Human Consciousness

This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991, pp. 651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics in the reply roughly follows that of the target article. The discussion begins with a reconsideration of the details of the empirical findings, whether they can be extrapolated to non-laboratory settings, and the extent to which one can rely on their use of subjective reports. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of what is meant by “conscious processing” and of how phenomenal consciousness relates to attentional processing. We then turn to broader philosophical and theoretical issues. I point out some of the reasons why I do not support epiphenomenalism, dualist-interactionism, or reductionism, and elaborate on how first- and third-person views of the mind can be regarded as complementary and mutually irreducible. I suggest how the relation of conscious experiences to their neural correlates can be understood in terms of a dual-aspect theory of information, and how this might be used to resolve some of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and brain. I also suggest that, viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness gives purpose to existence, which allows a different way of viewing its role in evolution.

Quantum mechanics was developed when human energies of consciousness were found to influence observations at the scale of elementary particles, here referred as non-contact biofield treat-ment or biofield energies. Quantum mechanics has also proved ef-ficacious in biological processes. The present experiments found an enhanced and significant impact of the biofield treatment on adaptive micropropagation response and callus induction of two plant spe-cies, Withania somnifera and Amaranthus dubius. The enhancement was perhaps due to greater focus on adaptation rather than specific mechanisms, showing high potential including at biochemical and genetic levels. Possible reasons for the enhancement are discussed and a possible model is presented, consistent with current scientific theory.

Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part of the contents of consciousness. A finding which requires a Reflexive rather than a Dualist or Reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the conventional separation of the 'mental' from the physical', and with it the very foundation of the Dualist-Reductionist debate. The alternative Reflexive model departs radically from current conventions, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, e.g. the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the Realism versus Idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed.

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of representational redescription processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people through three predictive loops: An inner loop, a perception-action loop, and a self-other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with Signal Detection Theory, highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both Type I (objective) and Type II (subjective, metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is closer to dual-route models in that it assumes that the redescriptions made possible by the emergence of metarepresentations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social cognition involve the same mechanisms.

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious.  Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a “conscious process” is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of “consciousness” is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term.  As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen.  A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time."

This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2) whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process”, 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person viewable causal efficacy of consciousness counts as ‘real’ causal efficacy and 6) a clarification of the sense in which first- and third-person causal accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible.

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal module" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences.

There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian Theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews what is known about the conditions for consciousness within the human mind/brain, understood in both structural (neural) terms and functional terms (in terms of human information processing), and concludes that “random variations in the genome” provide no explanatory mechanism for why some neural activities (but not others) are accompanied by consciousness. The paper then evaluates the many functional advantages that have been proposed for various forms of phenomenal consciousness once they emerge, and concludes that, on close examination, phenomenal experiences themselves do not carry out the information processing functions attributed to them, which challenges the Darwinian requirement that they could only have persisted (once emergent) it they enhanced reproductive fitness. The paper turns finally to what can be said about wider distribution of consciousness in non-humans, contrasting discontinuity theories with continuity theories. Discontinuity theories argue for a critical functional transition that “switches on consciousness” while continuity theories argue for a gradual transition in consciousness from unrecognisable to recognisable. All theories accept that there is an intimate, natural relationship of conscious experiences with their associated material forms. Consequently, as the material forms evolve, their associated experiences co-evolve—suggesting an indirect mechanism by which the emergence of species-specific forms of consciousness can be influenced by Darwinian evolution. It also allows a non-reductive understanding of human consciousness within the social sciences.

Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a non-reductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so—using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism.

This paper proposes an eco-integrated methodology for managing the structural uncertainty (EMSU) that is inherent in socio-ecological systems. The methodology incorporates the human factor side by side to economic and environmental aspects and in this way considers the system as complex, reflexive and emergent. Reflexivity implies the existence of structural uncertainty and although this cannot be reduced it needs to be managed for the system to move towards sustainable solutions. Our EMSU methodology combines elements from the eco-integrated approach of Naredo (2003), social multi-criteria evaluation (Munda 2004), the pluralist approach (van Asselt, 2000), and, importantly, Maturana and Varela's "biology of knowledge" (1987). The integration of those approaches into EMSU provides an original approach for the management of structural uncertainty within a strong sustainability paradigm, specifically one that is premised on human consciousness from the perspective of the biology of knowledge.

