Natural Justice

This is an excerpts from 'Constitutional Law-I' published in the Annual Survey of Indian Law - 2023.  This part examines the decision of the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court rendered in Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India (2023), in which the bench by 4:1 majority upheld the legality and constitutionality of demonetization of all series of high denomination bank notes in India in 2016.

When ordinary people like you or me are sued in the United States, our adversaries can use discovery to ask us questions — and we are required to answer. To create a similar obligation for corporations, Rule 30(b)(6) requires a company to designate and prepare a witness who can testify fully on its behalf. After Morton’s case was remanded, Morton invoked this rule and asked JPMorgan Chase to produce a designee who could demonstrate that JPMorgan Chase's previous testimony and legal argument that it possessed the original note was true. The desingee testified Chase had failed to educate him in this regard. Instead of enforcing the rule, the trial court excused Chase’s noncompliance on procedural grounds. The sanctions hearing transcript reveals this abdication: rather than compelling the bank to account for missing records, the court shielded it, leaving Morton unable to establish that the note had been destroyed.
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This judicial failure p;rovides only one, of those numerous grounds, which cause Morton and his attorney to assert amd make public their belief that Washington State's judcial officers have been purposely aligned with mammon by Washington States' political branches of government, which enacted judicial retirement laws in 2007 which were intended to provide electerd and appointed "judges" with pecuniary incentives to enforce mortgage backed securities as if they were signed promissory notes.

The aim of this thesis is to explore the evolution of the doctrine of natural justice in Australia, with particular emphasis on the work of the High Court of Australia. The essence of the argument is that today, the Court views natural justice as a doctrine of constitutional law -that in the Court's mind, natural justice amounts to a central principle of the "common law constitution". This argument is borne out, it is argued, by a consideration of the High Court's holdings in natural justice cases during the past twenty-five years. Through these holdings, natural justice has undergone a dramatic expansion in its scope and compass. Moreover, the Court has made it plain that the obligation to accord natural justice in Australia today arises as a matter of common law implication, independently of legislative intent. In this sense, the Court has been signalling a shift in Australian administrative law to an older vision of natural justice. But therein lies the difficulty with the Court's holdings. At the same time as the Court has been moving to dissociate procedural fairness from legislative presumption and the so-called "ultra vires principle", it has also been denying the historical basis by which a common law constitution could be said to exist in Australia. It is argued that a profound contradiction has come to exist in the High Court's public law discourse, and that a common law basis for natural justice cannot exist within the constitutional framework that has been enunciated by the Court. Associated with this is an argument that the Court has largely failed to enunciate a modem purpose for the protection of procedural rights. These flaws, it is contended, have left the Australian doctrine of natural justice in a less healthy state than may at first glance appear to be the case. The study consists of both an historical and a present-day consideration of the Australian doctrine of natural justice. It also places the Australian developments in context through comparison with contemporary developments in England.

Administrative Law TA4B: Governance, Control, and Justice
This "Administrative Law" (நிர்வாகச் சட்டம் TA4B) syllabus provides a comprehensive study of the legal principles governing administrative actions. Unit 1 offers an Introduction (அறிமுகம்) to Administrative Law, defining its nature, scope, and tracing its origin and development (தோற்றம் மற்றும் வளர்ச்சி) in the UK, USA, France, and India. Key foundational concepts like the Rule of Law (சட்டத்தின் ஆட்சிக் கோட்பாடு), including A.V. Dicey's evaluation and modern interpretations, and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers (அதிகாரப்‌ பிரிவு கோட்பாடு) are thoroughly examined. This unit also classifies Administrative Action (நிர்வாக நடவடிக்கைகளின் வகைப்பாடு) into executive, legislative, and judicial functions, including Quasi-Legislative (அரை சட்ட நிர்வாக செயல்பாடுகள்) and Quasi-Judicial Functions (நீதித்துறைப்‌ போல்வு செயல்பாடுகள்).

Unit 2 delves into Delegated Legislation (சட்ட விதியாக்கம்‌), covering its meaning, nature, origin, and development, along with its types and constitutionality. It explores restraints on delegation (சட்டமியற்றும் அதிகார ஒப்படைப்பின் மீதான கட்டுப்பாடுகள்), such as the Doctrine of Excessive Delegation (அதிகப்படியான சட்ட விதியாக்கக் கோட்பாடு), and various forms of control over delegated legislation (அதிகார ஒப்படைப்புச் சட்டத்தின் மீதான கட்டுப்பாடு)—judicial, procedural, and legislative.

