Mirror neurons and Intersubjectivity

www.chora.too.it Questa pubblicazione è stata registrata presso il Tribunale di Milano in data 20/09/2002 al n. 458; finanziata grazie ai fondi messi a disposizione dall'Università degli Studi di Milano per le iniziative culturali studentesche, secondo quanto previsto dalla Legge 429 del 03/08/1985; ha contribuito al finanziamento di questo numero l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici. La rivista è realizzata dal lavoro volontario e gratuito degli studenti e degli studiosi che compongono la redazione; pubblicata dall'Ass. culturale "AlboVersorio" (Email: info@alboversorio.it, www.alboversorio.it); prodotta in proprio. Qualora non fossimo riusciti a rintracciare i titolari del dominio delle immagini utilizzate, essi sono invitati a contattarci per far valere il loro diritto. Tiratura: 3000 copie. Direttore responsabile: al 1998. La sua ricerca, svolta all'intersezione tra fenomenologia e filosofia relazionistica del processo di derivazione whiteheadiana, si concentra sui temi della temporalità, della soggettività e dell'intersoggettività, e sul problema della definizione del concetto di evento. Autore di numerosi saggi su Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, Whitehead, per la casa editrice Mimesis ha pubblicato Modi del tempo. Simultaneità, processualità e relazionalità tra Whitehead e Merleau-Ponty (Milano, 2004) e L'evento del tempo. Saggio sulla filosofia del processo di A. N. Whitehead (Milano, 2005). È redattore della rivista di filosofia «Oltrecorrente» e collabora ad «Aut-Aut».

The intent of this research is to explore the area of attachment theory in
relation to art therapy. It first offers an overview of attachment theory and then considers how current neuroscience research supports this and offers some explanation as to the efficacy and validity of using non-verbal expressive therapies in the treatment of early relational trauma. This study also explores intersubjectivity and suggests that while attachment theory can offer us insight into our clients’ experience and patterns of behaviour, intersubjectivity can offer us a therapeutic way of being, to enable a process whereby clients can rebuild insecure attachments. The role of image making within the intersubjective client-therapist relationship is considered and how the nonverbal process of art making in art therapy can play a fundamental role in both accessing and communicating affective states. Examples from the author’s clinical placement within a child and adolescent mental health service will illustrate art therapy with three clients presenting different styles of attachment. Lastly, an argument is put forward for including attachment theory and the influence of neuroscience on the MA Art Therapy training course to inform and validate the practice. Through this, the author hopes to develop an argument based on neuroscientific research that emphasises a rationale for using art therapy within an attachment framework.

1.For Husserl phenomenology is an experiential philosophy of essence as phenomena. For Husserl there is the indivisibility of the essence and the manifestation of the essence which manifestation is phenomena, the manifestation of appearance. This was Husserl's great contribution to philosophy, the inseparability of essence and phenomena. Merleau Ponty made this the focus of his philosophical work.

Exploration of INTERSUBJECTIVITY is continued. Different kinds of if are differentiated and signs for its presence and effects are shown. The difference between it, subjectivity and objectivity are explored.
Intersubjectivity is crucial and universal for general everyday discourse in all cultures, sub-cultures, institutions, communities and socio-cultural practices such as religion, sport, etc or the so-called Manifest Image. It is essential for specialized areas, for example religion, sport and disciplines such as the humanities, arts, sciences, philosophy and all institutions.
It is a necessity for both cultural, social, interpersonal as well as intra-personal existence, emotions, attitudes, values and norms. But, it is not limited to human existence, life-worlds, realities and worlds, but also for animals and all organisms. Object Oriented Ontology would emphasize that is it not merely something anthropocentric and restricted to human existence and consciousness (and anthropocentric interpretations of and projections on other objects, non-human creatures and all organisms, as well as all objects.. In the case of the latter one would probably replace the notion of intersubjectivity with terms such as energy and other ways of action and interaction for example intra- and inter-atoms.)
In the Appendix is included work related to the above by others such as Sellars, Brandom (and his two images, Manifest and Scientific), Davidson, Dennett, Habermas, Nagel, etc.

Largely aided by the findings of the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ the attention to motor activity in action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally ‘mirror’ an observed action by covertly reproducing a version of it has lead to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that perception of others actions automatically activate our own covert action representations, and then that we can use this shared action representation to understand various aspects of the observed action and possibly infer the goal and/or intentions of the observed agent or maybe predict upcoming actions. There is some disagreement among researchers and theorists as to the function of motor ‘simulation’. It is debated whether it serves as the basis for low-level ‘mind-reading’, i.e. ascription of intentions and various mental states to others (Gallese 2003, 2004, 2007. Gallese & Goldman 1998, Goldman in press, Hurley 2005) or whether the function of the simulation is purely related to understanding the action itself (Jeannerod 2006) or maybe related to anticipating upcoming actions (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006). 
What seems to be assumed in most of these simulation theories is that the default role of the motor system in social perception is to ‘mirror’ the observed action or that it is only related to the observed action and not my own action motives and plans. It is these basic assumptions of the passivity of motor resonance that I would like to challenge. The question is whether it is misleading to conceptualize motor resonance simply as a mirroring simulation where we covertly ‘echo’ the observed action? Many studies of the functional properties of mirror neurons (MN) and motor facilitation during perception seem to point to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception (di Pellegrino 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). This has recently led to some proposals trying to reinterpret the function of motor activity during action perception and in social situations from a simple mirroring process to an anticipatory process (Kilner et al 2004, Csibra 2005, Prinz 2006) – or simply to abandon the idea of simulation altogether (Gallagher 2007). I think these are interesting proposals, but inspired by historic approaches to motor resonance and recent studies I would like to venture a hypothesis of an even more proactive, context and motivation dependent role of motor activity during action perception (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Schie et al. In press, Cheng et al. 2007, Keysers & Perrett 2004, 502). Motor resonance during object perception is by many researchers thought of in terms of affordances; i.e. what the object affords the observer to do (Grèzes et al. 2003). My question is why we should not – albeit extra social levels of complexity - see motor resonance during social perception in a similar way, as potential action sketches ‘afforded’ by own present motivational, senori-motor and perceptual situation. My point is not that we never ‘simulate’ or covertly imitate observed actions, but rather that it is questionable why we should think of this as the default process in normal interactive social contexts. Covert imitation might only take place during special cases of action observation where we exactly take on a passive spectator attitude, and that we therefore might need a broader theory of motor resonance that also explains normal active and interactive cases of action perception. Accordingly, I suggest that experimental paradigms with single observers in one-way social situations often carry an ‘imitation bias’, and that we are in dire need of more research of actual interactive social perception. I conclude that theories of motor resonance in social perception as a passive ‘mirroring’ or low-level simulation are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system might serve a much more proactive role in social cognition than previously thought.

