First Amendment

Standard American dictionaries define a university as faculty, students and administrators as a collective body, and describe the university as being an educational institution of the highest order, offering undergraduate and graduate programs, and conferring degrees. A student is defined as a person who studies or investigates; and faculty are described as related to a branch of learning or the learned professions. In the ancient universities in the U.K., this meant that the responsibility of faculty was to give personal attention to the student, and the tutorial was the preferred model of instruction -allowing the student the freedom to engage in research of a topic, and the teacher to listen to the student's defense of his research or inquiry and engage the student by refutation, correction, or explanation. 1 The gradual trend toward mass higher education in the U.K. has significantly compromised the ideal, but the 'ancients' at least attempt to preserve small group teaching, if not the true tutorial. By contrast, the trend toward mass higher education in the U.S. has produced a virtual abandonment of the classic relationship between professor and student at large universities, and the cost of education at small private colleges has limited the opportunity for small group learning to those students who are from well endowed families, or students who are willing to take on significant debt to pay for a liberal arts education. 2 To the reality of mass education, and the high cost of higher education, has been added the emerging image of higher education as job -rather than life -related. At the turn of the Century in America, social philosophers and civil rights activists like Dr. W.E.B. DuBois championed the ideal of a true liberal arts education as essential to full participation in a 1 D. Palfreyman, 'The Oxford Tutorial: Sacred Cow or Pedagogical Gem?' in D. Palfreyman (ed.), The Oxford Tutorial (Oxford Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, 2002). 2 Education based on the incurring of debt is similarly criticized as socially unacceptable and less than sufficient to pay for the cost of the student's education in the UK higher education system. See D.

faculty workshops for their suggestions and comments. 1. The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV 2. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 3. This maxim is not a product of the English common law; rather, it dates back much further. "Even in ancient times there were evidences of that same concept in custom and law, partly as a result of the natural desire for privacy, partly an outgrowth, in all probability, of the emphasis placed by the ancients upon the home as a place of hospitality, shelter, and protection." NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTITUION 13 (1970).

Protests are woven into the history and social fabric of the United States. Whether the topic involves racial inequity, abortion, police brutality, oil and gas pipelines, war, or allegedly stolen elections, Americans will voice their opposition-occasionally, in frightening or destructive ways. Politicians, in turn, have a history of using their lawmaking power to discourage protest by creating crimes like unlawful assembly, riot, civil disorder, disorderly conduct, trespass, and others. While lawmakers have considerable power to decide what is and isn't legal, they cannot criminalize expression or assembly that the First Amendment protects. But the lines delineating what forms of protest the government can and cannot criminalize are anything but bright. This Symposium Piece aims to clarify how far lawmakers can go in prohibiting protest. It does so by illuminating a notoriously murky area of First Amendment doctrine: overbreadth. The overbreadth doctrine authorizes courts to strike down laws that are written so broadly as to infringe on constitutionally protected expression. Overbreadth concerns are especially acute in laws used to criminalize protests. This Piece makes three significant contributions to overbreadth scholarship. First, it analyzes decades of Supreme Court case law addressing overbreadth claims arising from protests and articulates five features of protest-related laws that generate overbreadth concerns. Second, the Piece surveys statutes that lawmakers and law enforcement officials have used to deter protests and, employing the five features of overbroad laws, examines which statutes present overbreadth concerns. Third, the Piece closes with guidelines for correcting (or eliminating, when appropriate) overbroad protest laws.

The University of North Carolina Press has published the Foundations of American Democracy, edited and annotated by the faculty members of the History Department at UNC-Chapel Hill. The book addresses the current crisis in the teaching of North Carolina and U.S. History in the state's high schools. It includes primary-source documents, introductions by the faculty historians, and questions for the reader.

Some of the questions fail to address some key aspects of the documents. There are some documents that probably shouldn't have been included, and others that should have been included. But the main fault of the publication is the tendency of academic historians to monetize there work. Given the limited resources provided to North Carolina schools, the book is too expensive to be a textbook or only one copy be sold to the high school libraries. The publication should have been made available free on the University of North Carolina digital website.