Unit 3 focuses on Procedural Fairness and Judicial Review (வெளிப்படையான நடைமுறை மற்றும் நீதி மறு ஆய்வு). It details the Principles of Natural Justice (இயற்கை நீதியின் கோட்பாடுகள்), specifically the Rule Against Bias (பாரபட்சத்திற்கு எதிரான ஆட்சி) and Audi Alteram Partem (Rule of Fair Hearing) (நியாயமான விசாரணை விதி), along with their exceptions and effects of breach. The unit then extensively covers Judicial Review of Administrative Action (நிர்வாக நடவடிக்கைகளை நீதித்துறை மீளாய்வு செய்தல்) through Writ Jurisdiction (நீதிப்பேராணை ஆள்வரை வரம்பு) of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Public Interest Litigation (பொது நல வழக்கு), and doctrines like Legitimate Expectation (முறையான எதிர்பார்ப்புகள்‌ கோட்பாடு) and Proportionality (விகிதாசாரக் கோட்பாடு). It also examines Statutory Remedies (சட்டமுறைத்‌ தீர்வழிகள்‌) and Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion (நிர்வாக உளத்தேர்வின் மீது நீதிமன்றக் கட்டுப்பாடு).

Units 4 and 5 discuss specialized administrative bodies. Unit 4 introduces Ombudsman (முறைகேள் ஆணையாளர்), Lokpal (லோக்பால்), Lokayukta (லோகாயுக்தா), and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) (மத்திய கண்காணிப்பு ஆணையம்)—their meaning, object, and development. Unit 5 covers Administrative Tribunals (நிர்வாகமுறை தீர்ப்பாயங்கள்)—their meaning, nature, growth, and their similarities/differences with courts, procedures, and powers. Finally, the syllabus concludes with a study of Public Undertakings (அரசுத் துறை நிறுவனம்), exploring their objectives, characteristics, and various forms of control (Government, Parliamentary, Judicial, Public).

This article discusses the growth of public law in England through a pragmatic approach in which the law has been developed on a case-by-case basis. It identifies distinct public law principles that are of general application, independent of private law and comparable to those in civil jurisdictions. Distinguishing between public and private law, it suggests an issue is subject to public law if the public have a legitimate concern as to its outcome and it is not an issue already satisfactorily protected by private law. The relationship between the courts and Parliament is examined, and it is suggested that both arms of government are partners in a common enterprise involving upholding the rule of law.

