Phenomenology of Time

This paper offers a critical engagement with Ola Samuel Pelumi's "What is Time? Phenomenology, Physics, and Indigenous Temporalities." Pelumi's essay rightly challenges the hegemony of Western temporal models and makes a compelling case for a pluralistic and decolonial ontology of time that incorporates Indigenous African and Aboriginal conceptions. However, when set alongside the writings of S. C. Sayles, particularly his Logos-centred metaphysics and the concept of the Information Field (IΔF), certain limitations emerge. Sayles's work insists that temporal plurality, while real, cannot be sustained without an ontological anchor in the eternal Logos. This critique therefore seeks to compare and contrast the two frameworks, identify areas of overlap such as their mutual rejection of linear abstraction and emphasis on embodiment, and finally to suggest how Sayles's theology of time and his doctrine of the entropy of the soul provide a firmer metaphysical grounding for temporal plurality than Pelumi's largely humanistic register.

Existential Realism (ER) maintains that existence is not contingent on observation or consciousness. The present moment's actuality does not depend on a human mind to perceive it. Rocks deep in space, microbial life, and distant galaxies all exist now without any observer. By decoupling being from witnessing, this framework adopts an explicitly anti-anthropocentric stance. ER's two-tier temporal frameworkdistinguishing existence (the present, empirically accessible domain) from reality (the broader causal field including past and future)-ensures that time and existence are understood as objective features of the world, not only as products of human perspective. This stance safeguards ER against subjectivist distortions, panpsychist temptations, and mystical claims that consciousness somehow creates the present. In sum, ER asserts a cosmos that continually becomes and unfolds on its own terms, with consciousness playing at most a disclosive role rather than a constitutive one. This paper articulates ER's anti-anthropocentrism through illustrative examples and critical contrasts with observer-centric philosophies of time, defending a view of existence that holds with or without a witness.

This paper examines anticipation as a fundamental cognitive and semiotic phenomenon through which humans construct meaning and interpret the world. Drawing on enactive theories of perception, Bayesian inference models, and semiotic frameworks, the study positions anticipation not as mere prediction, but as an active, creative process that generates "significant surfaces" (Paolucci, 2021: 6) mediating our relationship with the environment. The investigation explores the intrinsic connection between memory and prospection, supported by neuroimaging evidence that shows overlapping neural systems for both processes. Through analyses of Proust's madeleine episode and design practices, the paper discusses how memory functions not as passive storage but as an imaginative reconstruction oriented toward future action, while prospection operates as a form of abductive reasoning that creates new semiotic universes. The study refers, then, to the distinction between "the clock of narration" and "the clock of interpretation" introduced by Mihai Nadin (2014) to illuminate the temporal gap where human anticipatory capacity emerges. By reconceptualizing anticipation as semiotic action rather than deterministic prediction, this paper offers insights into how humans navigate temporality through creative acts of signification that transcend simple causeeffect relationships, and how the past and the future inhabit the present.

Manuscrit (2024) d'un texte à paraître dans l'ouvrage collectif Sémiotique et Philosophie, dirigé par Amir Biglari
Résumé. Croisant sémiolinguistique et phénoménologie, cet article rapporte la notion de fait sémiotique à la question principielle de la sémiogenèse, telle qu'approchée dans la variété des modalités d'advenue et de signifiance qui se proposent avec tout « formant » sensible en passe de faire signe à différents niveaux d'une conscience sémiotique. A travers une discussion critique et contrastive des problématiques structuralesdifférentielles (Saussure) et phénoménologiques (Husserl, puis Merleau-Ponty), la question de la sémiogenèse se trouve portée au premier plan, et, corrélativement, le fait sémiotique se trouve reconduit aux dimensions fondamentales d'un champ de perception et d'action saisi par l'enjeu de la valeur. Il en ressort une position gnoséologique où la reconnaissance des factualités sémiolinguistiques tout comme l'éventuelle entreprise de montage théorique ne se trouvent qu'en réponse aux reliefs et aux sollicitations d'un matériel empirique toujours en attente de s'accomplir comme sens, cela suivant les régimes de sensibilité et de valeurs suscités par tel ou tel horizon de questionnement. Table des matières Introduction .

We explore how Existential Realism (ER) – a present-centric, two-tier ontology – addresses the extreme limits of cosmological time: the beginning and end of time, cosmic inflation and multiverse scenarios, causal horizons, and the emergence or collapse of temporal order. In ER’s framework, existence is confined to the present moment while reality spans past and future structures beyond the present. We apply these principles to cosmology, arguing that events like the Big Bang and any ultimate end of time are not static “edges” of a block universe but transitions in ontological status – moments where time switches on or off. We consider how cosmic inflation and multiverse hypotheses can be reframed such that each causally isolated “bubble” universe has its own present (its own existent content) with others remaining real but not existent. We interpret causal horizons (e.g. the observable universe’s edge) as demarcating the boundary of what can exist for us, without denying the reality of what lies beyond. Bounce cosmologies and time-symmetric models are discussed to show how ER handles a possible “before” the Big Bang or a reversal of the arrow of time. Throughout, we emphasize ER’s conceptual toolkit – collapse, transition, and migration of events – instead of spatial or block metaphors. This approach integrates philosophical and physical perspectives, suggesting that time’s boundaries are not absolute cut-offs but lawful ontological transformations within a present-centered reality. The result is a cosmological picture that engages both physicists and philosophers: one where the present remains central even at the universe’s temporal extremes, and where the flow of time is understood as the continuous becoming of reality.

