Naval Warfare

This paper examines the growing strategic rivalry between China and India in Turkistan, a region of significant geopolitical importance at the center of Eurasia. The rivalry is unfolding amid broader power transitions, particularly as Russia’s historical dominance in Central Eurasia declines and a strategic vacuum begins to emerge. Rather than reducing the dynamics to bilateral border disputes, the study situates Turkistan
as a key arena of sub-systemic power transition. In this setting, external rivalries intersect with the agency of regional actors. Turkistan’s geographical proximity to major powers, its abundant natural resources, and its historical role as both a hub and crossroads of civilizations make it a critical focal point of contemporary great power competition. While China has established itself as a convincingly dominant regional actor across multiple sectors, which amounts to significant regional dominance compared to Russia economically and increasingly politically via regional organizational bodies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the term "silent succession" is introduced to describe how China is displacing Russia without openly confronting it and is transforming the strategic core of Eurasia. China pursues a neo-hegemonic strategy—blending infrastructure, institutions, and normative discourses such as Tianxia—to consolidate influence, while India adopts a more gradual soft-hegemonic approach rooted in connectivity, cultural diplomacy, and democratic appeal. The study concludes that the evolving Sino-Indian rivalry, mediated by Russia’s decline and the agency of Central Eurasian states, will decisively influence the region’s trajectory and offers fresh insights into the dynamics of multipolarity and hegemonic competition in the 21st century.

In the summer we traveled eight thousand sea miles across the Russian High Arctic to explore the coast of Siberia and look at Russian centers for weapons research. On board a small German ship we would see part of what the Russians are doing in the Arctic north to develop new maritime warfare-conventional and nuclear. Tromso is a port on the Cape littoral of Norway north of the Arctic Circle. It is our departure point across the top of the world. We will be going east to Soviet Asia and the Russian Far East-once a denied area for any Westerners. Murmansk is the home port for the Russian Navy and Red Banner Submarine Fleet. During World War II allied convoys kept Russia alive with shipments of armaments and food from the US and UK to Murmansk across the turbulent and ice jammed Barents Sea. Thousands of U.S and British civilian mariners lost their lives in the sea battles of the Barents Sea during the naval war of the 1940s.

Dutch overseas expansion was always a subject of particular interest to historians of Portuguese expansion. Portugal and the Netherlands were the only small European countries that developed significant colonial empires during the early modern period. Apart from this similarity in scale, the Dutch and Portuguese empires conflicted for the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century. This conflict proved decisive in the future shape of both empires. As the book under review makes clear, it was during this time that the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC) grew into the major European power in Asia, partly at the cost of several Portuguese Asian positions. From the 1630s onward, something similar seemed about to happen in the Atlantic, with the occupation of Northeastern Brazil and Luanda (Angola) by the Dutch West India Company (West-Indische Compagnie, or WIC).

This article examines the contested and evolving relevance of amphibious warfare in Southeast Asia, analysing its strategic articulation within ASEAN member states and the broader regional security discourse. Drawing on primary documents, defence white papers, and doctrinal texts, it investigates how states in the region justify, frame, and operationalise amphibious capabilities. The article argues that amphibious warfare in ASEAN has been discursively constructed not only as a tool for deterrence or military assertion but also as a flexible capability for humanitarian response, maritime security, and regional cooperation. Despite a shared normative framework under the ASEAN Political-Security Community, member states diverge significantly in their amphibious doctrines and strategic narratives. These variations reflect broader geopolitical tensions, especially those centred on the South China Sea, and demonstrate the tension between national defence priorities and ASEAN's commitment to regional stability. The article also considers the role of external partnerships, particularly with the United States and China, in shaping how amphibious capabilities are developed and perceived. It concludes that while amphibious warfare remains a critical military component for several ASEAN states, its long-term strategic value will depend on whether it is integrated into a cooperative framework or becomes another vector for regional competition.

Emre Koç* Öz Bu çalışma Osmanlı Devleti merkezi yönetimi ile Mısır valisi Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa arasında meydana gelen Meis adası iltizamı meselesini ele almıştır. Çalışmanın ana amacı küçük bir adanın iltizamı noktasında meydana gelen anlaşmazlığın tarafların birbirlerine yaklaşımlarını ne şekilde etkilemiş olduğunu ve tarafların bu olay karşısında nasıl bir politika ortaya koyduklarını anlamaktır. Bunun için adanın talep edilmesinin ve bu talebin reddedilmesinin görünürdeki ve altta yatan sebepleri karşılaştırmalı olarak irdelenmiştir. Buradan anlaşıldığına göre görünürde küçük bir talep olan Meis adası iltizamı konusu Osmanlı yönetiminin Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın asli niyetlerini sorgulamaya açmasına sebep olmuştu. Konuyla yakından ilgilenen Sultan II. Mahmud, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın Osmanlı topraklarında yaşayanlar arasında işgal korkusu yaratmaya başladığını devlet adamları ile paylaşıma açmıştı. Dolayısıyla Meis talebi henüz 1820'lerin ortasında iki taraf ilişkilerinin bir savaş halini alabileceği veya ilişkilerin her an düşmanlığa dönüşebileceği düşüncesinin gündeme gelmesine zemin hazırlamıştı. Neticede Meis meselesinin ilişkileri çok farklı bir boyuta taşıyan süreçte merkezin Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'ya dair olan şüphelerini açıkça ortaya koymasına sebep olan ilk ve önemli gelişmelerden birisi olduğu söylenebilmektedir. Olayın iç yüzünün bizzat Padişah'ın elinden çıkan düşüncelerle ve Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın dilinden yazılan karşı yorumlarla desteklenmesi çalışmanın en değerli ve özgün katkısını oluşturmaktadır.

