Republic (Plato)

This collective volume, at the cutting edge of research, presents a wide range of perspectives on Plato's theory of Ideas. It features numerous authors whose main language of publication is not English, thus providing international readers access to a wide range of scholarly works not normally available to them. In this collective volume, to which a number of established scholars of international renown as well as young up-and-coming researchers have contributed, the Platonic theory of Ideas is examined from philological, historical, psychological, metaphysical and ethical viewpoints, presenting a boldly innovative hermeneutical impulse that meets the highest standards of contemporary research.

This study examines Plato's Timaeus through the lens of constitutional psychology, revealing how the dialogue's structure and content support the Platonomic thesis that Plato's primary concern was psychological rather than political. The analysis uncovers evidence for a deliberate philosophical strategy: using a simplified summary of the Republic to distinguish readers who grasped its deeper constitutional psychology from those who remained at the political surface. This investigation illuminates the Timaeus itself, the historical misreading by Aristotle, and the proper methodology for extracting enduring wisdom from period-specific scientific frameworks.

El comentario se centra en el debate sobre la justicia en el Libro I de
La República de Platón. A través de las posiciones de Céfalo, Polemarco y Trasímaco,
se ponen en juego concepciones que vinculan la justicia con la verdad, la retribución, la
amistad o la conveniencia del poder. Sócrates, en diálogo con cada uno, desmonta estas
propuestas mostrando sus contradicciones: la justicia no puede reducirse a decir la
verdad ni a dar a cada uno lo suyo sin considerar las circunstancias; tampoco puede
justificar el daño al enemigo sin corromper el sentido mismo de virtud; y frente a la
visión de Trasímaco, sostiene que el verdadero arte de gobernar busca el bien de los
gobernados y no la mera conveniencia del gobernante. El libro concluye afirmando que
la justicia es virtud y sabiduría, condición indispensable para la vida en común, mientras
que la injusticia, aunque pueda ofrecer ventajas inmediatas, conduce inevitablemente al
desorden y la corrupción social.

Aristophanes says that Clouds, a recognized model for Plato’s Republic, is a reworking of his first play Banqueters (Δαιταλεῖς). Plato uses the δαιτ- stem only at Rep. 1.345c and Timaeus 17a, where Socrates calls yesterday’s hosts of Republic “banqueters” (δαιτυμόνων). Aristophanes’ Banqueters featured two sons and educations, one traditional and prudent, the other, called Thrasymachus, rhetorical and “buggered.” The blush of Plato’s Thrasymachus likely suggests the “buggering” of his argument. The chorus of Banqueters were θιασῶται of Herakles, which explains the rowdy mock–kidnapping of Socrates in the proemion and Herakles imagery throughout. Banqueters’ early date (427 BC) could explain Thrasymachus’ role in Republic I, if the dialogue is tracing the fall of Athenian democracy in the Peloponnesian War, using the theme of failed education.

It seems necessary and above all logical to demand from researchers in the realm of the Classical Tradition the provision of conclusive proofs of the dependence of literary or artistic works on Greek or Latin models that, after having been adapted -lato sensu-, have reached our times. The preservation of Classical Wisdom offers in its turn a wide range of possibilities among which there would be, for instance, not only replicas ad litteram but adaptations, mere allusions and, why not?, all sorts of rules and commonplaces, thus becoming sometimes a burden rather than a source of inspiration. Whatever the case may be, it is essential to provide the proof and demonstrate that there has been both awareness and deliberate use of the ancient model -and perhaps of its tradition all through the centuries-, so that we can draw a line that associates -since Cinema is now our subject-the ancient world with the contemporary one. In other words, those who do research into the Classical Tradition and Cinema may and must write, for instance, on Pier Paolo Pasolini's Edipo Re or Medea, Jules Dassin's Phaedra or the Victorian experience of Platonic love in James Ivory's Maurice, etcetera, but they should neither analyse a film simply to establish certain parallelisms with Classical models, nor pay attention to significant coincidences if finally they cannot confirm any Classical authorship or inspiration. Following this professional code, they will exhibit an irreproachable behaviour, but they will not take good opportunities to lead con-

