Battle of the Sexes

Women's participation as athletes in American football precipitates gendered conflict, in that the routine reproduction of masculine discourse and identity is challenged. As such, the purpose of this study was to explore how the creation of discourses of masculinity and femininity undermine most women's access and acceptance into American football. Utilizing critical discourse analysis, an analysis of The Gender Bowl , a reality TV program featuring a full-contact football game between women and men, revealed how men sought to preserve the social relations of football and how women sought to contest this masculine domain in part by adopting typically masculine linguistic practices of insult. Results of the analysis revealed interdiscursivity of two discourses of gender relations: discourses of conservative gender relations iterated by the men, discourses of conflict from both men and women, and discourses of egalitarian gender relations iterated by the women.

Using secondary data and literature review, this paper explore Desai’s (2010) preconditions for creation of regional unions for SAARC. There are Common goals articulated in several SAARC declarations. However, power balance and conducive local political environment are questionable. Therefore, the performance of SAARC as a regional cooperation is not satisfactory. A two stage-game is designed to describe SAARC internal affairs. First India and Pakistan play Stag Hunt game. Then the remaining members chose the best strategy for them after observing the equilibrium of the first stage Stag Hunt game. Effect of rest of the world interventions on equilibrium is also considered. Accordingly, India and Pakistan would have found amicable solutions to Jammu Kashmir issue and to the terrorism if they can cooperate. However, mutual mistrust does not allow it. Strategic interventions by external parties has aggravated the problem in terms of further restricting cooperative strategy and in terms of Indian retaliations against the smaller members with such cooperations with outside SAARC. In the second stage of the game, all small countries choose two optimal reactions; be silent over Indo-Pakistan issue and going for bilateral agreements disregarding the SAARC trade facilitation role in multilateral manner. All these developments are not in favor of the future of SAARC.
Key words: Regional Cooperation, SAARC, Stag hunt

Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions.

Approaches to economics which will be outlined are:
(1)  Neoclassical economics;
(2)  New institutional economics;
(3)  Behavioral or psychological economics;
(4)  Old or orthodox (conventional) institutional economics; and
(5)  Evolutionary economics including co-evolution.
Some attention will also be given to views associated with the Austrian School of Economics and its relationship to the perspectives listed above and to game theory.

The behaviour between men and women is a problem that affects
the society, which has resulted in a controversial issue, a theme
dealt with by mass media and many contemporary writers. An
author such as Suso de Toro (Santiago de Compostela, 1956)
who, with his camera view, has occupied his time in observing
the modern world’s diseases, he couldn’t stay out; for this reason,
the aim of this study is, on the basis of the personal considerations
of the author born in Santiago and making a brief analysis
of his publications, to present the dynamic which is developed
between men and women in his narrative work and the different
views which men and women have of each other.

Solution concepts for game play implicitly assume what information is relevant for choosing moves. Maximin and Eliminating Dominated Strategies use payoff order; mixed strategies and Harsanyi's risk dominance use payoff values. "Cooperative" strategies use previous choices, ignoring payoffs altogether. We first define the 12 symmetric 2 × 2 games as a continuous payoff space then use this space to evaluate strategies based on different types of information. Strategic success is shown to be sensitive to actual payoffs and seldom consistent for all games of an ordinally defined category such as Chicken. A new hybrid strategy using both payoff and choice information is introduced and shown to produce efficient outcomes in all symmetric 2 × 2 games when employed by both players. It does well in evolutionary tournaments against strategies of other types, especially in the difficult distribution games including Battle-of-the-Sexes.

Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions.

In this paper, the authors examine a phenomenon, which has been observed in the grocery channel recently, called ''guarantee of margins''. Guarantee of margins is a clause inserted in the contract between the manufacturer and the retailer that ensures a certain profit margin for the retailer irrespective of the retail price hershe is charging. In the wake of increasing retail level concentration and competition, the retailers' ability of extracting these guarantees from the manufacturers is a clear demonstration of retailer power. Our analysis provides new insights into the growing debate about the power shift to the retailers in the grocery channel. It shows how the retailers can and have utilized this power to maintain their margins by extracting these guarantees from the manufacturers. We specifically model the ability of the retailers to play one manufacturer against another and to use the private label brands as a lever to extract more profits.

