Philosophy and Religion

Recent scholarly interest in Nāgārjuna has been intense, with especial focus on the vexed question of the rationality, or irrationality, of his thought. In this article, I am concerned to bring to light the theoretical underpinnings of the hermeneutical project predominant among present-day scholars, which is to actively overlook or downright depreciate the religious motivation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments. While this project has typically been pursued in an apologetic effort to justify Nāgārjuna, as truly worthy of the title ‘philosopher’, to mainstream philosophers, it has also had the effect among some scholars of dismissing him as insufficiently philosophical. Regardless of the glowing or dim light in which he is thereby cast, Nāgārjuna is appraised according to exclusively philosophical criteria such as cogency, consistency, and coherency. My ‘religious critique of philosophizing Nāgārjuna’, then, is aimed at elucidating and problematizing this approach, however philosophically fruitful it may be, as at best tangential to and at worst seriously distortive of Nāgārjuna’s thought as a whole.

Online technologies enable vast amounts of data to outlive their producers online, thereby giving rise to a new, digital form of afterlife presence. Although researchers have begun investigating the nature of such presence, academic literature has until now failed to acknowledge the role of commercial interests in shaping it. The goal of this paper is to analyse what those interests are and what ethical consequences they may have. This goal is pursued in three steps. First, we introduce the concept of the Digital Afterlife Industry (DAI), and define it as an object of study. Second, we identify the politico-economic interests of the DAI. For this purpose, we develop an analytical approach based on an informational interpretation of Marxian economics. Third, we explain the practical manifestations of the interests using four real life cases. The findings expose the incentives of the DAI to alter what is referred to as the ''informational bodies'' of the dead, which in turn is to be seen as a violation of the principle of human dignity. To prevent such consequences, we argue that the ethical conventions that guide trade with remains of organic bodies may serve as a good model for future regulation of DAI.

Since time immemorial Lord Jagannath has been regarded as the principal deity of Odisha. The Land of Odisha was a meeting place of the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains. However, of all religious creeds Buddhism played an important role in the socio-cultural history of Odisha. During the period of emperor Asoka, the Shabaras(a tribal people)of Odisha were converted to Buddhism.Biddhist pillars were built in Puri and Buddhist symbols were carved into it. Later on the Shabaras started worshipping the Triratna as the three principal deities of the Jagannath temple. In course of time the three deities of the temple viz.Jagannath, Balabhadra and Subhadra have been accepted by the people of Odisha as the symbols of Buddha ,Dharma and Sangha respectively. In the eighteenth century Buddhist works such as " Jnanasidhi " and " Pranidaya Binischaya Siddhi " the Buddha was named as Lord Jagannath. By the 12 th century A.D. there had already developed a new culture in Odisha with Jagannath as the centre and the Lord came to be conceived as Adi Buddha and Buddha as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu-Jagannath. The place of Puri has been regarded as a place of Tantric worship and Jagannath as the Lord of the Tantric cult. The gundicha temple(where the Lord resided for ten days during the Car festival) has been regarded as a Buddha Vihara.The Buddhist principle of non-violence and universal brotherhood found its best expression in the Jagannath cult.

In this article, I outline a logic of design of a system as a specific kind of conceptual logic of the design of the model of a system, that is, the blueprint that provides information about the system to be created. In section two, I introduce the method of levels of abstraction as a modelling tool borrowed from computer science. In section three, I use this method to clarify two main conceptual logics of information (i.e., modelling systems) inherited from modernity: Kant's transcen-dental logic of conditions of possibility of a system, and Hegel's dialectical logic of conditions of in/stability of a system. Both conceptual logics of information analyse structural properties of given systems. Strictly speaking, neither is a conceptual logic of information about (or modelling) the conditions of feasibility of a system, that is, neither is a logic of information as a logic of design. So, in section four, I outline this third conceptual logic of information and then interpret the conceptual logic of design as a logic of requirements, by introducing the relation of " suffici-entisation ". In the conclusion, I argue that the logic of requirements is exactly what we need in order to make sense of, and buttress, a constructionist (poietic) approach to knowledge.