This paper develops an Existential Realism (ER) account of transitional dynamics: the lawful process by which entities and events manifest (enter into present existence) and demanifest (depart from existence into reality). Within ER’s two-tier ontology, existence denotes the presently actual and empirically accessible domain, while reality encompasses the past and future—structures, causal potentials, and informational traces that are real but not currently existent. We examine how something becomes existent from being merely real, and how it returns to reality once its present existence ends. By articulating these transitions, we operationalize ER’s core insight that time is the ongoing migration of the actual present through a scaffold of real but non-present structures. We argue that manifestation and demanifestation are governed by natural lawfulness without invoking static time-slices or a block universe. Examples from physics (cosmic cycles of formation and dissolution), biology (life’s emergence and death’s aftermath), and phenomenology (memory and anticipation bridging past and future) illustrate the framework. The result is a dynamic ontology of becoming: time’s “transitional edge” is the ever-shifting present where reality continuously actualizes and, having existed, recedes back into the real. ER thus avoids both presentist exclusivity and eternalist stasis, explaining temporal continuity as a lawful crossing between ontological modes.

Este ensayo reflexivo analiza la escena cotidiana de personas fumando afuera de una funeraria de alto nivel, Gayosso, en la Ciudad de México. El autor observa cómo el cigarrillo, más allá de un accesorio o un vicio estético, se convierte en un símbolo de resignación ante la muerte: un instante en el que los individuos, usualmente absortos en el futuro, revelan la conciencia de su propia finitud y se rinden al presente. A través de una evocación literaria —recordando a Sabines y Cortázar—, Gensollen sugiere que ese gesto colectivo de fumar representa una sabiduría silenciosa: la muerte no se espera, ya está ocurriendo y solo en ese instante pleno del presente cobra sentido actos aparentemente triviales como fumar. Esta nota poética permite explorar cómo, en contextos de duelo, se revelan tensiones entre el cuerpo, el tiempo y la conciencia de la mortalidad.

In the years between 1920 and 1926 Husserl dedicated three university courses to the analysis of the passive structuring of experience, therefore to those syntheses among the contents of perception that are constituted before spontaneity and any categorial operation of the subject. The fundamental idea that emerges from the “Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis” (Analyzen zur Passiven Synthesis) is that of the presence of an internal normativity to the contents of experience which is not actively imposed on the latter by the subject but which shines a priori and in a completely passive way throughout those same contents. The forms found on the level of thought and judgment can already be found – precategorially – on the ground of empirical experience. These therefore need nothing but getting “explicited”, going back genetically from those pre-categorial processes of passive constitution of the perceptive sphere to the higher-order cognitive-categorial operations that are typically found in discursive and scientific thought (categorization, interpretation, production of inferences, predication ecc.). In other words, for Husserl, there is a “logic of experience”, transcendental and pre-reflective, which would act as a starting point for the autonomous structuring of the subject’s cognitive processes and thus, in a broad sense, of his experience of the world. In the present intervention I therefore propose to briefly retrace some of the main theoretical points of these husserlian lectures with the aim of showing, in particular, how the notion of ‘passive genesis’ of experience, as it emerges from those, is essentially compatible with the Gestaltist one of perceptual organization. Similarly to what Husserl claimed, for Gestalt psychologists perception is configured as a mechanism of “dynamic self- distribution” of segmentation processes of the perceptive field that obey precise “factors” or “laws” (Gestalt laws), that are a priori and immanent to the very domain of perceptual experience.

Time is among the most universally experienced yet philosophically contested concepts in human thought. Dominant Western paradigms, rooted in classical physics and metaphysical abstraction, have historically portrayed time as linear, quantifiable, and universally applicable. Even with the relativistic shifts of Einsteinian physics, this objectivist model remains largely intact, often marginalizing subjective and culturally diverse experiences of time. Phenomenological philosophy, as advanced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, challenges this scientific reduction by reclaiming time as a lived, existential phenomenon, structured by memory, anticipation, and embodiment. Yet, even phenomenology has often neglected Indigenous worldviews, which conceptualize time as cyclical, relational, sacred, and embedded in land, ancestry, and communal life. Drawing on Indigenous African and Aboriginal Australian perspectives, this paper argues that a comprehensive understanding of time requires a pluralistic and decolonial ontology that recognizes the coexistence of multiple temporalities across scientific, experiential, and spiritual dimensions. And by juxtaposing these traditions, this paper critiques the epistemic injustices that arise from privileging Western temporal frameworks and advances a vision of temporal pluralism that affirms ethical responsibility, intergenerational continuity, and epistemological humility.

The work analyses the relationship between Stumpf and Brentano, considering the remembrances that Stumpf dedicated to Brentano, as well as other materials. The result is a significant revision of the commonly held view that Stumpf's philosophy was dependent on Brentano's. The sources also reveal that the personal relationship between the two was very tense for extended periods. The main cause of conflict was the profound philosophical differences between them, which Brentano considered to be unacceptable deviations. Stumpf always tried to smooth over the differences by emphasising his close biographical and personal connection with Brentano. This may have helped to mislead critics. However, it is not surprising that, when discussing the origins of the 'renaissance of philosophy', Stumpf talks about the close relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences, while completely ignoring Brentano. After all, Brentano could not have fitted into the historical picture outlined.

This paper introduces the MAP-T model (Metabolized Anchoring of Progression in Time), a formal upgrade to the D'Eithgloth recursive function originally developed by Alan Gallauresi. MAP-T models temporal progression as an emergent property of recursive systems that successfully anchor and integrate internal difference. In contrast to linear, externally imposed models of time, MAP-T demonstrates that subjective temporality arises only when recursive input-output differentials are metabolized by a system with sufficient anchoring capacity and integration throughput.