The author examines the thorny issue of breach of statutory duty in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Campbell v Gordon [2016] UKSC 38 where the court required to determine whether provisions in the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 provided the basis for an action for breach of statutory duty against a sole company director. Introduction Some statutes provide that breach of their provisions gives rise to an action for breach of statutory duty by someone who is damnified by the breach. The Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 and the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 are notable examples. Other statutes (for example, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, s.47) provide that no such action will arise in event of breach of their provisions. Difficulties arise, however, where a particular statute remains silent on the issue of whether civil liability results from a breach of its provisions. In such situations, the courts are faced with the task of determining Parliament's unstated intention, a task which has been likened to solving a "guesswork puzzle" (Island Records Ltd v Corkindale [1978] Ch. 122, per Lord Denning M.R. at pp.134-135). While certain presumptions exist to assist the courts, the judges' task is far from an easy one, as the recent case of Campbell v Gordon [2016] UKSC 38; [2016] 3 W.L.R. 294 demonstrates. Indeed, at the Supreme Court stage of the litigation, reference was made (by Lord Toulson at para.35) to Judge Richard Posner's statement to the effect that "[t]he judges face hieroglyphs without a Rosetta Stone." (Divergent Paths-The Academy and the Judiciary, Harvard University Press, 2016, p.172). In this article, the author tracks the judicial path of the litigation in Campbell having first set out the facts of the case, the relevant statutory framework and the existing authorities. The author concludes that the litigation in Campbell illustrates the difficulty of predicting how courts might respond to particular statutory provisions and suggests that reform of the law is overdue. Campbell v Gordon-the alleged facts The pursuer, an apprentice joiner, sustained injuries in June 2006 in the course of his employment with the first defenders, Peter Gordon Joiners Ltd. The company went into voluntary liquidation in December 2009 and there were no company funds available to meet the pursuer's claim. The employers' liability insurance taken out by the company excluded any legal liability arising out of the use of electrically powered woodworking machinery, which was the very context in which the pursuer's injuries had been sustained, the accident having involved an electrically powered circular saw. The claim against the company was therefore worthless. Accordingly, the pursuer also sued the second defender, Peter Gordon, who was the sole director of the company and responsible for its day to day operation. It was alleged that the company's failure to have in place appropriate insurance was a breach of its obligations under s.1(1) of the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 and that Mr. Gordon, who, as sole director, had arranged such insurance as there was, was liable under s.5 of that Act. The statutory framework Given that the task of the court in such cases is one of statutory construction, the key provisions of the 1969 Act require to be set out. Section 1 of the Act provides as follows: "1. Insurance against liability for employees. Except as otherwise provided by this Act, every employer carrying on any business in Great Britain shall insure, and maintain insurance, under one or more approved policies with an authorised insurer or insurers against liability for bodily injury or disease sustained by his employees, and arising out of and in the course of their employment in Great Britain in that business …" Section 5 of the Act goes on to provide: "5. Penalty for failure to insure. An employer who on any day is not insured in accordance with this Act when required to be so shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale; and where an offence under this section committed by a corporation has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or facilitated by any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the corporation, he, as well as the corporation shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly." These provisions of the Act have already received considerable judicial attention, as will be discussed below. Existing authorities in England and Scotland The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 applies both in Scotland and in England and Wales. (It has no application in Northern Irelandsee s.7 of the Act). It should be said at the outset that there is no express provision in the 1969 Act creating civil liability on the part of an employer for the failure to insure. The Act is silent on the matter. Prior to the litigation in Campbell v Gordon, there had, however, been attempts to found an action for breach of statutory duty based upon the provisions of the Act. Interestingly, different results had ensued north and south of the border. In Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] QB 123, the English Court of Appeal (by a majority) held that the 1969 Act did not give rise to civil liability on an employer's part and it would therefore be anomalous if civil liability was imposed on the employer's directors or other officers. A relevant factor underlying the court's decision was that breach of the Act would not occasion direct physical injury to the plaintiff but would involve him only in economic loss, namely an inability to recover damages from the relevant employer. Stuart-Smith LJ took the view that insurance was normally taken out to protect the insured (the employer) against the potentially disastrous consequences of a large claim and the Act should not be regarded as imposing a duty solely or principally for the protection of the employee. Stuart-Smith LJ also regarded the level of the fine capable of being imposed on the company and the delinquent director, as "to some extent a special penalty, a feature which militates against civil liability" (at p.133). While acknowledging that none of those reasons was determinative in itself, Stuart-Smith LJ took the view that cumulatively those

Judicial review is a process under which a government's executive, legislative, or administrative actions are subject to review by the judiciary.  In a judicial review, a court may invalidate laws, acts, or governmental actions that are incompatible with a higher authority. For example, an executive decision may be invalidated for being unlawful, or a statute may be invalidated for violating the terms of a constitution. Judicial review is one of the checks and balances in the separation of powers—the power of the judiciary to supervise the legislative and executive branches when the latter exceed their authority. The doctrine varies between jurisdictions, so the procedure and scope of judicial review may differ between and within countries.

Fundamental human rights are legal privileges enjoyed by citizen of a given country, irrespective of their age, sex, colour etc.

This publication analyses the encounter of Seun Kuti, the son of the Afro beat Legend, Fela Anikulapo Kuti with the Nigeria Police, when it was reported that he assaulted a police officer on the Third Mainland bridge.

Many castigated his actions, while others supported him, and a few were left with the dilemma of what to believe.

This publication analyses the event from the position of the law, ethics and public good.

Cardinal Chambers 1. The Crown Court exercises a number of important functions, though often through part-time judges. In this context, there ought to be an avenue whereby the decisions of the lower court can be appealed or reviewed: this was the theme the last time this question was considered in this journal (see [1996] JR 230).