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On a longtemps présenté le long XIX e siècle européen (1815-1914) comme un âge de paix générale, troublé par des tensions régionales et des conflits limités, dont la guerre franco-allemande de 1870-1871 est la crise la plus grave et la plus lourde de conséquences. Cette perspective globale n'est certes pas inexacte. Si l'on considère les années 1792-1815 et le premier XX e siècle (1914-1945), le XIX e siècle paraît bien être, en effet, un âge de retenue diplomatique et militaire. La concertation régulière des grandes puissances européennes, leur prudence et leur recherche du compromis préviennent alors efficacement l'extension des conflits. Ni les crises grecque et belge (1820-1830), ni l'unification italienne (1845-1870) ni même la question d'Orient et ses extensions balkaniques (1830-1913) ne détruisent ce concert. Pour autant, cette paix « générale » est régulièrement troublée par des crises régionales de basse et de haute intensité, particulièrement nomb-reuses en Europe méditerranéenne où les effets contraires de l'autoritarisme, du sous-développement et du nationalisme se conjuguent. Manifestes, dès les années 1820, dans les péninsules ibérique et italienne, les aspirations libérales et nationales y sont exacerbées, au milieu du siècle, par des aspirations démocratiques, qui ne parviennent pas à s'exprimer pacifiquement. Le 13 avril 1848, les projets sécessionnistes siciliens entraînent la déchéance des Bourbons qui, reprenant l'offensive en septembre 1848, écrasent toute opposition au printemps 1849. En Vénétie, dans le Milanais comme en Italie Centrale, les mouvements démocratiques et anti-autrichiens de 1848, sont défaits l'année suivante par les forces autrichiennes. La victoire des Habsbourg est toutefois provisoire. Champion de la cause unitaire, le Piémont, battu en 1848-1849, dispose d'intelligences et de complicités dans tous les États péninsulaires qui facilitent, en 1860, l'annexion partielle de l'Italie Centrale, au lendemain des victoires françaises de 1859, puis l'intégration du royaume des Deux-Siciles, dont l'administration et les forces armées se désagrègent sous les coups des Garibaldiens et de leurs partisans. En Méditerranée orientale, de meurtrières résistances et violences de masse entravent les entreprises réformatrices et pro-libérales dont les Puissances occidentales attendaient la « régénération » des sociétés et des économies. Après la guerre de Crimée (1854-1856), l'instabilité politique de la Grèce, où les insurrections et le brigandage sont endémiques, ruine définitivement le crédit du roi Othon I er , contraint à l'exil en 1863. Dans l'Empire ottoman, les luttes agraires et de

The sea, an untamed and mythic force, surges through the heart of ancient Greek literature, weaving a thalassomythia-a tapestry of sea and story that defines identity, destiny, and divine interplay. Far beyond a mere setting, the sea is a living entity, a realm of power, peril, and philosophical quest, uniting martial triumphs, existential wanderings, and cosmic narratives. This essay explores this maritime ethos through Homer's Iliad, Odyssey, and Virgil's Aeneid, enriched by Greek mythology's sea gods, dramatic traditions, and their echoes in painting and music from the Renaissance to the present. From Poseidon's tempestuous reign to the visual and sonic reimaginings of epic voyages, the sea shapes the Greek imagination, its waves resonating in art, literature, and the maritime empires of antiquity and beyond. Crests of Conquest: The Maritime Might of Homer's Iliad In Homer's Iliad (8th century BCE), the sea pulses as the lifeblood of the Greek campaign against Troy, embodying thalassomythia as a force of unity, strategy, and divine will. The Catalogue of Ships (Iliad 2.494-759) is a poetic monument, listing 1,186 vessels from disparate city-states, each ship a testament to Greek seafaring skill. These wooden hulls, crafted to brave the Aegean's unpredictable currents, ferry warriors, provisions, and ambition across vast waters, anchoring the Greek camp on Troy's hostile shore. The fleet's vulnerability, nearly incinerated by Hector's advance (Iliad 8.180-250), underscores the sea's dual nature: a lifeline to glory and a potential grave. This maritime operation, requiring advanced shipbuilding and navigation, mirrors the strategic naval campaigns of later thalassocracies, from the Athenian Empire to the Age of Sail, where control of the sea dictated victory.