Through beat reporting and investigative journalism, reporters monitor the foundational institutions of our society. This reporting has value even to those who never buy a newspaper or read a website. For example, subscribers and nonsubscribers alike benefit when government officials respond to a critical news story by eliminating an abusive practice. Yet unfortunately, the professional press is experiencing a severe economic crisis. Layoffs are pervasive, and news organizations across the nation are on the brink of insolvency. As a result, a number of commentators have proposed government subsidies for the press. Yet if the press becomes financially dependent on the government, would they be deterred from monitoring and criticizing the government? If so, the subsidy would undercut some of the social benefits it is meant to preserve. In response to this conundrum, this Article proposes a three-part analytical framework for evaluating press subsidies. The first step is to assess how effectively the subsidy safeguards press independence. The second criterion, which this Article calls ''focus,'' gauges how effectively a subsidy channels resources to externalitygenerating activities, as opposed to other uses. For example, a subsidy that induces press organizations to hire more reporters is superior to one that can be used, instead, to fund pay raises for the advertising staff. The third criterion is political feasibility. How likely is a subsidy to attract political support? And how much political support does it need? One that can be implemented under current law, for example, requires less political support than one that depends on broad new legislation. Based on this framework, the principal recommendation of this Article is for news organizations to make greater use of the nonprofit form. By providing a subsidy through the charitable deduction, we would not empower the government to choose how much funding to allocate to each news organization. Instead, the charitable deduction allows the government to piggyback on the judgments of private donors about which nonprofits to support. In addition, this subsidy is feasible politically since it already can be used, to a significant extent, under current law.

If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people. 1 This is an Article occasioned by the Supreme Court's important campaign finance reform decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 2 But unlike most other articles with which it shares this genesis, it is not mainly about that case. Instead, this Article takes on a broader concern and examines and decries the drift away from traditional and foundational First Amendment and other constitutional doctrine, and the slouching toward more egalitarian and managerial notions of free speech and democratic government, for which the McConnell opinion is an avatar. In contrast to other critiques of campaign finance reform, I hope to do more than just raise free speech objections. That sort of approach has two main faults-it needlessly limits the purchase and force of one's critical arguments and it invites easy counterpunching replies. The complaint that campaign finance reform measures unduly restrict free speech will receive the reply (for example, from Justice Breyer) that money is not speech (or, at least, is not just speech) and that, even if it is, the need to protect governmental and

This piece considers the conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, particularly in the context of the derivative works right asking (1) how the right is deployed by parties and construed by courts and (2) whether it is overly broad. These questions are particularly timely and relevant in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (January 18, 2012) which upheld the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act thereby sanctioning the removal from the public domain of works previously available for use by secondary authors. The existing derivative works literature calls for limiting the right by strengthening fair use and First Amendment arguments. The piece proposes revisions to the Copyright Act intended to align the right with the Constitution, render transparent the asserted interests, and disallow authors’ successors from refusing to deal.

In January 2012 Mitt Romney's campaign received a cease-and-desist letter charging, among other things, that its use of news footage concerning Newt Gingrich's ethics problems in the House of Representatives constituted a violation of NBC's copyright. This is just the latest such charge and came amidst similar allegations against the Gingrich and Bachmann campaigns and in the wake of similar allegations against both the McCain and Obama campaigns in 2008. Such allegations have plagued political campaigns as far back as Reagan's in 1984. The existing literature is nearly devoid of a consideration of such uses as political speech protected by the First Amendment. Rather, scholars tend to focus on fair use. Courts have considered this question very rarely and also tend to concentrate on fair use. Because these cases rarely progress to decisions, there is little to be said of what courts have done but much to be said of what they ought * Associate Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University. Thanks are due to the participants at the Central States Law Schools Association Conference ( ) where an early version of this paper was presented, the participants at the Regional Faculty Workshop held in February 2013 at Valparaiso University Law School especially Curt W. Cichowski and Michael D. Murray whose lively discussion of the paper provided me with invaluable insights and a title, and the faculty at the University of Kentucky where I presented a version of the paper and received helpful feedback. I am thankful to Brian Frye for the invitation to present the paper there. I must also thank my colleagues at ONU whose support is unwavering, especially Joanne Brant whose brain I picked mercilessly for suggestions on the First Amendment aspects of the paper. For research assistance, I am thankful to Kelli Vaughn, Christopher Mosley, and Laura Waymire. All errors and omissions are mine alone.