Although little analyzed, the concept of divine honor or glory (kavod shamayim) has been central to formulations of classical Jewish thought and ethics. In the aftermath of the 1994 Hebron massacre, Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg deployed the concept of divine honor as a religious sanction for murder. His tract Barukh Ha-Gever treats attrocity as a mystical technique for the attainment of unmediated, ecstatic, and personal experience of the divine. This article examines the genealogy of Ginsburg's anarchic ideology, which it contrasts with that of Rabbi Abraham Issac Kook and the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, two important twentieth-century Jewish thinkers for whom divine honor was also central, but whose vision for that honor was antithetical to the quest for unmediated divine experience, or to acts that violate religious law and human dignity. This article assays a phenomenology of divine honor and its relationship to violence in modern times. Don Seeman is an assistant professor of religion and Jewish studies at

Religious diversity is a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. One way religious diversity has been of interest to philosophers is in the epistemological questions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversity has been seen to pose a challenge for religious belief. In this study four approaches to dealing with this challenge are discussed. These approaches correspond to four well-known philosophers of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The study is concluded by suggesting four factors which shape one’s response to the challenge religious diversity poses to religious belief.

Reviewed by Brian Schroeder, Rochester Institute of Technology While the name and thought of Gianni Vattimo is familiar to European philosophers, theologians, cultural and political theorists, and even the general public (he regularly writes commentaries for La Stampa, a major Italian newspaper in Turin, and was a member of the European Parliament), in North America he is comparatively little known outside the domain of continental philosophy. Yet he is the author of some thirty-two books and coauthor of another five, of which fourteen have been translated and published in English, and is regarded by many as one of today's most original and influential thinkers (if not the most, as another leading Italian philosopher, Pier Aldo Rovatti, attests). Vattimo is recognized principally for his philosophical approach known as il pensiero debole, or "weak thought," which for him has a positive connotation in its realization and affirmation of the present condition of existence, characterized by the increasing erosion of the traditional metaphysical and rational foundations of modernism. While this is indeed an expression of nihilism, he argues throughout the corpus of his work that nihilism need not be construed solely or at least primarily as reactive and destructive. Vattimo announces rather an "optimistic" nihilistic phase of intellectual and cultural realization that will lead to an actual ethical social and political transformation. In the present postmodern scenario of rapidly changing values, belief systems, geopolitical boundaries and epistemological foundations, the project of one such as Gianni Vattimo is sorely needed. The publication of Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo is thus a cause for celebration. This collection of very fine essays not only further establishes Vattimo's rightful place in contemporary European philosophy, it also takes up his call to advance the crucial active and affirmative engagement with thinking and society. Edited by Santiago Zabala, a former student of Vattimo's and presently researcher in philosophy at the Pontifical Lateran University of Rome, Weakening Philosophy is comprised of twenty-three essays, including one by Vattimo, which, while referred to as a response in the editor's introduction, is actually an original essay both summarizing the trajectory of his thinking as a whole and addressing it in light of the philosophies of Theodor Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas. As the subtitle states, the book is basically a

Contemporary science seems to be caught in a strange predicament. On the one hand, it holds a firm and reasonable commitment to a healthy naturalistic methodology, according to which explanations of natural phenomena should never overstep the limits of the natural itself. On the other hand, contemporary science is also inextricably and now inevitably dependent on ever more complex technologies, especially Information and Communication Technologies, which it exploits as well as fosters. Yet such technologies are increasingly " artificialising " or " denaturalis-ing " the world, human experiences and interactions, as well as what qualifies as real. So the search for the ultimate explanation of the natural seems to rely upon, and promote, the development of the artificial, seen here as an instantiation of the non-natural. In this article, I would like to try and find a way out of this apparently strange predicament. I shall argue that the naturalisation of our knowledge of the world is either philosophically trivial (naturalism as anti-supernaturalism and anti-preternaturalism), or mistaken (naturalism as anti-constructionism). First, I shall distinguish between different kinds of naturalism. Second, I shall remind the reader that the kinds of naturalism that are justified today need to be protected and supported pragmatically, but they are no longer very interesting conceptually. We know how to win the argument. We just have to keep winning it. Whereas the kind of naturalism that is still interesting today is now in need of revision in order to remain acceptable. Such a kind of naturalism may be revised on the basis of a realistic philosophy of information, according to which knowing is a constructive activity, through which we do not merely represent the phenomena we investigate passively, but create more or less correct informational models (semantic artefacts) of them, proactively and interactively. I shall conclude that the natural is in itself artefactual (a semantic construction), and that the information revolution is disclosing a tension not between the natural and the non-natural, but a deeper one between a user's and a producer's interpretation of knowledge. The outcome is a philosophical view of knowledge and science in the information age that may be called constructionist and a revival of philosophy as a classic, foundationalist enterprise.