In January 1958 the 421 ton Cardiff coaster Anna Toop grounded on the sand bank south east of Arklow near the Arklow no 4 buoy. She carried sheet steel from Port Talbot to Derry. The crew of ten were rescued by the trawler Naomh Eamonn and the lifeboat was also involved in the rescue 1. During the summer 1958 the Arklow based trawler Naomh Eamonn was used as a tender for divers attempting to find and salvage the wreck. They trawled for the wreck and snagged something. The diver went down and said the snag was a submarine later they snagged the Anna Toop. The divers aboard were Graeme Shortis and his wife, also a diver, working for Heinke. The salvage file that was held in The Salvage Association was damaged by flooding. The London office said salvage did not proceed on the Anna Toop because it had a bad survey and was not worth much. The salvage company involved was United Marine & General Salvage Co. Ltd. of 211-213 London Road, Benfleet Essex. The Anna Toop was refloated on 21-9-1959 according to one report but that seems inaccurate though her steel cargo may have been raised. The Infomar seabed survey identified a wreck as the Anna Toop 49m long located at latitude 52.73 longitude-5.95 in 33 metres depth. Initially there was local speculation that the submarine described had sunk after shelling Kynoch's munitions factory on 21-9-1917 during the Great War but Shortis in a personal communication said that the submarine was from the second world war and that he knew the number and date of loss. He would reveal no more as his Heinke bosses were German and very sensitive to the war grave situation. A submariner, Werner Henke died during an escape from detention in the USA and may have been a connection. Shortis also explained that the British sources were vague as they had chased the submarine into Irish waters in contravention of neutrality. The U boat archive 2 do not have any information on any WW2 U-boat sunk in the immediate vicinity of Arklow. The U-boat loss recorded nearest to Arklow is U 1172 (Type VII C/41), which was sunk by depth charges from British warships in the St George´s channel about 34 miles South-Southwest of Arklow on 27 January 1945. The next nearest U-boat loss to Arklow is U 1302 (Type VII C/41), which was sunk by depth charges from Canadian warships in the St George´s channel about 46 miles South-Southwest of Arklow on 27 January 1945. The wreck of U 1172 is still undiscovered, while the position of the wreck of U 1302 seems to be known and marked on maps of the UK Hydrographic Office. Both were lost on their first war patrol so no log books exist. U 1172 Launched 3 December 1943 and commissioned 20 April 1944. At noon on 27 January convoy HX 332 was attacked by U825. Escort Group 5 was deployed to look for the U-boat and at 19.55 HMS Keats was in Asdic contact in a position 20 miles SSW of the attack. After a number of depth charges by HMS Keats and HMS Bligh, a considerable amount of wreckage and oil rose to the surface. The logs of Keats and Bligh are not in the archives at Kew but this is not significant as not all logs were archived.

Corps d'Armée) (1878-1952) Une aventure imprudente qui ne laisse pas de trace dans une brillante carrière d'officier colonial Maurice-Pierre-Auguste Martin naît le 29 juillet 1878, à Lille, de Pierre Martin et dame Mathilde Savaëte. Bachelier ès lettres (rhétorique), il est admis le 28 octobre 1898 (l48 ème sur 160) à l'Ecole spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr. Le l" mars 1902, il est envoyé au Tonkin, au lO ème régiment d'Infanterie coloniale, puis le 10 décembre 1907, lieutenant de première classe, au 4 ème R.I.e. En 1908, il rejoint le bataillon d'Oubangui-Chari, et devient Résident de France à Bangassou, dans l'est de ce Territoire. En juillet 1908, il est blessé à Fouroumbala, lors d'un passage en force de la rivière Kotto contre des indigènes révoltés. Son supérieur, le capitaine Jacquier a relaté cette révolte du chef Baram Bakié dans le secteur Haute-Kotto -Kouango.

Corps d'Armée) (1878-1952) Une aventure imprudente qui ne laisse pas de trace dans une brillante carrière d'officier colonial Maurice-Pierre-Auguste Martin naît le 29 juillet 1878, à Lille, de Pierre Martin et dame Mathilde Savaëte. Bachelier ès lettres (rhétorique), il est admis le 28 octobre 1898 (l48 ème sur 160) à l'Ecole spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr. Le l" mars 1902, il est envoyé au Tonkin, au lO ème régiment d'Infanterie coloniale, puis le 10 décembre 1907, lieutenant de première classe, au 4 ème R.I.e. En 1908, il rejoint le bataillon d'Oubangui-Chari, et devient Résident de France à Bangassou, dans l'est de ce Territoire. En juillet 1908, il est blessé à Fouroumbala, lors d'un passage en force de la rivière Kotto contre des indigènes révoltés. Son supérieur, le capitaine Jacquier a relaté cette révolte du chef Baram Bakié dans le secteur Haute-Kotto -Kouango.