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

[AMAZON LINK BELOW TO BOOK ITSELF -- TOC and book intro in downloadable .pdf] 

"It is a common experience that a problem difficult at night is resolved in the morning after the committee of sleep has worked on it." --John Steinbeck Scientific research confirms what people have always known: answers, ideas, and inspiration do come to us in dreams. Harvard psychologist and world-renowned dream specialist Deirdre Barrett, Ph.D., offers this rich collection of examples of how the world's most creative practitioners in art, music, film, science, literature and other fields have used the revelations of their dream life to inform their work. Dr. Barrett offers insights showing us how to encourage lucid, meaningful dreaming, and how to apply the meanings of our dreams to solving problems--from the everyday to the extraordinary. This is the stuff dreams are made of. In the visual arts, Jasper Johns couldn't find his unique artistic vision until he dreamed it in the form of a large American flag. Salvador Dali and his colleagues built the startling new genre of surrealism out of dreams. Kubla Kahn dreamed the design for his stately pleasure dome; thousands of years later, Lucy Davis, chief architect at a major firm, continues the tradition of dreaming designs into life in her extraordinary buildings. Film is a fertile avenue for dreams: "Twice I have transferred dreams to film exactly as I had dreamed them," confides director Ingmar Bergman, as have Federico Fellini, Orson Welles, Akira Kurosawa, Robert Altman, and John Sayles. From Mary Shelley's terrible nightmare, which became Frankenstein, to Stephen King's haunting dream as a little boy, which led to his first bestseller, countless writers have consulted the Committee. Musicians from Beethoven to Billy Joel and Paul McCartney have whistled the Committee's tunes. In science, physiologist Otto Loewi dreamed the medical experiment that earned him the Nobel Prize. In sports, Marion Jones dreamed she'd broken a world record, then brought the dream to life. Gandhi translated his dream of resistance into a movement that changed the world. Since Freud, we take it for granted that our dreams reflect our past. In The Committee of Sleep, Barrett reveals how dreams can also tell us about our future potential--and how to reach it.

This paper argues that within consciousness studies, dualist vs. reductionist debates typically characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience, and that to understand consciousness one must start with an accurate description of its phenomenology. Only then can one develop an understanding of how experiences viewed from a first-person perspective relate to events in the brain viewed from a third-person perspective. The paper then lists some common arguments for conscious experiences (accurately described) being nothing more than brain states along with their fallacies. It concludes that there are fundamental problems with ontological reductionism of conscious experiences to brain states that cannot be resolved.

By accepting that the formal structure of human language is the key to understanding the uniquity of human culture and consciousness and by further accepting the late appearance of such language amongst the Cro-Magnon, I am free to focus on the causes that led to such an unprecedented threshold crossing. In the complex of causes that led to human being, I look to scholarship in linguistics, mythology, anthropology, paleontology, and to creation myths themselves for an answer. I conclude that prehumans underwent an existential crisis, i.e., the realisation of certain mortality, that could be borne only by the discovery-creation of the larger realm of symbolic consciousness once experienced as the sacred (but today we know it as the world — as opposed to our immediate natural environment and that of other animals). Thus, although we, the human species, are but one species among innumerable others, we differ in kind, not degree. This quality is our symbolically enabled self-consciousness, the fortress of cultural identity that empowers but also imprisons awareness.

The pseudoscience of evolutionary psychology purports to explain human behaviors by reference to an ancestral environment (essentially, a hunting-gathering way of life) in which we evolved. Contemporary human behaviors are allegedly governed directly by genes that reflect adaptation to this environment by natural selection. However, the evolutionary process is much more complex than this reductionist approach implies, and adaptation cannot involve the fine-tuning of structures or behaviors within individuals or species: natural selection can only affect entire organisms, not their components. Similarly, genetic processes are too complex to admit this simplistic view. Instead, our flexible, complex human behaviors probably represent an emergent acquisition.

