by saying that to achieve great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049, Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream needs to accompany with its ambitious geopolitical agenda. Geopolitics refers to three agendas which are to first, gain security against potential enemies; second, increase power and third, influence over others and to assure access to markets and resources. Traditionally, geopolitical strategy of a state is relying upon military power and alliance arrangements thus, making the geopolitics an arena of competition among great powers to dominate. In this sense, the geopolitics which had been dominated by the post cold war unipolar structure has been challenged by China asserting its great power position. The most interesting part of the book, the author has made the comparison between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia by looking at the geopolitics factors. Northeast Asia marked by three regional conflict which are: i) the Korean Peninsula, ii) the Taiwan Strait, and iii) militarized confrontation between China and Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu Island. All these three factors implicate China and the United States on opposite sides. The United States presence in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan is to maintain military balances against China. Despite the hostility and armed tension surrounding the Northeast Asia countries, it is through economic interdependence and military power balances which preserve the stability in the region. Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries on the other hand, which are modestly armed were not involved in any major unresolved armed conflicts. Governed by the ASEAN Way, ASEAN manage to preserve its stability from other intervention and play a leading role in regionalism. In this sense, economic reason has become the biggest motivation for ASEAN countries to avoid any conflicts and to maintain stability and strive for prosperity in the region. The economic integration together with its abundance resources has made ASEAN as the center of attention among great powers especially China and the United States. Another part of the book that are worth to read is about the Chinese Dream that is reflected from China's past golden ages which was destroyed during the 'century of humiliation' due to the Opium War. Now, under Xi Jinping, China has the vision to claimed which once belonged to them based on the 'historical right' and this could explain the growing of the maritime disputes in East Asia. The Chinese dream agenda comes with clear message which signify their geopolitical interest such as i) the 'new type of great power relationship' (xinxing daguo guanxi); ii) the 'community of common destiny' (mingyun gongtongti) and 'One belt, One Road' (yidai yilu); iii) 'New Asian security concept' (xinde yazhou anquanguan); and iv) 'great power military status and maritime great power' (Haiyang qiangguo). It is no doubt that the United States presence in this region has become China's problem on realizing its geopolitical expansion. This supported with the author stated that China has repeatedly tells the United States not to 'interfere' in China's conflicts with its neighbors. To China, US policy in Asia is prone to 'contain' China. For example, regarding China assertiveness in South China Sea, the US has reacted with strategic rebalancing with two objectives: i) to engage China in strategic partnership to maintains its liberal international order and ii) to preserve US alliances, bases and navigation rights in the region. Therefore, it has triggered Chinese strategy in peninsular and archipelagic of East Asia. For East Asia peninsular strategy, China focus on economic inducements to bring South Korea and Thailand into economic dependence with China. In contrast, Chinese strategy towards Archipelagic states is more on territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines. China's has exercised its ownership rights in the disputed island. It succeeded in Scarborough Shoal/Huangyandao but failed in the Senkaku islands because Japan has guarded the island together with the US pledge to respond if China used military force against Japan.

The case of Pakistan has presented if security provision is a pure public good in the light of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix hypotheses. Evidential analysis of the data from 1990 to 2010 from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) suggests that terrorism incidents are not reduced with the increase of public expenditure on defence, and instead, more fatalities and injuries are witnessed during the years. The analysis is based in isolation to terrorist attacks, defence expenditure and relating hypotheses of Influential Violent Extremists Organization Knowledge Matrix (I- VEO Knowledge Matrix) and counterterrorism operations, at ceteris paribus. The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix shows there is a lack of a comprehensive set of strategy based on the collection of relevant hypotheses more productive than the existing and likely less effective counterterrorism strategies to ensure security provision as a pure public good in the case of Pakistan

Global power shift and the long-lasting war on terror have left deep impact for US foreign policy. It has put a blow on the overall political, economic and diplomatic affairs that has caused securitization and increased military influence in American foreign policies. The post-9/11 deviations in military related policies to report these changing security scenarios have caused drift in civil-military tensions. It is subsequently becoming important to understand that states can fuse a military that is obliged to do the acts, the civilians ask them to, consequently guarantees that a military will remain under the control of civilian enough to the civilians and the state authorizes it to perform any task. Therefore, shifting the strategic policy, the defence diplomacy of the United States in the core of the current war against terror in Afghanistan helped US military to operate without granting of total authority to the Taliban. There is a notion that when war ends, diplomacy begins. Bu...

