Right-Wing-Authoritarianism

Political Capital is a Budapest-based, independent political research and consultancy institute with a decade of experience, a strong international network and reputation. The basic values of the institute are parliamentary democracy and market economy. The institute's main fields of interest are political radicalism, extremism and its social background, conspiracy theories, prejudices, election research and Russian political influence within the EU. Political Capital has strong expertise in quantitative analyses.

Thanks largely to the Kremlin’s information war, Ukraine’s ultranationalists have become global media stars of a sort, depicted in Western and other reports as key players in Ukraine’s third major political upheaval in less than a quarter-century. How do we explain the paradox of ultranationalist parties becoming involved in a protest movement whose thrust is toward greater integration between Ukraine and the European Union? And are the fears that swirl around these parties justified?

This essay identifies influential and prominent twenty-first century Brazilian graphic novels and associated sociocultural affects, such as racial inequality, gender disparities, and social dysfunctionality, as this Post-Boom literary genre expands into a global market. A specific selection of influential texts, key citations, provocative images, and disturbing themes is analyzed, revealing humanistic leitmotifs such as fear of death, violence, and disease, as well as fear of life, immigrant acculturation, futurism, and authoritarianism. The selection is limited to Brazilian graphic novels produced so far in the twenty-first century that have achieved a significant international readership: Daytripper (2014) by Fábio Moon and Gabriel Bá; Two Brothers (2015) by Moon, Bá and Milton Hatoum; Pixu (2009) by Moon, Bá, Becky Cloonan, and Vasilis Lolos; V.I.S.H.N.U (2012) by Eric Archer, Ronaldo Bressane, and Fabio Cobiaco; and Notas de um tempo silenciado (2015) by Robson Vilalba.

9780691125992, £13.95 (pbk) Stefan Breuer, Nationalismus und Faschismus: Frankreich, Italien und Deutschland im Vergleich, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, 2005; 202 pp.; 3534179943, E44.90 (hbk) A. James Gregor, The Search for Neofascism: The Use and Abuse of Social Science. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2006; xii + 306 pp.; 9780521676397, £14.99 (pbk)

In recent years right-wing populism has risen significantly across the west. In 2017, Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, came very close to winning the French presidential election. She eventually lost out to Emanuel Macron, a man dedicated to maintaining the neoliberal consensus but smart enough to voice the usual progressive liberal platitudes during his election campaign. If this was a victory for liberalism over an increasingly virulent and regressive nationalism, it rang rather hallow. The huge strides made by the National Front under Le Pen, quite clearly, do not augur well for the continuation of liberal values in Europe. However, it seems quite important to ask why a representative of the dominant yet ailing politico-economic order was presented to the electorate as the alternative to the ethnocentric nationalism currently pulling France to the right. Is it feasible that Macron's unmitigated neoliberalism can assuage the anger and anxiety that underpin the new French nationalism? Does the invidious choice between Le Pen and Macron not tell us something about the parlous state of liberal democracy and the chains that have been placed upon our collective political imagination? Might the continued dominance of neoliberal capitalism – which has throughout the west concentrated wealth in the hands of an oligarchic elite and permeated economic insecurity throughout the rest of the population – have in some way influenced the development of this new right-wing populism? Could the current crisis in fact be an outcome of neoliberalism's continued political dominance? And perhaps more to the point, shouldn't we be asking searching questions about why the political right has been the principal beneficiary of post-crash economic insecurity, stagnating wages, declining lifestyles, austerity and the gradual breakup of the west's welfare states? Why has there not been a resurgence of interest in traditional left-wing politics rooted in political economy and committed to advancing the interests of the multi-ethnic working class? Why have we not seen a new generation of strident leftist politicians, keen to control the brutal excesses of market society, bursting onto the stage? There is no doubt that the new right has prospered in the vacuum created by the traditional left's decline. Focusing on 'Brexit Britain', the task we have set ourselves here is to identify why the historical relationship between the working class and left-wing politics has become fragile, strained and at risk of coming to an end altogether.