The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the “heterophenomenology” developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of “critical phenomenology” implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper posted on Dan’s website that summarises a related debate between Dan, David Chalmers and Alvin Goldman (Dennett, 2001). To make the discussion easier to follow, the multiple embeddings have been removed (restoring the sequence in which the comments were written). I have also corrected a few typos and grammatical errors. However, the text of the emails remains exactly the same.
In Round 1, I suggest that scientific investigations of consciousness are better described as a form of “critical phenomenology” that accepts conscious experiences to be real rather than as a “heterophenomenology” which remains neutral about or denies their existence. Dan replies that I have misunderstood his position - he doesn’t deny that conscious experiences exist. Conscious experiences just don’t have the first-person phenomenal properties that they are commonly thought to have and, in his view, science remains neutral about the nature of such properties.
In Round 2, I agree with Dan that science initially remains neutral about how to understand the nature of conscious experiences. Nevertheless, the phenomenology of consciousness provides the data that scientists are trying to understand. A better understanding of data does not, in general, make the data disappear. I also ask, “if you remove the phenomena from phenomenal consciousness, in what sense is whatever remains “consciousness”? And, if one removes all the phenomenal content from what one takes consciousness to be, doesn’t this amount to a denial of the existence of “consciousness” in any ordinary sense of this term? Dan’s reply likens beliefs in phenomenal properties to the belief in evil spirits causing disease. He has no doubts that diseases such as whooping cough and tuberculosis are real, but this doesn’t require him to believe in evil spirits. And, what’s left, once one removes phenomenal properties, is what a zombie and a so-called conscious person have in common: a given set of functional properties that enable them to carry out the tasks we normally think of as conscious.
In Round 3, I summarise our similarities and differences. We agree that first-person reports are not incorrigible and that third-person information may throw light on how to interpret them. We also agree that first-person reports are reports of “something”, although we disagree about the nature of that something. I suggest that Dan is sceptical about first-person reports rather than heterophenomenologically “neutral” (e.g. when he likens belief in phenomenal properties to belief in evil spirits). While we agree that science is likely to deepen our understanding of consciousness, I repeat that, unlike the replacement of old theories by better theories, a deeper understanding of phenomena does not in general replace the phenomena themselves. Rather than third-person data replacing first-person reports, the former are required to make sense of the latter, making their relationship complementary and mutually irreducible. In fact, there are many cases where science takes the reality of first-person phenomenology seriously, for example in the extensive literature on pain and its alleviation. If this can’t be squeezed into an exclusively third-person view of science, then we will just have to adjust our view of science - something that a “critical phenomenology” achieves at little cost. At the time of this editing, Dan has not replied.

When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.

"They said, 'You have a blue guitar,
You do not play things as they are.'

The man replied, 'Things as they are
Are changed upon the blue guitar.'

[Wallace Stevens (1954), "The Man with the Blue Guitar"]

I: The View from 'Without' & 'Within'

In the worlds of philosophy, linguistics, and communications theory, a view has developed which understands conscious experience as experience which is 'reflected' back upon itself through language. This indicates that the consciousness we experience is possible only because we have culturally invented language and subsequently evolved to accommodate it. This accords with the conclusions of Daniel Dennett (1991), but the 'hermeneutic objection' would go further and deny that the objective sciences themselves have escaped the hermeneutic circle.

The consciousness we humans experience is developed only within the context of crossing the 'symbolic threshold' (Percy 1975; Deacon 1997) and one of the earliest and most important symbols we acquire is that of the self, or 'the subject of experience'. It is only when we achieve self-awareness that the world, as such, comes to exist for us as an object (which contains categories and sub-categories of objects). Any consciousness imputed to prelinguistic stages of development is based on projection and guesswork, since we can know nothing directly of it. It can be said that any experience which does not separate an inner subject from an outer world is probably a continuum of sensation in which environmental stimulus and instinctive response are experienced as a unity; it may be 'lived experience' but it is experience 'lived' non-consciously."

This ongoing research explores the psychological associated with the attempts of individuals who attempt to beneficially influence physiology of living organisms through such methods as wishing, laying-on of hands, prayer, and the purported transfer of subtle "energy." Participants met specific criteria of social and/or scientific acceptability. A multiphasic research approach is explored in which the writings of a variety of healers were analyzed. A content analysis of the writings of 3 scholarly healer-researchers clarified and objectified healers' esoteric language, and an experiential inventory was developed. A systematic analysis was then performed using 10 books wrinen by well known healers in combination with 10 taped interviews of individuals who demonstrated healing (or biological influencing) under controlled conditions. Interviewees also ranked the importance of each major area of consciousness.
Ranked averages indicate that the principal features of Transpersonal Healing (TH) are alterations in attention, cognitive processes and sense of self. Qualitative analysis reveals that TH involves self-regulation of attention, physiology, and cognition, the induction of altered awareness and reorganization of the healer's construction of cultural and personal realities. Attention is directed towards intrapsychic processes, resulting in (1) increased accessibility of subconscious materials, (2) enhanced empathy, (3) heightened emotional responses. (4) modified aHirudes. (5) altered meanings, and (6) distortions in time sense. Most significant among ontologic changes is a modification. or transcendence. of the healers' ordinary sense of self and absorption within functional beliefs. TH healer types appear to represent a range of contemporary subtypes of "pure" shamanic practice, the core process of TH being described as encompassing methodologies used to intentionally activate an endogenous healing potential. A taxonomic system is proposed and recommendations for future research are presented.

