DICTATOR GAME

We analyze and compare three methods of measuring social norms: the Krupka and Weber (KW) coordination game, the two-step approach by Bicchieri and Xiao (BX), and a novel Binarized Scoring Method (BSM) we introduce that elicits the full distribution of normative beliefs. We discuss the properties of each method and test their effectiveness in two distinctive ways. First, we compare the fit and predictive power of the norms elicited by each method in 3 versions of the dictator game, which differ in how the pie is initially allocated. Then we use vignettes to assess the extent to which the methods can recover existing norms for various naturally occurring settings. We find that, within the framework of a norm-dependent utility model, the KW method yields better predictive power. All three methods effectively recover norms in field settings, although KW and BSM are more robust to false positives.

Behavior contagion in social decision-making refers to the alignment of an individual's behavior and decisions with those of others in social interactions. Despite previous studies in the field, it remains necessary to understand how brain activities are spatiotemporally organized during contagion. Since brain activities include both positive and negative fluctuations, monitoring these occurrences in a polar space using a visibility graph (VG) can aid in a better understanding of this phenomenon. Methods: We subjected a healthy group to a psycho-economic task while their EEG was simultaneously recorded. The participants' performances were compared before and after observation of others' preferences in a dictator game task. Subsequently, two groups were differentiated based on their behavior contagion rate. Then, the VGs of event-related potentials (ERPs) in both contagion and non-contagion groups were compared before and after observation. Results: Our results indicated that the VG features differentially change in various EEG channels. For instance, changes in clustering coefficient, modularity, and efficiency of VGs suggested that the number of ERP components varies after contagion, specifically at the frontal, frontocentral, centroparietal, and parietal regions. Conclusion: This result may raise questions about the ERP analysis of contagion, particularly when using the same number and length of components (e.g. P300) for comparing ERPs before and after contagion.

Current computational models suggest that paranoia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to environments. However, it is unclear whether this applies to social contexts, and whether it is specific to harmful intent attributions, the live expression of paranoia. We sought to fill this gap this by fitting a computational model to data (n = 1754) from a modified serial dictator game, to explore whether pre-existing paranoia could be accounted by specific alterations to cognitive parameters characterising harmful intent attributions. We constructed a ‘Bayesian brain’ model of others’ intent, which we fitted to harmful intent and self-interest attributions made over 18 trials, across three different partners. We found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with greater uncertainty about other’s actions. It moderated the relationship between learning rates and harmful intent attributions, making harmful intent attributions less reliant...

The study examines the influence of induced negative mood on dictator game giving (DGG) with two recipients. Participants (N = 63) played the role of a dictator in a threeplayer dictator game. They could choose among two options: an altruistic option, where two receivers receive 10 Euros and the dictator himself receives nothing, or a selfish option, where the dictator himself receives 5 Euros and both receivers receive nothing. For half of the participants, the second option entailed that only one receiver receives nothing and the other receives 10 Euros. After four rounds, participants were randomly assigned to look at 10 pictures with either positive or negative emotional content with the purpose of inducing positive or negative mood. The results show that looking at pictures with negative emotional content increases anxiety and skin conductance and increases DGG in the remaining four rounds of the game. On the other hand, whether the selfish option would imply that one or both recipients receive nothing does not seem to have a strong influence on DGG.

We ran an experiment where the subjects initially played a four-round dictator game, after which each subject was shown either a set of positive images or a set of negative images. Finally the subjects played another four-round dictator game.The effect of the sign of images shown is clear on the players’ behaviors: positive images have moderate effects on charitable behavior while negative images dramatically increase charity.We could therefore infer from our experimental results that showing negative images of the Haitian and Chilean catastrophes to the international public would have significant positive impacts on international donations to the victims and the rebuilding programs in both countries.

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant's counterfactual generosity intention. For a given pair of proposer candidates each states, via the strategy vector method, an intended and two adjusted offers: one (possibly) upward adjusted in case the intended offer of the other candidate is higher and one (possibly) downward adjusted in case it is lower. Additionally, each candidate determines an acceptance threshold for the responder role. Only one candidate in each pair is randomly selected and endowed as the actual proposer whose offer is either possibly upward or downward adjusted depending on the counterfactual offer of the other proposer candidate. The endowed proposer of one pair is matched with the non-endowed candidate of another pair in the responder role. The data confirm that counterfactual intentions of others often affect own generosity via substantial and significant average adjustments to the weakest social influence. Overall, offers seem correlated with acceptance thresholds. Furthermore, we find significant gender differences: female participants state lower intended and adjusted offers as well as acceptance thresholds and therefore appear to be less sensitive to social influence.