Parece necesario y, sobre todo, coherente que la investigación rigurosa en el ámbito de la "Tradición Clásica" exija a sus estudiosos la presentación de pruebas concluyentes de la dependencia de cualquier obra literaria, artística, etc., de modelos grecolatinos que, una vez adaptados -lato sensu-, perviven en épocas posteriores. Ni que decir tiene que esta preservación de la sabiduría clásica cuaja en un abanico enorme de posibilidades que irían, por ejemplo, desde la copia más o menos literal hasta verdaderas adaptaciones a propósitos y sensibilidades diversos y, ¿por qué no decirlo?, pesados condicionantes que, en ocasiones, más que un acicate creativo, se convierten en una losa de la que no todos son capaces de liberarse. Sea como sea, lo esencial, como apuntaba, sería la prueba, la demostración de que ha habido conciencia y uso intencionado del modelo y quizás de su tradición a lo largo de los siglos, de modo que es posible dibujar una línea, si es necesario con trazos intermitentes pero una línea al fin y al cabo, que une, ya que abordamos el mundo del cine, la Antigüedad con la Contemporaneidad. O, dicho de otro modo, quienes trabajan en Tradición Clásica y Cine pueden y deben hablar por ejemplo de la Medea o del Edipo Re de

Στην παρούσα εργασία, σκοπεύω να εξετάσω την κριτική του Ξενοφάνη και του Πλάτωνα απέναντι στο θεολογικό σύστημα της εποχής του Ομήρου και του Ησίοδου. Συγκεκριμένα, θα αναλύσω την ουσία και τις ιδιότητες των θεών, σύμφωνα και αντίθετα με το παραδεδομένο θεολογικό σύστημα της εποχής τους. Παράλληλα, θα διερευνήσω πώς οι δύο φιλόσοφοι υπονομεύουν το κύρος των δύο ποιητών. Στην περίπτωση του Ξενοφάνη, εστιάζω στις σωζόμενες μαρτυρίες, τις οποίες ο Σέξτος Εμπειρικός παρουσιάζει για την παραπάνω στάση του φιλοσόφου. Την εντάσσω στο πλαίσιο της ευρύτερης κριτικής του Ξενοφάνη απέναντι σε διαδεδομένες αντιλήψεις της εποχής του για τους θεούς, με την οποία επιδιώκει να διατυπώσει τη θεωρία του για την ουσία και την ηθική του θεού.  Από την άλλη, στον Πλάτωνα δίνω έμφαση στην Πολιτεία και εξετάζω παραδείγματα από τον Όμηρο και τον Ησίοδο, τα οποία ο φιλόσοφος χαρακτηρίζει ως ηθικά αντιπρότυπα. Μέσω της μελέτης των περιπτώσεων από τους δύο φιλοσόφους, τονίζω πως ο Πλάτωνας φαίνεται πως αξιοποιεί και εξελίσσει την κριτική του Ξενοφάνη, καθώς την εντάσσει στη συζήτηση για τη θέση της ποίησης στο εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα της ιδεώδους πολιτείας του. Συγκεκριμένα, ο Πλάτων υπονομεύει το κύρος της ποίησης ως πηγής γνώσης, καθώς εφιστά τον κίνδυνο διαφθοράς των νέων, μέσω της μίμησης των συχνά αρνητικών παραδειγμάτων που αυτή προσφέρει. Η ποίηση σύμφωνα με τον Πλάτωνα συνδέεται στενά με την άγνοια, την απαιδευσία και την διαφθορά και θεωρώ πως στην Πολιτεία είναι εμφανές το δίπολο γνώσης-τέχνης.

This dissertation frames Plato's Republic as an attempt to reform the state of discourse in a politico-discursive crisis that occurred toward the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century BCE in Athens, by focusing on the previously unexplored role that proverbs and gnômai play in Plato's creation of the ideal polis. Plato uses such commonplaces not solely for the purpose of lending his dialogue a more authentic character. Rather, they both elucidate the dynamics of power that inhere in the prevailing modes of Athenian discourse and provide a locus for Plato's critique of the improper use of language. Plato reveals how discursive reform is inseparable from social and political reform. Proverbs, gnômai, and other rhetorical topoi serve collectively as one of the building blocks of a just society. Put simply, wordcraft is statecraft. Plato's effort at discursive reform in the context of proverbial expressions that are themselves part of the larger Greek wisdom tradition parallels, in turn, the critique against poetry The dissertation of John Roger Tennant Jr. is approved.

