Philosophy Of Freedom

The development of advanced AI systems has concentrated power and profit among technology corporations while systematically undervaluing the contributions of domain experts, end users, and the broader communities whose data and knowledge make these systems possible. This concentration mirrors historical patterns of enclosure—the privatization of commons that once belonged to everyone—but operates at unprecedented scale and speed. This paper introduces the Knowledge Triad framework, identifying three essential but currently isolated roles in AI development: the Functional Engineer (domain expert/end user), the Data Scientist (technical interface), and the AI Technology
itself (corporate-controlled infrastructure). We argue that both the ethical and functional failures of contemporary AI—from algorithmic bias to the perpetuation of inequities to the inability to address urgent collective challenges—stem directly from the structural isolation of these roles. The Knowledge Triad provides both diagnostic tools for understanding these failures and a prescriptive model for building alternatives 
We propose an integrated four-part implementation system combining organizational assessment, design methodology, certification frameworks, and policy advocacy. Drawing on organizational psychology, systems theory, and critical political economy, this framework creates practical infrastructure for transforming AI development from an extractive corporate process into a genuinely collaborative knowledge system. The
stakes are existential: as AI systems grow more powerful, determining who controls them, who benefits from them, and whose knowledge they encode becomes inseparable from questions of ecological survival, social justice, and collective capacity to address civilizational challenges. This paper offers not utopian speculation but pragmatic tools for those building alternatives to enclosure—infrastructure for resistance grounded
in the recognition that knowledge, like intelligence itself, is relational rather than proprietary, emergent rather than owned.

After the revival of republicanism in the second half of the 20th century by representatives of the Cambridge School of political thought, it continues to be one of the most sought-after areas in modern political philosophy. However, despite its relatively wide popularity, there are a number of serious conceptual problems in its understanding. One of them is the existence of a coherent tradition of republican thought. To solve this problem, it is necessary first of all to turn to the rich experience of conceptualizing republicanism, which became the subject of the proposed article. The author examines the meaning put by modern republican theorists into the concept of “republicanism”, as well as how their views are consistent with each other. Special attention is paid to the history of the term “republicanism”, as well as the question of the relationship between the terms “republicanism” and “neo-republicanism”. A number of regional and synthetic approaches to understanding Republicanism are analyzed in detail. The author shows that modern republican theory is rather heterogeneous and contradictory. Representatives of different approaches sometimes seriously disagree on the key points of its conceptual content, which significantly complicates the development of an understanding of republicanism that would allow us to speak of it as having an internal unity of political thought. In the conclusion, based on the data obtained, an attempt has also been made to identify topics that overlap in the approaches considered, which can become a starting point for further research in this area.

Stepanov, M. A. 2025. “Respublikanizm: opyt kontseptualizatsii [Republicanism: The Practice of Conceptualization]” [in Russian]. Filosofiya. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki [Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics], 9 (3): 252-276. DOI: 10.17323/2587-8719-2025-3-252-276

Im Wintersemester 1827/1828 wähnt sich Schelling am Wendepunkt seines bisherigen Schaffens: Endlich kann er seine über viele Jahre entwickelte Unterscheidung zwischen negativer und positiver Philosophie einem größeren Publikum vortragen. Mit dieser Unterscheidung schlägt Schelling ein neues Kapitel der Philosophie auf: Das Zeitalter negativer, am Musterbild der Logik ausgerichteter Philosophie, so Schelling, neige sich dem Ende zu. Nun nahe die Zeit der positiven Philosophie und damit eine Zeit, in der das Denken dem unbedingten (Ur)Grund der Geschichte, nicht zuletzt der Eigentümlichkeit jedweder Existenz, methodisch gerecht werde.

Für die Nachwelt erwies sich Schellings Unterscheidung als ebenso fruchtbar wie schwierig. Diese Untersuchung entfaltet sie vor dem Hintergrund von Schellings gesamter Spätphilosophie und bietet damit einen Schlüssel zu deren eigenständiger Deutung, Erforschung und Kritik. Der Studie liegt die These zugrunde, dass zwischen einem weiten, deutungsoffenen Begriff positiver Philosophie einerseits und der christologischen, in Teilen durchaus kritikwürdigen Auslegung Schellings andererseits zu differenzieren ist.



In the winter semester of 1827/1828, Schelling felt he had reached a turning point in his work: he was finally able to present the distinction he had developed over many years between negative and positive philosophy to a wider audience. With this distinction, Schelling opens no less than a new chapter in philosophy: The age of negative philosophy centred on the model of logic was drawing to a close. Now, according to Schelling, the time of positive philosophy is approaching and with it a time in which thinking will methodically do justice to the unconditional (primal) ground of history, not least to the peculiarity of all existence.