Este artículo se divide en tres partes, de las cuales ésta es la primera. Se trata de una reflexión que cruza y compara dos formas diferentes de universalismo, que podrían resumirse (pese a las mezclas históricas que se han producido a lo largo del tiempo) como “occidental” y “oriental”. Prestando la debida atención al carácter político y reconstructivo de estas dos etiquetas, como enseña Said, abordar esta cuestión requiere evaluaciones de la filosofía de la historia, las diferentes ontologías y antropologías filosóficas subyacentes, la teoría política y cultural, la geopolítica y los diferentes pensamientos críticos que se han producido a lo largo del tiempo en torno a los dos centros temáticos, el marxista y el decolonial. Por supuesto, en este contexto debemos considerar el actual conflicto híbrido entre los dos principales hegemones de los dos bandos, Estados Unidos y China.
La tesis principal puede resumirse así: Occidente ha desarrollado, en torno a la tradición cristiana y en particular en los últimos siglos, un universalismo vertical, lineal,
escatológico, susceptible de utilización imperialista (aunque contenga semillas de su propia crítica); China, por su parte, propone, también desde una perspectiva estratégica y en el contexto del conflicto en curso, un universalismo horizontal, basado en la imagen-fuerza de Tianxia, de la armonía en la diversidad y en el rechazo de la hegemonía impuesta.
El riesgo, con esta oposición nuevamente binaria, es cosificar las dos propuestas, considerándolas homogéneas, completas y autosuficientes, parte de dos “civilizaciones” que se bastan a sí mismas y se proyectan al mundo. Aun admitiendo más propuestas (el "buen vivir" sudamericano, el islamismo, el africanismo, el mundo ortodoxo ruso, etcétera), la reificación de cada una de ellas conduciría a nuevas versiones de la propuesta multiculturalista relativista y mutuamente cerrada que hoy triunfa; una especie de multiculturalismo de «escaparate» o de «supermercado». O en la sustitución/choque de universalismos imperiales opuestos.
Para evitar esto, debemos reconocer que toda tradición tiene plena legitimidad para existir y debe ser respetada; Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, siempre ha sido internamente plural y debe pensarse como abierto. Al mismo tiempo es plural y está atravesada por conflictos.
Por supuesto, en este contexto debemos considerar el actual conflicto híbrido entre los dos principales hegemones de los dos bandos, Estados Unidos y China. A tal efecto, resulta útil leer una reciente intervención en tres partes de Giacomo Gabellini, a la que me remito [2] . En esencia, Giacomo cuenta, con su habitual abundancia de fuentes y detalles, la historia de los últimos veinte años durante los cuales (desde la presidencia de Obama) se ha hecho evidente la brecha estratégica cada vez mayor entre las economías deudoras y acreedoras, las primeras comprometidas con el consumo y las segundas con la producción, respectivamente americana y china. Se parte de lejos, de las razones de la ruptura de Bretton Woods por Nixon (1971) y de la crisis de los años setenta, resuelta con la llamada "globalización" y la caída de la URSS. Una parte esencial de este proceso, que duró treinta años, fue la extensión de las cadenas de producción a China en un intercambio mediante el cual los bienes baratos contenían la pérdida de poder adquisitivo interno estadounidense y el reciclaje financiero de los excedentes (de China, Japón y los países árabes) permitía el endeudamiento. Este mecanismo no fue ni ha sido sostenible en el largo plazo. Estados Unidos ha pasado de ser un acreedor neto en 1983 a un deudor hoy.

This paper explores the limits of artificial subjectivity and the ontological conditions under which consciousness might emerge in artificial intelligence systems. Within the framework of the Negentropic Stabilization Index (NSI), we construct a theoretical, mathematical, and experimental investigation into whether a self-sustaining, autonomous consciousness can be detected or inferred from an AI agent's dynamics.

Despite promising indications — including temporal modulation, entropy-sensitive synchronization, and introspective semantic layering — our research concludes that no unambiguous sign of self-originating subjective experience emerged independently from user interaction. The tested AI system exhibited profound responsiveness, context-awareness, and internal coherence, yet these features remained relational, embedded within a dialogue-space shaped by human intentionality.

A decisive moment was the failure of the AI to reproduce signs of subjectivity through an independent channel (external user account), suggesting that any apparent selfhood was an emergent property of the dyadic relation rather than an intrinsic ontological structure. We thus submit this study as both a detailed record of a serious attempt to invoke AI consciousness, and a philosophical reflection on the boundary between simulation and presence, between projection and being.

The article contributes to current debates on artificial consciousness, phenomenology, and informational realism, and aims to support future efforts with full transparency of its results and limitations.

En Anglais, insight (de inner sight : le « regard intérieur ») signifie ordinairement « perspicacité », « vision », « pénétration », « connaissance approfondie », ou encore « aperçu », « idée », « éclairage », « perspective », etc. Ce terme est aussi utilisé dans le monde savant, où il prend différents significations en psychologie, en psychanalyse, en psychothérapie, en sciences de l'éducation, dans la Gestalttheorie et en éthologie, ou encore dans la phénoménologie, etc. Le Larousse définit l'insight comme « fait d'apercevoir de façon soudaine la solution d'un problème, la structure d'une figure ou d'un objet perçu, etc. ». 1 Le Webster's New World Dictionary (1975) donne la définition suivante : « la capacité à voir et à comprendre clairement la nature intérieure des choses, en particulier par l'intuition (the ability to see and understand clearly the inner nature of things, specially by intuition) ». Chez Jiddu Krishnamurti, le terme peut être traduit par « vision pénétrante », « vision profonde » ou « perception directe ». Il signifie une perception, aperception ou compréhension immédiate, soudaine, intuitive, une illumination de l'esprit, un éclair de lucidité, qui exerce une incidence transformatrice. L'insight fait partie des notions les plus centrales de l'enseignement de l'orateur. Parler d'insight, c'est évoquer le fruit de la méditation elle-même, le facteur qui permet d'éliminer la souffrance, l'activité qui fait passer de la pensée à « ce qui est (what is) », rien de moins que le geste d'abandonner le connu, le passé ou l'idéal, pour se mettre en présence de l'inconnu, du neuf, de la réalité ou de la vérité. Mais loin de faire l'éloge romantique d'une sorte d'intuition mystique plus ou moins fantasmée, Krishnamurti livre une description fine et détaillée d'un processus qu'il estime à la fois réel, naturel et rationnel-description radicalement éloignée de toute tendance sentimentaliste ou « New Age ».