This note considers if there is a discernible framework in which courts resolve alleged claims of breaches of natural justice. On the one hand, once it has been ascertained that the rules of natural justice apply, the court will look at all the circumstances of the case to determine if there has been any unfairness. On the other hand, it has been suggested that even assuming the rules of natural justice apply, there can be varying degrees of rigour in which they are enforced, a sliding scale of sorts.

If there is mutual trust and respect between the parliament and the court, there is little need to legislate the law on privilege issues. There is a written law, and more benefits will flow to those who destroy the parliament, and more and more members, committees and courts will be intervened. The government is untimely to influence the privilege of parliamentarians without worrying or favoring there is no doubt that parliaments and state legislatures need certain powers, privileges and immunities, otherwise they will not be able to operate independently or maintain their dignity and prestige.

If there is mutual trust and respect between the parliament and the court, there is little need to legislate the law on privilege issues. There is a written law, and more benefits will flow to those who destroy the parliament, and more and more members, committees and courts will be intervened. The government is untimely to influence the privilege of parliamentarians without worrying or favoring there is no doubt that parliaments and state legislatures need certain powers, privileges and immunities, otherwise they will not be able to operate independently or maintain their dignity and prestige.

Canon 7 provides that a law is established when it is promulgated, and canon 8 sets out how promulgation is carried out in the Chuch. Yet the essential nature of promulgation and its intrinsic importance to the provision of just legislation is found, first of all, in principles of natural justice. Establishing the fundamental purposes of promulgation, and so what in practical terms is requisite and necessary for its proper enactment, is essential to justice, stability, and integrity in the Church. This article offers a survey of the doctrine of promulgation from the perspective of natural justice, particularly as it is articulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez. It review concerns about the subversion of promulgation in first century Rome and eighteenth century America, as a means of reflecting on the principles of natural justice in relation to concrete instances. And it considers and weighs contemporary developments in the promulgation of universal ecclesiastical law, inviting a renewed appreciation and concern for just and sufficient promulgation within the canonical legal system, thereby promoting good legislative and governmental practice, which in the Church is always oriented to the highest of goals.

This will be inadequate, but. .. I was fortunate to enter graduate school when I did. My colleagues were inquisitive, able to better one another's work, and enjoy themselves. I am grateful to all of them, especially those with whom I lived and spent the most time: Nico, Nick, Josef, David, and Jean-Bertrand. Indiana University was a wonderful place to be an undergraduate and graduate student, and I was honored to have taught, learned from, and worked alongside Indiana students. I owe my committee-David Reingold, Stephen Benard, and Bradley Heim-a hearty thanks for their patience and their willingness to point out the more tangential, uninteresting, and misguided parts of my research. They gave me the freedom to pursue some eccentric, tangled lines of thought, but never let me get (too) lost. To Edward Carmines and William Bianco I offer special thanks. Ted stepped in to chair my committee after my original advisor died and Bill provided invaluable professional advice and opportunities throughout my (somewhat lengthy) graduate school tenancy. Tim Downey and Ben Calvin were prodigious in their programming efforts to make the online experiments reliable and beautiful. Grants from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and from the Social Science Research Commons funded much of my research. Thanks to James Walker, Ursula Kreitmair, and Michael McGinnis for their guidance: If my experiments were worthy of financial backing, they helped make them so. And thanks to Emily Castle,

The involvement of people living with mental illness in the judicial process, whether in civil or criminal justice system, is a growing phenomenon that can be defined as judiciarization. Such over-representation of people with mental illness in the justice system is related to several issues, including stigma, experienced coercion, loss of autonomy and social isolation. To explore this understudied phenomenon in nursing research, we conducted a study to better understand how judiciarization affects people living with mental illness. The specific objectives were: 1) to understand how insertion into a judicial process affects people living with mental illness; 2) to explore the perception of these people and their lived experience within the judicial trajectory. For the methodology, grounded theory was used as a research model. The theoretical framework of the total institution, proposed by Erwin Goffman, was used conceptually. Participants were recruited from a university-affiliated hospital. Hospitalized persons who had been involved in the justice system were interviewed (n = 10). Three conceptualizing categories were identified through the analyzed data: 1) Diversity of Judicial Trajectories; 2) Involuntary Psychiatric Admission Process; 3) Judiciarization Lived as a Complex Experience. The results of this research can be used to better inform nurses, clinicians, and policy makers about the impacts of the judiciarization of mental illness, and how clinical practices can be better adapted to populations with very complex health needs.