In South Africa, the issue of musicians dying as paupers despite their fame relates to a set of factors, including technological developments that affected traditional modes of content distribution and archaic laws, that predates the internet. Relying on CISAC and IFPI reports, this article finds that while physical copies, which were by far the most rewarding mode of music distribution, have become obsolete, current modes of distribution -downloads and streaming -have diminished revenue for the South African musician. This situation is due to free streaming from platforms that enable user-uploaded content, as well as to negligible payouts from streaming platforms in general. Efforts by the legislature to address musicians' dwindling income are nevertheless contradictory. Looking at sections of the Copyright Amendment Bill and stakeholder submissions thereto, it is clear that the bill diminishes artists' economic rights through unmitigated exceptions while leaving the safe harbour provisions unaddressed, which pose a further risk to artists' income.

In a recent series of US court cases involving media ownership regulation, broadcasters have invoked the First Amendment to the US Constitution to resist ownership limitations, while civil society organizations and critics of media consolidation have raised free speech rights as ...

In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court ruled that the Westboro Baptist Church had a First Amendment right to picket the funeral of a young soldier killed in Iraq. This decision reinforces a view that has become increasingly dominant in First Amendment jurisprudence — the view that the state may not regulate public discourse to protect individuals from emotional or dignitary injury. This Article contends that this view not only sacrifices the law’s protections for individual personality but also undermines the normative foundations of public discourse itself. The Article then presents an alternative theory of the First Amendment which holds that the same values of human dignity and autonomy that support free speech also give rise to other fundamental rights. Thus, speakers should have a duty to respect the personality and rights of others. Drawing extensively on the record in Snyder as well as on other materials, the Article argues that Westboro’s funeral picketing should not receive...

tives of this sort would be in the best position "to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. ' 29 It was these views that led Madison to promote a new constitution to establish a stronger federal government. His views played an important part both in the Constitutional Convention and in explaining the proposed Constitution to those who would ratify it. For these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that the Constitution at least partly follows the approach to political, social, and economic conflict that Madison advocated. Instead of denying or suppressing such conflict, the Constitution recognizes that it is inevitable, but seeks to control and channel it. This is particularly true of the legislative process. As Madison observed, "[t]he regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government." 30 Madison's argument in The Federalist No. 10 was concerned with how a constitution, once adopted, could control the effects of faction in the operations of government and the ordinary political process. As Madison discovered, however, the same divisions over interest and ideology had an impact on the drafting and ratification of the Constitution itself. 31 This was true of the conflicts in the Constitu-

Modern First Amendment jurisprudence is deeply paradoxical. On one hand, freedom of speech is said to promote fundamental values such as individual selffulfillment, democratic deliberation, and the search for truth. At the same time, however, many leading decisions protect speech that appears to undermine these values by attacking the dignity and personality of others or their status as full and equal members of the community. In this Article, I explore where this Jekyll-and-Hyde quality of First Amendment jurisprudence comes from. I argue that the American free speech tradition consists of two very different strands: a liberal humanist view that emphasizes the positive values promoted by free speech, and a darker vision that is rooted in the jurisprudence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes understands free speech as part of a struggle for power between different social groups-a struggle that ultimately can be resolved only by force. After sketching the liberal humanist view, I trace the development of Holmes's position, which is grounded in his Darwinian understanding of human life and in his deeper view that all phenomena in the universe are governed by force. Next, I evaluate the Holmesian approach and discuss its implications for a wide range of contemporary issues, from hate speech and pornography to the Citizens United decision on electoral advertising by corporations. I conclude that Holmes's view does not provide an adequate rationale for free speech, and that it undermines the liberal humanist principles that should be regarded as central to the First Amendment.