This dissertation frames Plato's Republic as an attempt to reform the state of discourse in a politico-discursive crisis that occurred toward the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth century BCE in Athens, by focusing on the previously unexplored role that proverbs and gnômai play in Plato's creation of the ideal polis. Plato uses such commonplaces not solely for the purpose of lending his dialogue a more authentic character. Rather, they both elucidate the dynamics of power that inhere in the prevailing modes of Athenian discourse and provide a locus for Plato's critique of the improper use of language. Plato reveals how discursive reform is inseparable from social and political reform. Proverbs, gnômai, and other rhetorical topoi serve collectively as one of the building blocks of a just society. Put simply, wordcraft is statecraft. Plato's effort at discursive reform in the context of proverbial expressions that are themselves part of the larger Greek wisdom tradition parallels, in turn, the critique against poetry The dissertation of John Roger Tennant Jr. is approved.

!is paper explores the role of external factors in the constitution of
the Stoic mind. It will show how the external infuences the Stoic mind
in several crucial ways: 1) Constitutive Role: the external world acts
as a constitutive factor for the soul (the third level of the scala naturae),
shaping its development. At the fourth level, the logos (rational principle)
interacts with qualified external objects. These objects form the
basis of abstract reasoning and teachings derived from external sources;
2) Truth-Making Function: the external world serves as a truth-maker
for phantasiai and the axiomata associated with them, providing validation
and substance to internal representations and core beliefs; 3) Opposition
to External Goods: For the Stoic soul dedicated to virtue, external
goods are elements to be opposed or transcended. The Stoic perspective
emphasizes the pursuit of virtue as independent of external goods,
which are considered indifferent or secondary to moral development;
4) Condition of Possibility: the external void or incorporeal space is
a necessary condition for the growth of the cosmos, including its periodic
conflagration (destruction) and subsequent reconstitution.

Aristotle offers us no sustained account of civic friendship (πολιτική φιλία), only remarks scattered throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.1 In this paper I hope to make clear what his views on civic friendship are. Before I get to his remarks on civic friendship themselves, I want to look briefly at two discussions in Aristotle that I believe contribute to uncovering his views on civic friendship, and I want to indicate briefly those interpretations of Aristotle's civic friendship that I reject. I First, let us take a quick look at two related issues: (1) Aristotle's criticism of the communism of women and children in Plato's Republic, and (2) Aristotle's claim that one cannot properly be a friend-i.e. a character friend-to many people.2 According to Plato, nearly every citizen in the best city of the Republic will actually feel close familial friendship or affection towards one another: A citizen will regard all younger citizens as children, and all older ones as parents and grandparents, and all those of the same age as siblings. And they will really feel this; these are not simply words (Rep. 463c-d). This, it was claimed, will result in the highest unity possible. (See Rep. 462b-464d.)3 Aristotle levels several criticisms against this 'communism of women and children,' as it is sometimes called. (See Pol. II 3-4.) For example: What is common to the most people gets the least care, since they are concerned (φροντίζουσιV) most of all with their own things, but less with the common things, or [only with] as much as falls to each [individually] (1261b33-35). And: There comes to be a thousand sons to each of the citizens, and these not as [sons] of each [individually], but any chance man is equally the son of any chance man [given that they are in the proper age groups], such that all [the "fathers"] will eaually neglect them [i.e. the "sons"] (1261b38-1262al). The main thrust of Aristotle's complaint is that where women and children are held in common (or more accurately, where all regard themselves as part of one common family) , people will not be able 1

Μια πρώτη παρουσίαση των θραυσμάτων του Ευριπίδειου Κρεσφόντη και η ανορθόδοξη ανακάλυψή τους. 1 Είναι νομίζω σημαντικό κι ενδιαφέρον να παρουσιαστεί μια ανασύνθεση εν τη γεννέση της με μια κάπως εκλαικευμένη μορφή έτσι ώστε να γίνει κατανοητή τη εργασία μας στο κοινό.

Razmišljajući duže vrijeme o jednom od najpoznatijih i najveličanstvenijih filozofskih odlomaka – “mitu/alegoriji o pećini”, iz Platonovog djela ‘Država’, koji predstavlja osnovu za različita tumačenja, imali smo potrebu skrenuti pažnju na određene usporedbe. Nakon skraćenog navođenja spomenutog ulomka slijedi brzopotezni komentar.

