Papers by Mark Eccleston-Turner
Vaccines are hugely important tools in minimising the effect pandemic influenza could have on a p... more Vaccines are hugely important tools in minimising the effect pandemic influenza could have on a population. The reforms introduced by the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework are ill-suited to providing sufficient levels of access to vaccines to meet the needs of developing states, and as such developing states will continue to be reliant upon the traditional methods of vaccine procurement to procure the majority of the vaccines they required. Using procurement during 2009-H1N1 as a case study, this paper examines the methods of procurement utilised by states in order to determine if the procurement tools available to developing states are sufficient to procure adequate levels of pandemic influenza vaccines. Particular focus is given to the role Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) play in the procurement process. By exploring this case study it is possible to argue that these procurement methods are ineffective for developing states, and when the next influenza pandemic occurs, demand will once again outstrip supply globally, due to supply of vaccines being dominated by the developed states with APAs in place.
The creation of new vaccines is one of the key challenges in the battle against global infectious... more The creation of new vaccines is one of the key challenges in the battle against global infectious diseases. Therefore, creating the optimal conditions for innovation in vaccines is one of the most important roles law may undertake in this battle. In relation to pharmaceuticals, the economic theory of patent protection is commonly cited by industry and in the academic literature to justify the patenting of life-saving medicines and vaccines. The economic theory of patent protection holds that innovation occurs due to patents protecting the research and development investment made by the innovator. Proponents of this theory claim that without patents such innovation in medicines and vaccines would occur at a significantly reduced rate. This Article considers the applicability of the economic theory of patent protection to pandemic influenza vaccines. This Article examines a number of factors relevant to patent law, theory, and innovation including: the patent landscape for pandemic influenza vaccines; the market dominance enjoyed by manufacturers; the actual risk posed by imitators making generic vaccines if patent protection were not in place; and, the licensing and regulatory provisions for creating generic vaccines. According to the economic theory of patent protection, a patent incentivizes innovation by providing an innovator with a temporary monopoly regarding their innovation, and by protecting them from the threat posed by imitators who wish to make a cheap replica of the product. However, even without a patent, pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers are in this position. Due to economies of scale and the complicated regulatory and licensing frameworks relevant to bringing a pandemic influenza vaccine to market, manufacturers are at little to no risk from generic imitators. Moreover, there is a very strong incentive to innovate because pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers are selling a product for which demand exceeds supply to a captive market of nations and organizations, each of which is hoping to secure as much vaccine as possible. The unique conditions associated with pandemic influenza vaccines appear to provide more of an incentive to innovate and research in this field than the fact that the innovations can be patented.
Knowledge is a public good. Patents provide property rights in knowledge, which gives the patente... more Knowledge is a public good. Patents provide property rights in knowledge, which gives the patentee the right to exclude others from utilising the knowledge for the life of the patent. Patents in the field of pharmaceuticals are controversial because of the importance of the knowledge which they exclude others from using. Patents have come under significant criticism for this very reason – with some going as far as to claim that patent protection on pharmaceutical products as the cause of developing states having poor or limited access to life-saving pharmaceutical products. Most of the academic literature regarding access to medicines goes this same way. This paper challenges this viewpoint, and considers the barriers to generic access to medicines beyond patents. This paper looks beyond intellectual property rights to determine what other mechanisms exist that allow innovative vaccine manufacturers to control access to knowledge regarding their products which can act as a barrier to the utilisation of knowledge in the pharmaceutical industry, in a similar manner to intellectual property rights. This paper takes a case study approach considering non-patent-related barriers to access to medicines, focusing on pandemic influenza vaccines and the role of proprietary, non-patented knowledge. This paper concludes that manufacturers have an exclusive monopoly, not because of their intellectual property rights, but because the knowledge required to make the drug is not accessible to generic manufacturers, and highlights why this is the case. This paper argues that it is not the patent protection which is the barrier to introducing generic pandemic influenza vaccines, but rather it is the inaccessibility of knowledge which is not in the public domain, or the inability of manufacturers in developing states to utilise this knowledge, which is the true barrier in this field.
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Papers by Mark Eccleston-Turner