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other's intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other's intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant’s counterfactual generosity intention. For a given pair of proposer candidates each states, via the strategy vector method, an intended and two adjusted offers: one (possibly) upward adjusted in case the intended offer of the other candidate is higher and one (possibly) downward adjusted in case it is lower. Additionally, each candidate determines an acceptance threshold for the responder role. Only one candidate in each pair is randomly selected and endowed as the actual proposer whose offer is either possibly upward or downward adjusted depending on the counterfactual offer of the other proposer candidate. The endowed proposer of one pair is matched with the non-endowed candidate of another pair in the responder role. The data confirm that...

The relation of allocation was conceptualized in the analytical framework of a real socialist economy, the Soviet economy, henceforth referred to as "communist economy". As an empirical phenomenon, it is in a communist economy the relation that governs the phenomena of possession, and as such, it is the relation that is a substitute to ownership. This relation is of a general nature, because it governs possession when the possessor acquires the goods while in a subordinate position. It follows that the relation of allocation, to a certain extent, constitutes an element in the organization of "hierarchical" parts of capitalist economies, their administrations and their firms, concerning that portion of goods that "circulate" from superiors to subordinates. The analysis and comparison of economic systems, the construction of a general theory of economic systems makes it necessary to build not only the adequate concepts for the knowledge each of these systems, but also the linguistic expressions (general terms) allowing to capture these concepts. Therefore, we shall introduce the relation of allocation starting from the concept of relation of possession, of which we shall present a general outline,

The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries.

This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in decision making. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals' utility function when facing a Dictator Game decision is then presented. Finally, this "identity-based" utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allow us to study the main parameters of the model, suggesting that we should move with caution when attributing identities to individuals.

Ideally we would like subjects of experiments to be perfect strangers so that the situation they face at the lab is not just part of a long run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions and experimenters try to mitigate any effects from those out-of-the-lab relationships by, for instance, randomly matching subjects. However, even if this type

We report on a two-stage experiment in which i) we …rst elicit the social network within a section of undergraduate students and ii) we then measure their altruistic attitudes by means of a standard Dictator game. We observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic, as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated with the level of giving, even after controlling for framing and social distance, which have been shown to signi…cantly a¤ect giving in previous studies. Our …ndings suggest that social distance and social integration are complementary determinants of altruistic behavior.

Land conflicts in developing countries are costly. An important policy goal is to create respect for borders. This often involves mandatory, expensive interventions. We propose a new policy design, which in theory promotes neighborly relations at low cost. A salient feature is the option to by-pass regulation through consensus. The key idea combines the insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction. As a first, low-cost pass at empirical evaluation, we conduct an experiment among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a region exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed. Our results suggest that a low-cost land delimitation based on neighborly recognition of borders could deliver a desired low-conflict situation if accompanied by an optional higher cost demarcation process.

We present an experiment on the behavior of individual subjects across four simple economic games: ​the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game, the Trust Game, and the Public Goods Gam​e. Subjects complete the games using the strategy method with role reversal. We thus gather data from each subject that allows us to construct a full decision plan for each role in each game, and we then study the relationships between behavior at the individual subject level in the different games. We find that dictator giving decisions are highly predictive of offers in the ultimatum game, and also of trust game return decisions. We also find strong relationships between behavior in the trust and public good games. Specifically, amounts sent in the trust game are highly predictive of unconditional contributions in the public good game, and demonstrating high reciprocity in the trust game by returning high proportions after receiving a high amount is highly predictive of heavily conditioning pu...

Аннотация. Значительная часть социальных и экономических взаимодействий происходит между людьми с разным социальным статусом. В силу возраста, должности, достатка или других причин люди по-разному оценивают свое положение в обществе. В данной работе мы исследуем, насколько восприятие человеком своего социального статуса может формироваться в ходе участия в экспериментальной экономической игре. В нашем эксперименте участники в парах последовательно играют в игры «Диктатор», «Доверие» и «Трудовой контракт». После каждой игры мы измеряем их субъективный экономико-социальный статус, используя две шкалы. Мы показываем, что наиболее сильно на восприятие собственного статуса влияет участие в игре «Диктатор»: статус у игравших роль распределителя значимо выше, чем у игравших роль получателя. Распределение ролей в остальных играх не показывает такого эффекта. На субъективный статус также влияют объективные характеристики респондентов: уверенное поведение, пол, материальное благосостояние и т.д.