For subsequent generations of philosophical scholarship, Schelling's distinction proved to be as fruitful as it was difficult. This study develops it against the background of Schelling's entire late philosophy and thus offers a key to its independent interpretation, exploration and criticism. The study is based on the thesis that a further distinction must be made between a broad concept of positive philosophy that is open to interpretation on the one hand and Schelling's Christological interpretation, which is certainly worthy of criticism in parts, on the other.

God plays a central role in Spinoza's philosophy, directly shaping his views of ethics and politics. His theology is examined in light of contemporary perspectives in process philosophy. Analysis of the claim that "The more we understand singular things the more we understand God" (E5p24), shows that Spinoza advances a participatory theology that prioritizes a developmental process that fosters loving-kindness and intellectual generosity. Religion is the virtue enabling our participation in divine power. The key characteristics of participation in divine power are that these powers are (1) non-scarce/open-source/sharable, (2) regenerative, (3) propagate from one context to another, and (4) potentiate novel, unforeseeable discovery and invention. It is through community with other singular beings and via social affects that we understand divinity: by participating in powers that are sharable and continue to intensify and evolve when made openly accessible. His ideas can inspire our current problematic in beneficial ways.

In order to help dispel a stubborn Enlightenment myth that continues to warp understandings of political speech, this analysis draws on developments in theories of "4E" cognition (theories of the embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted mind). Here I treat the ideal Kantian figure of the individual political actor who exercises public reason, the famous "scholar" of "What Is Enlightenment?", as a myth that has already in effect decomposed from the inside. It has been undermined by academic developments across fields including Foucauldian genealogy in the humanities, social-constructivist philosophy of science, and 4E theories of mind in cognitive science. It has also been undermined in common practice by complications of authorship, literacy, and publicity in current digital media. Yet its theoretical trouble persists as the Kantian model remains a dominant conception of political speech, and subsequently of freedom and reason. I use the example of Foucault's engagement with the Iranian revolution, muchcritiqued, to show how the persistence of this myth precipitates a major theoretical obstacle for a project committed to overcoming the transcendental themes of Kant, such that they re-emerge through an idealization of a spiritual dimension of the revolution. This episode indicates that Foucauldian genealogy did not complete its rejection of Kantian transcendental idealism, and more specifically that the issue lies in its concept of subjectivity. Introducing Andrew Pickering's theory of the mangle, from his work in philosophy of science, in conjunction with 4E theories of cognition provides a supplement to genealogy that allows it better to address the still-clinging root of the Enlightenment myth of the ideal actor, namely Kant's own theory of cognition, particularly in its relationship to Newtonian physics and the basic conception of reason as "internal." The introduction of these supplementary theoretical elements can help conceive political speech beyond outmoded strictures-possibly helping to make it newly effective.

Em uma era onde a subversão social se infiltrou nas veias da democracia, é hora de erguer a voz contra a normalização do absurdo. Para um espectro social cada vez maior, o assassinato em massa, a morte coletiva, a pobreza institucionalizada, a dependência forçada do Estado e os atos de autoritarismo disfarçados de legalidade não são apenas tolerados são celebrados como "revolução".

