O. Stanciu, “‘An explosive thought’. Kant, Fink, and the Cosmic Concept of the World”. In: C. Serban and I. Apostolescu, Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020, p. 429-444., 2020
The task of my inquiry is to lay out the main lines of Eugen Fink’s reading
of Kant, focusing on ... more The task of my inquiry is to lay out the main lines of Eugen Fink’s reading
of Kant, focusing on his interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic. In the
first part, I explain Fink’s claim that the Transcendental Dialectic represents the very heart of the Kantian project, in as much it is in this section of the first Critique that the question of totality (on Fink’s account, the driving impetus of this work) first comes to the forefront. Secondly, I undertake an examination of Fink’s argument regarding the proper outcome of the “Antinomies of Pure Reason,” according to which the failure of the attempts to determine the world with “innerworldly models” is not a sufficient reason to contend that the world is merely a subjective idea. Finally, I discuss Fink’s thesis concerning the construction of the “Transcendental Ideal” according to which the transition from the omnitudo realitatis to the ens realissimum is not necessary (neither objectively, nor subjectively). In this regard, Fink’s project can be understood as an attempt to think the omnitudo realitatis for itself, prior to and independent from any realization in a being (be it a supreme one).
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Papers by Ovidiu Stanciu
category, operating in a plurality of fields and intervening at various levels
of analysis. Although these registers are interlocked, we can distinguish
analytically the following ramifications of the concept of recognition. 1) In the
first place, recognition designates, for Kojève, the indispensable condition for
self-consciousness. To be a self, and to be conscious of oneself, amounts to be
engaged in a recognitive relation. Stated differently, self-consciousness does not
exist as closed off from the outside, as impervious to otherness. The comingabout
of self-consciousness is dependent upon the instauration of a relation
of recognition. 2) Secondly, recognition constitutes the normative requirement
for an accomplished inter-subjective relation. There is no real inter-subjectivity
without reciprocal recognition. 3) Thirdly, the desire for recognition has a
decisive bearing on Kojève’s concept of history: it is the requirement to obtain
recognition that triggered the coming about of history, and the achievement
of genuine recognition is both the driving force and the telos of history. 4)
In a fourth sense, the universal and homogeneous state is characterized by
the fulfillment of universal recognition. Thus, human emancipation amounts
to universal recognition. 5) In a fifth sense, the difference between the three
juridical regimes discussed in the Outline of a Phenomenology of Law is given
by the kind of recognition each regime puts in place. Thus, at the heart of
any juridical regime lies a determinate form of recognition. 6) In a sixth sense,
recognition amounts to intersubjective confirmation. As such, it sets the
standards for assessing an epistemic claim, a claim to truth. Thus, recognition
is what enables the transition from subjective certainty to genuine knowledge
or objective truth. The truth of a claim is measured by its successfulness, by
its capacity to achieve intersubjective recognition. 7) Finally, the concept of
recognition is meant to illuminate the distinctiveness of the human being, to
elucidate what sets the human being apart from merely natural entities.
Descartes. Le secret de Sartre s’articule autour de deux
thèses distinctes, mais étroitement solidaires. La première
concerne la physionomie interne du champ de la philosophie
française et affirme que le texte des Méditations métaphysiques
de Descartes en constitue la matrice structurante. La
deuxième a trait à l’oeuvre de Sartre et avance que celle-ci
doit être envisagée comme une réactivation contemporaine
du geste cartésien, et que c’est seulement lorsqu’elle est placée
dans le sillage de Descartes qu’elle acquiert son unité et
sa profondeur véritables.
move is accomplished through a constant while critical dialogue with Hegel. I start by exposing the criticism Fink leveled against the canonical, Husserlian, understanding of phenomenology as a descriptive enterprise. Then, I delineate the interpretative strategy Fink puts in place in his reading of Hegel and bring out its underlying commitments. As I will show, his
interpretation of Hegel is determined by the concern of rescuing some deep-seated cosmological insights determining Hegel’s philosophy. I further show that his understanding of Hegel is worked out in reference to, but also in explicit contrast to, Heidegger’s reading of Hegel. Finally, I claim that Fink’s sustained attention toHegel does not amount to an endorsement of his position and examine the reasons he advances for “rejecting Hegel”.
Kojève’s ontological position. My main claim is that he designs an original ontological framework, which integrates (but also regionalizes) Hegel’s and Heidegger’s analysis, and which can be properly characterized as a “double dualism”. In order to assess this thesis, I discuss Kojève’s relationship to Heidegger and show that: a) on Kojève’s view, Heidegger’s phenomenology is marked by an attenuation of the scope of negativity which gives rise to a
tendentially monistic phenomenology; b) for Kojève, Heidegger’s main philosophical innovation is the idea of a dualist ontology. This thesis relies on Kojève’s hermeneutical conjecture that in the unpublished part of Being and Time Heidegger accomplishes a doubling (o a duplication) of ontology.