Objectives: Considerable evidence including twin and family studies suggests that biologic determinants interact with cultural cues in the etiology of anorexia and bulimia nervosa. A gene that makes ''biologic sense'' in contributing susceptibility to these disorders, and to our knowledge not previously investigated for this phenotype, is the vasopressin receptor (AVPR1A), which we have tested for association with eating pathology. Methods: We genotyped 280 families with same-sex siblings for two microsatellites in the promoter region of the AVPR1A gene. Siblings completed the 26-item Eating Attitudes Test (EAT) and the Drive for Thinness (DT) and Body Dissatisfaction (BD) subscales of the Eating Disorders Inventory (EDI). The Quantitative Transmission Disequilibrium Test program (QTDT), which employs flexible and powerful variance-components procedures, was used to test for an association between EAT scores and the two AVPR1A promoter region microsatellites, RS1 and RS3. Results: A significant association (p ¼ .036) was detected between the RS3 microsatellite and EAT scores. The strongest association was between RS3 and the Dieting subscale of the EAT (p ¼ .011). A significant association was also observed between the EDI-DT and the RS3 microsatellit (p ¼ .0450). Conclusions: We demonstrate for the first time an association between a microsatellite polymorphism in the AVPR1A promoter region and

Researchers working in the fields of family studies and psychology show motherchild relationship dynamics affect the occurrence of childhood overweight and obesity. Many of the significant behaviors they identify relate to negotiation and generosity norms in the household. The primary objective of this study is to test the value of altruistic and collective models of household behavior using the dictator and ‘carrotstick’ laboratory experiments. We also test exploratory hypotheses relating mother’s generosity and child’s punitive behavior and mother-child weight and fitness outcomes using dictator and ‘carrot-stick’ games. The data were collected from 50 mother-child pairs in Laramie, Wyoming. The children were all eight to 10 years old. The mother’s completed a survey to measure family attitudes and beliefs around food and fitness. All of the mothers and children completed a fitness assessment and blood draw to measure their cholesterol, triglyceride, and hemoglobin levels in addit...

In this paper, we examine decisions to cooperate in economic games. We investigate which payoffs give players the greatest pleasure and whether the pleasure they feel about payoffs predicts their decisions to cooperate. To do this, we modify the ultimatum and dictator games by asking players to consider a fixed set of offers and report their preferences over all offers. Players also report the pleasure they imagine feeling from each possible payoff. Results show that players differ in the extent to which they derive pleasure from fairness or greediness. They also differ in the extent to which their choices depend on what we call bstrategicQ and bnon-strategicQ pleasure. Strategic pleasure is the expected pleasure of offers, whereas non-strategic pleasure is the pleasure of accepted payoffs. Players whose pleasure primarily depends on larger payoffs tend to make fair offers in the ultimatum game and selfish offers in the dictator game. They maximize strategic pleasure in the ultimatum game and non-strategic pleasure in the dictator game. Players who derive greater pleasure from fairness tend to act fairly in both games. These players maximize non-strategic pleasure. Brain imaging studies should address the question of whether the observed differences in pleasure and preference are systematically linked to differences in neurological activation.

Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators. (JEL D63, D81, H23)

Several studies have sought to assess the cognitive aspects underlying the sharing of goods. This work aimed to evaluate whether there is a relationship between inhibitory control and distributive behavior in a private context (total anonymity of the distributor). One hundred and thirty-six children aged between three and 12 years participated in a dictatorial game and a standard Stroop task. Age, inhibitory control and distributive behavior were positively correlated, but only age was predictive of sharing. It is suggested that the moral reasoning employed in the distributive context explains this tendency, in which older children, when reflecting on resource sharing, resort to respect for social rules. In contrast, younger children feel that their desire is sufficient to justify the self-centered behavior, even knowing the rules. The results contribute to the field of child development by providing information that allows a better understanding of the role executive functions play...

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share is exogenously fixed. Responders can accept or reject the proposal, with game types differing in the consequences of rejection: all four combinations of (not) self-harming and (not) other-harming are considered. We find that envy leads responders to reject high proposer claims, especially when rejection harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict and results in a considerable loss of efficiency.