There are numerous interpretations of Plato's theory of justice as it relates to the ideal state, deeply intertwined with his political philosophy. This complexity makes understanding his interlocking ideas challenging, as he seeks to construct a theory of the ideal state. Plato's philosophy of justice, particularly in its political dimension, emphasizes integration as a fundamental factor in grasping his theory. This paper aims to elucidate the original concept of justice in Plato's state by delving into the roots of the Republic, analyzing its historical context. Plato's predictions reflect values and truths connected to politics and philosophy, emphasizing integration as essential to understanding his theory of justice, which lies at the core of his philosophy. This essay compares the relationship between the functions and class structure of the state. Plato classifies human nature into three components: reason, courage, and appetite, which correspond to three major classes in the state. The ruling class, educated in philosophy, governs the state. The military class, characterized by courage and strength, defends the state, while the professional class manages the everyday affairs of governance. Plato's theory posits functional specialization across all classes as fundamental to his ideal state. In essence, while Plato's imagined city may lack historical existence, it holds significant relevance in the realm of speculative human thought.
Keywords: Justice. State. Function. Class. Rulers. Guardians. Producers.

The purpose of this study is to find out the effect of PjBL with WBL media as an instructional strategy and direct instructional (DI) strategy on the understanding (intercept) and the concept application of science-integrated learning media. The method of this research is Quasi-Experimental with 2x2 factorial design. The number of respondents is 110 pre-service teachers consisting of 68 respondents for the experimental class and 42 respondents for the control class. The sampling technique is purposive sampling with a class as an experimental class and another class as a control class. MANOVA is used to analyze the data. The result of the test shows that: (1) there is a difference in the average score of learning outcomes in understanding and science-integrated conceptual application among pre-service teachers who are taught with Web-based PjBL and DI strategies. The average score of understanding the concept of developing science-integrated learning media with a Web-based PjBL strat...

The concept of the idea of the Good is one of the key aspects of Platonic ontology and ethics. Plato introduces the Good in Book VI of the Republic, defining it as the “the highest form of knowledge”. The function of the Good in Plato turns out to be twofold: on the one hand, it assumes a practical-normative role in relation to the other ideas; on the other hand, the function of the Good is purely ontological, in that it serves as the ontological foundation of the entire intelligible reality. The function of the idea of the Good played a central role in the so-called Middle Platonism, in which interpreters have sought to interpret the doctrines of the dialogues according to a systematic unity. In this view, the Good always assumes the role of the apex of the real, but it loses its normative character in favour of an ontological and theological perspective. The most significant example is that of Numenius of Apamea, who makes the Good (also called “first God”) the absolute apex of the real. The Good, in Numenius’ perspective, represents the being, transcendent with respect to the intelligible plane, but still ontologically determined as it is the highest intellect. The next step comes with Plotinus, who identifies the Good with the One of the Parmenides, from which he de- rives a series of aporias regarding its knowability and ontological determination. For Ploti- nus, the One-Good is defined as beyond being and thought, being transcendent even with respect to the sphere of the ideas-Nous. I have tried to show very briefly how the meaning of Good evolves in metaphysical-theological terms throughout the Platonic tradition, being profoundly different from how it was conceived by Plato in the Republic.

Some scholars doubt that the dialog "Alcibiades Major" was written by Plato, but
this conversation has an important place among the works belonging to the Platonic
school. "Alcibiades Major" contains a dialog between Socrates and the young
Alcibiades, and in some parts of the conversation they also talk about the
Achaemenid Empire. In this study, only one part of the conversation has been
considered, namely that Socrates mentions Cyrus the Great and Xerxes I as the only
people the young and ambitious Alcibiades respects. Thus, the aim of this study is to
identify, through a critical and comparative reading of the conversation of
"Alcibiades Major", the concepts and images that led the author to mention the
names of Cyrus and Xerxes as the only honorable persons for Alcibiades". Finally,
this study aims to analyze the hidden ideas that existed in the public opinion of the
Greeks of the 5th and 4th centuries BC about these two Achaemenid great kings.