Based on a constructivist approach, this book offers a comparative analysis into the causes of nationalist populist politics in each of the five Nordic independent nation states. Behind the social liberal façade of the economically successful, welfare-orientated Nordic states, right-wing populism has found support in the region. Such parties emerged first in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s, before becoming prominent in Sweden and Finland after the turn of the millennium and in Iceland in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, when populist parties surged throughout the Nordics. The author traces these Nationalist trails of thoughts back to the National Socialistic movements of the 1920s and 1930s (the respective Nordic version Nazi parties) and before, to the birth of the Nordic nation states in the nineteenth century following the failure of integration. Since then, as the book argues, separate nationalisms have grown strong in each of the countries. This study will appeal to students and scholars as well as wider audiences interested in European Politics, Nordic Politics, Nationalism, and Populism.

We are witnessing a global phenomenon of the rise of right-wing leaders who combine nationalist rhetoric with a claim to challenge the pernicious effects of neoliberalism. But, upon achieving power, they do not oppose the business elite, instead, while paying lip service to the victims of economic processes, they direct the blame for those structural problems upon the minorities and " Others " within the rightwing nationalist imagination. In the Indian context, this is typified by the rise of Narendra Modi. The Modi-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and its coming to power in 2014 has similarities with Trump, and is also different from the earlier incarnations of the BJP. In the first part of this article, I explain the innovative nature of the specific Modi-mix of Hindutva and Development, and outline the toxic impact his right-wing populist government has had on a broad spectrum of Indian society and polity. However, in spite of the visible increase in real and symbolic violence across the country, Modi continues to remain popular and wield great influence. The second part of the article answers this apparent puzzle by providing an account of the work of the " Modi myth " that projects him as an ascetic, paternal, and decisive ruler. This political myth is constantly reinforced through medium, speech, and performance. Further, given the many disparate constituencies with differing concerns that Modi-led BJP addresses itself to, the policy inconsistencies are reconciled by a strategic and systematic use of " forked tongue " speech that presents the different interests as being uniform. A populist right-wing politics is constructed out of keeping these dualities in motion by speaking to the different constituencies with a forked tongue. I conclude by giving three examples of management of such dual domains: corporate/grassroots, national/international, India/Bharat.

Ein gängiger Mythos ist,  bei der Tea-Party-Bewegung handele es sich um eine rein rechtslibertäre, also marktradikale Bewegung. Sie habe mit der  „alten“ Christlichen Rechten nichts gemein. Sie kümmere sich bloß um Wirtschaftsfragen und „individuelle Selbstbestimmung“ und pflege eine Abneigung gegen „Bevormundung“ aller Art – wie Besteuerung, Regulierung von Schusswaffen, Drogengebrauch und auch kirchlich-religiöse (Moral-)Vorschriften? Die christliche Rechte sei dagegen eine Bewegung des Wertkonservatismus, die gerade (religiöse) Bevormundung anstrebe. Sie verfechte zudem keine ökonomische Agenda, sondern bloß eine kulturelle – den „Kulturkrieg“ gegen den „säkularen Humanismus“ (Bill O’Reilly), also gegen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Frau (Abtreibungsverbot), gegen die gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe und für die Aufhebung der Trennung von Kirche und Staat. Die These, bei der Tea Party von 2009ff handele es sich ideologisch und personell um eine andere Rechte als bei der christlichen Rechten 1980-2008, ist jedoch unhaltbar. Die Tea Party war von Beginn an eine in rechtsreligiöser und marktradikaler Sprache zugleich artikulierte Einheit des US-Rechtspopulismus. Marktradikalismus und christlich-rechter Autoritarismus bilden in der Tea Party eine Einheit. Der Hintergrund dieser Tatsache ist, dass sich in den USA eine spezifische neoliberale Religiosität herausgebildet hat. Der Aufsatz rekonstruiert ihren historischen Entstehungsprozess und fragt abschließend nach emanzipatorischen Interventionsmöglichkeiten, die sich nichtsdestotrotz in der Krise des neoliberalen Kapitalismus ergeben.