1925- 2025 : gli incrociatori pesanti italiani, una sintesi di storia navale e di tecnica a un secolo dalla loro apparizione, il ricordo di un breve periodo di servizio conclusosi con un episodio che è diventato un caso politico e motivo di aspre polemiche per oltre settant’anni.
Un dibattito che ben evidenzia le spaccature e i confronti emotivi e demagogici che troppo spesso prevalgono e caratterizzarono (poco) la nascita di questo tipo di nave e molto la loro fine.
Nello specifico, ci sarebbe poco da trattare riguardo ad un programma navale limitato, nato da un compromesso politico, un esperimento che poteva essere un’opportunità, di potere e di sviluppo industriale, che alcuni Paesi hanno colto mentre in Italia non si è capito né si è sfruttato
In Italia si fece quanto si poteva fare, ma non era quanto si sarebbe dovuto fare, anche se alcune voci si alzarono al riguardo e, con poco,  si sarebbero potute trovare opportune e tempestive soluzioni
Il progetto dei Trento venne sviluppato da uno “stato dell’arte nazionale”, sulla base di capacità industriali e cantieristiche al momento ancora accettabili, seppur non all’avanguardia;  l’incapacità di cogliere l’opportunità portò in breve tempo a un divario incolmabile rispetto allo stato dell’arte degli avversari .
Stato dell’arte e quindi capacità belliche e operative
Il risultato fu purtroppo, al momento della necessità e degli eventi bellici,  quello di navi superate se non sbagliate, nel posto sbagliato nel momento sbagliato.
Questo è l’ assioma che potrebbe chiudere questo capitolo di storia navale, ma - invece - sarà certamente oggetto di ben altre polemiche.
Una storia di responsabilità e incapacità che non si vollero riconoscere e quel che è peggio non si vogliono ancora riconoscere in un diverso panorama e un altro contesto, a distanza di un secolo e con insanabili conseguenze di perdite umane in uno scenario tragico ed inaccettabile: un dibattito al riguardo è possibile ed auspicabile,  ormai in assenza dei protagonisti e dei responsabili, come si è voluto aprire nella commemorazione dell’ottantesimo anniversario di Matapan, suggellata con la pubblicazione del libro di Massimo Alfano (Matapan: Il caso e la colpa. Dalla grande Marina alla vera Marina – Phatos Edit.)

Questo saggio è un anticipo del secondo volume sull’argomento e rientra nel dibattito in corso da tempo sulla reale preparazione e capacitò italiane di affrontare quella che nel 1940 era chiaramente una guerra tecnologica
 
Abstract
1925- 2025 : the Italian heavy cruisers, a synthesis of naval and technology history a century after their appearance, the record of a brief period of service that ended with an episode that became a political case and a reason for bitter controversy for over seventy years.
A debate that well highlights the rifts and emotional and demagogic confrontations that too often prevail and characterized (a little) the birth of this type of ship and very much their end. Specifically, there would be little to debate regarding a limited naval program, born from a political compromise, an experiment that could have been an opportunity, of power and industrial development, which some countries have seized while in Italy it has not been understood or exploited
In Italy what could be done was done, but it was not what should have been done, even if some voices were raised in this regard and, with little, appropriate and timely solutions could have been found
The Trento project was developed from a "national state of the art", on the basis of industrial and shipbuilding capacities that were still acceptable at the time, although not at the forefront; the inability to seize the opportunity led in a short time to an unbridgeable gap with respect to the state of the art of the opponents “state of the art” and therefore war and operational capabilities
The result was, unfortunately, at the time of operational necessity and war events, that of outdated more que wrong ships, in the wrong place at the wrong time.
This is the axiom that could close this chapter of naval history, but - instead - it will certainly be the subject of much more controversy.
A story of responsibility and inability that may people did not want to recognize and what is worse they still do not want to recognize in a different panorama and another context, a century later and with incurable consequences of human losses in a tragic and unacceptable scenario: a debate on this is possible and desirable, now in the absence of the protagonists and those responsible, as it was intended to open in the commemoration of the eightieth anniversary of Matapan, sealed with the publication of Massimo Alfano's book (Matapan: Il caso e la colpa. Dalla grande Marina alla vera Marina – Phatos Edit.)