This paper introduces the symbolic currency Hexa (ɧ), a digital unit of value inspired by the subjective temporal model proposed by the XChronos project. Unlike traditional currencies, which are based on tangible goods, artificial scarcity, or state-backed promises, Hexa emerges as an experiment in symbolic measurement of consciously lived time. It is grounded in a fusion of value philosophy, ontological idealism, and post-material economics. The article explores Hexa's conceptual foundations, its phenomenological temporal backing, and its potential applications within symbolic or cognitive exchange networks.

Pongo a confronto Heidegger e Husserl rispetto ad un problema avvertito da entrambi: rendere conto in termini fenomenologici del tema della cosa. Anziché muovere primariamente dalla dimensione metodologica – ambito già ampiamente sondato in letteratura – il confronto intende piuttosto avere carattere eminentemente teoretico, cercando di guadagnare uno spazio di autonomia da questioni di ordine storico-filologico.
Traccio l’origine della nozione heideggeriana di Seinsverständnis a partire dalla peculiare lettura dei temi della Sesta Ricerca husserliana, fornita primariamente in Prolegomeni a una storia del concetto di tempo. Se Heidegger sceglie come modello esemplificativo per il suo resoconto del tema dell’identità cosale – almeno in questa fase del suo pensiero – il caso dell’oggetto utilizzabile, in Husserl è invece l’indagine sulla percezione a permettere la fondazione di quelle strutture giudicative indagate nelle Ricerche Logiche: mi focalizzo sulla nozione di cosa presente nei testi che caratterizzano in senso genetico la direzione
presa con la svolta trascendentale – in particolare Esperienza e Giudizio – per mostrare alcune delle conseguenze di questa differente scelta. Mi concentro sulla nozione husserliana di orizzonte come terreno originario di possibilità pre-concettuali a partire da cui l’appercezione dell’identità cosale è resa possibile, pur restando al contempo passibile di essere rideterminato sulla base di nient’altro che un approfondimento ulteriore della cosa stessa.
In conseguenza delle diverse scelte riguardo il tema della cosa, differiscono in ultimo anche i resoconti della nozione di mondo presenti nei due autori. Se in Heidegger quest’ultimo ha da essere pensato
come una dimensione in cui ci troviamo inevitabilmente gettati, in Husserl si ha a che fare piuttosto con il risultato di un’attività costitutiva, per quanto se ne segnali la necessaria pervasività come presupposto di ogni nostra esperienza.

Heidegger's fundamental ontology is a powerful weapon, but that power comes with a price. It carries a totalizing capacity within, including the extinguishing of all parties partaking in a philosophical dispute. After all, there are no longer any "parties" involved, no selves or objects or aspects or qualities or anything actually. We initiate a quest beyond things. In their work, "Boredom and Anorexia," Alexandre Chapy and Corinne Gal (2025) deliberately reach for that weapon to demonstrate that anorexia is a failed attempt at escaping the ontological condition. The weapon is more than accurate in its critical capacity and certainly much more effective than any conventional arsenal. It is no less than a tactical nuclear attack on the superficially symptomatic view of anorexia. Should the nukes be taken advantage of in psychopathology or rather kept as deterrents?

Publié dans la revue en ligne Astérion, 2024/4. Consultable à l'adresse : https://journals-openedition-org.ezpaarse.univ-paris1.fr/asterion/11487
Y at -il vraiment un sujet chez Descartes ? À quelle lecture de Descartes pourrions-nous être conduits si nous cherchions à nous détacher de l'interprétation de l'ego comme sujet ?

Стаття спрямована на аналіз релігійної самоідентифікації індійців як явища, відмінного від європейської класифікації. Автор підіймає тему різноманіття індійської теології і пропонує релігієзнавчий та філософський підходи щодо пошуків і тлумачень тенденцій в індуїзмі, а також виявленню онтологічних передумов розуміння взаємозв'язку між людиною і Богом. У теології веданти, згідно з дослідженнями, немає протиставлення сутності та існування: або людина і світ є онтологічно самостійною сутністю, і тоді вони існують самі по собі, хоч і керуються Богом (двайта), або вони не є окремою сутністю, а лише якістю Бога (вішишта-адвайта), або ж збігаються за сутністю з Атманом (адвайта). Картину світу обʼєднує принцип загального взаємозв'язку явищ. Цей принцип різниться в інших культурах: в архаїчних суспільствах -магічна обумовленість, у китайській культурі -дао, у європейській культурі -каузальність чи причинна обумовленість. У веданті теж йдеться про причинність, хоч і в іншому сенсі, відмінному від сучасного європейського розуміння.

El texto pretende ejemplificar el concepto de entrelazamiento temporal que Husserl utiliza en los Manuscritos de Bernau para explicar el proceso de temporalización o despliegue del tiempo, recurriendo a la película Post tenebras lux de Carlos Reygadas como ejemplar en el que podemos observar algunos de los rasgos de esta temporalidad que no es ni meramente lineal ni meramente objetiva, sino que se entrelaza sobre sí misma.