"In the opinion of some historians the era of fascism ended with the deaths of Mussolini and Hitler in 1945; yet, the academic debate about its nature is as far from resolution as ever. Besides, a number of developments since 1945 make it ever more desirable that politicians, journalists, lawyers, and the general public can turn to "experts" for a heuristically useful and broadly consensual definition of the term. The novel post-war phenomena include: the emergence of a highly prolific European New Right, the rise of radical right populist parties, the flourishing of ultra-nationalist movements in the former Soviet empire, the radicalization of some currents of Islam and Hinduism into potent political forces, and the upsurge of religious terrorism. This book brings alive the intense controversy the topic has generated, while suggesting valuable heuristic strategies for resolving it. Twenty-nine academics, mostly German but including several prominent experts working in English, were invited by the journal "Erwaegen Wissen Ethik" to engage with an article by Roger Griffin, one of the most influential theorists in the study of generic fascism in the Anglophone world. The result is essential reading for all those who realize the need to provide the term "fascism" with theoretical rigour, analytical precision, and empirical content. The book will change the way in which historians and political scientists think about fascism, and make the discussion on the threat it poses to infant democracies like Russia more incisive not just for academics, but for politicians, journalists, and the wider public.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS (with their affiliations as of 2004): David Baker, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Warwick; Jeffrey M. Bale, Assistant Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California; Tamir Bar-On, Professor of Politics and Sociology at George Brown College at Toronto; Alexander De Grand, Professor of History at North Carolina State University; Martin Durham, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Wolverhampton; Roger Eatwell, Professor of European Politics at the University of Bath; Peter Fritzsche, Professor of History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; A. James Gregor, Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley; Roger Griffin, Professor in the History of Ideas at Oxford Brookes University; Siegfried Jäger, Professor Emeritus of Linguistics at the University of Duisburg-Essen; Klaus Holz, Director of the Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. at Villigst, Nordrhein-Westfalen; Aristotle Kallis, Lecturer in European Studies at Lancaster University; Melitta Konopka, social psychologist at Bochum; Walter Laqueur, Professor Emeritus of History at Georgetown University, Washington, DC; Werner Loh, Research Fellow in Social Sciences at the University of Paderborn, Nordrhein-Westfalen; Bärbel Meurer, Professor of Sociology at the University of Osnabrück; Philip Morgan, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary European History at the University of Hull; Ernst Nolte, Professor Emeritus of Modern History at the Free University of Berlin; Kevin Passmore, Lecturer in History at the University of Cardiff, Wales; Stanley G. Payne, Hilldale-Jaume Vicens Vives Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Friedrich Pohlmann, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau; Karin Priester, Professor of Sociology at the University of Münster; Sven Reichardt, Junior Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Konstanz; David D. Roberts, Albert Berry Saye Professor of History at the University of Georgia; Alfred Schobert, Research Fellow in Social Sciences at the Duisburger Institut für Sprach- und Sozialforschung; Robert J. Soucy, Professor Emeritus of History at Oberlin College, Ohio; Mario Sznajder, Leon Blum Professor of Political Science at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Andreas Umland, DAAD Lecturer in German Studies at the National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyïv; Leonard Weinberg, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada; Jan Weyand is a Research Fellow in Sociology at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg; Wolfgang Wippermann, Professor of Modern History at the Free University of Berlin."

Like Weimar Germany, contemporary Russia is home to fascist actors and widespread nationalism. But unlike interwar Germany, the party system in post-Soviet Russia is heavily manipulated and civil society remains underdeveloped. This means that fascists have not had a chance to use elections or to penetrate civil society in order to build up political support. The continuing presence of a resolutely authoritarian, yet non-fascist “national leader” (Vladimir Putin) keeps the country from becoming a liberal democracy but it also, for now, makes it less likely that the regime will become fascist.

This chapter introduces some basic contours of Russia’s contemporary radical right scene. It distinguishes between systemic and non-systemic ultra-nationalist groups in Putin’s Russia, the principal difference being the groups’ and individual actors’ proximity and clarity of connections to the crypto-authoritarian regime. The systemic component consists of political groups, authors, and activists that are allowed or encouraged to participate in official mass media and public life. Main actors of the mainstream radical right include Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and organizations using the “Rodina” (Motherland) label. Major expressions of government-supported Russian “uncivil society” and anti-democratic intellectual discourse include the writings of the far right political thinkers Lev Gumilev and Aleksandr Dugin. Manifestations of the non-systemic component of Russia’s extreme right include skinheads and their use of ethnic violence, political movements such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, other descendants of the “Pamiat” (Memory) organization in the 1980s, and their activities.