Social networking via texting, Facebook, Twitter, and similar media is enormously popular with students, though it often leads to communication challenges along gender lines. Research supports the fact that men and women have divergent expectations for social networking and use it differently. Students can benefit from classroom experiences that raise their awareness of communication challenges associated with social networking and encourage them to assess their own areas for improvement.

This article presents a model for Internet portal management. The model allows portal implementers to monitor and reflect on their portal implementation process and to identify appropriate strategies to improve their community building efforts. The portal management model (PMM) is a lifecycle model that contains four stages. Each stage is identified and described by a number of characteristics and an

We investigate the effects of order-of-play (simultaneous, unobserved sequential and fully observed sequential play) and form of presentation (extensive vs. normal) in three simple two person games: battle-of-the-sexes with and without outside option and a three strategy game which differentiates between virtual observability (VO) and iterated elimination of dominated strategies as principles of equilibrium selection. VO predicts that knowledge of the order of play alone will affect the distribution of strategies chosen. We contrast this with the predictions of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We report results from 1800 one-shot games conducted in 6 sessions with 120 subjects and analysed as panel data. The form of presentation strongly affects the distribution of outcomes and strategies. Information about order of play shifts the distribution of strategies away from the distribution in simultaneous play and towards the distribution in fully observed play, especially i...

In her paper, "Examples of the Motif of the Shrew in European Literature and Film," Louise O. Vasvári presents the shrew-taming story as a masterplot of both Eastern and Western folklore and literature concerned with establishing the appropriate power dynamic between a ...

This article presents a model for Internet portal management. The model allows portal implementers to monitor and reflect on their portal implementation process and to identify appropriate strategies to improve their community building efforts. The portal management model (PMM) is a lifecycle model that contains four stages. Each stage is identified and described by a number of characteristics and an associated existential crisis. Each crisis must be addressed for the portal to remain in business but it must be overcome to move on to the next -more advanced -stage. Four competitive strategies are presented as effective for steering the portal through each of the stages. At the initial stage, the new portal should seek to be the unavoidable pesky little brother and seek to imitate the older established portals. At the second stage the appropriate strategy is for the portal to gain strength through marriage rather than staying single -called the battle of the sexes strategy. At the third stage it is time to take firm control over the portal community. Here open confrontation is unavoidable as in the fairytale of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. At the fourth and final stage, the established portal must ceaselessly monitor the market for new contestants and counter them.

The Battle of the Sexes describes asymmetric conflicts in mating behavior of males and females. Males can be philanderer or faithful, while females are either fast or coy, leading to a cyclic dynamics. The adjusted replicator equation predicts stable coexistence of all four strategies. In this situation, we consider the effects of fluctuations stemming from a finite population size. We show that they unavoidably lead to extinction of two strategies in the population. However, the typical time until extinction occurs strongly prolongs with increasing system size. In the meantime, a quasi-stationary probability distribution forms that is anomalously flat in the vicinity of the coexistence state. This behavior originates in a vanishing linear deterministic drift near the fixed point. We provide numerical data as well as an analytical approach to the mean extinction time and the quasi-stationary probability distribution.

In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certainty at a pre-speci…ed time. To add more realism we propose a framework in which, after an initial simultaneous move in time t = 0, one player gets to revise his action with positive probability at some t 0. Since the initial action of the opponent can be observed, and payo¤s accrue over time, the setup constitutes a dynamic extension of the Stackelberg leadership concept. Allowing for an arbitrary timing distribution, and using both subgame perfection and stochastic stability, we derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which our dynamic revision game has a unique e¢ cient outcome even if the underlying normal form game has no e¢ cient Nash, or multiple ones. Intuitively, the fact that a player is less likely to move than the opponent may serve as a commitment device. Therefore, if the revision opportunity is expected to arrive su¢ ciently early then the committed player's initial cost of mis-coordination or con ‡ict will be more than compensated by ensuring his preferred outcome after the opponent's revision. The framework allows, among other things, to address the issue of equilibrium selection in games in which traditional equilibrium selection approaches fail such as the Battle of the Sexes and the Game of Chicken. It also o¤ers some insigths into the debate about Pareto-dominance versus risk-dominance.