Keywords Constructionism · Closure · Level of abstraction · Naturalism · Naturalisation · Open question argument · Reasonably reiterable query test

Recognizing the importance of the Kyoto School and its influence on philosophy, politics, religion, and Asian studies, Japanese and Continental Philosophy initiates a conversation between Japanese and Western philosophers. The essays in this cross-cultural volume put Kyoto School thinkers in conversation with German Idealism, Nietzsche, phenomenology, and other figures and schools of the continental tradition such as Levinas and Irigaray. Set in the context of global philosophy, this volume offers critical, innovative, and productive dialogue between some of the most influential philosophical figures from East and West.

Author: Rebecca Seligman. Part of our Culture, Mind, and Society series.
Spirit possession involves the displacement of a human's conscious self by that of a powerful other - a spirit, god, or demon - who temporarily occupies the human's body. To many, spirit possession is quintessentially exotic, a novelty, an example of the ways in which "others" are fundamentally different. In this book, Seligman shows that, far from being exotic and "other," spirit possession mediumship represents a privileged site for understanding a number of fundamental aspects of human experience - especially those involved with interactions among meaning, embodiment, and subjectivity. Using a diverse set of ethnographic, psychological, and biological data gathered during fieldwork among spirit possession mediums of the Candomblé religion in Northeastern Brazil, she explores how everyday and religious practices and meanings shape and interact with the bodily experiences and psychophysiological states of Candomblé mediums, both before and after their initiations, and how such interactions shape their experiences of selfhood.

This study pioneers the use of philosophy of religion in the study of the Hebrew Bible. After identifying the need for a legitimate philosophical approach to Israelite religion, the volume traces the history of interdisciplinary relations and shows how descriptive varieties of philosophy of religion can aid the clarification of the Hebrew Bible’s own metaphysical, epistemological, and moral assumptions. Two new interpretative methodologies are developed and subsequently applied through an introduction to what the biblical texts took for granted about the nature of religious language, the concept of deity, the properties of Yhwh, the existence of gods, religious epistemology, and the relation between religion and morality.

Contemporary philosopher David Benatar has advanced the self-evidently controversial claim that “coming into existence is always a harm.” Benatar’s argument turns on the basic asymmetry between pleasure and pain, an asymmetry he seeks to explain by the principle that those who never exist cannot be deprived. Benatar’s import is almost incredible: humans should cease to procreate immediately, thereby engendering the extinction of the species—a view known as “anti-natalism.” According to many of his readers, the ancient Hebrew sage Qoheleth expresses a pessimistic nihilism that runs as thick as Benatar’s. Prima facie grounding for this assertion is that Qoheleth, like Benatar, raises the issue of whether coming into existence may be a harm—and gives an affirmative answer. In two passages, Ecclesiastes 6:1-6 and 4:1-3, Qoheleth declares that an unborn hypothetical person is “better off” than their existent counterpart. Yet the meaning and implication of these words is far from obvious. Does Qoheleth imply that the non-exister’s state, and non-existence in general, is universally superior to existence? Or is he instead speaking exceptionally, of particular persons in rare circumstances? By examining the two “better”-statements in their literary context, I will argue that Qoheleth intends these examples as exceptions. He does not go so far as to make the supremely nihilistic claim that coming into existence is always, or even generally, a net harm; yet, he does concede that in certain cases, it can be. Beyond this, I will explore how the two thinkers’ divergent conclusions can be traced to a deeper difference of philosophical method. This question concerning non-existence opens a window to Qoheleth’s broader scheme of values and therefore serves as a surprisingly useful entry point by which to engage his philosophy. The paper utilizes the methodology Jaco Gericke has recently termed “philosophical criticism,” but specifically applied to Qoheleth.