What we"ll be exploring together today is awareness, becoming aware of awareness, and working with awareness, both with our own selves and with the other. It"s a very simple topic, actually, yet it"s not easy to hold awareness, to enter into awareness, and to become awareness. We often think that awareness is simply a cognition, being aware of a color or of a pretty picture. That is not awareness; that"s a cognition. [At first], awareness is a state. Initially, we think it"s a "state" we enter into, and then, in time, it begins to open up, and it"s actually a field. Then a lot can happen that could not happen, if we were not in the awareness field.

Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 90’s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘mirror mechanism’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. It is proposed instead that the teleological organization found in the broader fronto-parietal circuits might be inherently sensorimotor. Thus the idea of an independent ‘purely perceptual’ goal understanding process is questioned. Further, it is hypothesized that the often asymmetric, heterogeneous and contextually modulated mirror and canonical neurons support a function of multisensory mapping and tracking of the perceiving agents affordance space. Such a shift in the interpretative framework offers a different theoretical handle on how sensorimotor processes might ground various aspects of intentional action choice and social cognition. Mirror neurons would under the proposed “social affordance model” be seen as dynamic parts of larger circuits, which support tracking of currently shared and competing action possibilities. These circuits support action selection processes—but also our understanding of the options and action potentials that we and perhaps others have in the affordance space. In terms of social cognition ‘mirror’ circuits might thus help us understand not only the intentional actions others are actually performing—but also what they could have done, did not do and might do shortly.

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context.

Research paradigms for stimulating empathic responses in virtual reality change perceived self-other overlap through illusions that cause users to experience their own body as a virtual avatar with a different type of body. Virtual Alterity paradigms involve sharing aspects of another real person's first-person experience in interactive virtual environments. In this thesis, I define empathy as an other-directed emotion motivating concern for another's welfare, and argue that virtual alterity systems are better designed to facilitate empathy when conceived in this way, as compared to avatar illusions in VR.

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and couldparadoxicallybe seen as representing the "dark matter" of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really "go social"; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as they relate to 1) our current affordances (here & now navigation) as opposed to 2) presently non-actual relations, where we need to leave our concrete embodied/situated viewpoint (counterfactual navigation). It is proposed that whereas toddlers seem able to understand FBs in their current affordance space, they do not yet possess the resources to navigate in abstraction from such concrete affordances, which explicit FB tests seem to require. It is hypothesized that counterfactual navigation depends on the development of ‘sensorimotor priors’, i.e. statistical expectations of own kinestetic re-afference, which evidence now suggests matures around age four, consistent with core findings of explicit FB performance.

This article adds to the rich array of scholarly work on the moral dimensions of fairy tales by inverting key aspects of what has so far been theorized, and suggesting a basis for the evaluation of moral agency that arises from reciprocal interchange. Drawing upon current theories of "folk-psychology," complementary developmental studies of "intersubjective competency," research on "motor resonance" (Gallese 2001, Zwaan and Taylor 2006), and close textual analysis, this article illuminates how fairy tales guide (or manipulate) the reception of their moral content by conveying abstract notions and sociocultural knowhow through accessing preconscious sensory-motor mechanisms and "affective consciousness" (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp 2011). In so doing, I add credence to the theory of cultural evolution proposed by Richard Dawkins (1976, 1982) and Daniel Dennett (1984. 1991, 2017), which posits genes and memes to be the main currency of cultural transmission. This view overlaps in interesting ways with the Extended Mind hypothesis and the "4E" modal of human cognition, according to which the mind is embodied, embedded, enactive and extended (Clark 1997, 2013; Wheeler 2005; Gallagher 2005; Menary 2010; Colombetti 2014; Rowlands 2015). What we learn from the continuously successful history of the fairy tale tradition, I argue, is that moral standards may vary, but certain principles for communicating moral content remain steadfastly effective.

lived during the 6 th . Century. Heidegger and Gadamer utilized Augustine in their understanding of Hermeneutics. His work helped them formulate positions that went beyond idealistic thinking. Augustine's work helped them go beyond the predicative statement alone and helped Heidegger and Gadamer understand that the predicative statements completion is through the readers mind. Augustine's work helped them go beyond the literal predicative statement and to the revelation of the experience of meaning from within the reader's awareness.