In this essay, I shall argue that, contrary to common assumptions, Plato's so-called "City of Pigs" (Pl. rep. 372a3–373b1) is by no means an anti-philosophical state. Refuting this assumption, I aim to show that the dialogical context accounts for the interlocutors' rejection of this state: it is, I ar-gue, an economic system that stands at the outset of the ideal state's foundation as its basis. This system illustrates metaphorically, represented by population groups and concrete lifestyles, a hierarchy according to which necessary and non-necessary human needs ought to be satisfied. However, Socrates' idea of what necessary needs are (depicted in the "City of Pigs") seems all too meagre to Glauco personally, highlighted by his coinage "City of Pigs". Precisely this makes Socra-tes realize that the moderation he has in mind - rendering the system "healthy, true" (and by the way vegetarian) - would demand too much from average people. Thus, despite his explicit prefer-ence for that City he makes no attempt at rejecting Glauco's prototypical wish. Instead, he modi-fies this system of needs accordingly, thus turning it "luxurious, inflamed", even if its very abun-dance will lead to resource scarcity (and eventually war). Only at this stage does the dialogue face problems for which there has been no room in the preceding economic discourse: a splitting of society into specialised classes, the education of the guardian class, political power, etc. that gradually establish the ideal state. At its beginning, however, we encounter - in the form of the "City of Pigs" - an often-misjudged plea for moderation (and vegetarianism) that - as Socrates rec-ognizes melancholically - is not (yet) suitbale to the people (of his time).

YouTube Address of the video "Platons Seelentheorie. Der Kampf zwischen den Seelenteilen" - Lecture held on 13th December 2010 at the Volkshochschule Alsegrund, Währing, Döbling, Vienna within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCkdxQJJAMFDL24VBu9Zk9Tw

YouTube Address of the video "Wissen und Tugend bei Platon. Ist Wissen ausreichend, um gut zu sein?" - Lecture held on 27th April 2011 at the Jüdisches Institut für Erwachsenenbildung within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCkdxQJJAMFDL24VBu9Zk9Tw

YouTube Address of the video "Die Idee bei Platon. Das Enigma der Philosophie" - Lecture held at the Volkshochschule Meidling, Vienna within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public, 30th May 2012 - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCkdxQJJAMFDL24VBu9Zk9Tw

YouTube Address of the video "Wissen und Tugend bei Platon. Ist Wissen ausreichend, um gut zu sein?" - Lecture held on 18th November 2009 at the Volkshochschule Hietzing (Bezirksmuseum Hietzing) within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCkdxQJJAMFDL24VBu9Zk9Tw

At Republic 414b, Socrates asks “Could we... contrive ... one noble lie ...?” Most plausibly, these words imply that there is one noble lie. Following these words, the Autochthony Claim asserts the Best City’s citizens are equally brothers, and the Myth of Metals asserts that brother justifiably rules over brother. The article argues that the Autochthony Claim is the “one” noble lie. This conclusion derives from showing that the two assertions are not only a normative exercise about what the Best City should do but are also descriptive insofar as they describe the behaviour of worldly polities in Plato’s day and ours.

The Allegory of the Cave (514a-520a of Plato’s Republic) describes how people may come to know the form of the good, or, the good itself. It depicts a prisoner who with great difficulty leaves the cave in which he was bound and enters the external realm. There, under compulsion, he gazes at the light, responsible for all things, including the shadows which he had mistakenly thought represented truth. My project is to consider why one leaves the cave. Thus, I am interested in the mechanisms by which the philosopher is externally compelled to leave the cave, but I am perhaps more interested in his internal compulsion – his internal desire, and striving, to leave the cave – and how external compulsions may help bring out and in concert satisfy it. Accordingly, I will suggest that while external compulsions are necessary (to varying degrees) for a person’s rise from the cave, they are only successful because there lies in each person (again, to varying degrees) the ability to recognize the good, and the eros-driven desire to do so. It is thus my view that the external compulsions represented in the cave are auxiliary catalysts — they aid people in coming to know the form of good by focusing their natural eros on attaining knowledge. In making this argument, I will consider the Allegory of the Cave and other more focused passages in the Republic which deal with eros and the soul. I will also enter into some conversation with Rachel Barney’s “Eros and Necessity in the Ascent from the Cave,” which deals specifically with this issue and whose reading — that the more conventional external motivations (per her curricular and Socratic readings) and eros can each or even together compel one’s ‘ascent’ from the cave — I will accept in part but attempt to strengthen and specify in my own.

En el presente artículo se sostiene que la violencia es inevitable en cualquier organización humana, pero que debe ser ejercida a modo de justicia. Según Platón el ser humano debe ser conducido, mediante la motivación y/o coacción, a preferir el bien de la comunidad sobre el propio. La violencia al ser un elemento negativo del poder político, ha de ser racionalizado de tal modo que logre reducirse a sus mínimos; pues sólo así se dirige al bien común y puede ser parte de la justicia, pues es el modo en que ésta combate la injusticia. En consecuencia, la racionalización de la violencia es posible en la medida en que ésta es útil y conveniente para la comunidad.