The central character and motivation for this study is Marie. Our task here is first to introduce the reader to Marie. The specific features of Marie's character and behavior will present challenges to our understanding of her, a process that will cause us to challenge our understanding of ourselves. Ultimately, our aim is to be able to augment our interaction with Marie and be able to help her in some way. To do this we will have to investigate the character and causes of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In unearthing Marie's condition and its possible causes, we will come to some understanding as to how to address her situation. In particular, we will investigate how Christ and the Gospel could ameliorate and address her condition. Despite that Marie appears to be an ideal candidate for the boon provided by Christ, we will ultimately discover her resistance to that Good News. From this resistance we will try to draw some conclusions regarding the evangelistic process. In the long run Marie could be anyone who is studied in some detail with the intention of trying to make sense of them. The important aspect of this story is that it is a particular story, and not some sociologically averaged comment.

The following review explores Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) in terms of comparative philosophy, supporting IIE as the most relevant and significant development of the field of Information Ethics (IE). The focus of the review is threefold. First, it will review the core presumption of the field of IIE, that being the demand for an inter- mission in the pursuit of a founding philosophy for IE in order to first address the philosophical biases of IE by western philosophy. Second, a history of the various philosophical streams of IIE will be outlined, including its literature and pioneering contributors. Lastly, a new synthesis of comparative philosophies in IIE will be offered, looking towards a future evolution of the field. Examining the interchange between contemporary information ethicists regarding the discipline of IIE, the review first outlines the previously established presumptions of the field of IIE that posit the need for an IE as grounded in western sensibilities. The author then addresses the implications of the foregoing presumption from several non-western viewpoints, arguing that IIE does in fact find roots in non-western philosophies as established in the concluding synthesis of western and eastern philosophical traditions.

It is usually thought that only one being can be all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-loving. Challenging this monotheist conviction, I propose a universe ruled by two deities: ‘day shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is up, whereas ‘night shift God’ oversees the events that occur while the sun is down. I survey objections to this proposal and conclude that the real obstacle is not an argument, but an aesthetic preference.

This article begins with a few general suggestions about what it means to be a Christian, then summarizes a new interpretation of Kant as developing a "System of Perspectives"--an interpretation that the author sets out in greater detail elsewhere. After discussing the important notions of "criticism", "perspective", and "system" as they operate in Kant's thought, the bulk of the essay is devoted to an assessment of the theological implications of Kant's System. The article concludes that, contrary to popular opinion, particularly among some Christian theologians, Kant's intentions were theologically constructive, and moreover, that his System is thoroughly consistent with the Christian perspective outlined at the beginning of the article.

Post-publication note: This article was submitted under the title "Can A Christian Be A Kantian?" The title was revised at the request/requirement of a blind reviewer. Unfortunately, the revised title has given rise to the false impression that the paper's purpose is to argue that Kant himself was Christian. But this was never the point. Rather, the central argument is that being Christian does not exclude a person from being Kantian, or vice versa.

In order to assess the debate concerning the constitutional recognition of Christianity in Europe, we need to pose the more general question of the role (if any) of the symbolic function of the modern democratic constitution in relation to religion. In the present paper, we differentiate between three stylized understandings of constitution-making, namely communitarian, liberal and discursive. Our argument is that the discursive "model" of the symbolic function of the constitution combines the merits and avoids the demerits of communitarianism and liberalism.

According to most scholars, the Enlightenment was a rational awakening, a radical break from a past dominated by religion and superstition. But in Let There Be Enlightenment, Anton M. Matytsin, Dan Edelstein, and the contributors they have assembled deftly undermine this simplistic narrative. Emphasizing the ways in which religious beliefs and motivations shaped philosophical perspectives, essays in this book highlight figures and topics often overlooked in standard genealogies of the Enlightenment. The volume underscores the prominent role that religious discourses continued to play in major aspects of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.

The essays probe a wide range of subjects, from reformer Jan Amos Comenius’s quest for universal enlightenment to the changing meanings of the light metaphor, Quaker influences on Baruch Spinoza’s theology, and the unexpected persistence of Aristotle in the Enlightenment. Exploring the emergence of historical consciousness among Enlightenment thinkers while examining their repeated insistence on living in an enlightened age, the collection also investigates the origins and the long-term dynamics of the relationship between faith and reason.