Pubblicato in Mauro Maldonato (ed.), Pensare la scienza, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2009, pp. 260---292. Neuroni specchio ed empatia I neuroni specchio sono i correlati neuronali dell'empatia? Per fornire una risposta chiara e univoca è necessario interrogare anzitutto i presupposti che rendono la domanda possibile, e questo non può essere fatto se non si affronta una preventiva indagine filosofica sulle nozioni di "empatia" e di "correlati neuronali". Affrontiamo pertanto questa domanda considerando che il nodo concettuale maggiormente problematico non concerne, in sé e per sé, la legittimità di una correlazione tra i neuroni specchio e le dinamiche della coscienza empatica (correlazione che pare legittimamente documentabile e, all'interno di un quadro metodologico sperimentale, addirittura incontrovertibile); piuttosto, esso riguarda anzitutto il significato metafisico che, in maniera per lo più inconsapevole, viene attribuito dal registro esplicativo del naturalismo alle corrispondenze verificabili tra i sostrati neuroanatomici e la vita di coscienza dei soggetti empatici. In questo lavoro avrò modo di sostenere che la compromissione metafisica tipica delle spiegazioni di questo tipo deriva in primo luogo dai presupposti rappresentazionalistici e riduzionistici con i quali, per lo più, viene semplificata la correlazione tra eventi neurobiologici e fenomeni della vita di coscienza. Cominciamo con l'introdurre, anzitutto, che cosa sono i neuroni specchio. Si tratta di strutture della corteccia premotoria la cui attivazione è legata selettivamente a specifiche tipologie di atti motori finalizzati, caratterizzabili come azioni intenzionali: la peculiarità dei neuroni specchio di un soggetto consiste nel fatto che essi si attivano sia quando il soggetto compie l'azione, sia quando il soggetto osserva qualcun altro compiere la medesima azione . Si può parlare, per estensione, di "sistemi specchio" o "sistemi risonanti" di un soggetto per indicare tutte le strutture neuronali che si attivano sia in concomitanza del prodursi di una certa modificazione intenzionale nel soggetto (intenzionalità motoria, affettiva, ecc.), sia quando il soggetto riscontra la medesima modificazione in un altro agente intenzionale (si parla pertanto di sistemi specchio motori per le azioni finalizzate, sistemi specchio somatosensoriali per le sensazioni tattili e per il dolore, sistemi specchio emotivi per la paura, la rabbia, il disgusto, ecc. 1 ). Essendo coinvolti tanto nei processi inerenti l'esperienza vissuta in prima persona (eseguo un'azione, provo una sensazione, vivo un'emozione) quanto nei processi riscontrabili in terza persona (osservo qualcuno compiere un'azione, provare una sensazione, vivere un'emozione), i sistemi specchio sono stati indicati come i correlati neuronali di funzioni che sono ad un tempo performative e percettive, ovvero di controllo esecutivo e di riconoscimento 2 . Questo ha condotto a supporre che i neuroni specchio 1 Si veda ad esempio Singer et al. (2004) per gli studi sull'empatia per il dolore e Wicker et al. (2003) per i fenomeni di contagio legati alle espressioni di disgusto. 2 Gallese (2002). Si veda anche Rizzolatti e Sinigaglia (2006) per un'esposizione comprensiva delle problematiche inerenti i neuroni specchio e l'action recognition.

Mirror neurons have been hailed as the key to understanding social cognition. I argue that three currents of thought—relating to evolution, atomism and telepathy—have magnified the perceived importance of mirror neurons. When they are understood to be a product of associative learning, rather than an adaptation for social cognition, mirror neurons are no longer mesmerising, but they continue to raise important questions about both the psychology of science and the neural bases of social cognition.

Institutionalized and internalized,‭ ‬competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality,‭ ‬including of themselves‭ (‬Dennett and Sellars‭)‬,.‭ ‬This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive,‭ ‬understanding intersubjectivity.‭ ‬It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding‭ (‬scientific,‭ ‬Dennett and Sellars‭) ‬image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics and morality deal with the reality of competence intersubjectivity‭ (‬by means of socio-cultural practices that are derived from,‭ ‬based on an created by means of this restrictive,‭ ‬misleading,‭ ‬unreal,‭ ‬illusory,‭ ‬unrealistic intersubjectivity and the life-worlds associated with it‭)  ‬and human life-worlds constituted on the basis of and in terms of this intersubjectivity.‭ ‬This is why I am a nihilist,‭ ‬a libertarian,‭ ‬at least a minarchist or rather an anarchist and epistemologically a sceptic.

Kant’s‭ ‬things in themselves are similar‭ ‬to Dennett and Searle‭’‬s‭ ‬notions of manifest and scientific image.‭ ‬With my addition that we‭  ‬are socialized and internalize the competent,‭ ‬know how to do it,‭  ‬institutionalized manifest,‭ ‬everyday intersubjectivity,‭ ‬instead of the comprehension,‭ ‬insights and understanding knowing that,‭ ‬scientific intersubjectivity of all scientific disciplines.‭


This piece can be read as independent as comments on meta-ethics,‭ ‬or it can be read as a chapter in my Book‭ ‘‬Intersubjectivity‭ (‬continued‭)’‬,‭ ‬or it can be read as an introduction to my thoughts on philosophy and more specifically Intersubjectivity as‭ –


Determining the nature of‭  ‬philosophy


Determining the nature of the subject-matter of philosophy,‭ ‬sociology,‭ ‬social psychology,‭ ‬aspects of cognitive sciences,‭ ‬ethics,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬etc,


Determining the nature of philosophical methodology and approaches.

Reasons why I have refrained from reflecting and writing on ethics and morality‭ ‬-‭

a‭)‬  The intersubjectivity that are institutionalized,‭ ‬socialized and internalize and therefore being employed to constitute reality,‭ ‬life-worlds,‭ ‬selves,‭ ‬discourses and socio-cultural practices,‭ ‬including specialized disciplines,‭ ‬eg philosophy,‭ ‬is that of‭  ‬Kantian things-for-us or Searle‭’ ‬and Dennett’s notion of manifest,‭ ‬imaginary,‭ ‬competent or know-how,‭ ‬knowing-how-to images.‭ ‬This kind of intersubjectivity underlies human morality and ethics,‭ ‬as well as approaches of philosophers to these and other branches of philosophy.

‭ ‬b‭) ‬How philosophers exist and how they live,‭ ‬their attitudes and beliefs,‭ ‬are very different from the theories of human existence,‭ ‬consciousness,‭ ‬selves,‭ ‬ethics,‭ ‬morality,‭ ‬epistemology,‭ ‬ontology,‭ ‬metaphysics,‭ ‬etc they advocate or express in and as their theories.‭ ‬Philosophers have their own private ways or personal styles of im/morality and being a-ethical while they advocate theories of ethics‭ (‬and other branches of philosophy‭) ‬that are completely different from their real attitudes and beliefs.

c‭) ‬As far as institutionalized and lived ethics and morality go I am a nihilist,‭ ‬an anarchist,‭ ‬or at least a minarchist,‭ ‬a Pyrrhonist,‭ ‬or at least a Humean or Kantian sceptic if not a fallibilist.