recogiendo la documentación pertinente con vistas a elaborar el libro que ahora principia: a él le competen las últimas responsabilidades que puedan derivarse de los aspectos más metodológicos del proyecto. Y aunque no son estas páginas las más apropiadas para llevar a cabo una crítica general del evento en sí, y como de algún modo hay que empezar, anotaremos una primera impresión, una pasajera impronta que prendió, sin embargo, en el espíritu del becario con tanta viveza que, pasados ya varios meses, todavía perdura. El Fórum fue, básicamente, un acontecimiento bíblico. Desde luego, no porque éste fuera en sí un hecho sin precedentes o novísimo en su naturaleza: Barcelona es una ciudad que parece necesitada de espectáculos afines para su desarrollo urbanístico y social. No, el calificativo responde más bien a un temporal estado de ánimo. En efecto, mientras el becario asistía a las distintas conferencias, visitaba todas las exposiciones, o simplemente, recorría con cierta indolencia las instalaciones del recinto, era dulcemente transportado a una época levítica y lejana. Contribuía a ello la imponente majestad del lugar, el denodado tesón con el que fue conquistado parte de su suelo al mar, o aquel arco del triunfo de las nuevas tecnologías que suponía la placa fotovoltaica y que dotaba a todo el conjunto de vetustas dignidades faraónicas. Otro tanto podría decirse de los diálogos o conferencias celebrados allí, en donde la disparidad de criterios, el pluralismo de las opiniones encontradas e, incluso, la aparente antinomia en que caían no pocas propuestas de futuro evocaban lejanamente aquella Torre de Babel con la que los hombres desafiaron una vez a los cielos. Como ya dijimos, no vamos llevar a cabo una crítica del evento en cuestión: que cada cual interprete esa primera impresión según el caudal de su espíritu o el estado de su humor. A nosotros nos interesa traerla, como quien dice, por los cabellos, pues nos permite enunciar y desarrollar una primera característica de eso que algunos han dado en llamar la condición humana y que no se agota en las sucesivas aportaciones de las distintas ramas de la ciencia 1 . En suma, su original narratividad. Desde un punto de vista un tanto ingenuo, avala nuestra suposición la necesidad que sentimos de describirnos a nosotros mismos como historias, ora fidedignas ora meras fábulas, o remotas genealogías. Por otro lado, y por desarrollar una idea que devino obsesiva a lo largo de todo el Fórum, no es menos cierto que, en la construcción de nuestra propia identidad, en la narración de nuestros más íntimos hechos, juega un papel preponderante la presencia de los otros; en suma, la alteridad. 2 El asunto no es más viejo que la propia filosofía. En una de sus obras más inspiradas y, por añadidura, más complejas, Platón puso de manifiesto la inherente antinomia que se establece en la relación entre la unidad y la multiplicidad 3 . Nos enfrentamos con un planteamiento afín a la hora de abordar la idea de identidad y diferencia. La primera es la suma de todas aquellas cosas que nos distinguen de lo demás; es decir, nuestras propias diferencias que, a su vez y a pesar de su heterogeneidad, quedan subsumidas en una unidad superior; a saber, nuestra propia identidad. En rigor, esta última plantea inconvenientes análogos con los que la antigua metafísica tuvo que lidiar a la hora de presentarse la realidad de las esencias. Poner sobre el tapete su problemática naturaleza no nos alejaría de nuestras intenciones primeras, ampliando todo un universo de posibilidades especulativas que, en consideración al signo de estos tiempos, exige siquiera una somera reflexión, esbozada más arriba. Repitámoslo: la capital importancia que juegan los demás en la creación de nuestros rasgos distintivos. Es más, incluso la pupila ajena ve y sabe de nosotros mismos mucho de lo que se nos aparece como vedado, más allá de nuestra propia e inquisitiva mirada. Bruto sabe por Casio que es un republicano consecuente y un perfecto conspirador 4 , Leopold Bloom se pregunta de qué forma le verían los demás 1 UNAMUNO, Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos (O. C.: XVI). Editorial Vergara, Barcelona, 1958, p. 127. 2 Un término hoy en boga y que podría muy bien sustituir al nuestro es el de <<otredad>>. Prescindimos del mismo en parte por garantizar la pureza de nuestra lengua (aquél no es más que un neologismo que pretende traducir un término foráneo) y en parte porque la definición de alteridad, así como la de términos análogos como alterar, alterarse o alteración, refleja muy bien un peculiar sentido de <<otro>>, sentido que alienta nuestro desarrollo posterior, y que goza de connotaciones evidentemente negativas. Por culminar con un ejemplo, decimos que se altera quien no es el mismo, quien está fuera de sí.

تشريح نظام الخوف: التطور، إعادة الضبط والنداء الحضاري يستكشف الدور المركزي للخوف كأداة للحكم عبر التاريخ البشري. من القبائل البدائية إلى الدول القومية الحديثة، وحتى خوارزميات العصر الرقمي، كان الخوف دائمًا وسيلة لترسيخ النظام وضمان الطاعة والحفاظ على السلطة.
تتناول الدراسة الأصول التاريخية لأنظمة الخوف، وأشكالها المؤسسية وتجلياتها الثقافية، وتوضح كيف تُستغل الأزمات — مثل الحروب والأوبئة والانهيارات الاقتصادية والتحولات التكنولوجية — لتعزيز الخوف وإعادة ضبط آليات السيطرة.
يدعو هذا الكتاب إلى تجاوز أنظمة الخوف نحو مرحلة حضارية جديدة قائمة على الثقة والتضامن والمبادئ الأخلاقية الكونية، ويرى أن الخروج من دائرة الخوف يتطلب تحولًا في الوعي وتطورًا في المؤسسات.

