A 'Hermeneutic Objection': Language and the Inner View

Journal of Consciousness Exploration Research, 2011

In an important sense this note is not about self. It does not make any claim that self does exist or it does not exist. This note questions the the very notion of self. The notion, this note argues, is misconceived and fails to make sense beyond the discursive boundary with in which it finds a problematic use. It fails to cross the boundary to talk about that is not a mere construction of the discourse. I have used in this note a few terms that are neologisms and a few others for which I have departed from conventional use. There are certain words I needed to rediscover for the presentation. In a discursive context for example deliberators arrive at a position by rational argumentation. The words agreement an consensus tell a different story. Gratis, the Latin root of 'agree', actually means to please. And 'consensus' derived from sentire meaning in Latin feeling. Originally therefore agreement and consensus are non-rational and very inter subjective in nature. The rational procedure of the discursive level hardly gets out of the vicious circle it's own ideas create. And cannot match with the agreement and consensus of the inter subjective level. Key words: Subjective plane-introspection-extra-spective-intersubjective plane-extra-spective plane-extraspectively intersubjective-introspectively intersubjective-discursive level-phenomenation-transcendental unity of apperception-selfsame ess of continuous consciousness-reflexive consciousness-lived bodies-three orders of being-sense of horizon of existence-auto-ontological-ex-ontological-facing-field-bio-embodied Consciousness-interface-instrumentation of sign system-cogito complex-spontaneous reflexivity-auto-thetic-linguistic fabrication One: spontaneous reflexivity Thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries dared not use the word self as reassuringly as many of their counterparts do today. They stuck to the words 'the I' or 'ego' for referring to something which many of them thought to have an

2007

There is nothing so self-evident and pervasive and immediate that nonetheless remains as opaque and illusive as consciousness. Consciousness underpins everything we are and everything we do and everything we know, and yet for all our progress in philosophy and science, we are still no closer to an accepted definition of consciousness. Not only is there no agreement about what consciousness actually means, there is not even agreement about what term to use to describe this condition of being and experiencing that we are referring to (even though we all seem to intuitively understand what we mean when we say consciousness). This work is an attempt at describing what it is we are referring to when to talk about consciousness.

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for phenomenological considerations. Often however the term 'phenomenology' is being used simply as a synonym for 'folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self.

Human Studies, 2018

Throughout human history people have wondered about the nature of the self. For the past several millennia or more, the many cultures of the earth have investigated this topic from the vantage points of their respective philosophical and religious traditions. More recently this has become a subject of inquiry in the contemporary academic disciplines of philosophy, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurobiology, cognitive science, anthropology, and theology, to name a few. The exploration of the nature of the self, investigated philosophically, scientifically, and cross-culturally by peoples ancient and modern has led people to ask timeless questions like: What does it mean for a human being to have (or be) a self? What is this self?

Preprint, 2024

This paper delves into one of the most fundamental questions in cognitive science and philosophy of mind: How does language, the very tool we use to understand and describe our consciousness, distort our perception of reality? Drawing on insights from neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, this work explores how symbolic representation—particularly through language—creates cognitive artifacts like selfhood, emotions, and qualia. Building on the predictive coding framework, the paper argues that what we commonly experience as stable realities—such as the self and emotional experiences—are not metaphysical truths, but functional constructs developed by the brain to minimize uncertainty and optimize survival. By compressing the complexity of individual emotions and experiences into simplified symbols, language creates an illusion of shared reality, inflating the ego and misguiding our understanding of consciousness. The paper appeals to scholars across disciplines—from neuroscience and AI to psychology and philosophy—by challenging the widely accepted view of selfhood as an intrinsic part of human identity. Instead, it presents a compelling argument that emotions and consciousness are cognitive tools, shaped pragmatically to serve adaptive purposes. The text invites a deeper exploration into how these cognitive artifacts function both in biological systems and in artificial intelligence, encouraging interdisciplinary collaboration to further investigate the illusionary nature of subjective experiences. Ultimately, this paper is a thought-provoking contribution to ongoing debates about the nature of consciousness and invites readers from diverse fields to rethink long-held assumptions about the role of language and symbols in shaping our cognitive realities.

Journal of Conscious Evolution, 2020

The “linguistic turn” from the early 20th century created a shift in the ontological underpinnings of various disciplines within the social sciences. Several key figures asserted that much of what we think of as reality is constructed based on a system of social institution that we call language. Language shifted to becoming a fundamental aspect of the ontological realities within a given discipline in the social sciences. Most significant to my understanding of the relationship between language, its origins, and the emergence of higher forms of human consciousness is Terence McKenna’s Stoned Ape Theory. In this article, an exploration of McKenna’s theory will be addressed as it relates to the emergence of human language and consciousness while including a brief introduction to linguistic relativity in order to demonstrate how many great thinkers and scholars reasoned that language has indeed shaped our worldview. Finally, a reflection on the implications of McKenna’s theory for research in language pedagogy will be given as it relates to the current state of my research inquiry. Furthermore, it is my contention that McKenna’s theory be deemed worthy of in-depth consideration within the field of Consciousness Studies as it seems to offer a valuable lens to the current discourse on consciousness.

2017

A cognitive semiotic perspective on the nature and limitations of concepts andconceptual frameworks.