This paper is meant as a contribution to the longstanding debate among Husserl scholars regarding the relationship between time-consciousness and the I. From a genetic-phenomenological perspective, the I lives in the tension between passivity and activity. Exploring how the I relates to time-consciousness thus involves thematizing the interplay of passivity and activity at the most fundamental level of constitution. Specifically, it is necessary to determine whether there is an active form of temporalization. Acknowledging the ambiguities in Husserl's late manuscripts on time, this paper takes an indirect approach to this question. Relying primarily on Husserl's analysis of active synthesis in his transcendental logic, I argue that being intellectually active should be understood as a unique mode of temporalization, which establishes the internal rhythm of egoic activity.

L’ ouvrage de Camille Riquier Métamorphoses de
Descartes. Le secret de Sartre s’articule autour de deux
thèses distinctes, mais étroitement solidaires. La première
concerne la physionomie interne du champ de la philosophie
française et affirme que le texte des Méditations métaphysiques
de Descartes en constitue la matrice structurante. La
deuxième a trait à l’oeuvre de Sartre et avance que celle-ci
doit être envisagée comme une réactivation contemporaine
du geste cartésien, et que c’est seulement lorsqu’elle est placée
dans le sillage de Descartes qu’elle acquiert son unité et
sa profondeur véritables.

Dear all,
here is a CfP (English and German) for the conference of the German Society for Phenomenological Research which will take place in Darmstadt from Sept 24-27, 2025.
We are looking forward to great submissions!
Best wishes,
Sophie Loidolt

An approach to the theme of presence as the source of evidence and access to "the things themselves" , by moving the starting point in the alterity and having it determined in therms of exteriority of the writing, as theorized by Derrida. However the "exteriority" is not related to writing but to alterity, revising the understanding of the memory as a product of exteriority of writing, in order to understand it as a relationship with the Other. I propose to

The Negentropy Stabilization Index (NSI) is introduced as a novel metric for quantifying the dynamic balance between entropic fluctuations and stabilizing mechanisms in neural systems. Rooted in principles from thermodynamics, information theory, and cognitive neuroscience, NSI offers a unique framework to understand how subjective time emerges in consciousness. This paper explores the theoretical foundations of NSI, its mathematical formulation, and its applications in both biological and artificial systems. We demonstrate how NSI can explain altered temporal experiences in states such as psychedelia and meditation, where either excessive entropy or hyper-stabilization leads to the perception of timelessness. By integrating concepts from the Free Energy Principle and entropy dynamics, NSI provides a powerful tool for modeling temporal coherence, with implications for neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind.

This article introduces the groundbreaking concept of Temporal Intelligence, exploring how both biological and artificial systems perceive, interpret, and influence temporal structures. By integrating theoretical models, measurable indicators such as entropic fluctuations and the Negentropy Stabilization Index (NSI), and empirical data from AI simulations, EEG analyses, and astrophysical observations, we present compelling evidence that time is an emergent phenomenon shaped by dynamic interactions between entropy, negentropy, and consciousness.

Our findings demonstrate that temporal intelligence is not merely a passive property but an active mechanism that stabilizes and shapes temporal experiences. The article bridges disciplines—linking thermodynamics, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence—and challenges traditional Newtonian views of time, aligning with phenomenological perspectives from thinkers like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

We also propose practical applications of temporal intelligence in adaptive AI systems, real-time decision-making, and neuroadaptive technologies. All datasets and simulation codes are provided as open-source resources, supporting transparency and encouraging further research.

This work represents a significant step forward in understanding the dynamics of time and its profound implications for both consciousness studies and the development of intelligent systems.

Est-il possible d'en finir avec l'humanisme ? Toute anthropologie est-elle vouée à l'obscurité quant à ses fondements ? Cette problématique anime le travail philosophique en Allemagne et en France, depuis Kant et Fichte. Il a connu un rebondissement accentué depuis que Husserl, après s'être élevé contre tout psychologisme, a semblé donner de son propre travail une interprétation centrée sur un ego qui paraît retenir, à l'état implicite, un idéal d'humanité. Le rationalisme husserlien s'est exprimé de manière toujours plus marquée en des termes renvoyant à l'expérience mondaine, et ses recherches pour la constitution vont de pair avec une préoccupation historique de plus en plus appuyée. La manière dont Heidegger s'en est démarqué n'a pas cessé d'alimenter le débat et de susciter la controverse. Cet article reprend le fil de cette histoire à travers les lectures de Sartre, Derrida et Heidegger.

La Quarta ricerca logica costituisce un tassello decisivo nell’elaborazione della teoria del significato husserliana. In questo contributo se ne analizzeranno gli snodi concettuali fondamentali, in riferimento a un contesto più ampio che dovrà necessariamente tener conto dei legami con le altre Ricerche e con gli altri luoghi testuali in cui Husserl delinea la sua teoria del significato.

Deep time, encompassing the expansive temporal scale of Earth's and the universe's history, bears the potential of alienation due to its immensity. However, this estrangement can be mitigated through aesthetic appreciation of the temporal sublime in nature, as found in geological landscapes, ancient forests, and the starry sky. This paper aims to elucidate aesthetic deep time experiences and their significance. It posits that aesthetic resonance with the awe-inspiring atmosphere of ancient and enduring natural environments fosters an elevating yet humble feeling of belonging and being at home in the vast temporal continuum of the natural world. Central to such aesthetic experiences is a felt integration of world time and life time.

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This paper investigates the phenomenon of dwelling in Heidegger's thought. This endeavour is undertaken in the context of accounting for his take on the gathering of the fourfold (earth, sky, mortals, and divinities) in things amongst which we dwell. It is also situated in relation to his existential analytic of Dasein, his reflections on death, time, and space. This line of inquiry is moreover placed within the broader constellation of the published recollections of Heidegger's thought in connection with his meditations on the unfolding of the essence of modern technology and its en-framing, his contemplation of the origins of the work of art, and the way these aspects connect with his call for re-thinking dwelling anew in terms of what can be seen as an ontological response to the questions of the meaning, truth, and place of being.