A suggestion before I paste the usual,‭ ‬contemporary encyclopaedic notions of ethics as a branch of philosophy and present notions of the‭ ‘‬division‭’ ‬of the subject and approaches to ethics and meta-ethics.‭

When a compatibilist says free will and determinism are compatible,‭ ‬and critics say they are mistaken‭ – ‬see below‭ – ‬they talk about specific situations,‭ ‬while those who points out that there do exists some kinds of determinisms after all,‭ ‬the latter take a more general,‭ ‬big picture view and make a statement on a greater or higher level of generality or generalization.

A number of psychoanalysts have become excited about mirror neurons, as they are called by neuroscientists.  Mirror neurons have the remarkable property of responding identically to an action I intend as well as an action you intend.  The argument of some psychoanalysts is that mirror neurons open a new pathway to understanding the intentions of others.  They make possible a new type of empathy, more direct and less mediated by the typical defenses.  One result of such a perspective on psychoanalysis is the virtual death of the countertransference.  If one has direct empathic contact with another mind, then countertransferential experience is only a barrier, not a guide.  The essay not only looks at the evidence for mirror neurons, which is ambiguous, but also at what need they might be filling in our contemporary culture.

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

Debates about neonatal imitation remain more open than Keven & Akins (K&A) imply. K&A do not recognize the primacy of the question concerning differential imitation and the links between experimental designs and more or less plausible theoretical assumptions. Moreover, they do not acknowledge previous theorizing on spontaneous behavior, the explanatory power of entrainment, and subtle connections with social cognition.

Skepticism toward the existence of neonatal differential imitation is fostered by views that assign it an excessive significance, making it foundational for social cognition. Moreover, a misleading theoretical framework may generate unwarranted expectations about the kinds of findings experimentalists are supposed to look for. Hence we propose a theoretical analysis that may help experimentalists address the empirical question of whether early differential imitation really exists. We distinguish three models of early imitation. The first posits automatic visuo-motor links evolved for sociocognitive functions and we call it Genetically Programmed Direct Matching (GPDM). The second is Meltzoff and Moore’s Active Intermodal Matching (AIM), which postulates a comparison between the acts of self and other. The third is the alternative we propose and we call it Association by Similarity Theory (AST), as it relies on the tacit functioning of this domain-general process. AST describes early imitation merely as the differential induction or elicitation of behaviors that already tend to occur spontaneously. We focus on the contrast between AIM and AST, and argue that AST is preferable to AIM for two reasons. First, AST is more parsimonious and more plausible, especially because it does not require infants to be able to recognize self-other similarities. Second, whereas the extant findings tend to disqualify AIM, AST can account for them adequately. Furthermore, we suggest that AST has the potential to give new impulse to empirical research because it discriminates promising lines of inquiry from unproductive ones.

In this article we advocate the methodological feedback loop in the study of the dynamical self at the crossroads of performance philosophy, (artistic) performance, and the philosophy of science. We point to
the importance of the dynamics of methodology transfer between arts and sciences and the “interactive continuum” proposed by Newman & Benz in 1998. In the first part of this paper we give a comparative
review of the research context relevant for our field of study, and we explain our research hubs in approaching the concept of “performance”. We suggest the possibility to define our filed of research in three equally legitimate ways: as philosophy-of-performance, philosophy-as performance and performance-as-philosophy. In our recent work we are primarily interested in artistic performances that incorporate elements of artistic practice in the methodology of research output (Frayling 1993), as well as in the potentials of performative aspects of scientific praxis and methodology. However, the conceptual background relevant for this paper is in the field of process philosophy and its relation to science
(Birkhard’s “interactivist model” 2009; Campbell’s “process-based model for an interactive ontology” 2009). We attribute particular importance to the notion of “autopoietic feedback” (Maturana and Varela 1974; Luhmann 1990). The second part addresses the issue of transcending identity in the representations of the self and the other; the relationship between Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST), as well as some recent attempts at combining different theories of mind (e.g. Barlassina 2013). We also deal with the notion of “embodied praxis” (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996); we mention some neuroscientific insights into the similar phenomena, and – commenting on the importance of the dialogue between neuroscientists and philosophers (Changeux and Ricour) – we give an example of an enactive approach to understanding acting (Zarrilli 2007). In the third part of this article, we critique the notion of “interpassivity” (Žižek 1997; Pfaller 2000). In the concluding part we mention the importance of exploring the concept of “expanded self” (Gallagher 2000; Jeannerod 2003; Kim and Johnson 2013). Being aware of the impossibility to reach final conclusions in the scientific approach to the dynamics of the self, instead of a formal conclusion, we offer a quote from Yeats’ poem “Balloons of Mind”.

In this volume,‭ ‬volume‭ ‬6,‭ ‬I will deal with insight and understanding,‭ ‬meaning and communication and intersubjectivity.‭ (‬In an appendix I will include a number of‭ –‬isms,‭ ‬cognitive biases and fallacies that might interfere in,‭ ‬with and distort these things.‭)
The latter is pre-supposed by,‭ ‬present,‭ ‬necessary and operating in all four of these notions when they are employed as verbs.‭ ‬I hope and intend to employ these words and explore them without the need for ghost-in-the-machine like mysterious,‭ ‬mystical and mythical‭ ‘‬mental‭’ ‬processes and organs such as‭ ‘‬mind‭’ ‬and‭ ‘‬consciousness‭’ ‬but by means of different meanings,‭ ‬dimensions,‭ ‬levels of t notions of intersubjectivity.‭ ‬Intersubjectivity enfolds‭ (‬like a pregnant mother her foetus‭) ‬insight,‭ ‬understanding,‭ ‬meaning and communication.‭ ‬Intersubjectivity is the beginning,‭ ‬the ground and reason for and the end of all meanings or sense that human beings could have.