Providing an overview of the rich spectrum of eighteenth-century culture, the authors demonstrate that religion was central to Enlightenment thought. The term "enlightenment" itself had a deeply religious connotation. Rather than revisiting the celebrated breaks between the eighteenth century and the period that preceded it, Let There Be Enlightenment reveals the unacknowledged continuities that connect the Enlightenment to its various antecedents.

Contributors: Philippe Buc, William J. Bulman, Jeffrey D. Burson, Charly Coleman, Dan Edelstein, Matthew T. Gaetano, Howard Hotson, Anton M. Matytsin, Darrin M. McMahon, James Schmidt, Céline Spector, Jo Van Cauter

L’article propose, à titre de document, la traduction française (et, à ma connaissance, la première traduction en une langue occidentale) d’extraits du Kitâb A’lâm an-Nubuwwa d’Abû Hâtim ar-Râzî, auteur ismaïlien du Xème siècle. Le livre est le fruit et le témoin de l’affrontement entre deux visions du monde, l’une – celle de l’auteur – ésotérique et symbolique, l’autre – celle du médecin-philosophe Abû Bakr ar-Râzî avec lequel il polémique – rationnelle et empirique.

This essay examines the analysis of language in The Concept of Anxiety and argues that language ultimately reveals itself as both dangerous and salvific. The pseudonymous author, Vigilius Haufniensis, is suspicious of language, for it divides the individual from herself and thereby makes possible the self-forgetfulness of objective chatter. Indeed, this warning (which commenters have tended to follow uncritically) is a legitimate one – yet it fails to grasp that by rendering the self other than itself, language constitutes the self. In other words, the individual’s very existence depends on language. Moreover, the attempt to establish oneself as absolutely self-identical is precisely sin. Language opens us to alterity, and for this reason the demonic cannot endure it and seeks to control it. Language is uncontrollable, however, to the point that no sign permits us to be certain that we have rightly distinguished good from evil, the salvific from the demonic – and salvation can come only if we renounce the attempt to establish distinctions that are beyond our power. By employing a pseudonymous figure who views language with suspicion, Kierkegaard shows that language is dangerous, even deadly, but also allows us to realize that language is the condition of possibility for salvation.

Among the Epicureans the most testified use of their founders' quite similar portraits can be explained by an ideal twin friendship between Epicurus and Metrodorus, which is the first link in the chain of the Kepos' friends, connected to the divine model, principle and aim of the epicurean happiness. Now the zeal for gods imitation, through which epicurism has become a real religious reformation, presupposes that the most advanced disciples internally and even physically move. The mecanism of this transformation can be analysed both in the theory of gods' physic and in Epicurus' overflowing affectivity. It consists in a continuous flood of mental or visual "eidola" which men or (and) gods send to each other in a burst of friendship. The being of the gods finds in this unifying exchange a neverending nutriment, while the sage draws from it right in ecstasy his standing serenity.

Abondamment attesté chez les Épicuriens, l'usage des portraits des fondateurs de la secte s'explique par l'amitié idéale qui unissait Métrodore et Épicure, et qui réalisait le modèle divin du bonheur épicurien. Or, le zèle à imiter les dieux - qui fait de l'épicurisme une véritable réforme religieuse - suppose chez les sectateurs les plus avancés une mutation intérieure, dont le mécanisme s'analyse tant dans la théorie physique que dans l'affectivité débordante d'Épicure. Il consiste en un flux continu d'images mentales ou visuelles qui s'échangent dans l'effusion de l'amitié. L'être des dieux trouve dans ce commerce fusionnel un aliment ininterrompu et le sage puise dans cette extase même son indestructible sérénité.

This article examines communication between a human being and God in the Jewish philosophy of the German-Jewish philosopher, Hermann Cohen (1842–1918). It observes Cohen’s Jewish philosophy in light of communication theories, using the theoretical wealth of a relatively new discipline – communication, in order to deepen the philosophical and theological discussion. This new perspective enriches our view of philosophy, theology, and offers a fresh and novel approach to the philosophical and theological study of communication, and media theology in particular.