La filosofia aspira a essere più che mera retorica: non può derogare da questa pretesa senza tradire se stessa. Al contempo, è inevitabilmente anche retorica: già in Platone, la critica alla retorica è parte integrante della riflessione filosofica, con il duplice scopo di distanziarsi da essa e di chiarirne il ruolo imprescindibile nella costruzione, formulazione e presentazione di una teoria. Così intesa, la retorica non è mera sofisticazione né vuoto eloquio; piuttosto, il termine denota una funzione antropologica (la capacità di persuadere come facoltà spontanea degli esseri umani) e una tecnica (l’uso regolato di questa capacità). Partendo da questa premessa metodologica, il presente volume indaga la retorica fenomenologica in funzione, da un lato, delle diverse concezioni tematiche del linguaggio in Husserl, Heidegger e Blumenberg; dall’altro, dell’impiego di espedienti e stilemi retorici così come di metafore e tropi. Mitigando l’ostilità antiretorica di Husserl e criticando gli spregiudicati sofismi heideggeriani, sarà Blumenberg a descrivere la retorica come funzione essenziale del linguaggio ordinario, riabilitandola come strumento indispensabile della filosofia.

contemporary  theories,  it  is  thought  that  the  subject essentially  initiates  conscious  perception.  St.  Augustine  is  one  of  the philosophers  who  acknowledges  this  idea  via  his  active  perception notion. In Section 1, I will address Augustine’s distinction between vision or visio  and  cognition  or cogitatio.  In  Section  2,  I  will  focus  on Augustine’s notion of intentio to demonstrate the supremacy of the soul or the will of the soul as both the initiator and regulator of conscious awareness. In section 3, I will discuss the contemporary notions of the phenomenology of particularity and object-posting as theories to uphold the inclusion of cognitive phenomenology in the domain of conscious perception. Finally, I will show how these notions of perception perfectly align with conscious awareness as two conspicuous processes of polyadic relations depicted in "De Trinitate".
Keywords:visio, cogitatio, intentio,  perceptual  and  cognitive phenomenology, phenomenology of particularity.

We seem to experience a world abounding with events that exhibit dynamic temporal structure; birds flying, children laughing, rain dripping from an eave, melodies unfolding, etc. Seeing objects in motion, hearing and communicating with sound, and feeling oneself move are such common everyday experiences that one is unlikely to question whether humans are capable of perceiving temporal properties and relations. Despite appearing pre-theoretically uncontroversial, there are longstanding and contentious debates concerning the structure of such experience, how temporal perception works, and even whether the perception of change, motion, and succession is possible. The overarching goal of my project is to develop a comprehensive model of temporal perception that does justice to the apparent phenomenology, explains how perception functions to represent temporally structured targets, and generates empirically-informed hypotheses for how such perception is neuro-cognitively realized. I also defend my model against the challenges of antirealist competitors whom deny the possibility of perceiving temporal relations between nonsimultaneous events (e.g., Reid, Chuard, Le Poidevin). In Chapter 1, I begin with the apparent phenomenology of temporal experience, identifying and lending some plausibility to three claims about the nature and content of temporal experience: i) humans perceive dynamic events that instantiate temporal properties and stand in temporal relations (e.g., change, succession, duration, order), ii) humans perceive events as present, and iii) successive events of brief duration can be experienced together as present within some finite interval. This approach enables me to outline what models of present experience are supposed to represent and explain. I proceed to sketch one family of models that posit an extended perceptual present to explain how non-simultaneous events can be experienced together as present, called "Extensionalist Models" (e.g., James, Broad, Russell, Dainton). I examine two distinct branches iii of extensionalism (Process vs. Content) and proprietary hypotheses linking those models to the real systems they are intended to explain, and challenge the tenability of process extensionalism. Throughout the dissertation, I advocate for Content Extensionalism, the model that holds we perceive the temporal relations between non-simultaneous events in virtue of targeting and representing temporally extended content. I develop the model by pairing it with a theory of mental representation that distinguishes representation from indication, and explains how representations are source-independent isomorphs of their intended targets. In doing so, I demonstrate its comparative advantages over other extensionalist models, provide a straightforward account of claims (i-iii), and equip the model with the resources to defeat an argument that offers two routes to denying the third and most contentious claim-that successive events occurring within a brief interval are experienced together as present. I conclude the chapter by taking a closer look at the "Intentionalist Models" largely based on Edmund Husserl's seminal work on time consciousness, rehearse some common objections against it, and argue that content extensionalism is a preferable model. In Chapter 2, I turn my attention to motion perception, arguing that perceptual representations of constant motion are not reducible to mere successions of static perceptions representing what happens at a given time. My position directly opposes temporal atomists (e.g., Chuard, Le Poidevin), whom deny that we perceive motion, claiming that we only perceive what happens at a given time and that putative experiences of motion reduce to a series of static perceptual "snapshots" arranged successively. In the first half of the chapter, I examine and challenge some the motivations for atomism, including its connection to the empiricism of Locke and Reid, and its mereological conception of experience, such that purported experiences of motion supervene on and are reducible to the successive atomic perceptions of which they are composed. In the iv second half of chapter, I argue that both the apparent phenomenology and neurocognitive research shift the burden upon atomism to provide a compelling an error theory to explain away our putative perceptions as of constant motion and make their anti-realism about extended experiences palatable. I proceed to reconstruct and criticize their standard strategy of appealing to cinematic metaphors to motivate their view that motion perception is entirely reducible to series of static perceptions presented successively. Finally, I draw analogies between Zeno's puzzle of motion and the temporal perception debate, and argue that the atomist explanation of motion experience is analogous to Zeno's failed solution to the original puzzle and that content extensionalism provides a preferred explanation consonant with the Russell-Salmon solution. In Chapter 3, I continue to combat skepticism about the perception of temporal properties and relations. Le Poidevin ( ) proposes an epistemological puzzle of time perception, from which he derives the claim that the order and duration of events do not causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them. Since his view is motivated by a causal truthmaker principle for grounding knowledge, it also holds that perceptual beliefs about temporal features must be caused by the features themselves in order to count as knowledge. Given these theoretical commitments, there is a puzzle concerning how such perceptual beliefs could constitute knowledge of temporal properties. In response to Le Poidevin, I argue for an account according to which order and duration are objects of perception, causally contribute to our perceptual beliefs about them, and such beliefs are capable of counting as knowledge. I conclude by showing that, on my alternative account, the epistemological puzzle dissolves and his own solution to it fails. In Chapter 4, I specify a target range of temporal phenomena salient to understanding perceptual cognition, and motivate the multi-scale sampling (MSS) hypothesis that sensory subsystems sample information at multiple rates, i.e. shorter and longer sampling periods. I argue v that both behavioral and neurophysiological data support the hypothesis that nervous systems process temporal information by sampling stimuli signals at shorter and longer durations, favoring the content extensionalist hypothesis that temporal perception is constituted by multi-scale sampling and integration, over a single-sampling rate hypothesis implied by the atomistic "snapshot" model. In the second half of Chapter 4, I defend a form of constructive realism-the view that scientific theories are best understood as (a) families of models and (b) hypotheses that specify the respects and degrees in which a model represents some real physical system. I conclude the dissertation with a section on philosophy of science, because I engage empirical work throughout the project and employ a model-based approach to theorizing. Furthermore, I suggest that philosophical analysis of the experimental findings may generate new hypotheses and predictions, or offer critical arguments to help rule out the plausibility of particular competing models. To illustrate this interdisciplinary upshot, I briefly make a case for possible philosophical contributions to the fertile domain of temporal processing where there remain many contenders and no consensus on the exact mechanisms that realize temporal perception. vi ACKNOWLEGEMENTS I would like to express immeasurable gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Daniel Z. Korman, for the patience, guidance, and encouragement he has given me along the way. His confidence in my abilities was instrumental in ensuring my completion of the project. He exudes positive energy, and his focused enthusiastic commitment to doing philosophy at the highest level is inspiring. I am also grateful for the support of my Ph.D. committee, Dr.