The reason for these attitudes of mine towards mental things,‭ ‬processes,‭ ‬organs,‭ ‬etc is that I do not believe they exist,‭ ‬apart from being umbrella-notions that refer to a number of undefined and not yet conceptualized meanings.‭ ‬They have their origins in uneducated,‭ ‬uninformed redundant myths and folk psychology.‭ ‬Their usage date back to almost pre-historic times in the evolution of human thinking and psychology and are conceptual remainders and linguistic left overs‭  ‬of primitive flat earth socio-cultural attitudes and beliefs.

I further need to make four points concerning my approach in this volume and my approach to or understanding of philosophy,‭ ‬they manner or style in which I write,‭ ‬especially in this volume and how I employ and interpret the nature and one function of intersubjectivity,‭ ‬both in this volume and in general.‭ ‬The latter I present as a kind of hypothesis and conclusion.

1‭)‬I realized many years,‭ ‬decades,‭ ‬ago‭ ‬that I approach philosophy,‭ ‬science,‭ ‬art and other socio-cultural practices that I am interested in and became involved with in a manner that is not the usual run-of-the-mill one or that of the typical scholar,‭ ‬but in an original and creative thinking way.‭ ‬I did not attempt to study in this manner,‭ ‬but it came to me naturally.‭ ‬I would study and grasp what some philosopher,‭ ‬scientist,‭ ‬sociologist,‭ ‬artist,‭ ‬thinker,‭ ‬etc attempted to express and communicate‭ – ‬as serious scholars would and some of them do in an excellent way,‭ ‬and most of them in a mediocre manner and others rather poorly.‭ ‬But,‭ ‬that was only the beginning of my contact with a subject and an author.‭ ‬I had to go further and question his work and the assumptions he made as merely the first preliminary step,‭ ‬as I had to re-think his approach and work by means of my own original insights,‭ ‬model or perspective.‭ ‬I thought this is merely the natural or usual way of reading and thinking about the ideas thinkers or authors present to us,‭ ‬until I discovered this,‭ ‬my natural attitude and way of dealing with texts,‭ ‬approaches and theories are unusual and that the conventional way of dealing with such things is that of the academic scholar‭ ‬-‭ ‬that what we read in articles,‭ ‬theses,‭ ‬books and research.‭ ‬It often consists of commentaries on the work and/‭ ‬or the commentaries of others‭ – ‬for example one paper in sociology presented us with commentary on Habermas’s commentary on Brandom.‭ ‬Of course that type of thing is fine for the category of scholarly work,‭ ‬but to me it appears almost pointless and irrelevant and does not develop the discipline or provide us with meaningful insights.‭ ‬So much for scholarly approaches,‭ ‬or the stuff that the majority of academic books,‭ ‬articles and theses are made of and the insights and ideas of the handful of original-‭ ‬and creative thinking individuals in disciplines,‭ ‬discourses or socio-cultural practices,‭ ‬for example Plato,‭ ‬Aristotle,‭ ‬Kant,‭ ‬Hegel,‭ ‬Wittgenstein,‭ ‬Leibniz,‭ ‬Spinoza,‭ ‬Marx,‭ ‬et al.

One aspect of these two approaches is the question about the intention or motive of these different kinds of work.‭ ‬The original,‭ ‬creative-thinking one is obliged to work,‭ ‬think and write in that discipline or execute the socio-cultural practice,‭ ‬as if his life depends on it,‭ ‬he lives or exists for his passion,‭ ‬the other kind forms part of the professional,‭ ‬academic practice,‭ ‬the academic who must publish and therefore is obliged to find some topic or subject-matter,‭ ‬often contrived,‭ ‬as it forms part of his tenure and job-description,‭ ‬like the majority in any discipline who lives off that subject.

2‭) ‬The second point concerns certain aspects of the so-called Socratic Method/s.‭ ‬In an earlier book I roughly distinguished between different kinds of philosophy‭  ‬in terms of the ways it is being done‭ (‬speculative or revisionary metaphysics as Strawson labelled it,‭ ‬his own descriptive kind of metaphysics,‭ ‬and two kinds of explorative philosophy,‭ ‬namely the hard ones,‭ ‬that retains certain metaphysical ambitions and the soft explorative kind,‭ ‬that lost the need or desire for any form‭  ‬of metaphysics.‭ ‬The latter is represented by the Socratic methods and the former‭  ‬by the Philosophical Investigations.‭ ‬In that work I suggested that the explorative types of doing philosophy appear to be more meaningful for the philosophical enterprise as it discarded all or most metaphysical aspirations and motives and as they provide us with a faint glimmer of hope that there remains a future for the philosophical discourse‭ – ‬a socio-cultural practice that desperately seeks for subject-matter‭ (‬by innovations such as experimental philosophy,‭ ‬the creation‭  ‬of philosophies of every subject and everything possible and increasing attempts to become involved in interdisciplinary work‭) ‬and methods and that is increasingly predicted not to last beyond the end of this century,‭ ‬if that long.

È veramente possibile comprendersi? Siamo in grado di coesistere con gli inviolabili spazi che ci separano? La psicologia cognitiva ha elaborato alcuni modelli che tentano di spiegare la comprensione dell’altro. Ma cosa accade se questo altro è un personaggio letterario? Come possiamo provare delle emozioni per dei personaggi che non esistono nella realtà? Per sceverare questi temi mi sono basata su alcune derivazioni della tradizione fenomenologica, analitica e su alcuni studi di psicologia cognitiva, partendo dall’assunto che elementi tratti dalle diverse tradizioni possano servire vicendevolmente da correttivi.