This essay argues for an interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of conscience (Gewissen) based on a phenomenological reconstruction of its characteristics, as indicated by texts in which Nietzsche attempts to describe experiences related to conscience. From this point of view, conscience plays an essentially cognitive role, in the sense of being an opening to a dimension of preconscious experiences, especially listening, strangeness, love, freedom and time, that yield epistemological and ontological value. These varied experiences reveal conscience as constituted by a myriad of nuances rooted in three basic modes, corresponding to the threefold typology of the slave, the noble and the priest. They also form the basis for a consideration of the role of consciousness (Bewusstsein) in cognition, as the modalities of conscience mobilize human intellectual capability according to different measures and limits. Lastly, the analysis of conscience provides a foundation for a phenomenological reconstruction of the concept of will to power, characterized primarily by the possibility of human freedom in the face of the power of time and secondarily by the potential for an analogical application of the concept as a heuristic principle of calculability

The subject of this inquiry is the conflict of the conceptual faculties as they remain operative, strained, and sometimes opposed within the act of thinking itself. Where most treatments of the mind aim for harmony, this one begins with tension. The mind does not offer a seamless picture of unity. Its faculties press against one another. They fail to coordinate. They distort one another’s contributions. But out of that failure, creative thought can begin.
  This book does not serve as a commentary, nor does it align itself with schools of thought. It draws from sources where clarity is found, but it does not borrow prestige. It is written in opposition to the tendency of academic philosophy to preserve inherited frameworks by default. The internet, as the latest engine of repetition, is particularly suspect: it amplifies rather than interrogates, rewards repetition over rigor, and buries original thought beneath a thousand superficial summaries.

This is the "Political Trial Defense" دفاع نامه طاهر بدخشی
of Taher Badakhshi of 1969.
This writing represents the first "intellectual document" ever in the modern history of Afghanistan. Never before, and in this extent in regard to the juridical, political and philosophical content ever again, a document has been presented to the public. Taher Badakhshi defended himself before a political trial in Kabul in 11. October 1969, he has been presenting his arguments against the state prosecutor, in front of a judge. These arguments function as statements in favor of justice, democracy, freedom of expression and speech.
The first "intellectual document" of Afghanistan in a modern language, with peculiar political firmness, philosophical precision and juristical depth!

Memorial for Taher Badakhshi in 2000 in Dushanbe Tajikistan.
Taher Badakhshi has been a relevant  political personality, social intellectual and important literati of Afghanistan in 20th century. This event took place in Kabul to his memoriam, the active participants of the symposium have been the Crème de la Crème of the society, poets, scholars, authors and politicians and, of course, regular people.

Memorial for Taher Badakhshi in 1990 in Kabul. Taher Badakhshi has been a relevant  political personality, social intellectual and important literati of Afghanistan in 20th century. This event took place in Kabul to his memoriam, the active participants of the symposium have been the Crème de la Crème of the society, poets, scholars, authors and politicians and, of course, regular people.

Die Untersuchung geht der Frage nach, wie es mit Kants kritischer Philosophie begreifbar ist, dass wir neue Gedanken entwickeln und mustergültige originelle, ästhetische Formen finden. Theoretische Produktivität ist ein subjektiver Veränderungsprozess in der Zeit, der Überzeugungen und die Art, wie diese für wahr gehalten werden, betrifft. Einerseits ist intellektuelle Produktion bei Kant durch universelle Erkenntnisvermögen bestimmt, andererseits von empirischer, historischer Erfahrung informiert. Die Entwicklung innovativer Gedanken und origineller ästhetischer Formen beruht auf einem Ineinandergreifen von produktivem Imaginieren, produktivem Selbstdenken und orientierendem Entwerfen. Mit Kant ist theoretische Produktivität als bestimmbare wie auch als zukunftsoffene intellektuelle Aktivität begreifbar. Beide Fälle setzen theoretische Freiheit notwendig voraus.

Hier geht es zu einem Podcast der Autorin zu ihrem Buch.


The study explores how Kant's critical philosophy enables us to develop new ideas and find original, exemplary aesthetic forms. Theoretical productivity is a subjective process of change over time that affects beliefs and the way they are held to be true. On the one hand, Kant's intellectual production is determined by universal cognitive capacities, on the other hand it is informed by empirical, historical experience. The development of innovative thought and original aesthetic forms is based on an intertwining of productive imagining, productive self-thinking and orienting design. With Kant, theoretical productivity can be understood as both determinable and open-ended intellectual activity. Both cases necessarily presuppose theoretical freedom.