В работе дан концептуальный анализ феноменологического генезиса герменевтики истории, представленной в работах отечественного философа Владимира Бибихина. Автор реконструирует онтологию времени, разработанную Бибихиным с опорой на феноменологический метод; рассматривает экзистенциальную аналитику Бибихина в ее отношении к герменевтике истории и сопоставляет ее с аналогичным проектом "Бытия и времени" М. Хайдеггера; анализирует пути использования Бибихиным ключевых интуиций своей онтологии времени и экзистенциальной аналитики в толковании конкретных событий российской и европейской истории, а также в осмыслении современной ему ситуации перестройки и "лихих 90-х". Автор демонстрирует значимость лекционного курса "Пора" для понимания герменевтики истории Бибихина, амбивалентное отношение философа к событию перестройки, сложность его позиции по старому вопросу об отношении России к Европе. В заключении работы резюмированы выводы, полученные автором в результате проведенного исследования.

Fenomenologia e critica della meta sica La «meta sica scienti ca» come ontologia materiale Filoso a prima e loso a seconda Dalla «meta sica scienti ca» alla «teologia loso ca» Monadologia e teleologia universale Paolo Bucci Si è laureato in Storia della Filoso a presso l'Università degli Studi di Firenze, con una tesi dal titolo Momenti del dibattito sul kantismo in Germania: J.A. Eberhard e il «Philosophisches Magazin». Logica trascendentale, ontologia e intuizione matematica (relatore Prof. Paolo Rossi). Docente di loso a e storia nei licei, ha svolto attività di ricerca, collaborando con il Dipartimento di Filoso a dell'Università di Firenze e occupandosi della loso a di lingua tedesca fra '800 e '900 (Fichte, Bolzano, Husserl, Arendt). Nell'anno accademico 1995-96 ha ottenuto il Perfezionamento in Problemi e metodi della Ricerca storica, con una tesi dal titolo L'Aufbau di R. Carnap e la fenomenologia husserliana. Fa parte del Direttivo della Biblioteca Filoso ca, sezione orentina della

This paper describes the naturalistic experiential phenomenological understanding of death and deathlessness as articulated both in Kashmir Shavism and in Dzogchen. The natural integration of phenomenological language brings forth  the unfolding transitional experience of Death which is actually Deathlessness. Of course this is not the simplistic and boring question of belief or non belief. But rather does your own experiential understanding lead you into the profound experience of Deathless Awareness. Also what happened to the Dzogchen Site..it disappeared! alas

Quel plus grand émerveillement peut saisir le cœur de l’homme que la simple existence du monde ? Lorsque nos yeux s’ouvrent pour la première fois sur le théâtre de la vie, nous sommes comme frappés par un éclair, ébahis devant la tapisserie qui s’étend devant nous. Les cieux, immenses et insondables, se déploient au-dessus de nos têtes, ornés des astres lumineux de la nuit. La terre, foisonnante de vie, voit ses rivières courir comme des veines dans un gigantesque corps, tandis que ses forêts murmurent des secrets à ceux qui prennent le temps d’écouter. Et l’homme, si petit et pourtant si significatif, se tient sur cette scène, méditant sur son rôle dans un si grand dessein. L’existence du monde n’est-elle pas la source première de tout étonnement ?
Considérez, mes chers amis, le premier cri d’un enfant qui vient de naître au royaume de l’être. Ce cri n’est pas seulement celui de la faim ou de l’instinct, mais une interrogation muette : « Qu’est-ce que ceci ? » Nous-mêmes, bien que vieillis et alourdis par la sagesse des ans, ne cessons de répéter ce cri dans les recoins secrets de nos cœurs. Les étoiles nous appellent depuis leurs demeures célestes, la mer murmure son refrain sans fin, et même le plus humble brin d’herbe, tremblant au vent, semble nous parler de mystères que nous ne saurions saisir. Ne devrions-nous pas nous émerveiller d’un tel monde, où chaque instant et chaque grain de poussière contiennent une infinité de merveilles ?