”Evenisation,” borrowed from the biblical Eve, can be defined as the long-developed patriarchal hegemony describing women as inferior, sexually debased, and the patriarchate’s urge for domesticated, passive, and subdued female figures under the total control of men.
This thesis is a genealogy of women’s oppression, its causes, implementations, and emphasizing women’s evolutionary sexual ability as exposed in the earliest civilizations. The focus is on the Mesopotamian pre-patriarchal civilizations and the paradigm shift that led to male domination, creating three female archetypes: Lilith, Eve, and Virgin Mary and the sexual objectification of women.
Extensive use of nearly 400 literary compositions recorded from sources originating in Ancient Mesopotamia (today’s Iraq), dating to the late third and early second millennia BC Together with the Bible, biblical commentary sources, esoteric Jewish mysticism, and early church father teachings, the study analyses how the change of view on women transformed during these millennia and the first millennium BC, and how this influenced modern society.
Based on the present research, I argue that successful warrior tribes from Eurasia, who after domesticating the horse and developing advanced weaponry through sophisticated metallurgical processes, succeeded in altering civilization’s path from fertility worship and an equal sexual affirmation onto a road towards male supremacy and oppression of women.

(Değerli kardeşimiz Prof. Dr. Neşet Toku’nun “Risale-i Nur’da Felsefe Eleştirisi” adlı kitabının sadece yirmi sayfasındaki (85-104) yanlışların tesbiti ve tashih raporudur.)

Sh: 85

1- Bediüzzaman hakikat tartışmalarına Kur’anî yolu, müstakil ve asıl yol diye dâhil etmesinin gerekçesini şöyle temellendiriyor… İşte bu sözdeki zaaf ve yanlışlar:

a) Hakikat tartışmaları ifadesi yanlıştır. Doğrusu, Varlıkta ve kâinatta hakikat var mı? Yok mu?” gibi bir deyim olmalı. Ayrıca Bediüzzaman böyle bir tabiri de kullanmaz. Hakikat arşına (semasına) çıkan yolların ve miraçların en sağlamı, en kısası Kur’an’dır, diyor. (Nokta Risalesi)

b) Kur’anın hakikatin şahidi ve belgesi olması, Asr-ı Saadetten beri var olan ve kullanılan asıl bir yoldur. Bediüzzaman ile literatüre dâhil edilmiş değildir.

c) Kur’anî yolun müstakil bir yol olması, anlamsızdır. Çünkü her yol zaten kendine özgü bir yoldur. Ayrıca yazarımız Akli burhanlar üzerine tesis edilmiş olan Kur’an, diyor. Demek Kur’an’ın müstakil ve asıl yol olduğunu kendi kendine çürütmüş oluyor.

The article is devoted to the analysis of understanding the phenomenon of divine revelation
in that era, when the basic principles of its Orthodox (but to a large extent also Catholic and
Protestant) interpretation were formed. It deals with “conception” not as a positive teaching,
but as a sum of consistent statements, the general grounds of which are to be clarified by
problematic formulation of the issue. The Church Fathers’ thought on the divine inspiration
is being considered in the aspect of their attitude to both the substantive and the formal side
of biblical text. The author confirms the conclusions previously made by a number of Rus-
sian scholars, that fathers were not supporters of the theory of “dictation” (or extreme ver-
balism). He also tries to make more clear the meaning of categories of “hearing” and “vi-
sion”, and of the Chalcedon dogma-analogy in the concept of the revealed text’s origins that
was predominant in the patristic era.