The Doctrine of Judicial Review reads as the power exercised by the Constitutional Courts to review the validity and the constitutionality of any statute passed by the legislature or any provision of the state or the validity of any act(s) or orders which includes orders or ordinances promulgated by the executive. Judicial review serves two important functions: legitimising government actions and protecting the Constitution from any undue violation by the government. The final power of the judiciary to review and determine the validity of a statute or ordinance can be described as the power of 'judicial review." In India, the rule of law is followed. In other words, the Constitution is the country's supreme law, and any law based on it is null and void. 1 In any country where the principle of 'rechtsstaat' or the 'rule of law' is followed, the Judiciary must always play an active role in reviewing and analysing the validity of the laws and orders promulgated by the legislative and the executive. The doctrine of Judicial Review is not an express provision in the Constitution of the United States, but it is an implied rule that the American Judiciary has undertaken, the first instance of this was in the case of Marbury v. Maddison 2 , where it was stated by the US Supreme Court that; Congress does not have the power to pass laws that override the Constitution, such as by expanding the scope of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. What the court means by this is that the legislature does not have the authority to make laws that override or abridge the Constitutional provisions. The Indian Judiciary has the express authority under Article 13 of the Constitution 3 to exercise the power of Judicial Review on any laws or actions passed by the legislature or the executive. Judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of Judges. It contains the power of a court to hold 1

Irish judges have tended to 'jealously guard' the judicial power - vested as it is by Article 34.1 of the Constitution in the courts alone. And they have jealously guarded their control over the articulation of public law norms. It is they who get to decide what counts as fair procedure in this or that non-judicial body - not the non-judicial actors operating at the coalface.

But in Zalewski v Workplace Relations Commission a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled a shift away from the rigid judicial 'centralism' that has prevailed for a century in the Irish legal system. The judges have departed from the formulaic approach to assessing what counts as judicial power, preferring instead a purposive approach more in line with comparator countries. They have revived a 'saver' provision of the Constitution (Article 37.1) expressly providing for 'the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature' by bodies other than courts. And they have indicated that courts and lawyers do not have a monopoly on authority in respect of public law norms.

Things remain in flux, however, because there are conflicting messages in the majority judgment in respect of this more 'pluralist' conception of public law.

A consideration of the legal principles and rationales for the involvement of interpreters in judicial proceedings serves to highlight not only gross inadequacies in services provided and practices governing courtroom interpreting. It also has clear implications for policies, institutions and members of the professions involved.

Experts in counseling ethics have indicated that the ability to practice ethically, to abide by the code of ethics, and to appropriately apply models of ethical decision making are critical issues for professional counselors (Herlihy & Dufrene, 2011). State legislators establish licensing laws that serve as a minimum set of standards for each state in the areas of education, examination, and experience (American Counseling Association [ACA], 2016). Licensing boards monitor the legal and ethical practice of counseling and serve as an entity to act upon consumer ethical complaints (ACA, 2016; Mascari & Webber, 2013). Currently, all 50 states, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico have laws and licensing boards that oversee professional counseling (ACA, 2016). This is a relatively recent phenomenon, with California being the last state to approve licensing laws for counselors in 2009 (ACA, 2016) after Virginia led the charge in 1976 (Mascari & Webber, 2013). Ethical issues are consistently changing and can be complex (Herlihy & Dufrene, 2011). Neukrug, Milliken, and Walden (2001) argued that understanding the types of ethical violations that get reported and acted upon by counseling licensing boards is helpful for the training and practice of counseling professionals. Researchers have made some attempts to explore counseling boards and their ethical trends, although many of the studies are now 10 to 30 years old. The purpose of this study is to address this gap by comprehensively exploring current trends in the ethical violations that result in disciplinary actions across the licensing boards of all 50 states and Washington, DC.