This paper experimentally measures the ‘social capital’ of altruism, trust and reciprocity and empirically explores the impact of these norms on economic well-being. Using an experimental economic design that distinguishes trust and reciprocity from altruism, data were collected from individuals in a random sample of South African communities. Analyzed at the community level, these data suggest that while related, trust and reci

We present experimental evidence that policies chosen by leaders depend on whether they were elected or appointed. Consistent with previous studies of the "dictator game", we find that unitary policymakers do not always act selfishly, that is, choose a policy that maximizes their own payoffs. However, the way in which one became the leader matters. Leaders who are elected are significantly more likely to choose a policy not equal to their "type" than leaders who are appointed. Elected leaders who act non-selfishly will favor the voter rather than the losing candidate, while appointed leaders show no tendency to favor the voter over the losing candidate. Our results provide support for the view that non-selfish behavior of leaders reflects a reciprocity motive. They also show that candidates do not simply implement their own preferences once in office, as suggested by the basic citizen-candidate model.

We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most "appropriate" plan of action for individuals involved in a "Trust Game". The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline condition where no voting takes place.

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

We investigate the role of affect and deliberation on social preferences. In our laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are under varying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: they can decide between a fair or an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load condition are more generous -they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a low-load condition. The series of mini Dictator games also allows us to investigate how subjects react to the games' varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects react considerably more to the degree of advantageous inequality. Our results therefore underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting decisions to a given situation.

We investigate the role of affect and deliberation on social preferences. In our laboratory experiment subjects decide on a series of mini Dictator games while they are under varying degrees of cognitive load. The cognitive load is intended to decrease deliberation and therefore enhance the influence of affect on behavior. In each game subjects have two options: they can decide between a fair or an unfair allocation. We find that subjects in a high-load condition are more generous -they more often choose the fair allocation than subjects in a low-load condition. The series of mini Dictator games also allows us to investigate how subjects react to the games' varying levels of advantageous inequality. Low-load subjects react considerably more to the degree of advantageous inequality. Our results therefore underscore the importance of affect for basic altruistic behavior and deliberation in adjusting decisions to a given situation.

Several prominent evolutionary theories contend that religion was critical to the emergence of large-scale societies and encourages cooperation in contemporary complex groups. These theories argue that religious systems provide a reliable mechanism for finding trustworthy anonymous individuals under conditions of risk. In support, studies find that people displaying cues of religious identity are more likely to be trusted by anonymous coreligionists. However, recent research has found that displays of religious commitment can increase trust across religious divides. These findings are puzzling from the perspective that religion emerges to regulate coalitions. To date, these issues have not been investigated outside of American undergraduate samples nor have studies considered how religious identities interact with other essential group-membership signals, such as ancestry, to affect intergroup trust. Here, we address these issues and compare religious identity, ancestry, and trust a...

This paper explores new motivations behind giving. Speci…cally, it focuses on personal involvement and responsibility to explain why decision makers give positive amounts in dictatorial decisons. The experiment is designed to uncover these motivations. Subjects face the problem of a dictator's allocation of an indivisible pie P to one of two players; indivisibility creates an extremely unequal outcome and the dictator is given a chance to correct this outcome at a cost. The willingness to pay to correct the outcome is examined under di¤erent scenarios so that we learn about several features concerning preferences.

A growing literature in economics examines the development of preferences among children and adolescents. We combine a repeated dictator game with treatments that either provides participants with information about the average behavior of others or not. In a sample of 384 children aged 5-17, we find an increase in donations until the age of 13-14, but not beyond. We find no effect of social information on average donation behavior in any of the studied age-groups, but do find effects on the distributions of donations.

The ability to trust others, including strangers, is a prerequisite for human cooperation. Economically it is not rational to trust strangers, as trust can be easily exploited. Still, generally, the level of trust toward strangers is relatively high. Trust is closely related to trustworthiness: when trusting others, one expects them to reciprocate. Some individuals elicit more trust than others. Apparently, humans use subtle cues for judging the trustworthiness of their interaction partners. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates trust and trustworthiness in a population of 176 mainly Dutch students. The aims of our study were: (1) to investigate how the sex of interaction partners and their facial appearance (femininity/masculinity) affect the degree of trust and trustworthiness, compared to fully anonymous conditions; (2) to test whether individuals who elicit trust in their interaction partners are trustworthy themselves. Each subject of our experiment played five one...