The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept consciousness as it relates to human health and invite nurses to examine a variety of perspectives on the concept that may influence practice, education, and research. A review of American nursing, medical, psychological, and philosophical literature reveals a considerable range of theories that seem to connect forming a broad foundation for further study. Initial analysis of the concept yields a working definition that consciousness is the fundamental and thoroughly pervasive implicit field of all existence, both seen and unseen. Additionally, the North American Nursing Diagnosis Association human response patterns were found to provide a useful set of empirical referents. Further exploration and testing of these referents may stimulate important insights into the fundamental domains of nursing.

From time immemorial, human beings have tried to uncover the meaning of their existence. Philosophers and scientists alike have tried to answer the puzzling questions on human consciousness. Consciousness can be considered as the most familiar yet the most mysterious aspect of human lives. Human consciousness is often the outcome of what we see and what we perceive. The colors that we see around us can have a great impact on our moods and feelings. Color Psychology studies how hues determine human behavior, moods and feelings. In literary texts, especially in the autobiographical ones, authors have tried to express their self, identity, consciousness and their mental and physical beings through symbols and binarisms. The dichotomies in the society in which one lives affect the existence of the individual. Binary opposites are considered as 'western construct'. French anthropologist Levi Strauss, who is considered as the father of modern anthropology, proposed the theory of binary opposites and spoke about how books and media use binary opposites to strengthen their plot, develop narratives and bring about contrasts. Han Kang in her semi-autobiographical novel, The White Book, has extensively used the color 'white' to express her moods, feelings, memories and thoughts. White is a color that comprises of all the other colors in the color spectrum. The white color is usually associated with peace, purity and hope. On the contrary, it also symbolizes death, detachment, disinterest and dryness. This dichotomy is used very beautifully throughout the novel. The current paper thus tries to deconstruct the binarisms of the color white as used in the novel, The White Book. The paper also tries to examine how color psychology affects human behavior and consciousness.

Contemporary social paradigm outlines, within present-day reality, a whole range of aspects that do not necessarily justify the idea of educational pragmatism. The paradoxical situation of education is that education itself needs education. Consequently, technology relies on education and education develops inside this paradigm via new learning technologies. Still, such an assumption gives credit, on a socio-educational level, to the idea according to which new learning technologies prove their usefulness in a recently accepted educational culture. In this respect, we consider that a reevaluation of the dimension of education through a reference to mankind consciousness is needed. Thus, the emergence and development of a new type of educational culture, by assuming on a social level, new learning technologies, gives birth to a " possible world " that needs to be analyzed from the perspective of an epistemology of education. In this way, we consider that the characteristics that outline a certain connection between social and educational systems speak about an approach from a scientific knowledge perspective. Moreover, the assessment standards show different degrees of complexity that offers an educational paradigm whose hermeneutics is to be identified with a scientific lexis. In the same way, a conceptual-theoretical construction, relevant within a new accepted paradigm, acquires methodological substance to the extent that by using new learning technologies we come close to obtaining results that are based on pragmatic criteria. The conceptual-theoretical understanding of new learning technologies corroborated with an analyses from the perspective of language theory is structured on specific set up levels in which cognizable structures are visible through which the new educational paradigm can be subject to a process of axiological reevaluation. It is in this context that I consider that new learning technologies should focus on a qualitative-competitive approach of information contents. It all comes down to a deep pedagogic understanding of a new educational culture in which human consciousness is related to new learning technologies. A prioritized educational pragmatism is of utmost importance against the contents specific for the conservatism of those social actors that are involved in this activity. Consequently, this aspect brings about epistemological issues through which the realism of a paradigm is explained from the perspective of a conceptual relativism. Thus, I think it is appropriate, on the level of any scientific interpretation, that we should accept innovation in pedagogy from human consciousness perspective. On the other hand, as far as, both on theoretical and practical level, new learning technologies prove their pragmatism; the acceptance of a new educational model is completely justified from a social point of view.

For David Hodgson, human beings must be free—in some sense adequate to ground personal responsibility—and it becomes the work of his book to demonstrate how. The premises he starts with, however, simply do not lead to the conclusion he would like us to draw. Or they do not without smuggling in a trainload of assumptions all along the way. Hence, although the project sets out with great promise, the reader is left with little more than a sort of “free-will-of-the-gaps.”