This Essay argues that the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abandoned. Instead of engaging in a fruitless game of determining whether privacy is invaded, the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt a more pragmatic approach to the Fourth Amendment and directly face the issue of how to regulate government information gathering. There are two central questions in Fourth Amendment analysis: (1) the Coverage Question-does the Fourth Amendment provide protection against a particular form of government information gathering? and (2) the Procedure Question-how should the Fourth Amendment regulate this form of government information gathering? The Coverage Question should be easy to answer: the Fourth Amendment should regulate whenever government information gathering creates problems of reasonable significance. Such a scope of coverage would be broad, and the attention wasted on the Coverage Question would be shifted to the Procedure Question. This pragmatic approach to the Fourth Amendment is consistent with its text and will make Fourth Amendment law coherent and comprehensive.

How the Free Flow of Information Liberates and Constrains Us, 17 Gossip and the Virtues of Knowing Less, 50 Shaming and the Digital Scarlet Letter, 76 Part II Privacy, Free Speech, and the Law The Role of Law, 105 Free Speech, Anonymity, and Accountability, 125 Privacy in an Overexposed World, 161 Conclusion: The Future of Reputation, 189 Notes 207 Index 237 Across the Internet, people made posters with the girl's photograph, fusing her picture with a variety of other images. The dog poop girl 1

Cable television brings many channels of programming into the home. Amid this cornucopia, some programs occasionally contain nudity or offensive language, "pornography" to those offended. There has been much debate over whether cable pornography should be regulated. Not only must policy makers decide if regulation is desirable, the courts must determine the appropriate legal standard for evaluating the legality and constitutionality of such regulation. In July 1986, by a "bare majority," the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography voted against applying to cable television the same standard used to bar "indecent" radio and television broadcasts. 1 Two months after the issuance of the Commission's report, a federal judge endorsed, for the first time, the argument that "indecent" cable programming could be regulated and limited to nighttime viewing. 2 On March 23, 1987, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a decision striking down a Utah law that barred "indecent" cable programming. 3 Because the Court did not issue an opinion, however, the precise basis for the Court's decision is not clear.

The Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota l was both a major step on the road to free expression and a missed opportunity. It represented the first time a law was struck down as violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression. Moreover, it placed the concept of "prior restraint" at the forefront of the theory of free expression. As one scholar noted: "Since the 1931 release of the Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota, the doctrine of prior restraint has been an essential element of first amendment jurisprudence."2 Unfortunately, the Court neither defined prior restraint, nor explained precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior restraint. Equally regrettable, the Court listed, without explanation, four exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine, a list that was both over-and under-inclusive. 3 The lack of a generally accepted definition, plus the unprincipled gaps created by the exceptions, has led to a situation in which the prior restraint doctrine is increasingly derided by legal scholars and frequent-

rules exceeded the Commission's authority, but did not address the issue of their constitutionality, except to say that the question was "not frivolous."8 The unresolved issue of the constitutionality of governmentmandated access to cable television systems must still be faced. Even if the federal government does not reimpose the rules,9 several states have already enacted their own access requirements. 10 This article will examine whether such requirements by a state violate the First Amendment rights of the cable television operator. l l Many commentators have assumed that the primary focus of such an analysis must be a determination of whether cable television is "like" a newspaper or "like" a television broadcaster, followed by a routine application of the appropriate constitutional standard. 12 This approach is both simplistic and needlessly subjective. The proper inquiry must be whether a cable access rule, "abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect."13 Accordingly, the effect of an access requirement on the various interests served by the First Amendment will be examined. It will be demonstrated that those interests are furthered substantially by such a requirement, and in a manner which is not inconsistent with the Constitution. 14 8. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 709 n.l9. 9. The Supreme Court stated that the question of ''whether less intrusive access regulation might fall within the Commission's jurisdiction ... is not presently before this Court." Id. at 705 n.14. 10. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333(c) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(b) (West Supp. 1981). California permits cable companies to be free from rate regulation only if certain criteria are met, one of which is provision of public access channels.