In Critical Philosophy and, particularly, phenomenology 'inter-subjectivity' is a core theme of analysis. As Zahavi put it, intersub-jectivity, " be it in the form of a concrete self—other relation, a socially structured life-world, or a transcendental principle of justification , is ascribed an absolutely central role by phenomenologists. " Yet, when dealt with in this way, 'intersubjectivity,' as a conceptual attempt to refer to our ontology, to who we are, conceals other phenomena. In this paper an attempt is being made to articulate the phenomenon of authentic intersubjectivity by contrasting it with what we refer to as intersubjection, when only one subjectivity is expressing the Other by expressing the Other through the same, as in the case of empathy. Following the feminist critique we identify inter-subjection as the tendency to reduce the Other to one's own categories hence muting them or, at best, imposing on them a category which is intended from one subject only. Following Sartre, we articulate intersubjectivity as a reciprocal, bilateral relation where subjec

A lack of imitative behavior is frequently described as a core feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and is consistent with claims of mirror neuron system dysfunction in these individuals. Previous research has questioned this characterization of ASD however, arguing that when tests of automatic imitation are used - which do not require higher-level cognitive processing - imitative behavior is intact or even enhanced in individuals with ASD. In Experiment 1 60 adult individuals with ASD and a matched Control group completed an automatic imitation task in which they were required to perform an index or a middle finger lift while observing a hand making either the same, or the alternate, finger movement. Both groups demonstrated a significant imitation effect whereby actions were executed faster when preceded by observation of the same action, than when preceded by the alternate action. The magnitude of this ‘imitation effect’ was statistically indistinguishable in the ASD and Control groups. Experiment 2 utilized an improved automatic imitation paradigm to demonstrate that, when automatic imitation effects are isolated from those due to spatial compatibility, increasing autism symptom severity is associated with an increased tendency to imitate. Notably, there was no association between autism symptom severity and spatial compatibility, demonstrating the specificity of the link between ASD symptoms and increased imitation. These results provide evidence against claims of a lack of imitative behavior in ASD, and challenge the ‘Broken Mirror Theory of Autism’.

The ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness’ conference – which has now become ‘The Science of Consciousness’ conference – recently (June 5-10, 2017) took place instead at the receptive venue of the Hyatt Regency in La Jolla, California. It was well-planned and organized, which is extraordinary considering that it had to be organized all over again within a month or two when the original Shanghai location was cancelled. Things ran smoothly at La Jolla and it was well attended for an odd-year, non-Tucson setting. The Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies, Dr. Stuart Hameroff, and his able Assistant Director and logistics manager, Abi Behar Montefiore, deserve full credit for carrying off this last minute transfer, as do many others who worked in supporting capacities.

We previously reported that college students who indicated engaging in frequent dreamenacting behaviors also scored high on a new measure of mirror behaviors, which is the propensity to imitate another person’s emotions or actions. Since dream-enacting behaviors are frequently the culmination of nightmares, one explanation for the observed relationship is that individuals who frequently display mirror behaviors are also prone to nightmares. We used the Mirror Behavior Questionnaire (MBQ) and self-reported  frequencies of nightmares to assess this possibility.
A sample of 480 students, consisting of 188 males (19.2 ± 1.73 years) and 292 females (19.0 ± 1.55 years) enrolled in a first-year university psychology course, participated for course credit. They completed a battery of questionnaires that included the 16-item MBQ, plus an item about nightmare frequency (NMF) in the past 30 days. NMF scores were split to create low, medium, and high NMF groups.
MBQ total scores were significantly higher for female than for male subjects, but an interaction revealed that this was true only for Hi-NMF subjects. MBQ Factor 4, Motor Skill Imitation, paralleled this global interaction for females, whereas MBQ Factor 3, Sleepiness/Anger Contagion, was elevated only for Hi-NMF males. Item analyses indicated that Hi- and Med-NMF females scored higher than Lo-NMF females on the 3 items of Factor 4 that reflect voluntary imitation (imitating famous/cartoon voices, being a physically active spectator, and learning new skills by observing), as well as on 2 other items that reflect involuntary imitation (contagious yawning and self-rated empathy). Although Hi- and Lo-NMF males differed most clearly on the sleepiness item of Factor 3, all 3 items on this factor (including anger contagion and contagious yawning) are plausibly associated with perception of and response to social threat.
Results provide evidence that among females nightmares are  ssociated with voluntary and involuntary mirror behaviors during wakefulness, while among males nightmares are associated with threat-related mirror behaviors during wakefulness. They thus support the possibility that the association between mirror behaviors and dream-enacting behaviors is due to a common mirror neuron mechanism that  underlies mirror behaviors and nightmares and that involves motor, rather than emotional, resonance. These results have implications for understanding the comorbidity of nightmares and other pathological symptoms such as imitative suicidal behaviors, the influence of observational learning on dissociative symptomatology, and the predominance of threat and aggression in the dream enacting behaviors of REM sleep behavior disorder.

This projects aims at investigating an important aspect of the link between the bodily self and mirroring mechanisms and proceeds in two steps. First we examine the Visual Enhancement of Touch (VET) effect in Depersonalisation individuals, which is a crucial example of how multisensory modulation in the somatosensory system might play a crucial role in representing the sensations of others. Indeed, Depersonalization (DP henceforth) is a fascinating and intriguing phenomena which typically manifests as a profound disruption of bodily self-awareness (Sierra & Berrios 1997) which result in a feeling of being “estranged” not only from the physical and social world, but more crucially, from their own bodily experiences. Project members: 1. Dr. Anna Ciaunica (IF Porto/UCL_ICN London) PI; 2) Dr. Harry Farmer (UCL_ICN London) co-PI; 3)Prof. Ophelia Deroy (LMU); 4) Prof Vittorio Gallese ( Parma)

A lack of imitative behavior is frequently described as a core feature of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), and is consistent with claims of mirror neuron system dysfunction in these individuals. Previous research has questioned this characterization of ASD however, arguing that when tests of automatic imitation are used-which do not require higher-level cognitive processing-imitative behavior is intact or even enhanced in individuals with ASD. In Experiment 1, 60 adult individuals with ASD and a matched Control group completed an automatic imitation task in which they were required to perform an index or a middle finger lift while observing a hand making either the same, or the alternate, finger movement. Both groups demonstrated a significant imitation effect whereby actions were executed faster when preceded by observation of the same action, than when preceded by the alternate action. The magnitude of this "imitation effect" was statistically indistinguishable in the ASD...