This essay is a advance of the second volume on the subject and is part of the debate that has been going on the real Italian preparation and capability to face what in 1940 was clearly a technological war

Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali L'Arsenale di Venezia fra XVI e XVIII secolo viella Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie Calle del Tintor-S. Croce 1583-30135 Venezia Deputazione Di storia patria per le Venezie STUDI a cura di alfreDo Buonopane-pietro Del negro-giuseppe gullino-gherarDo ortalli

Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali L'Arsenale di Venezia fra XVI e XVIII secolo viella Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie Calle del Tintor-S. Croce 1583-30135 Venezia Deputazione Di storia patria per le Venezie STUDI a cura di alfreDo Buonopane-pietro Del negro-giuseppe gullino-gherarDo ortalli

Starting from the origin of the nickname "dall'Albero d'Oro" (from the Golden Tree), the pages of this volume invite readers to discover the soul of Palazzo Vendramin Grimani. It traces the history of the ancient lineage that inhabited it—from the Vendramin to the Marcello Grimani Giustinian families—through its male and female members, immersing the reader in the daily social and cultural life of Venice.
The reader will also witness some of history's great challenges: the fall of the Venetian Republic, the French occupation, the long Austrian domination, the Kingdom of Italy, technological innovations, social progress, the decline of class privileges, economic difficulties, family disputes, human frailties, and even an elopement for love.
The narrative unfolds between the Venetian palace in San Polo, now home to the Fondazione dell'Albero d'Oro—which once housed a rich art collection and a library open to friends and scholars—and mainland properties like the now-vanished villa in Fiesso on the Brenta Riviera and the castle of Montegalda in the Vicenza area. The scope then broadens to a European scale, reaching London, Paris, Vienna, Constantinople, Moscow, and St. Petersburg.
Thanks to a vast and largely unpublished collection of images and documents—including inventories, invoices, business cards, invitations, advertisements, theater posters and flyers, train schedules and tickets, certificates, vouchers, menus, recipes, prayer cards, diaries, memoirs, and personal letters full of news, worries, anecdotes, and sometimes gossip—unforgettable characters come to life. This vivid group portrait offers a backward glance, without nostalgia or regret, an "amarcord" that projects the past into the very future of Venice.

By the time most European polities started looking overseas in earnest in the late fifteenth century, the Iberian powers had already been able to secure papal sanction for what amounted to a global duopoly. 1 The Treaty of Tordesillas gave Spain and Portugal exclusive rights to half of the world each. A century later, both the duopoly and the religious order of Europe had been upended. A key practice in this upending was that of privateering. Privateering played a crucial part both in the survival of Protestantism in Europe and in the spread of the European-dominated state system, accounting largely for how polities beyond the Iberian ones went overseas and how they came to settle around the world. By continuously pushing boundaries, privateering proved to be a perfectly suited practice for challenging the Iberian imperial duopoly and successfully transforming it into a wider European imperial venture. Understanding privateering, then, opens the door to making sense of the challenge posed by the sea to different European polities, how they managed to overcome the obstacles posed by the sea, and how the sea became a political fibre, structuring the reach of their political authority. By challenging traditional dichotomies of public and private, sea and land, state and empire, trade and war, privateering is a clear-cut example of that rethinking we called for in the introduction, a rethinking of international relations with the sea. In this chapter we explore the early practice of privateering along two axes. First, Protestant privateering was central to the survival of Protestantism in northwestern Europe, in particular in a first phase from around 1560 to the late 1580s; second, and just as importantly, Protestant privateering had global repercussions by breaking the Iberian imperial duopoly, establishing new polities

UN MITO E UN SOGNO - IL NAUTILUS ed i suoi Record, l’inizio di un’era
Precorrere l’uso dell’energia nucleare per la propulsione fu forse più impegnativo e importante che la transizione dalla vela alla propulsione meccanica, certamente più di quella dal carbone agli oli minerali: ma l’entrata in sevizio del Nautilus e lo storico passaggio dell’ Artico in immersione furono più di un record, furono un messaggio preciso e contundente all’URSS in piena Guerra Fredda:  un messaggio di potere ed efficienza, del dominio del mare, un potere reale, in risposta ad un’operazione di immagine e di grande effetto propagandistico, il lancio dello Sputnik
Messaggio forte e chiaro:  l’Italia ne fu coinvolta, perché uno dei centri di diffusione del messaggio, immediatamente dopo l’azione, fu Genova....
In quella storica conferenza si riconobbero i meriti e l’opera dei pionieri, ed ancor oggi è necessario tornare a quel tipo di messaggi, e più che mai bisogna trattare del futuro possibile, ritrovare quello spirito e soprattutto la capacità di guardare al futuro, comunicare, trasmetterlo

========
Anticipating the use of nuclear energy for propulsion was perhaps more challenging and important than the transition from sailing to mechanical propulsion, certainly more than that from coal to mineral oils: but the entry into service of the Nautilus and the historic submerged passage of the Arctic were more than a record, they were a precise and blunt message to the USSR in the middle of the Cold War:  a message of power and efficiency, sea power and sea denial, a real power, in response to a Show, an operation and of great propaganda effect, the launch of Sputnik
A loud and clear message: Italy was involved, because one of the centers of the message diffusion, immediately after the action, was Genoa....
In that historic conference, the merits and work of the pioneers were recognized, and even today it is necessary to return to this kind of message, and more than ever  we need to deal with the possible future, rediscover that spirit and above all the ability to look to the future, communicate, transmit it

The contemporary grand strategy debate between deep engagement and restraint is inadequate both to contemporary geopolitical realities and to the strategies American presidents have actually pursued in recent decades. This updated typology of grand strategies sets the stage for a reinvigorated and more informed debate and research program.