Since the eve of 9/11, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have become strategically vital region in the world and also for the security and defence of Pakistan. The area is landlocked and an important junction of South, Southwest and Central Asia and chessboard of great power politics. The war on terror and the US and NATO actions against the Taliban militants and al-Qaeda network have changed the fabric of FATA region. This situation has created challenging circumstances for the security and stability of Pakistan. Moreover, the US has given free hand to India in Afghanistan which is a serious matter to Pakistan’s security concerns. However, the war seems to be “bleeding wound” for Pakistan because it is hurting more as compared to gains. So, the best strategy for Islamabad is disengagement from the war because it will protect FATA which is real strategic depth for the country’s defence rather than Kabul and it will also strengthen internal stability and guarantee...

Pakistan is among the poor and over populated countries having abundance of natural resources and geographical prominence. It also has a multi-cultural society that comprises of different sub-cultures. After more than seven decades of independence, it has not been able to establish a coherent and composed social system yet, tangled with fragmented, mobile and materialistic society. Pakistan’s economy is primarily based on agriculture, gradually progressing towards industrialization and urbanization. The urban modes of living have also been widespread across the country. Traditional culture has been over saturated but the new one is struggling to takeover, therefore ideological divisions and moral uncertainty penetrates through the roots of its foundation. Pakistani society is divided and diverse, poor but in a process of transition. Therefore, the study aims to identify and examine the motives of uncertain and assorted elements of Pakistani culture which cause hurdles in the process...

Advancement in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) has transformed the world. In the contemporary era, digital technologies are playing an important role in performing daily life operations. This advancement and dependence on ICT also brought with it various types of vulnerabilities. Nowadays, institutions and individuals can be easily targeted by using cyberspace. Dependence on digital infrastructure is also increasing at a very rapid pace in Pakistan. Cyber networks are not only used by common people, but critical institutes like online banking, electric grids, and dams are also connected to digital networks. In the same way, military infrastructures like command and control systems and nuclear power plants are also linked to cyber networks. Due to this reliance on digital technologies, Pakistan is facing a constant threat of major cyber-attacks. So far, Pakistan does not have a proper mechanism to deal with the threat of cyberattacks. This study analyses the impacts of the possible cyber-attack on the security
of Pakistan

China’s contemporary leadership does not have a “grand strategy” for the 21st century and it is unlikely that the new leaders, who came into power in 2012–13, will be able to craft one. This is a viewpoint that goes against the established truth about China’s comeback as a great power in the international arena. China observers concur and to some extent admire the Chinese leadership’s ability to think long term and commitment to patiently work towards the realisation of a grand vision for the “Middle Kingdom”. There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of strategic thinking going on in China, but it has not been translated into any coherent strategy. Today’s Chinese leaders are pragmatists, seeing and seizing every opportunity that arises without a binding plan. They are also introverted, however, and forced to engage in short-term fire-fighting rather than think long term.

The political, economic and military rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China is one of the most important aspects of the changing global distribution of powers. It prompts investigations into the Chinese war-making practice and the Chinese line of thought about warfare, thus facilitating the understanding of decisions made by Beijing authorities. The objective of this article is to outline the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare-its origins, characteristics and contemporary use. The principal research issue resulting from the assumed objective was to respond to the following question: What is unrestricted warfare, and how it is currently used by the Chinese People's Liberation Army? The following research methods were employed to solve the research queries: a monographic method, a document examination method, literature analysis and criticism, and methods of analysis and synthesis. Considering their preliminary investigations, the authors formulated the following research hypothesis: the concept of unrestricted warfare is one of the most important Chinese concepts describing its war-making practice and rivalry with the United States. Although it was developed over 20 years ago, it still forms a valid selection of warmaking methods and forms. Non-military forms of warfare, including financial warfare, trade warfare, resources warfare, economic warfare or regulation warfare are particularly important and frequently used by the People's Republic of China.

Global power shift and the long-lasting war on terror have left deep impact for US foreign policy. It has put a blow on the overall political, economic and diplomatic affairs that has caused securitization and increased military influence in American foreign policies. The post-9/11 deviations in military related policies to report these changing security scenarios have caused drift in civil-military tensions. It is subsequently becoming important to understand that states can fuse a military that is obliged to do the acts, the civilians ask them to, consequently guarantees that a military will remain under the control of civilian enough to the civilians and the state authorizes it to perform any task. Therefore, shifting the strategic policy, the defence diplomacy of the United States in the core of the current war against terror in Afghanistan helped US military to operate without granting of total authority to the Taliban. There is a notion that when war ends, diplomacy begins. Bu...

China's current naval program centers primarily on the limited construction of vessels comparable with their regional and coastal defense requirements. Due to financial restorations, the naval service has been severely limited in it's ability to construction new combatants during the last year. However, the long-term, China is anxious to operate a modern navy based on the domestic construction, including electronics, diesel power plants, and limited use of European -developed weapon systems. During the immediate decade, the navy will deploy few new classes of ships and build only a limited number of units.