THAT anyone should wish to re-till the soil of Tameside,' more than 10 years on, could require some explaining. I approach this task as a non-lawyer who first trespassed on this well-ploughed field, along with my social policy students, seeking to advance our understanding of the allocation of decision-making responsibilities. We have not been disappointed: the legal commentators* have assiduously drawn upon the duel between the Secretary of State for Education (Mr. Fred Mulley, October 1975-September 1976) and the Metropolitan Borough of Tameside to demonstrate arguments about the distribution of decision-making functions. Thus have they contributed to at least four aspects of our study: the relationship between legislative intent and judicial interpretation3; the judicial appraisal of electoral mandates4; a growing judicial willingness (not least on the part of Lord Denning) to scrutinise administrative actionss; and the judicial control of ministerial discretion.6 On this last point, Tameside has been especially useful in our consideration of what one of its fiercest parliamentary critics has called "judge-proof" law.' In other words, it has been for us the prime illustration of a distinction with which the law student will be more generally familiar: that between "objective" and "subjective" discretion.6 ' Secretary of Stare for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (19761 3 All E.R. 665; [1977] A.C. 1014. The latter report includes a brief summary (A.C., pp.1019-1020) of the judgment in the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division; but reference will be occasionally required, below, to the fuller transcript notes of Cherer & Co. ("Q.B. transcript"). My interest, here, is in the analyses of legal commentators alone: 1 have not considered it necessary comprehensively to review what educationisrs have derived from Tameside. While my focus will be on educational administration (what are the prerequisites of the school admissions process?), those educationists with whose work I am acquainted have tended to treat Tameside in terms of educational opportunity ("choice" for the few; and/or a victory for the middle-class): see M.

The doctrine of legitimate expectation has an important place in developing law of judicial review. The doctrine is that a person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment.

Procedure before quasi-judicial boards and tribunals has recently attracted abundant comment as well as some criticism. In administrative law, rules of evidence form an important part of procedure. In this paper, the author first tries to define what are the sources of the law of evidence before quasi-judicial agencies in Québec : the common law, the two Codes, statutes and regulations. Then follows in two parts an overview of the principal rules that govern the manner in which claims and arguments are brought before tribunals and the extent to which specific provisions or general principles of administrative law allow tribunals themselves to gather evidence required for the purposes of a decision. The paper suggests that administrative justice requires that the tribunal really be « master of the procedure », within the framework of natural justice.

The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation has its origin in English Administrative Law as a ground of judicial review of administrative action. It seeks to protect a person's procedural or substantive interests when a public authority resiles from a representation it had made. Founded on the Principles of Natural Justice and Fairness, this doctrine aims to prevent public authorities from abusing their powers by acting contrary to what it had induced a person to expect, and to ensure good administration.

THAT anyone should wish to re-till the soil of Tameside,' more than 10 years on, could require some explaining. I approach this task as a non-lawyer who first trespassed on this well-ploughed field, along with my social policy students, seeking to advance our understanding of the allocation of decision-making responsibilities. We have not been disappointed: the legal commentators* have assiduously drawn upon the duel between the Secretary of State for Education (Mr. Fred Mulley, October 1975-September 1976) and the Metropolitan Borough of Tameside to demonstrate arguments about the distribution of decision-making functions. Thus have they contributed to at least four aspects of our study: the relationship between legislative intent and judicial interpretation3; the judicial appraisal of electoral mandates4; a growing judicial willingness (not least on the part of Lord Denning) to scrutinise administrative actionss; and the judicial control of ministerial discretion.6 On this last point, Tameside has been especially useful in our consideration of what one of its fiercest parliamentary critics has called "judge-proof" law.' In other words, it has been for us the prime illustration of a distinction with which the law student will be more generally familiar: that between "objective" and "subjective" discretion.6 ' Secretary of Stare for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (19761 3 All E.R. 665; [1977] A.C. 1014. The latter report includes a brief summary (A.C., pp.1019-1020) of the judgment in the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division; but reference will be occasionally required, below, to the fuller transcript notes of Cherer & Co. ("Q.B. transcript"). My interest, here, is in the analyses of legal commentators alone: 1 have not considered it necessary comprehensively to review what educationisrs have derived from Tameside. While my focus will be on educational administration (what are the prerequisites of the school admissions process?), those educationists with whose work I am acquainted have tended to treat Tameside in terms of educational opportunity ("choice" for the few; and/or a victory for the middle-class): see M.