Historically, the Aegean Sea has been the cradle of Greek civilization and
consequently the center of gravity of the modern Greek state. However,
centuries after the arrival of the Turks, the Aegean Sea has transformed into a
theater of geopolitical competition between Greece and Turkey. On several
occasions, in the recent past, this competition has escalated into open war or
disputes regarding territorial waters, airspace, and the continental shelf. These
disputes have led Greece and Turkey to the edge of armed conflict, most
notably in 1976, 1987, and 1996.
Today, in an era of rapid global transformation, shifting power, and uncertainty,
Turkey is pursuing the expansion of its regional influence through major
investments in its domestic defense industry. Simultaneously, Athens, finally
emerging from the financial crisis, is acting towards modernizing its military
capabilities to restore the balance of power with its main rival, Turkey.
This short paper focuses primarily on the naval modernization capabilities of
both nations and their modernization efforts. Additionally, this study aims to
provide a clear understanding of the current balance of power in the Aegean
and its implications for regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Este artículo estudia la dinámica del poder naval en el contexto internacional del Siglo XXI. En él se analiza de qué forma la competencia por el reacomodamiento de poder mundial, entre los actores statuquistas y revisionistas del sistema internacional, se plasma en la disputa por el ámbito marítimo. Se sostiene que, en el marco de la decadencia de Estados Unidos como poder naval hegemónico y el ascenso de nuevos poderes navales, el espacio marítimo se ha convertido en la gran zona de fractura de este tiempo.

En este año 2025, y en el marco de una exposición organizada por el Museo Naval de Madrid con el título Annus Mirabilis. Salvador de Bahía, 1625: el crédito de España, se ha presentado públicamente una pintura prácticamente desconocida hasta la fecha que, sin embargo, y más allá de su indudable calidad artística, resulta capital para entender la crucial relación entre la Monarquía Hispánica y el dominio del océano Atlántico durante el siglo XVII.

Coastal Security, Data Management and Risk Assessment

Taking in consideration the international legal framework regulating the rights and responsibilities of both coastal states and flag states, in particular the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, it was attempted to design a possible simplified model to be used by states in order to control the access by vessels to coastal areas and ports.
Obtaining and managing data from vessels accessing coastal areas and ports is fundamental and the different sources of data were identified.  Once the legal framework regarding coastal access is in force and the vessels’ data is gathered and managed effectively, a risk assessment should be design and implemented in order to optimise control and surveillance resources and improve outcomes.
Based on this simple model a coastal state may a posteriori increment and improve its coastal security system based on the identified threats and a permanent evaluation of the outcomes.

The post-regime change order debates in Syria have strengthened the place of the Eastern Mediterranean on the agenda. In this context, Israel’s maritime strategy has been considered noteworthy for both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The study examines this strategy through French Admiral Raoul Castex's approach to naval strategy for non-hegemonic states and seeks an answer to the question of how Israel shapes its contacts with the Middle East through the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. Admiral Castex focuses on the maritime behavior of regional powers, and emphasizes two important approaches: improving the ability of maneuver and the primacy of the offensive. Within the framework of these two approaches, the study examines the Israeli navy in the Eastern Mediterranean between 2011 and 2024. Thus, on the one hand, it draws the hegemonic state-oriented approach of classical naval studies to the regional level, and on the other hand, it aims to portray the naval behavior of Israel, which is an important party to regional competition, through its contacts with the Middle East.
Keywords: Admiral Raoul Castex, Israel, Middle East, Eastern
Mediterranean, Naval Strategy

Established in 1906, the Izmir Italian School of Fine Arts (Scuola Italiana di Belle Arti) was created as part of Italy’s cultural diplomacy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the backing of the Italian Consul in Izmir, Odoardo Toscani, and in collaboration with the National Association for the Aid of Italian Catholic Missionaries (Associazione
Nazionale per Soccorrere i Missionari Italiani – ANSMI). The institution was led by the Italian artist Spiridione Pisani, who was born in Corfu. Pisani was among the initial artists to introduce Impressionism to the Corfu school of painting via Italy, serving as both an artist and educator in Corfu, Izmir, and Rome. Under Pisani’s leadership, the
Izmir Italian School of Fine Arts commenced operations on November 5th, 1906, and swiftly attained reputation within the Levantine society and abroad. The school, financed by Italy, was a distinctive instance inside the Ottoman Empire and operated until 1919. This article aims to shed light on the founding process, structure, and activities of
the school through Turkish and Italian archival records. The art and biography of Spiridione Pisani, the institution’s founder and a figure who has been largely overlooked in academic literature, are also examined for the first time using archival sources.