Begriff und Begriffenes sind verschieden. In kaum einem Bereich ist dieser Unterschied allerdings so gravierend und so fundamental wie in der Theo-rie des Bildes. Einerseits besitzen wir eine enorm reichhaltige Bildtradition, deren feine Verästelungen das Kultisch-Religiöse eben so durchdringen wie die Räume des Symbolischen. Andererseits vertraut die westliche Tradition, – und das nicht erst seit den Tagen Platons – auf einen fruchtbaren Bildbegriff, auf eine metaphorische Terminologie des Sehens und der Sichtbarkeit, des Lichts und des Erleuchtens. Dabei scheren Begriff und Begriffenes, Metaphorik und rationales Konstrukt, Theorie und Kunst auseinander. Die Splitter dieses Sprechens über das Bild, über Bilder und über die Bildhaftigkeit sind nicht mehr miteinander in Deckung zu bringen. Und tatsächlich lässt sich zu Recht fragen, ob die innere Kohärenz des Sprechens über Bilder überhaupt wünschenswert ist, ob – anders gesprochen – der vielstimmige Kanon nicht schöner und interessanter ist, als eine identifikatorische und deterministische Begriffsanalyse. Indes möchte man nicht in die Rolle des jungen Theaitet geraten, der, von Sokrates gefragt, was denn das Wissen sei, zunächst unbekümmert antwortete, Wissen von der Geometrie, Wissen von der Schuhmacherei, von der Tischlerei, Wissen von diesem und jenem, und sich von Sokrates maßregeln lassen musste, der ihm antwortete: "Gar offen und freigebig, Lieber, gibst du mir, um eins gefragt, vielerlei und mannigfaltiges statt des einfa-chen."  Sollte nämlich vom Bild in theoretischer Hinsicht die Rede sein, dann wird man nicht auskommen mit einer Antwort, welche die verschiedenen Weisen von Bildern einfach aufzählt.

ABSTRACT: In this special issue of _Nova Religio_ four historians of
medieval and early modern Christianities offer perspectives on basic
conceptual frameworks widely employed in new religions studies, including
modernization and secularization, radicalism/violent radicalization,
and diversity/diversification. Together with a response essay by J. Gordon
Melton, these articles suggest strong possibilities for renewed and ongoing
conversation between scholars of ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ religions. Unlike some
early discussions, ours is not aimed simply at questioning the distinction
between old and new religions itself. Rather, we think such conversation
between scholarly fields holds the prospect of productive scholarly surprise
and perspectival shifts, especially via the disciplinary practice of
historiographical criticism.

Johannes Wolfart and Michael Driedger are the co-editors of this special issue.

Buddhalainen meditaation kuvasto valaistumisen käsitteineen ja meditaatioasentoineen omaksuttiin ja muokattiin viime vuosisadan kuluessa osaksi länsimaisia henkisyyden muotoja. Taustalla on meditatiivisen kokemuksen kategoria, joka mahdollistaa buddhalaisen meditaation universalisoinnin näennäisesti kulttuurista riippumattomaksi. Yhdysvalloissa 1900-luvun alussa julkaistulla kirjallisuudella oli tässä kehityskulussa tärkeä asema. Erityisesti zenbuddhalaisuus esiteltiin länsimaiseen maailmankuvaan sopivana meditatiivisena perinteenä.

Descartes holds that the tell-tale sign of a solid proof is that its entailments appear clearly and distinctly. Yet, since there is a limit to what a subject can consciously fathom at any given moment, a mnemonic shortcoming threatens to render complex geometrical reasoning impossible. Thus, what enables us to recall earlier proofs, according to Descartes, is God’s benevolence: He is too good to pull a deceptive switch on us. Accordingly, Descartes concludes that geometry and belief in God must go hand in hand. However, I argue that, while theism adds a layer of psychological reassurance, the mind-independent reality of God would ensure the preservation of past demonstrations for atheists as well.

The paper discusses ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s epistemological views by addressing the four sources of knowledge, namely, sensory perception, reason, intuition and tradition that are explored by ‘Abdu’l-Bahá in his various talks and books. It systematizes ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s epistemology in the context of global philosophy and focuses on a number of issues that are of special concern for modern western thought such as the importance of scriptures and the limitations of human knowledge. The paper also analyzes the distinction between objective vs. subjective and human vs. divine knowledge.