The 21st century saw the rapid development of the administration of the nations of the world. With the development, it is essential to ensure that administrator entrusted with the administration of the country perform its duties in accordance with the rule of law. It must not act arbitrarily. Discretionary power if given to the administrator, it is limited. This is to guarantee that administrator in performing its duties would not infringe rights of an individual or community, especially fundamental rights. To make certain that this is achieved, an effective mechanism for the protection of rights, especially human or fundamental rights in state administration is needed. Judicial review is one of the effective mechanism to supervise and control action of the administrator. This mechanism is available in Administrative Law. Under the instrument, grounds of judicial review is made available to review action of the administrator. Currently, there are two streams of judicial review: Admi...

Judicial review is a provision that can be compared to the checks and balances theory of the three arms of the government but the difference here is that, it allows for the court to reviews the legality in decisions made by public bodies affecting a person in the Populus. As such, in this paper we shall not only discuss the theory of judicial review but will equally set to clearly distinguish it from a court appeal. JUDICIAL REVIEW VS A COURT APPEAL JUDICIAL REVIEW Judicial review can be said to be a court proceeding where a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action made by a public body. Michael Allen defines judicial review as, "the

The psychological associations in the 50 states and the District of Columbia were surveyed with regard to their membership structure and the status of master's-level members. Most (31) of these associations closely follow the membership criteria established by the American Psychological Association, allowing associate membership for master's-level personnel, whereas 15 associations provide full membership for such personnel. A minority (17) of the state psychology boards provide some form or licensing or certification for master's-level personnel, and 5 more states provide for registration of such personnel. It is argued that the structures of state psychological associations reflect a tension between two views of psychology: as a scientific discipline or as a profession. The scientific emphasis encourages associations to include all individuals interested in a field or scientific endeavor; the professional perspective motivates associations to exclude those ineligible to join a profession of sell-regulated, highly qualified, health service providers.

As its name implies, Natural Justice is so fundamental that it is equated to being innate, intuitive or instinctive. It is essentially designed to ensure fairness in the application of law. This paper aims to discuss the relevance of natural justice in the decision-making processes of public bodies and officials, taking the 1992 constitution of Ghana in perspective. The principles are so fundamental and universal that they are implied to apply to every situation of the law unless otherwise explicitly stated in statutes. It has even been said that, the Biblical events at the Garden of Eden; specifically, the act of disobedience by Adam and Eve and their subsequent trial by God marked the beginning and development of these principles. This paper studies the twin principles of Natural Justice against the backdrop of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. According to the study, "natural justice" is based on the two (2) principles that "no man shall be punished without due process of law" and "no man shall be judge in his own cause (with exception)". People have the right to seek redress in front of a court or other authority if they have been mistreated by the implementation of such acts or decisions. The principles of natural justice essentially guarantee justice and fairness therefore, the importance of the exercise of Natural Justice is clearly indicated. It is recommended that Rule of law should be strictly adhered to without prejudice. Also, due process should be followed without any human or institutional interference. Furthermore, the media must apply professional standards in their work delivery in the support of natural justice.

Drawing on my archival and biographical research on Anscombe, I argue that Anscombe’s work in moral philosophy was driven by her concern to recover the absolute moral prohibition on murder, and the virtue of justice as the appropriate basis for it.  Oxford moral philosophy made the mistake of giving priority to abstract moral theorizing over the most fundamental moral convictions.  Anscombe, following the wisdom of great philosophical and religious traditions, recognized that the prohibition of killing innocent people as a requirement of natural justice as a prerequisite for legitimate theorizing about morality.  She thus attacked what she took to be the naïve, frivolous and/or degenerate moral theorizing of the ‘Oxford moral philosophers.’

This note considers if there is a discernible framework in which courts resolve alleged claims of breaches of natural justice. On the one hand, once it has been ascertained that the rules of natural justice apply, the court will look at all the circumstances of the case to determine if there has been any unfairness. On the other hand, it has been suggested that even assuming the rules of natural justice apply, there can be varying degrees of rigour in which they are enforced, a sliding scale of sorts.