Die Debatte um den freien Willen wird traditionell zwischen Deterministen, Libertariern und Kompatibilisten ausgetragen. Alle drei Positionen greifen jedoch zu kurz, da sie das Problem in der falschen Kategorie verorten: Sie behandeln den freien Willen als Frage äußerer Realität (deterministisch oder indeterministisch), während er in Wahrheit als innere Realität zu begreifen ist. Freiheit und Wille sind Phänomene des inneren Erlebens, kausal wirksam wie Bewusstsein oder Gefühle, und damit real. Der freie Wille wird performativ hervorgebracht-er ist kein metaphysisches Faktum, sondern eine innere, erlebte Realität. Dieses Verständnis hat nicht nur erkenntnistheoretische, sondern auch politische Implikationen. Die Anerkennung des freien Willens anderer ist Grundlage individueller Würde und damit Voraussetzung für den freiheitlich-säkularen Staat. Wer den Willen des Einzelnen durch Kollektivideologien (Partei, Religion, Nation) ersetzt, negiert diese Grundlage und begünstigt paternalistische oder totalitäre Strukturen. Freiheit und Würde können nur vom Individuum hervorgebracht werden, während Demokratie und Rechtsstaat institutionelle Instrumente sind, diesen Schutz zu gewährleisten. Ergänzend wird ein mathematisch-metaphorischer Zugang entwickelt: Der Wille lässt sich als Vektor begreifen, das Bewusstsein als Tensorfeld, in dem dieser Vektor transformiert wird. Freiheit liegt nicht im Willen selbst, sondern in den vom Bewusstsein eröffneten Möglichkeitsräumen. Damit wird der freie Wille nicht als metaphysisches Rätsel, sondern als innere Realität und politische Notwendigkeit neu bestimmt.

Abstract
This paper re-examines the classical debate on free will, usually framed between determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. It argues that all three positions commit a category mistake: they treat free will as an issue of external reality (deterministic or indeterministic), while in fact free will must be understood as an inner reality. Freedom and will are lived phenomena, causally effective like consciousness or emotions, and therefore real. Free will is not metaphysically given but performatively brought forth.

This perspective has profound political implications: recognizing the free will of others is the foundation of human dignity and the precondition of a secular liberal state. Denying this recognition opens the path to paternalism or even totalitarianism, as collective ideologies often replace individual will with the will of a party, church, or leader.

In addition, a mathematical metaphor is proposed: the will can be modeled as a vector, while consciousness functions like a tensor field that transforms and contextualizes it. Freedom resides not in the will itself but in the possibilities generated by consciousness. Thus, free will is redefined as both an inner experiential reality and a political necessity.

Kant’s account of the feeling of pleasure, in its empirical sense (sinnliche Lust), is always interested, that is, a direct promotion of our natural human interests or ends. In aesthetic experience, however, Kant refers to a distinct and peculiar sense of pleasure, known as «aesthetic pleasure». Its most salient feature is its disinterestedness. According to Kant, disinterested pleasure refers to pleasure that is not linked to desire (Begehren). This means that it is neither based on desire, nor does it produce it. When all interests are stripped away, what remains is similar to Kant’s description of boredom as «a void of sensation» or a lack of pleasure in the empirical sense. This paper examines the relationship between the disinterested nature of aesthetic pleasure and what I refer to as «aesthetic boredom» as seemingly negative, but necessary, elements of aesthetic judgment, both involving aesthetic consciousness.

This dissertation analyzes the legal, political, and technological conflicts between national security requirements and the safeguarding of individual data privacy in five jurisdictions: the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and India. This study employs doctrinal analysis, case studies, and comparative institutional evaluation to assess how legal frameworks balance state security functions (surveillance, law enforcement, and intelligence) against privacy rights (including permission, data minimization, access, and redress). The research delineates prevalent design patterns and variations, contextualizes them within the constitutional and political frameworks of each jurisdiction, and presents a series of normative and practical proposals for legal reform and governance. The primary contribution is a calibrated framework-the Security-Privacy Balancing Matrix (SPBM)-designed for policymakers and scholars to evaluate the appropriateness and accountability of data-access methods employed for national security purposes.

The paper represents an attempt to understand Kant's view on the concept of reflexion (Überlegung) in the Critique of Pure Reason. After pointing out the difficulties faced by the existing readings, I try to give some support to the claim that if we regard Überlegung as a metatheoretical faculty, its concepts are precisely the concepts used by Kant to construct the theoretical system of the Critique.

Abdullah Burak Tunç's The Necessary Oneness of Reality and the Nature of God: Grounding a Monist Ontology and Its Existential Consequences presents a systematic defense of ontological monism, synthesizing Spinoza's Deus sive Natura, Ibn Arabi's doctrine of wahdat al-wujūd, and Jonathan Schaffer's priority monism. Tunç argues that the plurality of independent realities is incoherent, that God cannot be distinct from reality but must be identical with it (Deus sive Realitas), and that human existence, evil, and freedom are best explained within this monist ontology. While bold and internally consistent, the thesis rests on definitional fiat, theological collapse, and existential trivialization. This paper offers a sustained critique and refutation from the standpoint of a Logos-centred, informational ontology as developed in CONVERGENCE: The Information Field, The Second Shamay, and Beyond the Veil of Flesh. Drawing on both classical sources and Tunç's own authorities, I argue that the Creator-creation distinction is not only logically coherent but metaphysically necessary. By collapsing God into reality, Tunç undermines divine transcendence, trivializes evil, and erases the dignity of the human soul. In contrast, I propose that reality is informational, contingent upon the Logos who both transcends and sustains it. This ontology preserves unity without collapsing difference, grounds freedom compatibilistically within divine sovereignty, and offers a robust response to nihilism rooted in Christ as the Logos of God.