The future of integrated broadband networks (IBN S)1 has yet to arrive. Although the extraordinary theoretical technical capacities of this new form of transmission seem well established, the ultimate use for IBN s is not. That must await the answer to many questions: Which entities will operate IBN s? Which businesses will choose the use IBN s? Which services will offer IBN s? What will be the long-term regulatory environment for IBNs? Perhaps most importantly, which IBN services will consumers want? Due to these unanswered questions, many aspects of the future of IBNs remain unclear. Given human nature, however, specific legal problems are certain to arise. The insatiable human appetite for mischief, information, pornography, and anti-competitive activity guarantees that the many legal conflicts that afflict computers, telephones, cable television, and broadcasting will be visited upon IBN s. This article focuses on several of these legal problems. By examining the history of recent controversies involving the electronic media and breaches of security, protection of

stating that phone company's objective in cutting off billing and collection services to information service was to put it "out of business"), vacated, 804 F. Supp. 1225 (1992). 3 The First Amendment does not require "that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please." Adderly v.

which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official -as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or denied in the discretion of such official -is an unconstitutional censor ship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. -Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham1 In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants . . . the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.

which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official -as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or denied in the discretion of such official -is an unconstitutional censor ship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. -Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham1 In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants . . . the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.

passing, so most of this section relates the Good News Club decision to the Court's prior cases. The article concludes that the Court correctly decided both the free speech and Establishment Clause issues and that its decision poses no threat either to religious liberty or to the separation of church and state. Ever since the Supreme Court first held that the Establishment Clause was binding on the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 11 in 1947, the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been marked by bitter internal divisions, seeming inconsistency and at times incoherence. For example, the familiar three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 2 to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated, has been criticized by a majority of Supreme Court Justices 1 3 and has; at times been totally disregarded by the Court 14 but has never been officially overruled. The Supreme Court decisions outlawing the non-denominational New York Regents-approved prayer 15 and Bible reading in the 11330 U.S. at 16. 12 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."') (citations omitted).

In the meaning which the expression has for most of us, a "free society" suggests the incorporation of a right to dissent from the viewpoint of the majority. Yet, if the free society is organized upon a system of laws as the foundation, there cannot exist a "right" to disobey the law: a toleration of a general right to disobey would obviously undermine the legal foundation. The initiation of a discussion of the right to dissent was a reference to disobedience of the law is not an inherent necessity, nor even a logical step. Today, however, our society is so involved with examination and definition of the right to dissent and the "non-right" to dissent, that one cannot consider with any significance the former without considering the latter. The latter is generally called civil disobedience. This article examines, first and primarily, the right to dissent in a free society. When dissent extends beyond that right and involves a violation of law, the dissent is at least civil disobedience, if not treason, civil rebellion, or revolution. It is advantageous to here set out a workable definition of "civil disobedience". It will be useful first in considering civil disobedience as the limitation of the right to dissent. Later, the definition will be referred to when this article cites justifications which writers have urged for civil disobedience. These justifications, in effect, attempt to embrace various forms of civil disobedience within the right to dissent. "'Civil disobedience is the deliberate breaking of law in order to secure a change in the legal system."'

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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978); Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G.WL., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978). 1. 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978). 2. 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978). 3. The Florida Supreme Court derives its power to regulate the state's practicing attorneys from art. V, § 15 of the Florida Constitution. Good moral character is a prerequisite for admission to the Florida Bar. No person shall be recommended by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners . . . for admission to The Florida Bar unless he first produces satisfactory evidence to the Board that he is of good moral character, . . . and is otherwise a fit person to take the oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISS. R. IV, § 19. The Florida Supreme Court has defined good moral character as "acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for

A letter to the City Council of Edmond, Oklahoma voicing concern over the appointment of former-Oklahoma County District Attorney David Prater to the position of a municipal judge after a long and controversial career of prosecutorial abuses.

This Comment provides a thorough analysis of Amendment 2. The primary issue addressed is whether Amendment 2 will have an impact on Missourians\u27 religious freedoms or whether Amendment 2 merely reaffirms rights already granted under the old article I, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution. If Amendment 2 does add new rights, an analysis of whether such rights are in accord with the First Amendment is required. Part II outlines the legislative history, text, and general commentary on the key provisions of Amendment 2. In Part III, all new provisions under Amendment 2 are analyzed in light of the legal framework created by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding religious expression and the Establishment Clause. Future implications of Amendment 2 are also discussed. Part IV concludes that the substantial majority of Amendment 2 reaffirms Missouri citizens\u27 previously-protected constitutional rights. Although both federal and state constitutions have protected Missouria...