We investigated the connection between moral exclusion of outgroups and on the one hand, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation (SDO) on the other. We assumed that both RWA and SDO would increase the tendency to place other groups out of the scope of justice. However, we also tested whether negative stereotypes about an outgroup's threatening and norm-violating misbehavior would serve as a justification for moral exclusion. These assumptions were tested in connection with Roma, Jewish, and Muslim people as target groups in the Hungarian context (N = 441). In line with our hypotheses, we found that both RWA and SDO had an indirect effect on moral exclusion mediated by negative stereotypes about the particular target group. Our findings suggested that negative stereotypes were more important legitimizing factors for RWA than for SDO. Our results highlight the benefits of interpreting the process of moral exclusion as an outcome of motivated social cognition.

Abstract: The years 1975 and 1977 witnessed a wave of de facto military
regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. In Pakistan, General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq operationalized the country’s preexisting Islamic
identity from emblematic to substantive at both domestic and international levels. General Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad of Bangladesh revived the country’s Islamic identity at the domestic and international levels and reopened the space for religious fractions that were banned from politics constitutionally in the previous regime. Focusing on military regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan between 1975 and 1990, this paper aims to bridge that gap by specifically examining the use of Islam. This study argues that dictators in both countries used Islam to support their survival strategies of legitimacy, repression, and social control. Authoritarian rulers did not have to use Islam to maintain military coherence, because of the military’s culture of subordination to superiors

Despite the burgeoning literature on right-wing populism, there is still considerable uncertainty about its causes, its impact on liberal democracies and about promising counter-strategies. Inspired by recent suggestions that (1) the emancipatory left has made a significant contribution to the proliferation of the populist right; and (2) populist movements, rather than challenging the established socio-political order, in fact stabilize and further entrench its logic, this article argues that an adequate understanding of the populist phenomenon necessitates a radical shift of perspective: beyond the democratic and emancipatory norms, which still govern most of the relevant literature. Approaching its subject matter via democratic theory and modernization theory, it undertakes a reassessment of the triangular relationship between modernity, democracy and popu-lism. It finds that the latter is not helpfully conceptualized as anti-modernist or anti-democratic but should, instead, be regarded as a predictable feature of the form of politics distinctive of today's third modernity.

Public attitudes towards law-breakers shape the tone and tenor of crime-control policy. The desire for retribution seems to be the main motivation underpinning punitive attitudes towards sentencing, yet there is some confusion in the research literature over what retribution really means. In this paper we distinguish between retribution as revenge (as the desire to punish criminal offenders to retaliate a past wrong by making the offender suffer) and retribution as just deserts (as the preference to restore justice through proportional compensation from the offender). Results from an online survey (n=176) provide evidence of two distinct dimensions of retribution, but we also show that these two dimensions have different ideological and motivational antecedents, and have different consequences in terms of the treatment of criminal offender. We find that retribution as revenge is associated with the motivation to enforce status boundaries with criminal offenders, as well as ideological preferences for power and dominance (as expressed by social dominance orientation) and in-group conformity (as expressed by right-wing authoritarianism). Endorsement of retribution as revenge also predicts the support of harsh punishment and the willingness to deny fair procedures. By contrast, retribution as just deserts is mainly predicted by a value restoration motive and by right-wing authoritarianism. After controlling for revenge, retribution as just deserts predicts support for procedural justice in the criminal courts. We conclude with the idea that beliefs about proportionality and compensation work as a buffer against the negative effects of revenge.

This study off ers a discussion of the dangers to the stability of political systems in consolidated democracies posed by contemporary populism, with a particular focus on the dynamic development of extreme right-wing populism. The author considers the consequences of efficient populist campaigns, such as Brexit in Great Britain, lowered trust towards the United States under Trump's administration and practices followed by the Law and Justice party (PiS) under the leadership of Ja-rosław Kaczyński in Poland, which seem especially destructive for liberal democracy. Further examples are those of Hungary and Turkey, where the political systems have eroded into semi-consolidated democracy in the case of the former and an authoritarian system in the latter case. A comparative analysis of freedom indices indicates some dangers related to de-consolidation of the democratic system in Po-land. Furthermore, the study points out dangers arising from the transformation of soft populism, understood as communication rhetoric oriented towards the concentration of power in the hands of populist leaders, which clearly paves the way for the dismantling of consolidated democracy in favour of an authoritarian system. Th e conclusions of the study outlines a variety of actions which can be undertaken to protect the achievements of liberal democracy. Keywords: security of the political system, right-wing populism, destabilisation of the rule of law, liberal democracy, consolidated democracy, semi-consolidated democracy, authoritarianism.