L’objectif de cet article est de dégager les linéaments fondamentaux qui sous-tendent la position ontologique de Kojève. Ma thèse centrale est qu’il élabore un cadre ontologique original, qui intègre (mais aussi régionalise) les positions de Hegel et de Heidegger, et qui peut être caractérisé comme un « double dualisme ». Afin d’expliciter de cette thèse, j’examine la lecture que Kojève fait de Heidegger et montre que : a) selon Kojève, la phénoménologie de Heidegger est marquée par une atténuation de la portée de la négativité qui donne lieu à une phénoménologie tendanciellement moniste ; b) pour Kojève, la principale innovation philosophique de Heidegger réside dans l’idée d'une ontologie dualiste. Cette thèse s’appuie sur la
conjecture herméneutique audacieuse de Kojève selon laquelle, dans la partie non publiée d’Être et Temps, Heidegger aurait accompli un dédoublement (ou une duplication) de l’ontologie.
of Kant, focusing on his interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic. In the
first part, I explain Fink’s claim that the Transcendental Dialectic represents the very heart of the Kantian project, in as much it is in this section of the first Critique that the question of totality (on Fink’s account, the driving impetus of this work) first comes to the forefront. Secondly, I undertake an examination of Fink’s argument regarding the proper outcome of the “Antinomies of Pure Reason,” according to which the failure of the attempts to determine the world with “innerworldly models” is not a sufficient reason to contend that the world is merely a subjective idea. Finally, I discuss Fink’s thesis concerning the construction of the “Transcendental Ideal” according to which the transition from the omnitudo realitatis to the ens realissimum is not necessary (neither objectively, nor subjectively). In this regard, Fink’s project can be understood as an attempt to think the omnitudo realitatis for itself, prior to and independent from any realization in a being (be it a supreme one).
of Landgrebe’s attempt at “coming to terms” with the limitations he detects in Husserl’s concept of world and to make clear its enduring relevance for
contemporary discussions. As it will appear, this criticism moves in a double direction and involves a commitment to two seemingly competing requirements: that of radicalizing the transcendental-constitutive perspective beyond what Husserl has accomplished in his writings; and that of providing a theoretical space for what resists a transcendental-constitutive account, i.e., for a dimension of archi-facticity upon which any constitutive inquiry ultimately rests.
Mi objetivo es reconstituir los ejes fundamentales de los análisis que Patočka consagró al mito y así resaltar la función particular que juega el mito en la explicitación de la pregunta por el mundo. Demuestro que el tratamiento que Patočka reserva para el mito se encuentra marcado por una profunda ambigüedad: cuando el mito se considera en contraste con la actitud libre y cuestionante propia a la humanidad histórica, este aparece como el vector de un sentido pasivo y heterónomo, y el mundo así revelado aparece como siendo funda-mentalmente determinado por la dimensión temporal del pasado. Por otra parte, cuando el mito se opone al saber dominante proveniente del proyecto científico moderno, esta aparece como prolongando la Urdoxa, nuestra adherencia primera al mundo. De este modo, el mito atestigua el carácter inapropiable del mundo: el mundo no puede ser aprehendido en todo su alcance si es considerado como el mero reflejo o el correlato de un proyecto humano de sentido. La tensión que surge de estas descripciones procede de un equívoco, estructurante en el pensamiento de Patočka, relativo tanto al sentido primero y paradigmático del mundo, como al tipo de comportamiento humano apto para captarlo.
Mi artículo pretende exponer las dos estrategias teóricas desarrolladas por Patočka para superar lo que él consideraba como las limitaciones de la fenomenología clásica. En la primera parte, me propongo explorar el compromiso central que subyace a la fenomenología asubjetiva de Patočka, a saber, que el tema propio de la fenomenología no es la subjetividad trascendental y sus efectuaciones de sentido, sino el espacio de la manifestación, el campo del “aparecer como tal”. En la segun-da parte, señalo que el rechazo por parte de Patočka del subjetivismo de la fenomenología clásica no implica un abandono de la fenomenología en su conjunto y, por tanto, que la fenomenología asubjetiva no puede equipararse a un monismo neutro. Por último, abordo la segunda estrategia de Patočka para superar las limitaciones de la fenomenología clásica, estrategia que tiene por objeto elaborar no una versión radicalizada de la fenomenología, sino más bien una metafísica fenomenológica. Demuestro que lo que desencadena el traspaso de los límites de la fenomenología por parte de Patočka y su adopción de un cuestionamiento metafísico radica en dos aporías que surgieron en el marco de la investigación fenomenológica: una relativa a la relación entre el “aparecer como tal” y lo real, y otra relativa al estatuto de la subjetividad capaz de realizar la investigación fenomenológica.
L’hypothèse qui guidera mon entreprise est la suivante : l’élément transversal de l’œuvre de Fink réside dans le refus de concevoir le lieu ultime de la constitution dans le vocabulaire de l’être. S’il est indéniable que lorsqu’il s’agit de nommer positivement cette dimension Fink évolue au cours de sa carrière sur des registres distincts, qui peuvent même paraître antagoniques – ainsi, dans les années 30, la question fondamentale porte sur l’« origine du monde », alors qu’elle devient plus tard celle du « monde lui-même » ou de la « mondification » (Welten) du monde – il n’en demeure pas moins qu’à chaque moment de son évolution philosophique la dimension d’origine ne saurait supporter une caractérisation en termes ontologiques. L’écart entre la première et la deuxième philosophie de Fink réside dans la détermination positive qui est fournie à ce qui s’excepte du champ de l’ontologie : si dans les années 1930, le lieu dernier de l’élucidation philosophique est ressaisi comme vie transcendantale ou comme subjectivité absolue méontique, il sera déterminé plus tard comme « processus du monde », mondification du monde ou, tout simplement, monde. Si le rejet de l’ontologie constitue la basse continue de son évolution philosophique, le sens de celle-ci peut être caractérisé positivement comme allant du méontique au monde.
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