The ability to trust other individuals, including strangers, is a prerequisite for human cooperation. Economically it is not rational to trust others, as trust can be easily exploited. Still, generally the level of trust toward strangers is relatively high. Trust is closely related to trustworthiness: when trusting others, one expects them to reciprocate. Some individuals elicit more trust than others. Apparently, humans use subtle cues for judging the trustworthiness of their interaction partners. Here we report on an experiment that investigates trust and trustworthiness in a population of 176 mainly Dutch students. We address the following questions: What is the degree of trust and trustworthiness towards anonymous interaction partners? How do trust and trustworthiness change in a personalised setting (after seeing a silent video of a partner)? How does the sex and the facial features of the interaction partner affect trust and trustworthiness? The subjects in our experiment play...

In this paper we aim to disentangle the effects on in-group favoritism driven by beliefs from those stemming from group identity, with the final goal of testing the relative power of three potential explanations of this bias: The Beliefs Driven Explanation (BDE), the Group Identity Explanation (GIE) and the Belief-mediated Group Identity Explanation (BGE). The BDE suggests that in-group favoritism is only driven by the desire not to let others' expectations down. The GIE claims that people have a preference, per se, for members of their group. According to the BGE, people also have a preference for members of their group, but this is mediated by their second-order beliefs. To this aim, we built an experimental design able to produce exogenous variations in both group membership and expectations, hence providing a genuine test for the rationale of in-group bias. The results of our experiment suggest that beliefs per se are not a significant explanation of in-group favoritism and hence do not provide support to the BDE. Our experimental evidence does not provide support also to the BGE. We conclude that our experiment suggests to single out the GIE as the most powerful explanation of social identity.

We engaged over 430 Canadian children in a series of activities designed to reveal their evaluations of three ethnic groups (White, East Asian and South Asian), their identification with these groups, and their behavior towards them in a dictator game. Our experiments took place at the children's schools during their normal school day, allowing us to evaluate the salience and effects of ethnic identities on economically relevant behavior in an important natural setting. We find that children from the dominant White category have a clear sense of White ethnic identity, and tend to favor White recipients in the dictator game relative to East Asian or South Asian recipients. Minority East Asian children reveal a more complex ethnic identity; they perceive themselves to be equally similar to White and East Asian children. Unlike Whites, East Asian children do not favor recipients from their own East Asian category, nor do they favor recipients with whom they tend to identify. If anything, East Asian children show out-group favoritism.

Third-party punishment refers to a behavioral phenomenon whereby people punish wrongdoers even if their sanction incurs personal costs but yields no direct benefits. Given the eye cues demonstrated ability to convey signals of being observed, its effect on third-party punishment, driven by virtue of its effects on others' perceptions, was investigated. In addition, emotional message featured in the eye region is crucial in social interaction, whether the emotion within the eyes serves this effect with varying degrees of influence has rarely considered. The present study aimed at exploring (a) the watching eyes effect on the third-party punishment and (b) whether this effect varies from negative eyes to positive eyes. By two experiments using a modified Third-Party Dictator Game, we displayed either eye images or control images above the question on whether to punish the dictators or not. There was no emotional diversity of eye cues in Experiment 1, and most participants tended t...

endowment between himself and the second player in any way he sees fit. The second player has no input, whatsoever. The formal principle of distributive justice could be stated as "Equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally, in proportion to their relevant similarities and differences" . The specific application of this formal principle depends on how one defines "equality" and "relevant similarities and differences". Thus, two main types of distribution problems arise; Fixed Pie and Effort Dependent. Fixed pie problems concentrate on how to distribute a finite quantity of benefits and are mostly analyzed with economic games in order to

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long asserted that deception harms trust. We challenge this claim. Across four studies, we demonstrate that deception can increase trust. Specifically, prosocial lies increase the willingness to pass money in the trust game, a behavioral measure of benevolence-based trust. In Studies 1a and 1b, we find that altruistic lies increase trust when deception is directly experienced and when it is merely observed. In Study 2, we demonstrate that mutually beneficial lies also increase trust. In Study 3, we disentangle the effects of intentions and deception; intentions are far more important than deception for building benevolence-based trust. In Study 4, we examine how prosocial lies influence integrity-based trust. We introduce a new economic game, the Rely-or-Verifygame, to measure integrity-based trust. Prosocial lies increase benevolence-based trust, but harm integrity-based trust. Our findings expand our understanding of deception and deepen our insight into the mechanics of trust.

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Recent models of prosociality suggest that cooperation in laboratory games may be better understood as resulting from concern for social norms than from prosocial preferences over outcomes. Underlying this interpretation is the idea that people exhibit heterogeneous respect for shared norms. We introduce a new, abstract task to elicit a proxy for individual normfollowing propensity by asking subjects to choose from two actions, where one is costly. We instruct subjects that "the rule is" to take the costly action. Their willingness to incur such a cost reveals respect for norms. We show that choices in this task are similar across five countries. Rule-following is correlated with norm-consistent behavior in dictator games, providing support for our interpretation.

