Temporary Legislation

Αν και οι νόμοι περιορισμένης χρονικής ισχύος
έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί εκτενώς στη νομοθεσία σε πα−
γκόσμια κλίμακα, αλλά και παραδείγματά τους έχουν
καταγραφεί και στην Ελλάδα τα τελευταία χρόνια,
δεν έχουν διερευνηθεί και αξιολογηθεί οι πιθανές επι−
πτώσεις τους σε περιόδους έκτακτης ανάγκης από
τη σκοπιά της διάκρισης των εξουσιών. Στην ελληνική
έννομη τάξη, η αναφορά στους προσωρινούς νόμους
κυρίως επικεντρώνεται στην πληθώρα των πράξεων
νομοθετικού περιεχομένου που έχουν υιοθετηθεί τα
τελευταία χρόνια, αλλά και στην κριτική που έχουν
δεχθεί1. Κατά συνέπεια, τίθενται σημαντικά ερωτή−
ματα αναφορικά με την επίδραση των προσωρι−
νών νόμων στο κοινοβουλευτικό σύστημα και ειδι−
κότερα στη σχέση μεταξύ νομοθετικού και εκτελεστι−
κού σώματος

Antonios Kouroutakis’s new book on “sunset clauses”—defined as “statutory provisions providing that a particular law will expire automatically on a particular date unless it is re-authorised by the legislature”1—comes at just the right time. We are in the golden age of the study of temporary legislation.

This Article explores the functions or uses of temporary (or “sunset”) legislation – statutory provisions enacted for a limited time. It distinguishes between two main types of functions: legisprudential functions (using temporary legislation as regulatory tool to deal with situations in which the nature of the law, the policy or circumstances require the temporality of the norm); and political uses (using temporary legislation as a political tool for overcoming opposition to the bill). The article explores this issue both empirically and normatively. Empirically, it employs a multi-method approach to investigate how the legisprudential and political functions of temporary legislation are used in practice by the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset). The empirical study reveals a rich array of legisprudential uses of temporary legislation in the legislative practice of the Knesset - a richer array than is often assumed in existing discussions. It also reveals the political uses of temporary legislation and the ways they operate in practice. It exposes a variety of examples of how temporary legislation is employed (particularly by the government) as a means of facilitating legislation, overcoming parliamentary and governmental objections to the bill, and evading effective parliamentary, public, media and judicial scrutiny. It also finds that government bills that contain sunset clauses enjoy a significantly higher passage rate than all government bills. Against this backdrop, the article turns to a normative discussion about the appropriate uses of temporary legislation. It opines on which of the legisprudential functions are more appropriate, and which should be used more cautiously. It also argues, contrary to much of the current writing and to current practice, against the legitimacy and appropriateness of the political use of temporary legislation. It argues that temporary legislation should not be used merely as a tool to garner agreement and overcome opposition to the bill.
[Note: this is the pre-peer reviewed version. The final version will be published in Time, Law and Change: An Interdisciplinary Study (Sofia Ranchordas & Yaniv Roznai, eds., forthcoming]

The legal framework of the B-BBEE The Broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) programme was implemented as a nation building strategy in 2003. 1 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act in conjunction with its Associated Charters, the Codes of Good Practice and various Scorecards give guidelines to companies on how to implement the programme. 2 The aim of the legislation was to correct the "evils" of the apartheid regime, where most companies were run by a few white people. The BBBEE was enacted with the aim of empowering 'all blacks', which included Africans, Coloreds and Indians, 3 who were the economically-excluded majority of South Africa, the opportunity to participate in economic development in the country. 4

Perhaps, for the first time in the history of the Republic of India, consecutive past governments in Goa have succumbed to an ignominious low in governance. The then Congress Government in power clandestinely allowed fraudsters in the Town and Country Planning Department to publish fraudulent amendments to the existing established democratic legislation, namely “The Goa Regulation of Land Development and Building Construction Act, 2008” read with “The Goa Land Development and Building Construction Regulations, 2010”. These subtle fraudulent amendments have been unjustifiably imposed upon the unwary Goans through illegal Notification No. 21/1/TCP/2011/Part File/3252 dated 4th August, 2011, published with the purported sanction or assent of the then Governor of the State of Goa, representing the Hon’ble President of India.

This review essay is a book review of Antonios Kouroutakis, The Constitutional Value of Sunset Clauses: An Historical and Normative Analysis (Routledge, 2017). The essay argues that we are in the golden age of the study of temporary legislation, and places Kouroutakis’s book within the burgeoning global scholarship on temporary legislation. The essay then discusses the book’s contributions to the study of the history of sunset clauses and to the normative and theoretical debates about temporary legislation.

This article presents the findings of an extensive multi-method empirical study that explored the relationship between temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. Temporary (or “sunset”) legislation, statutory provisions enacted for a limited time and set to expire unless their validity is extended, is often hailed as a key tool for promoting experimental and better regulation. Despite the importance of temporary legislation and the burgeoning theoretical scholarship on the subject, there is still a dearth of empirical studies about how temporary legislation is used in practice. The lack of empirical evidence creates a lacuna in at least three areas of theoretical scholarship, concerning temporary legislation, better regulation, and experimentalist governance. This paper is a first step in filling this gap.