The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an eval- uation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a sufficient basis for the forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action, insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online mutual adjustment of participants’ actions.

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and couldparadoxicallybe seen as representing the "dark matter" of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really "go social"; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. Keywords: interactor's point of view; mentalizing network; mirror neuron system; observer's point of view; "problem" of other minds; second-person neuroscience; social cognition "No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed."

Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here

Resumo Apesar do fato de que " empatia " é muitas vezes usada apenas como uma tradução de Einfühlung, os dois termos têm significados distintos e filiações disciplinares distintas. Este texto considera a maneira pela qual a imagem em movimento (seja dentro de um filme, vídeo, instalação ou arte) convida formas espaciais de envolvimento semelhante aos descritos tanto pelos relatos históricos de Einfühlung, uma forma de engajamento que diz respeito não só às atividades de seres humanos representadas em imagens, como também pelas qualidades estéticas de imagens em um sentido mais abstrato e pelas formas de ser encontradas nessas imagens.

This essay contains two hypotheses: the first postulates that infectious and parasitic conditions in the first baby-carrying devices or “slings” selected for changes in juvenile hair distribution and immuno-resistance, and that a convergence of datable mutations and osteological changes indicate that infants in our lineage adapted to the microenvironment between 1.2 and 2.8 million years ago - with evidence converging towards the older end of that range. Such slings, which might have been first used to carry gleanings, would have surrounded offspring in dangerous pathogens and parasites. Babies whose fetal body baldness had not disappeared would have had an advantage over infants with previously normal body fur, because adults could clean them better – probably resulting in the neotenic extension of the fetal trait.
The microenvironment might have selected for the elimination of infectious pathways as well. The inactivation of the CMAH gene, which could have provided a pathway for pathogens associated with ungulate and proboscidean hides to infect infants with diarrhea, is explored as a candidate, and multiple ways of testing the hypothesis are described.
The related hypothesis, which is based partly on avian comparisons and milk chemistry, postulates that slings gradually forced adults to focus on the kind of nutrition needed by more slowly maturing infant brains by making their babies more altricial. This might have triggered more scavenging, hunting, and feedback mechanisms that slowly extended the new juvenile hair distribution to adults as part of a whole-body cooling system based on sweat and body baldness while contributing to speciation.

You can either download this article from Academia.edu or from my website, www.duncancaldwell.com, which offers more publications and information.

Through the use of Relational Group Process (Erskine, 2013) the therapist(s) and group members join together to build an intersubjective environment a co-constructed group experience. This process encourages people to respectfully listen and inquire of each other, to move out of the role of simply being observers of group dynamics, and to stop engaging in judgmental assessments of the others. The intersubjective aspects of Integrative Psychotherapy are essential components for achieving the goal of integration. The set of relational methods outlined in Integrative Psychotherapy provide a comprehensive guide for intersubjective treatment. When these methods are applied to the group setting in the format of relational group process, they allow the integration of different experiences in the group matrix. The more the group matrix holds individual experiences, the more internal and external contact of group members is fostered. A case study illustrating these concepts and dynamics is presented.

The main criticism Pfeiffer advances in his commentary is that our proposal is too narrow. Embodied simulation (ES), in his view equated to motor resonance, is not a sufficiently primary mechanism on which we can base a unified neurobiological theory of the earliest sense of self and others. According to Pfeiffer, motor resonance needs to be complemented by other more basic and primary mechanisms. Hence, as an alternative to our proposal, he suggests that multisensory spatial processing can play this role, primarily contributing to the earliest foundation of the sense of self and others. In our reply we stress on the one hand that identifying ES only with motor resonance is a partial view that may give rise to fallacious arguments, since ES also deals with emotions and sensations. We also show, on the other hand, that ES and multisensory integration should not be seen as alternative solutions to the problem of the neural bases of the bodily self, because multimodal integration carried out by the cortical motor system is an instantiation of ES. We conclude by stressing the role ES might have played in the transition from bodily experience to symbolic expression.

Drawing on the testing of three theoretical models of imitative learning in the ethnographic context of an Afro-Brazilian possession ritual, this paper examines the concept of bodily indoctrina- tion. The vernacular concept of “bodily indoctrination” refers to mirroring in an imitative learning situation, where the possessed mimics the initiator’s movements and the initiator, in his turn, imi- tates the dance of the deity that the possessed needs to learn. In this singular pedagogical context, bodily indoctrination seems to rely on tightly interwoven and mostly unconscious perceptual, emo- tional and sensorimotor mechanisms. The imitated behavior is first grasped bodily through emo- tional and motor resonance. The research also highlights that bodily indoctrination is the result of the pedagogical interaction between the deity and the initiator, characterized by perceptual and interpretative biases that facilitate learning and the imitative process.

KEYWORDS: Imitation, Possession Dance, Motor and Emotional Resonance, Natural Pedagogy, Bodily Indoctrination.

Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is characterized, among other symptoms, by interpersonal dysfunction and difficulties in empathizing. According to Simulation Theory empathy is linked to the activity of the mirror neuron system (MNS). Mu-rhythm desynchronization, as reflected in a suppression of electroencephalographic alpha-frequency bands (8–13 Hz) provides a non-invasive electrophysiological window into MNS function. Here, we analyzed mu-desynchronization in twenty-two patients with BPD and twenty-three matched healthy controls in a reward and punishment-sensitive action observation task. In addition, we examined empathy using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. BPD patients and controls did not differ with regard to mu-desynchronization when the entire time course was compared. However, differences in mu-suppression between groups occurred after the goal of the action became discernible. Correlations between mu-suppression and empathy ratings emerged only in controls, but not in the patient group. These findings suggest that BPD patients do not have a generalized impairment in MNS activity, though associations with contextual factors seem plausible.