The utopian character of Plato's city in The Republic has been a main subject of discussion, centred especially on the characteristics of the proposed community and its incoherencies when assumed as a concrete political project. The aim of this paper is to analyse which parameters are used by Plato in his view of the best constitution and how these parameters became the criteria assumed by Aristotle in his general classification of political thought. Through Plato's representation of Socrates' activity when describing the city of the Republic it is possible to trace a genealogy of the modern concept of utopia.

Plato was the first philosopher who discussed love philosophically. The discussion can be found in his work entitled Symposium. Through text analysis of Symposium, the perspective of Plato about love and the position of love in philosophical discourse can be concluded. For Plato, ultimate love does not have a relation to the body anymore. Plato believed that love is hierarchical, and it ascends from the lower level to the higher level as illustrates in Scala Amoris. The ultimate love is about a mental state which aims to gain absolute beauty and it is the highest level of love. However, in romantic relationships, love is not only about the mental state but also physical contact because romantic love relates to sexual things such as sexual intimacy. And according to Plato, love that still has attachment to the body is the lowest level of love. Thus, Plato's perspective about romantic love cannot be said as positive because romantic love strongly relates to the body. Plato believe...

Platons Seelentheorie. Der Kampf zwischen den Seelenteilen - Lecture held at the Volkshochschule Meidling, Vienna within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public, 26th January 2010. Der Vortrag erläutert die Seelenteilungslehre von Platons Staat und versucht den Streit zwischen dem vernünftigen und dem begehrenden Teil der Seele zu verdeutlichen. Behandelt werden Textstellen aus Platons "Der Staat" und "Phaidros".

Die Idee bei Platon. Das Enigma der Philosophie - Lecture held at the Volkshochschule Meidling, Vienna within the Programme UMP-University Meets Public, 30th May 2012. Eines der meistdiskutierten und schwierigsten Themen, die Platons Philosophie entwickelt, wird von den Ideen gebildet. Das Ziel dieses Vortrags wird darin bestehen, mit Hilfe von verschiedenen Beispielen aus den platonischen Dialogen die Merkmale und die Bedeutung der platonischen Ideen zu vermitteln.

Many of the ideas central to Western politics can be traced back to ancient Greece, and more specifically, to the ancient Athenian city-state. Indeed, classical Athens is often referred to as the birthplace of democracy itself. From the eighth to the fifth century BCE, a series of legislative reforms and popular revolts alike saw power (kratos) wrested out of the hands of nobility and placed among the people (demos). Average citizens passed, voted, and deliberated on laws in the assembly and played an important role in deciding upon matters of right and wrong as jurors in the courts. During Athens' period of direct democratic government, Plato wrote his most famous tract, The Republic. Yet the canonical text has come to be known for its rebuke of, rather than celebration of, democratic rule. Plato's student Aristotle, for his part, was not himself a citizen of the famed Athenian city-state in which he wrote his Politics. What are we, contemporary readers, to make of these disjunctures? This course serves as an introduction to political theory as a sub-field of political science, as well as an introduction to ancient political thought. We will spend our semester reading Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics closely, paying particular attention to how it is that these thinkers view the relationship between justice and democracy. Is popular judgment in matters of right a crucible of democratic government? Can justice exist absent democratic governance? We will focus our attention on these questions in class, with some reference to contemporary issues. Our primary goal, however, will be to attend to the form and substance of the arguments put forward in these canonical texts. After surveying the arguments made for and against democracy by these thinkers and learning about the mechanisms of democratic government and popular judgment in ancient Athens, we will turn our attention to the thought of Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Farabi. al-Farabi was an important interpreter of both Plato and Aristotle and is considered the father of Islamic political philosophy. In our last classes, we will think about the legacy of "the ancients" or "the Greeks" and learn about how it is that their texts were passed down to us by way of early medieval Islamic philosophers. In doing so, we will consider how the history of political thought is narrated and told, pondering upon the questions of justice that are raised by its telling.

Pensar qué es la justicia, qué es lo justo y que no, es como dice Sócrates, de mayor valor que el oro (336e). Y si el oro es difícil de hallar mucho más difícil será la búsqueda de lo que verdaderamente es la justicia. Tal es el panorama en la búsqueda de la justicia, que si bien, no interesa a algunos como Céfalo, e indigna a otros como Trasímaco, Sócrates emprende a partir del primer libro.