The advent of anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) marked a transformative moment in aerial warfare, as these weapons specifically target radar emissions to suppress or destroy an adversary’s air defense systems. Designed to home in on electromagnetic signals emitted by radar installations and other sources, ARMs exploit a fundamental vulnerability in modern militaries’ reliance on radar for early warning, guidance, and engagement. Yet, as with nearly all military technologies, the rise of ARMs provoked a parallel development of countermeasures. Jet fighters and other aircraft, recognizing the profound threat posed by these specialized missiles, developed a variety of techniques to evade or neutralize them. These countermeasures combine both tactical maneuvers and sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) technologies. In this paper, I will examine the basic working mechanisms of ARMs, outline how military aircraft counter them, and highlight examples from the United States, Russia, and China. It will argue that the interplay between ARMs and their countermeasures exemplifies the larger dialectic of measure and countermeasure that has long shaped the history of military innovation.

PACHECO MORALES-PADRÓN, Marcos. “La Sevilla americana y su mundo inmediato: notas para un puerto fluvial oceánico (siglos XVI-XVIII)”, ACOSTA GUERRERO, Elena (Coord.). XXIII Coloquio de Historia Canario Americana. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Casa Colón y Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 2018, pp. 1-13.

La captura de las fragatas (corbetas) del ejército británico Crawford (armada con dieciocho cañones de a 6 libras y una dotación de 45 hombres bajo el mando del teniente de la Royal Navy George Brander) y Lady Georgiana (equipada con veinte cañones de a 5 libras y dos de a 4 libras, con una tripulación de 52 hombres al mando del teniente Robert Smith, Royal Navy), por la fragata española Santa Lucía, de 34 cañones, al mando del capitán de fragata Ramón Topete y Fuentes, el 14 de noviembre de 1782. Ambos buques, al servicio de la Board of Ordnance del gobierno británico, fueron tomados como presas y su captura fue comunicada en un parte oficial enviado por el capitán Topete al teniente general Luis de Córdova, comandante de la escuadra española.

English: The capture of His Majesty’s Ordnance Storeships Crawford (armed with eighteen 6-pounder guns and carrying a crew of 45 men under the command of Royal Navy Lieutenant George Brander) and Lady Georgiana (equipped with twenty 5-pounder and two 4-pounder guns, with a complement of 52 men under Lieutenant Robert Smith, Royal Navy), by the Spanish 34-gun frigate Santa Lucía, commanded by capitán de fragata Ramón Topete y Fuentes, on 14 November 1782. The vessels, both in service of the British Government’s Board of Ordnance, were taken as prizes and reported in an official dispatch sent by Captain Topete to Lieutenant General Luis de Córdova, Commander of the Spanish fleet.

T o date, most warfare has taken place within what Robert J. Bunker terms "human space," meaning the traditional four-dimensional battlespace that is discernible to the human senses. In essence, war has always consisted of human beings running, dodging, and hurling things at each other, lately with the help of machinery. Even such revolutionary developments as gunpowder only enhanced our ability to throw things at enemies we could see and hear. The first crude examples of autonomous weapons were probably the early experiments by the US Navy and Sperry Gyroscope Company on unpiloted aircraft during the last years of the First World War. Then came the advent of electronics, especially radar, and warfare began to leave the realm of human senses. Ships and planes could fire on enemies that were no more than ghostly green images on a cathode ray tube. Later came military robots such as cruise missiles that were able to autonomously execute missions formerly requiring manned systems. Advanced radar engagement systems enabled pilots to locate, identify, and destroy enemy aircraft without ever seeing them. Some robotic systems became even more independent, such as the Navy's Phalanx close-in air defense weapon, which is "capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions." 2 Thanks to advanced sensors and information processing, target recognition and identification methods are being developed to permit truly autonomous guided munitions. This includes munitions capable of autonomously engaging fixed and mobile ground targets, as well as targets in air and space. 3 Warfare has begun to leave "human space." Vietnam, humanitarian assistance in Haiti, counterdrug missions in South America, and peace operations in Bosnia. His recent publications include Special Operations and the Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Cass, 1998) and "The Real Military Revolution," Parameters (Autumn 2000). His last operational military assignment was with the NATO stability force in Bosnia. A retired US Army lieutenant colonel, Adams holds a Ph.D. in political science from Syracuse University, an M.A. in international relations, an M.S.Sc. in social psychology, and a B.A. in liberal arts.