To understand modern land use classification it is necessary to consider its historical development. Zoning was originally a defensive device to augment and supplement the law of nuisance.' By creating zones, nuisances and near-nuisances could be excluded at least for the future without the expense and uncertainty of a law suit. This and little more was the objective of zoning. In the furtherance of this objective slight consideration was given to the total management of land, and not infrequently only a small proportion of even residential land was in fact zoned. From this narrow beginning, through the stimulation of judicial decisions invalidating zones which did not include all the land in a given jurisdiction, the comprehensive plan developed. 2 But even the early comprehensive plans were little more than a general recognition of existing land uses. The classifications were gross and seldom contemplated more than three use districts-residential, commercial, and industrial. The refinement of these districts by the creation of many sub-districts and the addition of agricultural, forestry, flood plain, and occasionally recreational zones extended the district idea almost to the point where there was a zone for every use. Where an activity was too specialized even for this scheme, the special permit provided a way for the location of diverse uses such as shopping centers, funeral parlors, garden apartments, schools, churches, or filling stations. Land management in a relatively slow-growing, urban society imposed no serious challenge to planners, city councils, or courts; but the accelerated growth of American cities has required a substantial rc-orientation of both objectives and methods. Zoning has been integrated with planning, and emphasis upon protection of adjacent land has given way to planning for municipal growth. Most American cities seek their destiny in a balance among agriculture, industry and commercial activity. In general, however, the greatest reliance for economic development is placed upon the attraction of new industry into, or at least near, the city. This approach, of course, is not new, but what is new is the shift in industrial demands upon the city itself. At one time it was enough *Professor, School of Law, Indiana University. 1. HORACK & NOLAN, LAND Usr CONTROLS 64 (1955). 2. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). [502] 3. NAT'L INDUSTRIAL ZONING COMMITTEE, PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAl. ZONINC, (1951). 4. "... industry's needs become the same as the needs of the entire community. Good streets and transportation facilities, smooth traffic flow, sufficient fire and police protection, decent housing, zoning ordinances that are observed, and adequate educational, recreational, and cultural facilities are just as vital to the growth of industry and business they are to the well-being of other elements in the community." Riley, What Industry Needs in the City Plan, Address,

The movement to amend the Constitution by convention under Article V has recently garnered incredible strength. In the past fi ve years, nearly two dozen pieces of Article V legislation have been passed in as many states by nearly as many public policy organizations. From the Left to the Right, Americans are recognizing that the rules of the political game need to be rewritten outside of Washington to reform the federal government.

The impact of the constitutional dilemma created by the ABA's aversion to Internet schooling is widespread. Currently, 18 states and 2 U.S. territories restrict bar exam eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. Additionally, 29 states and 1 U.S. territory restrict admission to practice on motion to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. Although numerous lawsuits have been filed in ultimately failed efforts to strike down bar admission rules that restrict eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, none has challenged the ABA-accreditation requirement based on the First Amendment's prohibition on media discrimination. This Article makes that case. Despite accelerating technological advances, the ABA still refuses to accredit online JD programs and Internet law school. But states that restrict bar eligibility to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools not only punish graduates of online JD programs for daring to have engaged in online educational communication, they necessarily devalue educational communication and association over the Internet. This, in turn, predictably diminishes the amount of protected Internet speech and association in favor of traditional face-to-face communication and association. Such media discrimination is vulnerable to First Amendment attack under theories that seek to protect liberty of circulation, academic freedom and access to the legal profession. Accordingly, states should meet their constitutional obligations and furnish graduates of online JD programs with an alternative pathway to licensure. brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk provided by bepress Legal Repository Part 3: By restricting access to the bar to graduates of ABA-accredited schools, the State is discriminating against the Internet as a medium of educational communication and interfering with liberty of circulation and academic freedom.