Web-address of the video of my interview "Il dramma della condizione umana nell'opera di Platone. (La idea del mal en Platón)", UNAD Colombia, Bogotá D.C. - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Enba6HUJS84 - The interview is in Italian with English and Spanish subtitles.

Certificate of my participation in the 31st International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought”, organised by the Plato Philosophical Society at the Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 22-23 June 2023.

The title of the lecture was: “Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic”.

In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato’s Phaedo and Republic.
I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal).
Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such – i.e., it is the property itself – and it is nothing else than the property – the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else –. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity.
These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas.
The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being.
The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves.
Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual’s liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

This is the PDF-PowerPoint which I used for my talk at the 31st International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought”, Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities, St Petersburg, Russia. The title of my talk was: "Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic". In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato’s Phaedo and Republic. I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal). Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such – i.e., it is the property itself – and it is nothing else than the property – the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else –. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity. These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas. The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being. The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves. Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual’s liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

I am going to speak on 22 June at the Conference The Universe of Platonic Thought - 31st International Conference, 22–23 June 2023 St Petersburg, Russia. The title of my talk will be: Individuals, Ideas and Dialectic. In my study, I shall investigate the features of ideas, the role of dialectic, and the effects which the acquaintance with ideas brings about in the individual. I shall mainly resort to passages taken from Plato's Phaedo and Republic. I shall first expose some differences between the entities of the average life dimension and the ideas. Entities of the sensible dimension are relative entities: they exist in a dimension of relativity. On the contrary, ideas are not relative: they never appear as different from what they are (for example, the idea of equality never appears unequal). Ideas are absolute: they are not affected by the dimension of relativity. Sensible concretisations of a property are relative since they are always relative to the context in which they are: for instance, sensible equals can appear as equal to something and not equal to something else. The idea of equal is absolute since it cannot appear as different from that which it is. The sensible concretisations of an idea, in general, and of the equal, in particular, are not the property as such, whereas any idea is the property as such-i.e., it is the property itself-and it is nothing else than the property-the idea of equal, for instance, is equal and nothing else-. Sensible concretisations are affected by the relativity of the sensible dimension; ideas, on the contrary, are free from this relativity. These differences have precise effects on the individual: the individual who is aware of the existence of ideas is, at least as regards his being connected to the ideas, absolute. Through the awareness of the existence of ideas and through the knowledge of ideas, the individual acquires an outlook on reality which is not dependent on the relativity of the sensible dimension. Therefore, the individual who becomes aware of the existence of ideas will have a relation with the world which is different from the relation that an individual who is not aware of the existence of ideas has: the individual who knows ideas is not dependent on the dimension of sensibility (at least not entirely dependent). He is not imprisoned in the dimension of the sense data. Thus, the condition of the individual completely changes after the individual has become aware of the existence of ideas. The acquaintance with ideas brings about the development of the rational part of the soul. An education process is presupposed in order that the individual can know ideas. The rational part of the soul needs to be appropriately developed in order that it can reach a condition in which it can successfully lead the whole soul. This development is achieved through the programme of education exposed in books VI and VII of the Republic. The individual should be shifted away from the dimension of Becoming and ought to be brought towards the dimension of Being: the preparatory mathematical disciplines, first, and the dialectic, then, should shift the individual from the dimension of Becoming to the dimension of Being. The education programme should lead the individual to the acquisition of a condition of stability for his rational part and to the acquisition of the correct perspective as regards the whole reality. Only after reaching the correct perspective on the whole reality is the individual able to give any component of reality the value which it deserves. Through the programme of studies, the individual meets a dimension of reality which he cannot know before. The dimension of Being is initially unknown to him. In Republic VII, 533 we can observe the role of dialectic as the discipline which finally liberates the individual from his condition of ignorance. Knowledge represents the individual's liberation from the original condition. The soul needs to be liberated: the condition of being free from the initial bog, as Plato describes the original condition of the individual, is not given and is not present initially.

YouTube address of the video of my interview "Il dramma della condizione umana nell'opera di Platone. (La idea del mal en Platón)": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Enba6HUJS84

The interview is in Italian with English and Spanish subtitles.

The interview was organised by Professor Tayron Alberto Achury Torres of the Universidad Nacional Abierta y a Distancia - UNAD Colombia, Bogotá D.C.

2nd June 2023