Review of No More Napoleons: How Britain Managed Europe from Waterloo to World War One by Andrew Lambert

Testing Kyle M Lascurettes (2020) &  Christopher Layne (1997) concepts Ordering &  Onshore Balancing concepts for Britain between 1793-1918 & 1939-45

PM Lord Liverpool & Castelreagh  - Wellington  - Scheldt estuary Antwerp  - harbours, ports
France  Ancien Régime  - Napoleon, Restored monarchy, Second Empire, Third Republic, Fifth Republic 

Imperial Germany & Nazi Germany  -  USA in WW1 & WW2  - Tsarist Russia, USSR

Napoleons today

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the key elements that enable real applicability of the mutual defence clause written within the Art. 42(7) of the Treaty for the European Union (TEU), using a different approach and understanding of the field. To overview the main features and understand the mutual clause's effects, we will provide a comparative analysis with the collective defence clause – Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO).
The methodology used is represented by a synthetic qualitative documentary analysis with a comparative component. The research design will provide the key elements identified through a comparative analysis of mutual defence clause, common ground, terms and conditions, practical application, limitations, and future prospects needed to better understand the EU's purpose in achieving a common defence.

Multinational military gatherings are important sites of international interaction. High level military officials meet on a regular basis in different configurations, and a carefully orchestrated global calendar coordinates these events. States build, maintain and strengthen diplomatic, organizational and interpersonal relations at these events. This article argues that understanding the logic and global political functions of such gatherings requires a study from the inside. Zooming in on naval symposiums, I present the results from participant observations obtained in attending fifteen such meetings. I show how these gatherings have a common structure and are driven by symbolic content and ritualized actions, such as gift exchanges, the celebration of food and culture, and the repetition of narratives. I conclude that gatherings have an important role in facilitating transnational (maritime) security communities.

W artykule przedstawiono działania włoskiej Marynarki Wojennej w ramach realizowanej na mocy mandatu ONZ operacji "Przywrócić nadzieję". Autor przedstawia włoskie zaangażowanie w "rogu Afryki" na tle stopniowego uzyskiwania przez flotę zdolności do działań ekspedycyjnych, począwszy od pierwszych lat powojennych. W opinii Autora marynarka wojenna jest obecnie ważnym instrumentem nie polityki zagranicznej państwa, a możliwość wydzielenia sił do działań poza wodami ojczystymi determinuje w istotnym stopniu pozycję Republiki Włoskiej na arenie międzynarodowej.

Russia's Black Sea Fleet plays an important role in shaping the geopolitical and military dynamics of Eastern Europe. As a key component of Russia's naval power, the fleet provides Moscow with significant strategic leverage over vital sea routes and chokepoints that link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and beyond. The fleet’s presence enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence over strategically important corridors such as the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, as well as in the contested regions of Crimea and the Donbas. The fleet’s operational capabilities enable Russia to assert control over crucial energy corridors, including gas pipelines and shipping routes that run through Eastern Europe. This impacts not only the region’s energy security but also its broader economic and political stability. Furthermore, the fleet’s strategic positioning challenges NATO’s presence in the region, complicating the alliance's efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and deter Russian aggression. Russia’s military activities in the Black Sea, combined with its fleet's modernization efforts, present significant implications for Eastern European countries. These nations, especially those bordering the Black Sea, face increased security threats, as Moscow utilizes its fleet to bolster its territorial claims and safeguard its regional interests. As tensions escalate, the Black Sea Fleet’s role continues to shape the strategic landscape of Eastern Europe, with long-term consequences for regional stability and international security.

Evolution and incorporation of unmanned systems in naval warfare has resulted in a major shift from conventional naval warfare. This is evident in the current Russia-Ukraine conflict. Unmanned or uncrewed systems, overall, indicate a transformative advance in the naval technology and it is attracting significant investments as well as developments around the world. As autonomous systems continuous to reshape the naval warfare, the whole naval community around the world is at the peak point of a new era of defense and conflict. Keeping in view the current technological development and trends of increasing use of unmanned systems, this paper will focus to identify that how these unmanned technologies has changed the conventional mindset of naval warfare, and how Ukraine used these unmanned systems and caused Russia's Black Sea Fleet pull out of the Ukraine's naval unmanned assets reach.

A cross-eye jammer based on a phase-conjugating (PC) retrodirective array is proposed. Such PC cross-eye jammers eliminate the delay inherent in traditional Van-Atta (VA) cross-eye jammers and induce errors in radars that use the same antenna beam for transmission and reception, while VA cross-eye jammers do not. Validated simulations are provided to confirm the effectiveness and retrodirective properties of the PC cross-eye jammer.

The effect of platform skin return on retrodirective cross-eye jamming is analysed, allowing the parameters of a cross-eye jammer in the presence of skin return to be determined. The inherently unknown phase of the platform skin return is accounted for, and the effect of variations in Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) is investigated. The widely-held, though unsubstantiated, view that a JSR of 20 dB is required for effective cross-eye jamming is found to be reasonable, though conservative.