Francis Crick

This is the readable introductory version of Global Workspace Theory, published in 1997 in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. The Oxford University Press book of that year provides an easy book-length introduction. Since 1997 our emphasis has been on incorporating more and more brain evidence. Please see our recent articles on Academia.edu

O presente trabalho é dedicado à introdução e avaliação de quatro teorias contemporâneas sobre o sonhar. Estas quatro teorias têm como característica comum o fato de seus autores privilegiarem uma ótica biológica em relação às características e possíveis funções da experiência onírica. São elas: a Variabilidade Intra-Específica, de Michel Jouvet; a hipótese da Ativação-Síntese, de J. Allan Hobson; a Aprendizagem Reversa de Francis Crick e Graeme Mitchison; e a Neuropsicanálise de Mark Solms. Depois de explorar as bases empíricas destas teorias e apresentar seus argumentos, há o estabelecimento de um diálogo com as psicologias das quais estas teorias se referem, principalmente a psicanálise. Na síntese discute-se brevemente a cisão entre a psicologia e as ciências cognitivas, e como o campo de pesquisa do sono e sonhos pode ajudar a melhor integrá-las.

La théorie actuelle de l'évolution par sélection naturelle est basée sur un postulat : la tranmission de caractères acquis est impossible. Il est maintenant clair que l'hérédité épigénétique invite à réviser ce postulat. Ce constat pose une double question : quelles sont les modalités précises de l'hérédité des caractères acquis, et quels sont les aménagements théoriques à faire pour accommoder ces nouveaux mécanismes ?

The story of genetics typically omits the original discovery of the molecular nature of DNA: Friedrich Miescher's 1869 discovery of the substance he christened “nuclein”. The article explains how he came... In 1869, the young Swiss biochemist Friedrich Miescher discovered the molecule we now refer to as DNA, developing techniques for its extraction. In this paper we explain why his name is all but forgotten, and his role in the history of genetics is mostly overlooked. We focus on the role of national rivalries and disciplinary turf wars in shaping historical memory, and on how the story we tell shapes our understanding of the science. We highlight that Miescher could just as correctly be portrayed as the person who understood the chemical nature of chromatin (before the term existed), and the first to suggest how stereochemistry might serve as the basis for the transmission of hereditary variation.

In 1869, the young Swiss biochemist Friedrich Miescher discovered the molecule we now refer to as DNA, developing techniques for its extraction. In this paper we explain why his name is all but forgotten, and his role in the history of genetics is mostly overlooked. We focus on the role of national rivalries and disciplinary turf wars in shaping historical memory, and on how the story we tell shapes our understanding of the science. We highlight that Miescher could just as correctly be portrayed as the person who understood the chemical nature of chromatin (before the term existed), and the first to suggest how stereochemistry might serve as the basis for the transmission of hereditary variation.

Meaning grows. This Peircean insight has important consequences, explaining why strictly formal, syntactic models both of legal and of scientific reasoning fail. Illustrated by reference to the complex history of the concept of DNA science) and "Establishment of Religion" (law).

Translated by Rachel Herdy.

Understanding consciousness has emerged as one of the great challenges of
modern neuroscience as it requires the application of both reductionist and
systems biology methods. Francis Crick’s writings on the subject place him in
the reductionist camp. Further, his willingness to hypothesize that a specific
brain nucleus, the claustrum (1), is important in understanding visual
consciousness, suggests that he applied a structure-function approach in an
attempt to bridge the two camps (2). This approach does not appeal to the
reductionists (for the level is not sufficiently molecular), nor is it the optimal
choice of systems biologists (for the concept of a foci is no longer in vogue).
So what makes this nucleus so special? Research has shown that the
claustrum is characterized by reciprocal and topographically-defined
relationships with most of neocortex (3). In this regard, the claustrum is
suitably positioned as a key element within a unique neural network, replete
with multisensory attributes (4), making it a viable candidate for contributing to
the establishment of visual consciousness. Perhaps Crick did not find a locus
of consciousness so much as the “server” as in a client-server relationship (to
use computing parlance). We include further information which highlights Dr.
Crick’s thoughts on the subject.

A causal approach to biological information is outlined. There are two aspects to this approach: information as determining a choice between a set of alternative objects, and information as determining the construction of a single object. The first aspect has been developed in earlier work to yield a quantitative measure of biological information that can be used to analyse biological networks. This paper explores the prospects for a measure based on the second aspect, and suggests some applications for such a measure. These two aspects are not suggested to exhaust all the facets of biological information.

This book offers both a new (Critical-Common-sensist) account of scientific evidence and scientific method, and an Innocent Realist account of the metaphysical underpinnings of science. More than that: if provides a novel approach to the relation of the social to the natural sciences, and to the relation of sociology of science and epistemology of science. It then goes on to offer chapters on science and religion, science and literature, and science and law.  It concludes with a chapter on the many meanings of "the end of science,"

Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.

As ferramentas e aportes conceituais da neurociência têm produzido avanços nas pesquisas sobre as características do sono e dos sonhos, associando estas aos processos de consolidação de memória. O presente artigo visa analisar a contribuição da hipótese da “Aprendizagem-Reversa” ao campo da psicologia. Pela natureza associativa da memória e pelo fato de forjarem-se novas conexões neurais diariamente através do aprendizado, as redes neuronais criariam memórias “falsas”. Com o risco de ficar sobrecarregada, esta rede passaria por uma “desaprendizagem” periódica; seria necessário um mecanismo para enfraquecer as conexões sinápticas errôneas durante o sono REM. As implicações dessa teoria serão avaliadas, que vão desde como evoluiu o sistema nervoso até a desconsideração de que os sonhos tenham origem nas necessidades psicológicas individuais.

Touching Consciousness: Crick and the Claustrum Understanding consciousness has emerged as one of the great challenges of modern neuroscience as it requires the application of both reductionist and systems biology methods. Francis Crick's writings on the subject place him in the reductionist camp. Further, his willingness to hypothesize that a specific brain nucleus, the claustrum (1), is important in understanding visual consciousness, suggests that he applied a structure-function approach in an attempt to bridge the two camps (2). This approach does not appeal to the reductionists (for the level is not sufficiently molecular), nor is it the optimal choice of systems biologists (for the concept of a foci is no longer in vogue). So what makes this nucleus so special? Research has shown that the claustrum is characterized by reciprocal and topographically-defined relationships with most of neocortex (3). In this regard, the claustrum is suitably positioned as a key element within a unique neural network, replete with multisensory attributes (4), making it a viable candidate for contributing to the establishment of visual consciousness. Perhaps Crick did not find a locus of consciousness so much as the "server" as in a client-server relationship (to use computing parlance). We include historic, anatomic and other information which highlights Dr. Crick's thoughts on the subject. 1. Edelstein L.R., and Denaro F.J. The claustrum: a historical review of its anatomy, physiology, cytochemistry and functional significance.

Haack's book DEFENDING SCiENCE--WITHIN REASON is now published in Italian. It offers a whole new philosophy of science (Critical Common-sensism), plus much more: a new approach to the relation of the natural and the social sciences and of the philosophy of science to sociology of science;  and chapters on science and literature, science and religion, science and the law, the values of sciences, and its goals. Throughout, Haack illustrates with examples from molecular biology, and steers between scientism and anti-scientific cynicism.