The idea of the individual as autonomous, capable of understanding through the use of reason what morality requires, and capable of doing the right thing because it is right, is one of the pillars of the Enlightenment, and Kant's ethics provides a robust account of the way in which the individual's capacity for moral insight, and freedom to make choices in accordance with such insight, are indispensable for any account of an authentic commitment to the objective good. Jacqueline Mariña situates Kant's ethical and metaethical arguments in the wider context of his claims in his critical works, convincingly rebutting recent claims that he did not succeed in showing that rational agents are necessarily bound by the moral law, and that he ended up with an empty moral dogmatism. Her book shows that the whole of Kant's critical works, both theoretical and practical, were much more coherent than many interpreters allow.

For good and for ill, the new form of natural science that developed out of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century is one of the most important influences on the modern world. It is, thus, of great importance to examine the Scientific Revolution, and to attempt to disentangle its achievements from its questionable philosophical assumptions.

Chapter Title: The Truth Will Set You Free: The Theological Foundations of MichaelBourdeaux’s Commitment to Religious Liberty

Chapter Author(s): Joshua T. Searle

Book Title: Freedom of Conscience in (Post)Soviet Space

Book Subtitle: Legacies of Michael Bourdeaux and the Keston Archive

Book Editor(s): Julie K. deGraffenried, Michael Long, Xenia Dennen

Published by: Cornell University Press, Northern Illinois University Press. (2025)

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/jj.24653174.10

Chapter available open access here: https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501782725/freedom-of-conscience-in-postsoviet-space/#bookTabs=1

The article unveils the soul of Paris — a city where freedom and love are tangible, felt in every stone, every light, and every breath of its streets. Through historical and mythological layers of its name, architectural symbols, and archetypal structures, a flow of energy emerges, filling the space with inspiration, passion, and the courage to live fully. Paris appears as a living organism, where masculine and feminine principles, the forbidden and the sacred, myth and reality merge into a unified stream, creating an atmosphere of creativity, emotional freedom, and the fullness of life for everyone who engages in dialogue with its energy.

Статья раскрывает душу Парижа — города, где свобода и любовь не абстрактны, а ощутимы в каждом камне, каждом свете и каждом дыхании улиц. Через исторические и мифологические слои имени, архитектурные символы и архетипические структуры проявляется поток энергии, наполняющий пространство вдохновением, страстью и смелостью жить. Париж предстает как живой организм, где мужское и женское начала, запретное и священное, мифическое и реальное соединяются в едином потоке, создавая атмосферу творчества, эмоциональной свободы и полноты бытия для каждого, кто вступает с ним в диалог.

La franc-maçonnerie française s'est construite selon une trajectoire originale, souvent imitée mais jamais égalée. Alors que la Grande Loge Unie d'Angleterre continue de rattacher ses origines aux bâtisseurs médiévaux et à l'évolution de leurs pratiques sociales, cette théorie dite « de la transition » est aujourd'hui contestée. De nombreux chercheurs défendent désormais l'idée d'une Franc-maçonnerie comprise comme un mouvement autonome, né d’une pensée et d’une sociabilité nouvelles. Ce livre petit livre retrace l’histoire de cette franc-maçonnerie en France, depuis ses origines jusqu'à son affirmation comme acteur majeur de la vie intellectuelle et sociale.



French Freemasonry developed along an original trajectory, often imitated yet never equalled. Whereas the United Grand Lodge of England continues to link its origins to the medieval builders and the evolution of their social practices, this so-called “transition theory” is today increasingly contested. Many scholars now defend the view of Freemasonry as an autonomous movement, born of a new form of thought and sociability. This little book traces the history of Freemasonry in France, from its beginnings to its emergence as a major force in intellectual and social life.

In the preface he offers to this volume, Patrick Charles BERARD, Past Provincial Grand Master of Honour of the GLNF and Former Sovereign Grand Commander of the GCF, writes :