The enclosed essay is posted at the AAUP Academe Blog:

https://academeblog.org/2017/12/18/how-the-alt-right-seeks-to-sabotage-the-university/

It is the companion piece to "Letter to My Colleagues";

https://www.academia.edu/35322691/Letter_to_My_Colleagues_Concerning_Turning_Point_USA_and_Professor_Watchlist_Its_Time_for_Courage_and_Conviction

Abstract:

There is a great deal to be said about the rise of the Alt-Right over this past year, and while I understand the argument for identifying its platform with the ascent of white supremacism, I'd argue that " Alt-Right " encompasses something far more ambitious and dangerous, especially with respect to the country's most vital institutions: free elections, a free press, an open public square, and academic freedom. The Alt-Right endangers all of these in ways both as flagrantly racist and anti-Semitic as " Unite the Right " rallies—and as quietly cancerous as the growth of organizations aimed specifically at recruiting a young cadre of future white nationalists. Despite their misleading " free market, " libertarian-sounding mission statement, Turning Point USA, and its McCarthyesque Professor Watchlist demonstrably belong to the latter.

This paper is an outline for a PhD thesis written by Daniel Thiel at the University of Marburg. It addresses discourses on a "new aristocracy", that is to say a new elite that should be formed after the model of the 'old', historical nobility. It clarifies which aspects have to be taken into account for a thorough analysis of neo-aristocratic mindsets between 1933 and 1945. This topic will surely provide new insights into the nature of Nazism.

For further information, read also my review of  Alexandra Gerstner's book "Neuer Adel".

Capítulo 12:  En: Botero, Felipe, Fredy Barrero, Miguel García Sánchez y Laura Wills Otero (compiladores). Dinamismo y diversidad en la Ciencia Política Latinoamericana. VII Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes. 2016
ISBN 978-958-774-309-8

I.  Антизападные идеологические течения в постсоветской России и их истоки (8)

Александр Янов
"Агония бешеного национализма: распад российского патерналистского мифа в XX веке"

Вера Тольц
"Петербургское востоковедение начала ХХ века и критика европейской науки о Востоке"

Гейр Фликке
"Патриотический левоцентризм: зигзаги Коммунистической партии Российской Федерации в 1990-х годах"

Виктор Шнирельман
"Хазария, Апокалипсис и «Мир Закулисы»: как преподаватель французского бросила вызов Западу"

Марк Йоффе
"Концептуальный карнавал: национальные элементы в русском националистическим роке"

Иво Мийнссен
"Кузница модернизации на озере Селигер: движение «Наши», путинский патриотизм и Всероссийский молодежный образовательный форум 2005-2010 гг."

Раиса Бараш
"Конкуренция оппозиции и власти в России как торговля страхами перед «Другим»: к пониманию мифологической составляющей Белой революции 2011-2012 гг."

Abstract: This chapter examines current issues in education that may impede progress in the field. A variety of external threats are analyzed, including k-12 and university funding and ideological threats in the form of political forces that may attempt to dictate k-12 curriculum. Business and political forces seek to influence university curriculum through monetary gifts and undermine the credibility of education at the university level through sensationalized media coverage and social media attacks. One avenue to address positive change within the field of education is with an increased emphasis on cognitive science. Myths regarding cognition common among educators are examined along with less well-known approaches that are supported by research on cognition. While the field of education can make internal refinements to strengthen students’ outcomes from k-12 through the university level, ultimately the citizens of the United States must make the choice to once again value education as an essential public resource, demand that states fully support it, and protect it from those who would seek to undermine it.

Publication information:
Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos
Nouveaux mondes mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds
Colloques | 2016
Las derechas en América latina en el siglo XX: problemas, desafíos y perspectivas – Coord. Ernesto Bohoslavsky y Stéphane Boisard