Cloud computing environment

Fog computing is an emerging service-oriented market in conjunction with Cloud computing to fulfill the resource demand of mobile users as well as IoT users for real-time applications. Auctioning in Fog computing is highly challenging due to mobility, dynamic pricing, real-time demand in comparison to Cloud based auctioning models. Further, due to users' mobility and limited Fog resources, existing reverse auction techniques developed for Cloud computing model cannot directly be applied for the resource procurement in Fog-Integrated Cloud Architecture (FICA). Therefore, a reverse auction-based model which includes customer, auctioneer, Fog provider, Cloud provider, and Fog & Cloud provider together as auction participants, is proposed in this work. The proposed model, for resource provisioning using a multi-attribute combinatorial reverse auction, is named as Fog-Integrated Cloud Auctioning Model (FICAM). FICAM pricing scheme includes three types of resources depending on their requirement i.e., local Fog, remote Fog, and Cloud. A truthful, robust, and fair algorithm for resource allocation is proposed considering response time, data source mobility requirements, and Fog resource limitations. To encourage providers to bid truthfully, the Vickrey model is extended. FICAM also introduces a new algorithm for resource procurement in which instead of giving all resources of the bundle, only the required resources at a time are given to the customer with the bundle discount. The discount is based on a certain threshold in the ratio of the availed amount of resources to the offered amount of resources. Rigorous experimentation exhibits that the proposed model offers a low resource procurement cost in polynomial time as compared to other state of the art algorithms.

Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access to the bundle of VM instances. This  scheme relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to maintain privacy of bid values.

Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access to the bundle of VM instances. This  scheme relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to maintain privacy of bid values.

The ever-growing demand for cloud resources places the resource management at the heart of the design and decision-making processes in cloud computing environments. Cloud providers offer heterogeneous resources such as CPUs, memory, and storage in the form of Virtual Machine (VM) instances. Recently, cloud providers have introduced auctionbased models to sell their unutilized resources in an auction market which allow users to submit bids for their requested VMs. In this PhD dissertation, we address the problem of autonomic VM provisioning and allocation for the auction-based model considering multiple types of resources by designing exact and approximation mechanisms. The mechanisms also determine the payment the users have to pay for using the allocated resources. Furthermore, our proposed mechanisms drive the system into an equilibrium in which the users do not have incentives to manipulate the system by untruthfully reporting their VM bundle requests and valuations.

Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access to the bundle of VM instances. This  scheme relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to maintain privacy of bid values.

Cloud Computing Environment provides computing resources in the form of Virtual Machines (VMs), to the cloud users through Internet. Auction-based VM instances allocation allows different cloud users to participate in an auction for a bundle of Virtual Machine instances where the user with the highest bid value will be selected as the winner by the auctioneer (Cloud Service Provider) to gain more. In this auction mechanism, individual bid values are revealed to the auctioneer in order to select the winner as a result of which privacy of bid values are lost. In this paper, we proposed an auction scheme to select the winner without revealing the individual bid values to the auctioneer to maintain privacy of bid values. The winner will get the access to the bundle of VM instances. This scheme relies on a set of cryptographic protocols including Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol and Yao’s protocol to maintain privacy of bid values.