Dream-enacting behaviors (DEBs) are behavioral expressions of forceful dream images often occurring during sleep-to-wakefulness transitions. We propose that DEBs reflect brain activity underlying social cognition, in particular, motor-affective resonance generated by the mirror neuron system. We developed a Mirror Behavior Questionnaire (MBQ) to assess some dimensions of mirror behaviors and investigated relationships between MBQ scores and DEBs in a large of university undergraduate cohort. MBQ scores were normally distributed and described by a four-factor structure (Empathy/Emotional Contagion, Behavioral Imitation, Sleepiness/Anger Contagion, Motor Skill Imitation). DEB scores correlated positively with MBQ total and factor scores even with social desirability, somnambulism and somniloquy controlled. Emotion-specific DEB items correlated with corresponding emotion-specific MBQ items, especially crying and smiling. Results provide preliminary evidence for cross-state relationships between propensities for dream-enacting and mirror behaviors—especially behaviors involving motor-affective resonance—and our suggestion that motor-affective resonance mediates dream-enactment imagery during sleep and emotional empathy during waking.

The presentation proposes to complement an existing development on meaning generation for animals, humans and artificial agents by looking at what could have existed at pre-biotic times and what could be a post-human meaning generation. The core of the approach is based on an existing model for meaning generation: the Meaning Generator System (MGS). The MGS is part of an agent submitted to an internal constraint. The MGS generates a meaning when it receives an information that has a connection with the constraint. The generated meaning is used by the agent to implement an action (physical, biological or mental) aimed at satisfying the constraint. The action can be in or out the agent. The purpose of the presentation is to widen the MGS approach in order to reach a coverage for information, constraint and meaning from a pre-biotic level to a possible post-human one. We present the MGS for animals, humans and artificial agents with the corresponding constraints. We then look at what could have been a constraint at a pre-biotic far from thermodynamic equilibrium level. At the other end of the spectrum we look at a possible post-human status with an evolution of a 'limit anxiety' human constraint and also with AAs submitted to animal or human type constraints. Such approach links information science with physics, evolution, anthropology, semiotics and human mind. Continuations are proposed.

Down syndrome (DS) is the most common non-lethal genetic condition that affects approximately 1 in 700 births in the United States of America. DS is characterized by complete or segmental chromosome 21 trisomy, which leads to variable intellectual disabilities, progressive memory loss, and accelerated neurodegeneration with age. During the last three decades, people with DS have experienced a doubling of life expectancy due to progress in treatment of medical comorbidities, which has allowed this population to reach the age when they develop early onset Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Individuals with DS develop cognitive and pathological hallmarks of AD in their fourth or fifth decade, and are currently lacking successful prevention or treatment options for dementia. The profound memory deficits associated with DS-related AD (DS-AD) have been associated with degeneration of several neuronal populations, but mechanisms of neurodegeneration are largely unexplored. The most successful animal model for DS is the Ts65Dn mouse, but several new models have also been developed. In the current review, we discuss recent findings and potential treatment options for the management of memory loss and AD neuropathology in DS mouse models. We also review agerelated neuropathology, and recent findings from neuroimaging studies. The validation of appropriate DS mouse models that mimic neurodegeneration and memory loss in humans with DS can be valuable in the study of novel preventative and treatment interventions, and may be helpful in pinpointing gene-gene interactions as well as specific gene segments involved in neurodegeneration.

Social cognition has received much attention in fields such as neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST) provide the dominant theoretical frameworks for research on social cognition. However, neither theory addresses the matter of how the concepts of “self” and “other” are acquired through the development of human and nonhuman agents. Here, we show that the internal representations of “self” and “other” can be developed in an artificial agent only through the simple predictive learning achieved by deep neural networks with the superposition mechanism we herein propose. That is, social cognition can be achieved without a pre-given (or innate) framework of self and other; this is not assumed (or is at least unclear) in TT and ST. We demonstrate that the agent with the proposed model can acquire basic abilities of social cognition such as shared spatial representations of self and other, perspective-taking, and mirror-neuron-like activities of the agent’s neural network. The result indicates that the superposition mechanism we propose is a necessary condition for the development of the concepts of “self” and “other” and, hence, for the development of social cognition in general.

" The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story. "-Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Adichie's statement resounds at the heart of what is being challenged in South African society, in our communication with each other, within our institutional structures and within our curricula. A single paradigm has dominated our discourse, intellectual thinking and ways of relating to each other. It is the youth that have challenged this antiquated status quo. The #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements have been a dominant force in South Africa over the last two years and seem to have set the restart button on racism, yet they have merely given voice to the invisible and silenced experience of the majority in our country. Whilst the voices are uncomfortable to listen to, important debate and visible change is arising from these platforms. The spaces between ordinary South Africans are being renegotiated from the ground up, with the youth leading the transformation desperately needed within our society. This paper proposes that empathy and self-awareness are the agents for change that are needed to pioneer a meaningful shift in the way we communicate with each other in contexts such as these. Together they cultivate compassion and an ability to stay present within the spaces between people, rather than default through to triggers of bias and entrenched perspectives. These are the real mediators that will move our society into a space of compassion so that we can connect across racial boundaries with our common humanity, communicating openly and without judgement. I posit that a critical component of South Africa's social psyche is being ignored, namely the very high levels of trauma in our society. What is proposed is the need to understand the communication challenges that the country faces through this lens in order to learn about what can be done as human beings in a society that has been through the kind of prolonged trauma South Africans endured through apartheid and before. With regard to empathy, the paper turns to Dr. Brene Brown's definition of 'feeling with' vs 'feeling for'. The former connects us and helps us to feel seen and acknowledged, while the latter separates us and leaves us feeling isolated and shamed. According to Brown, empathy is a set of tools that we can learn and practise.