In an era of routine air travel and disease multipliers born of human behaviors, a public health crisis anywhere in the world is a potential problem everywhere. Stimson Center Global Health Security Program 3 implementation and...
moreIn an era of routine air travel and disease multipliers born of human behaviors, a public health crisis anywhere in the world is a potential problem everywhere. Stimson Center Global Health Security Program 3 implementation and compliance. US disease detection and response capabilities rely heavily on state and local public health capacities. Communications between the state and Federal levels and across sectors remains a serious challenge. Despite these perennial challenges, the US is generally assumed to be well within the requirements for IHR (2005) compliance. The outlook is less rosy in other regions. The IHR (2005) framework assumes that countries will build their national public health surveillance and response capacities on the foundations of functional health systems. Many weak states fall short of this prerequisite, and a larger number of low and middle income states face solvable but serious gaps. The onus is on national public health leaders to define how they will implement the regulations, and to find the necessary resources. The IHR (2005) created no formal finance mechanism to support implementation. The scope of capacity-building and the lack of defined metrics present a quandary for donors who are uncertain about what it might mean to help partner nations fund IHR compliance. The global disease detection and response network is only as strong as the weakest link. Article 44 of the revised regulations encourages states to collaborate "to the extent possible" in detecting and responding to health crises, and in sharing technical, logistical, financial, and legal support to help other states implement the IHR (2005). As the largest bilateral donor of health assistance, US leadership and responsibilities in this area are preeminent. The US recently initiated a more robust dialogue among states at various levels of economic development, with the ultimate goal of cultivating IHR (2005) capacity-building partnerships. Aligning local public health and global biosecurity priorities Many countries have begun to invest in strong health systems at home and abroad. Reliable public health surveillance lies at the foundation of efficient health systems, and at the core of the IHR (2005). The IHR framework offers the global health community a template for cooperative capacity-building efforts that build local capabilities for evidence-based health policies and reinforce measures to prevent naturally, accidentally, or deliberate released infections from spreading internationally. This is no guarantee of long-term success. The IHR directly touch on politically charged issues from individual rights to state sovereignty. The legal mandate of the revised regulations may be a tool to empower health ministers within their own governments, but can also be perceived as an unfunded mandate on nations with other health priorities. Building the necessary capacities will require sustained commitment from national leaders inside and beyond the health sector, as well as consistent funding over the long-term. US agencies-even those that have engaged in capacity-building for decades-will require new strategies to measure progress in building global disease detection and response capabilities. This includes a whole-of-government assistance strategy that breaks down programmatic silos among security, science, and health actors. Stimson Center Global Health Security Program 4 Flexible, evidence-based responses adapted to nature of threat Communications Nations identify appropriate authorities on an ad hoc basis Notifications to and from WHO via designated IHR National Focal Points National capacity requirements Public health and infection control measures at ports of entry Capability to detect, assess, report, and respond to public health threats in near-real time at national and community level Risk assessment: WHO may declare any natural, accidental, or deliberate event a "public health emergency of international concern" (PHEIC) if it has the potential to affect health across national borders. This includes events of any origin, whether biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear or other disasters.