We develop a unifying framework to understand the sensitivity of prosocial behavior to variation in context in games. We argue that individuals are motivated not only by material payoffs but also by how closely their actions correspond to social norms. In extensive form games with observable actions, we derive the implications of norm-dependent utility -which depends on material payoffs, social appropriateness of actions in the game (i.e. norms), and a single parameter measuring sensitivity to norms. We demonstrate how all the ingredients of the utility function can be measured from behavioral data using specifically designed tasks. We argue that norms vary with context and that this can account for observed behavioral heterogeneity across payoff-equivalent frames of a game. We report the results of experiments aimed at manipulating norms and thereby behavior. In three variants of the dictator game we replicate previous findings that heterogeneity in individual norm sensitivity accounts for heterogeneity in dictator giving, though our manipulation does not directly influence norms. In two variants of the Ultimatum game, we demonstrate that our utility specification explains otherwise incomprehensible differences in strategic choices of the Proposers that result from experimentally induced changes in norms of Responder behavior.

We explore a unifying explanation for prosocial behavior in which people care not about others' payoffs per se, but whether their own behavior accords with social norms. Individuals who are sensitive to norms will adhere to them so long as they observe others doing the same. A model formalizing this generates both prosociality (without relying on explicit distributional preferences) and well-known context effects (for which simple distributional preferences cannot account). A simple experiment allows us to measure individual-level normsensitivity and to show that norm-sensitivity explains heterogeneity in prosociality in public goods, dictator, ultimatum, and trust games.

On a large sample of 2288 Han Chinese undergraduates, we investigated how religion and DRD4 are related to human altruistic giving behavior as measured with the Andreoni-Miller Dictator Game. This game enables us to clearly specify (non-)selfishness, efficiency, and fairness motives for sharing. Participants were further classified into religious categories (Christian, Buddhist-Tao, and No Religion) based on self-reports, and genotyped for the dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4) gene exon III VNTR. Our analysis revealed a significant interaction between religion and DRD4 correlated with giving behavior solely among males: Whereas no significant association between religion and sharing decisions was observed in the majority 4R/4R genotype group, a significant difference in giving behavior between Christian and non-Christian males was seen in the non-4R/4R group, with Christian men being overall more altruistic (less selfish and fairer) than non-Christian men. These results support the vantage sensitivity hypothesis regarding DRD4 that the non-4R/4R "susceptibility" genotype is more responsive to a positive environment provided by some religions.

This paper examines consumers’ awareness, knowledge, and perception of credibility of various types of environmental friendly products currently used by businesses, based on a survey of consumers in the U.S. Midwest region. Using a contingent valuation model, the willingness to pay for environmental friendly products is determined. The differences in consumers’ awareness, knowledge, and perception of credibility of various environmental friendly products across consumers with different demographic characteristics (i.e., income, education, occupation, ethnicity, etc.) and psychographic characteristics (i.e., environmental concerns, etc.) are examined.

Trust involves a willingness to accept vulnerability, comprised of the risk of being worse off than by not trusting, the risk of being worse off than the trusted party (disadvantageous inequality), and the risk of being betrayed by the trusted party. We examine how people's status, focusing on sex, race, age and religion, affects their willingness to accept these three risks. We experimentally measure people's willingness to accept risk in a decision problem, a risky dictator game, and a trust game, and compare responses across games. Groups typically considered having lower status in the USwomen, minorities, young adults and non-Protestants -are averse to disadvantageous inequality while higher status groups -men, Caucasians, middle-aged people and Protestants -dislike being betrayed.

Using a very simple method, we isolate and study precisely how interpersonal factors may influence individuals' decisions under uncertainty. We develop and test a model of individual behavior that encompasses the interpersonal concepts of altruism, malice, competitiveness (or, more properly, distinction) and fairness in decision making. As Veblen (1909) suggests, the relative importance of such factors may vary with the institutions governing decision maker behavior. Experimentally, we study five such situations, three of which parallel decision making in partnership, bargaining and auction situations. Preliminary results show that, when acting alone, individuals appear risk-neutral to slightly risk averse on average in a simple choice task. However, their risk aversion (measured using the same task) appears to shift when their decisions also affect other participants. Thus, interpersonal factors may account for anomalous patterns of risk aversion within particular institutions and differences in apparent risk aversion across institutions.