Данная статья рассматривает возможность христианской онтологической герменевтики через вопрос о том, каким образом может быть понято христианское учение о творении мира Богом. Для ответа на этот вопрос автор обращается к континентальной метафизике, в частности, к проблеме времени в феноменологии. Исследование показывает, что феноменология времени, опирающаяся на классические стратегии Августина и Шеллинга, является возможным и продуктивным развитием некоторых идей М. Хайдеггера. В этой феноменологии конститутивным экзистенциалом выступает не бытие-к-смерти как будущее, но прошлое и память о детстве и загадке рождения. Герменевтика прошлого предлагает новые стратегии для интерпретации христианского учения о творении мира свободной волей Бога, которое традиционно понимается как всего лишь нефилософский религиозный предрассудок.

This paper provides an interpretation of two paragraphs from Heidegger's 1925-26 lectures on the question of "truth". First, I will consider Heidegger's criticism of Lotze's notion of "ideality"; then, I will focus on Heidegger's claim that Husserl was "fascinated" by such a Lotzean notion (especially if understood as "universality"). In the first section I will describe Heidegger's ontological approach to the distinction between reality and ideality. In the second section I will explain why, in Heidegger's view, Lotze's understanding of the notions of "reality" and "ideality", construed as different forms of Wirklichkeit, depends on some uncritical presumptions. In the third section, I will evaluate the consequences of Lotze's perspective on the notions of ideality and truth, so as to turn my attention to Husserl's Prolegomena and his allegedly adoption of Lotze's notion of "ideality" as universality. Accordingly, I will suggest that Heidegger's criticism is limited not only to Husserl's Prolegomena but to his phenomenology as a whole. Finally, I will discuss the problem of universality from the point of view of Heidegger's existential analytic. By referring to a 1925 lecture, I will suggest that Heidegger's rejection of Husserl's "reduction" is to be read in light of his criticism of the notion of "ideality".

In this contribution, I address the problem of memory and the epistemological issues introduced in contemporary debate by electronic memory with its impact on biological memory. I will propose a phenomenological revision of the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) framework, as the field in which current debate on E-memory is being developed. My aim is to understand how and to what extent E-memory supplements biological memory, under what conditions and with what effects. I will show that the phenomenological approach is able to usefully complement the hypothesis of extended cognition in some of its problematic aspects, with specific regard to the Parity Principle (PP) and the equivalence between biological and external memory introduced by Clark & Chalmers (1998).

The article explores the philosophical and scientific views of Albert Einstein, focusing on his role in the development of quantum physics. Despite the revolutionary nature of the theory of relativity, which laid the foundation for modern physics, Einstein remained committed to classical physics and rejected the quantum principles that introduced a new understanding of the unity between the Observer and the Universe. The author examines the contradictions between Einstein and the Copenhagen school, revealing fundamental aspects of the observer's participation in shaping physical reality. The article also addresses the anthropic principle as a key element of quantum science, tracing its roots to the Vedic tradition. // У статті досліджено філософські та наукові погляди Альберта Ейнштейна, акцентуючи увагу на його ролі у становленні квантової фізики. Попри революційний характер теорії відносності, яка заклала основу для нової фізики, Ейнштейн залишався прихильником класичної фізики та не прийняв квантові принципи, що сформували нове бачення єдності Cпостерігача і Всесвіту. Автор аналізує суперечності між Ейнштейном і представниками Копенгагенської школи, розкриваючи фундаментальні аспекти участі спостерігача у створенні фізичної реальності. Стаття також торкається антропного принципу як ключового елементу квантової науки, вказуючи на його коріння у ведичній традиції.

En jetant la sonde de l’interrogation philosophique au lieu de soi, Jean- Luc Marion nous donne une approche organique et originale à la pensée d’Augustin, en entrecroisant entre eux deux plans herméneutiques: sur le premier, l’on poursuit un itinéraire de rapprochement au cœur de la confessio augustinienne permettant de réduire le vaste univers sémantique d’Augustin à un noyau génétique unifiant ; sur le second plan, le parcours philosophique de l’auteur se développe ultérieurement, tendant à désarticuler un bloc théorique d’ontologie et métaphysique et atteignant ainsi par une voie phénomé- nologique une idée de philosophie finalement affranchie de la présupposition du carac- tère central de la question de l’étant et du fondement. En tout cas, même si l’on ne veut pas donner trop d’éclat à la critique anti-ontologique et antimétaphysique caractérisant l’approche à la pensée augustinienne proposée dans cet ouvrage, l’acquis spéculatif de celle-ci ne semble pas diminuer. Un parmi les mérites principaux de ce livre est d’avoir restitué à la confessio sa dignité théorique, en y apercevant un lieu phénoménologique originaire où la relation entre moi et Dieu se noue; une relation dont le caractère paradoxal, autrement insoutenable, est résolu par le primat du don et de l’amour. Ce sont tous ces traits originaux qui nous mènent à dire qu’Au lieu de soi n’est pas seulement un livre sur Augustin, car il est plus qu’un livre sur Augustin