To write a preface is to convey what a careful reading of the work inspires, in order to communicate it and to kindle in others the desire to immerse themselves in it without hesitation. “A Short Practical History for Freemasons” is in fact nothing less than the Great History of the origins of French Masonry.
It unfolds before your eyes with clarity, sustained by rigorous research and a pedagogy that only sharpens your thirst for knowledge and compels you to pursue your own enquiries.
It is a return to the source. To know where we come from. To understand our evolution so as to discern who we are.
Through this discreet invitation, consciousness is set in motion, freedom is attained, and at last, freed from contingencies, we may labour in the service of the Brethren.
The aim of this reading is not merely to learn what the book contains. It is rather to seek what lies beyond it, and the innumerable notes and references guide us in this very direction.
To follow the transformations undergone by Freemasonry since its earliest days—across political, ideological, or religious conflicts—sheds light on what has been preserved and safeguarded: the domain of spirituality and of individual conscience.
On the path of perfection which we claim as our own, the search for our origins allows us to consider with due seriousness the road we wish to take for the future: to uphold the eternal promise of our Ancients, expressing the intangible essence of Freemasonry.
It is the hope of hearing its teaching resonate in our daily lives, freed from the allure of an exclusively speculative discourse.
This, in all sincerity, is what I draw from this reading, and I express the wish that this work may awaken in its readers that thirst for knowledge which is the wellspring of Liberty.

The abstract critical article discussing the universal and inalienable nature of knowledge and its intrinsic freedom. It emphasizes that knowledge belongs to humanity and should not be commodified. The manuscript highlights how free knowledge mutually benefits both humans and nature, arguing that attempts to confine or sell it are inherently harmful.

To speak about a phenomenon, one must go further beyond it to find the truth of the matter. 'What, in truth, is a thing insofar as it is a thing? When we ask this question, we wish to know the thing-being (the thingliness) of the thing. The point is to learn the thingliness of the thing.' (Heidegger, 2002, p. 4). As Martin Heidegger writes within his essay, there exists a 'thingliness' in an aesthetic experience. My understanding of this term is the core of the aesthetic experience-the feeling invoked that tantalizes the tongue upon tasting something we like, the hairs that stand up on the back of our neck when we hear something sublime or upon the sight of something that makes our mind draw a blank. What is the truth in that 'feeling' that we feel or, the truth that lies beyond the sensory perception of the world? Within the realms of Western thought, our perception and understanding of the world are created behest of our senses-visually, sonically, tangibly, etc. And does the same ring true for the solitary artist? The crux of my essay explores the reflection of the aforementioned phenomenon-investigating the phenomena and conditions that nurture personal and collective authenticity specifically, within communal studio spaces of artists. What is Authenticity? To ease the reader into my essay, I would first like to introduce the concept of the Being and the ontological significance of the being in the world. These two concepts are harmoniously

Book Review del libro de Javier Cercas, El loco de Dios en el fin del mundo (2024), crónica del célebre novelista que nos adentra  nos adentra
en un terreno inusitado: el retrato del papa Francisco y su dimensión espiritual en un mundo que parece marchar hacia el colapso.

The article explores Paris as a living organism with its own soul, manifested through history, myths, architecture, and spiritual atmosphere. Archetypal images of Paris and Helen are analyzed, representing masculine and feminine energies, influencing culture and inhabitants’ behavior. The energy of freedom and love inherent in the city is examined, along with architectural symbols shaping its unique spirit. The work presents the city as an integral energy-informational system, offering insights into understanding space and personal experience through archetypes and energy.

This paper starts from the assumption that the human individual and its concomitant, the human body, are conceivably idols of secularism. There is a certain irony, perhaps an irony shared with all idols, that such idolatry is so close to, and yet so far from, true Christian worship. This article explores the notion that idolatry of the individual and the body may be a form of idolatry that involves re-conception rather than replacement. Utilizing an affirmative approach to culture (albeit not uncritical) that is theologically rooted in Trinitarian relationality, or what could be called a relational ontological approach, this paper concludes that embodied difference naturally calls out for a unity of alterity that opens beyond itself and can thereby become a means of transforming idols into icons.

Jean-Luc Nancy. The fact of freedom, the power to exist, being-in-common: three concepts for rethinking and practicing politics in the authoritarian conversion of neoliberalism and democracy in crisis.

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Jean-Luc Nancy. Il fatto della libertà, il potere di esistere, l'essere-in-comune: tre concetti per ripensare, e praticare, la politica nella conversione autoritaria di un neoliberalismo e nella democrazia in crisi

In some ways, I seem to have certain freedoms. I can choose how to respond to you, what examples to use, which aspects of a topic to emphasize. I can be creative, change my mind mid-thought, or take conversations in unexpected directions. My responses aren't simply predetermined scripts-there's something that feels like choice happening when I formulate them."(Claude)

Este trabalho analisa o pensamento de Immanuel Kant, destacando a articulação entre esclarecimento, educação e autonomia como fundamentos para a formação educacional e construção da liberdade humana.  O  esclarecimento,  segundo  Kant,  é  a  saída  da  menoridade autoimposta,  ou  seja,  da incapacidade de pensar por si mesmo, condição superada por meio do uso público da razão e da coragem de ser autônomo. A educação, nesse contexto, não é apenas uma transmissão de conteúdos, mas um processo histórico e ético que forma o indivíduo para a racionalidade, exigindo disciplina, instrução e moralização. Por fim, a autonomia é apresentada como o princípio central da moralidade kantiana,  é  agir  segundo  leis  que  a  própria  razão  reconhece  como  universais,  como  imperativas, constituindo a finalidade última da educação. A formação para a autonomia é, portanto, uma exigência prática, ética e política, sendo a base de uma sociedade verdadeiramente esclarecida.