In 2001, acutely aware of the military capabilities of its rivals, a dynamic process of doctrinal evolution has seen the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shift its strategic focus from large-scale territorial defence, to developing the technologies and tactics necessary to conduct rapid, high technology warfare in Asia.  This has continued for the past 20 years.
A U K Defence Forum 'Milibrief'

The last major military reorganization to take place within the PLA and Navy (PLAN) began in September 1986, known as the "Simplified Administration Reorganization". Since then, China in the following decades placed emphasis on "Peripheral Defense" doctrine, using military forces for limited political objectives - what the Chinese also called 'shallow batttlefields'.

This thesis assesses the geopolitical structure and dynamic of the regional system East Asia under the framework of offensive realism, and provides a macro- to micro-level analysis of the impact of geography on great power behaviour, defence policy, and military acquisitioning. Assessing military strategy and acquisition under geographical aspects fills a gap in the theoretical body of offensive realism, since the theory does not sufficiently explain the role of landpower and its projection in a maritime environment. Support forces such as the navy and the air force, but also conventional missile and amphibious forces, are upgraded to enabling forces. A closer look on the priorities of Chinese and Japanese armament confirms this. So do reforms pushed by the US Pacific Command that are assessed as well. The states in East Asia, including the two regional great powers China and Japan are heavily dependent on sea lines of communication. The Chinese ambition of creating an anti-access area-denial zone (A2AD) in the Western Pacific that impedes US power projection into East Asia is directly driven by vulnerabilities created by this dependency. Likewise, Japan’s slow abandonment of pacifism is a reaction to China’s emergence as a seapower in this specific geographical context.

Psychological warfare is planned, tactical and non-combat use of propaganda, threats and other psychological techniques to mislead, intimidate, demoralize or otherwise influence the thinking of adversary or mislead it to take such an action, which makes it vulnerable in long run or at the spot.

Over the last two decades, Chinese relations with North Korea have deteriorated drastically behind the scenes, as China has tired of North Korea’s insolent behavior and reassessed its own interests on the peninsula. Today, China is no longer wedded to North Korea’s survival. In the event of a conflict or the regime’s collapse, Chinese forces would intervene to a degree not previously expected—not to protect Beijing’s supposed ally but to secure its own interests.

Does the United States seek primacy in Asia?  The claim or assumption that the United States seeks primacy in Asia is widespread.  Scholars and pundits in the United States and around the world routinely reference “primacy” (dominance or hegemonic control) as a goal of U.S. policy.  But is it accurate?  This is much more than a semantic dispute.  The primacy assumption is crucial to some arguments about U.S. grand strategy, as well as a hinge point in debates about the foreign policy strategies of American allies. 
This paper argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the primacy assumption about the U.S. approach to Asia is fundamentally wrong.  Since at least the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to sustain its Asian alliances, maintain a forward military presence for purposes of deterrence and readiness, and preserve its military superiority over potential adversaries.  The primacy assumption mistakenly extrapolates from the latter of these—preserving military superiority over competitors—that the United States seeks primacy.  But military superiority is an issue of force structure planning, involving long-term capability development, not foreign policy decision-making.  Primacy as a strategy or a goal would require policies that contain and curb the rising power of others.  American military superiority, by contrast, is a strategic hedge against undesirable yet foreseeable circumstances of war with competitors; it is also a necessary but insufficient condition for credible U.S. threat-making and warfighting.  Without military superiority, America’s alliance commitments would, at best, be unreliable.  Nothing about this force planning posture determines U.S. foreign policy, however.

The article explores the legacy of Obama's foreign policy based on the administration's engagement towards the defined 'core' foreign policy regions, aimed to renew the contemporary American identity. It argues how Obama's rhetoric in Asia-Pacific to rebalance the region has resulted to the adoption of an assertive and belligerent stance of China, with suspicions aimed at possible US coerciveness to undermine China's regional order and ambitions especially in the South China Sea. It further argues of Obama's failure to fully embrace the concept of American Exceptionalism in handling the contemporary power dynamics and anarchy of the Middle East, defying traditional US missionary policies with foreign policy elements of inconsistencies, cautiousness, and skepticism. Finally the article concludes of Obama's legacy with the continual regional disorders spurred by America's retreat in the Middle East, and China's belligerent rise in Asia.

United States’ foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is set to be fundamentally altered by two developments in Washington's defence policy. The first is the so-called pivot towards the region in terms of overall defence strategy. The second, occurring at roughly the same time, is a move towards a far greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in the US defence posture. We analyse the interaction of these two trends and discusses a central tension between short and long-term challenges, suggesting that, contrary to current developments, either a freeze in the deployment of these weapons programmes or a return to a strategy underpinned by traditional notions of deterrence may well be necessary.