Like other Christian theologians I like to call "postliberal,"1 Robert Jenson has offered instructions on how to free one's Christian theology from the undue influence of those elements of Greco-Roman-European inquiry that make it all the more difficult for congregants and readers to hear God's triune voice (as if the worldlier sins weren't enough of a roadblock). Also like the other postliberals, Jenson knows his way around the discourses of modern philosophy but chooses not to expend energy seeking to reform those discourses from within. There may be some value in "despoiling the philosophers," but not in joining them. He did join the academy, however, nurturing historical-critical skills before honing his prototypically integrated ecclesial, scriptural and academic approach to Christian theology. Max Kadushin, z"l, my mentor in what I call "Jewish postliberalism," took a comparable approach to Jewish philosophy. He sought to protect contemporary rabbinic thinking from the disorienting influences of Hellenic-European philosophy, while acquiring and reshaping sophisticated academic discourses as instruments of his reformational work.2 Jenson and Kadushin may have similar reasons for keeping philosophic discourses out of their primary toolkits: perhaps to save energy for the most urgent task at hand – theological reformation – and to protect their and their students' work from philosophy's reductive and divisive influences. I am sympathetic to their choice: the founding postliberal thinkers needed to take efficient paths to addressing the civilizational challenges to any renewal of scripturally grounded religious thinking. There are, however, several compelling reasons why the second and third generations of Christian and also Jewish and Muslim postliberal thinkers need to turn their attention to the disciplines of logic that perennially inform the major shifts and achievements in philosophy. The purpose of the postliberal practice of logic is not the purpose identified by most modern western philosophers. It is not to identify universal laws of reason. It is, instead, to nurture attention to the patterns of reasoning that are immanent in postliberal theology, in the practices of premodern and modern theology that postliberalism seeks to reform, and in the practices of philosophic and other modes of Western reasoning that have formed the civilizational context for Christian and other Abrahamic theologies.

Das Judentum als Religions- und Schicksalsgemeinschaft bleibt auch in einer Welt des Relativismus zukunftsfähig: durch die Besinnung auf den eigenen ethischen Standpunkt vor dem Horizont der Moderne und durch den festen Willen zur Kooperation, auch angesichts offensichtlicher Differenz zwischen den Religionen und Weltanschauungen.

Judaism as a community of religion and destiny remains viable even in a world of relativism: by reflecting on one's own ethical standpoint before the horizon of modernity and by a firm will to cooperate, also in view of obvious differences between religions and world views.

Although each of the classical theistic religions subscribes to a doctrine of descriptive religious exclusivism, holding that it is the one true religion, Christianity and Islam subscribe to a doctrine of salvific exclusivism, according to which only the adherents of the one true religion will escape divine punishment – divine punishment usually being conceived of as an eternity torment.  Salvific exclusivism does, while descriptive exclusivism does not, entail anything about how God treats those adherents of the one true religion.  These doctrines of divine punishment and salvific exclusivism, as we will see, are difficult to reconcile with ordinary intuitions about God’s moral perfection and perfectly loving nature. 

In this essay, I challenge salvific exclusivism, arguing that it is inconsistent with ordinary moral intuitions about fairness and justice, together with certain facts about belief formation.  In particular, I consider the role of luck, socialization, evidence, and certain emotional influences in conditioning what views one holds about the existence of God, arguing, ultimately, that what one believes is sufficiently beyond one’s capacity to choose that persons cannot fairly be punished for what they believe.  It seems unfair, and inconsistent with God’s moral perfection, to base the difference between an eternal reward and an eternal punishment on something that one can’t control.

The “Sōtō Kyōkai Shushōgi [The Meaning of Practice-Realization in the Sōtō Fellowship],” known more widely simply as “Shushōgi,” first appeared in 1890, partly in response to the quickly evolving changes and tumult of the Meiji era.  It essentially consists of interwoven passages selected from Dōgen’s voluminous magnum opus, SHŌBŌGENZŌ [THE TRUE DHARMA EYE].  ENGAGING DŌGEN’S ZEN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRACTICE AS AWAKENING offers series of critical reflections on "Shushōgi" and an extended commentary on Dōgen’s “Fukanzazengi” that would be helpful to those who are cultivating a Zen practice, other forms of Buddha Dharma practice, or even non-Buddhist spiritual practice. Opening with a series of introductory essays regarding various facets of “Shushōgi” and Dōgen more generally, this volume divides “Shushōgi” into thirteen sections and links each of these sections to the fascicles in SHŌBŌGENZŌ from which they are drawn. Thirteen scholar-practitioners provide commentaries on these sections that aim to speak to contemporary practice needs while at the same time being intellectually stimulating.