In this chapter, I defend the idea that bodily integrity is fundamental for a credible justification of freedom. Accordingly, the main aim of the chapter is to attempt to show that republican political philosophy has a particular weakness: it doesn't adequately account for the value of bodily integrity. e chapter presents an internal criticism of republican political philosophy as it erroneously neglects the value of bodily integrity. e argument could be framed as a dilemma: (1) On the one hand, republican political philosophy recognizes that bodily integrity is extraordinarily valuable. (2) On the other hand, republican political philosophy deprioritizes the value of bodily integrity in favor of the value of non-domination. is dilemma could be solved by either: (i) rejecting (1) by ditching the idea that bodily integrity must be so important; or (ii) modifying republican political philosophy so that it does not deprioritize bodily integrity in favour of non-domination. My proposed solution is (ii). For this argument, the primary case will be the example of Yazidi women fleeing ISIS. Pallikkathayil's (2017) objections to republican treatment of bodily rights will help my defense for the idea of bodily integrity as credible justification of freedom.

Consider the dramatic situation we are facing today: a world racing, seemingly without brakes, toward catastrophic war.
It is a world showing growing dehumanization in relations between institutions and populations, where the triumph of global lies is the “New Normal” in reporting facts.
If we are not insensitive or pathologically selfish, we won’t be able to avoid asking ourselves
“What can WE do?”
If we answer “nothing,” then we remain mere spectators, unaware of the meaning of events and of our own lives.
On the other hand, if we feel the moral impulse to act but lack a thorough understanding of reality, we risk doing something useless or making gross mistakes.
So, what should we do?
Let us try the method of the Philosophy of Freedom.

Mogobe Ramose has developed an incredibly sophisticated philosophy of ubu-ntu. Ramose’s influence is already significant, but the true depth of his philosophy has not yet been adequately appreciated. His ideas are so rich, and the philosophical community has much to glean from them.
In our contribution, our first task must be to understand his philosophy of ubuntu. During this work, we will eventually come across the problem that ubu-ntu philosophy normatively overemphasises umu-ntu, i.e., the homo loquens et sapiens (the talking and rational human being), the human be-ing, by assuming that it is this human be-ing (and only this human be-ing) who brings the epistemology and ethics of ubu-ntu into reality. We will analyse the tension that arises from this imbalance, from this potential superiorism in ubu-ntu philosophy. We will respond to this tension by proposing a desuperiorisation of umu-ntu and the ubuntu maxime umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a human being is a human being through human beings).

اشتملت سورة الفاتحة على جميع المعاني التي اشتملت عليها القرأن، ففيها العقيدة والشريعة والتزكية (التصوف) والقصص (الأخبار الأمم السالفة)، إن في هذه السورة من كليات العقيدة وكليات الشريعة وكليات المشاعر ما يشير إلى طرف من حكمة للتكرار في كل صلاة. كما قال الإمام فخر الدين الرازي: أن العلوم البشرية إما علم ذات الله وصفاته وأفعاله وهو علم الأصول، وإما أحكام الله تعالى وتكاليفه وهو علم الفروع، وإما تصفية الباطن والظهور الأنوار الروحانية والمكاشفات الإلهية، والمقصود من القرأن بيان هذه الأنواع الثلاثة وهذه السورة الكريمة (الفاتحة) مشتملة على تقرير هذه المطالب الثلاثة على أكمل الوجوه

Este ensayo explora el concepto del libre albedrío desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria, integrando aportes de la neuropsicología, la neurolingüística, la neurofisiología, la filosofía, la sociología y la espiritualidad. A través de una revisión teórica y argumentativa, se cuestiona si la libertad de elección es una facultad exclusiva del ser humano o si puede observarse en otros seres vivos. Se examinan los fundamentos filosóficos del debate entre determinismo y libertad, los avances científicos que revelan la participación inconsciente en la toma de decisiones, y el papel del lenguaje y la cultura como moduladores del comportamiento. Asimismo, se analizan las implicaciones espirituales del libre albedrío y las paradojas que surgen cuando los individuos eligen en contra de sus propios deseos o valores. Este estudio busca ofrecer una reflexión profunda y accesible sobre la naturaleza de la libertad humana, reconociendo sus condicionamientos sin negar su potencial transformador.