A foundational paradox in social choice theory is that liberalism (freedom of action) and Pareto efficiency, the standard in evaluating economic outcomes, can conflict with each other (Sen 1970). We capture this tension in a series of sequential Battle of the Sexes game experiments. We find that most individuals are willing to waive rights to achieve efficient outcomes. In addition efficiency is higher when participants may claim new rights than when they may relinquish them or when only one player possesses them. This evidence may help resolve the tensions between efficiency and liberty that lie at the heart of social choice and political philosophy.

Muslims and their critics tend to explain their differences in terms of Koranic teachings. But all practical precepts from holy scriptures are constantly contested. Most of these controversial practices concern the position of women in the family and in society at large; they derive not so much from religion as from the traditions of patriarchal, pre-industrial society the world over. Tensions between men and women, parents and children have much increased due to the recent educational revolution that now has girls competing on equal terms with boys for diplomas and jobs, both in their countries of origin and in the countries of immigration. As a result, many men attempt to cling to their superior position by invoking a patriarchal interpretation of the holy book and many women avoid a full confrontation out of loyalty to their men, their faith and their group origins.

In communal dens of garter snakes, Thamnophis sirtalis, in Manitoba, males obtain copulations forcibly, by inducing hypoxic stress in females. Females emerging from their 8-month winter inactivity are weak and slow, but recover strength and speed within a day or two of emergence. Thus, males may benefit by targeting newly emerged females that are too weak to resist, and by courting females under conditions that maximize the male's physical advantage. Fieldwork at a Manitoba den supported these predictions. Both in the field and in outdoor enclosures, males focused courtship on to newly emerged (weak) rather than dispersing (postrecovery) females. Experimental trials showed that males based this choice on female skin lipids (pheromones) that predict time since emergence, rather than correlates of recent emergence that reflect female physiological state per se (low body temperature, low resistance to hypoxia, high breathing rates during courtship). Male superiority in locomotor speed was maximal at high temperatures, and males targeted courtship to hotter females. The postemergence recovery of females in this system substantially shifts the balance of power in physical encounters between males and females, and provides a fitness benefit to male ability to recognize and exploit more vulnerable females. Male ability to discern and exploit differentially vulnerable females is likely to be widespread, but less overt, in many other populations.

In communal dens of garter snakes, Thamnophis sirtalis, in Manitoba, males obtain copulations forcibly, by inducing hypoxic stress in females. Females emerging from their 8-month winter inactivity are weak and slow, but recover strength and speed within a day or two of emergence. Thus, males may benefit by targeting newly emerged females that are too weak to resist, and by courting females under conditions that maximize the male's physical advantage. Fieldwork at a Manitoba den supported these predictions. Both in the field and in outdoor enclosures, males focused courtship on to newly emerged (weak) rather than dispersing (postrecovery) females. Experimental trials showed that males based this choice on female skin lipids (pheromones) that predict time since emergence, rather than correlates of recent emergence that reflect female physiological state per se (low body temperature, low resistance to hypoxia, high breathing rates during courtship). Male superiority in locomotor speed was maximal at high temperatures, and males targeted courtship to hotter females. The postemergence recovery of females in this system substantially shifts the balance of power in physical encounters between males and females, and provides a fitness benefit to male ability to recognize and exploit more vulnerable females. Male ability to discern and exploit differentially vulnerable females is likely to be widespread, but less overt, in many other populations.

In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certainty at a pre-speci…ed time. To add more realism we propose a framework in which, after an initial simultaneous move in time t = 0, one player gets to revise his action with positive probability at some t 0. Since the initial action of the opponent can be observed, and payo¤s accrue over time, the setup constitutes a dynamic extension of the Stackelberg leadership concept. Allowing for an arbitrary timing distribution, and using both subgame perfection and stochastic stability, we derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which our dynamic revision game has a unique e¢ cient outcome even if the underlying normal form game has no e¢ cient Nash, or multiple ones. Intuitively, the fact that a player is less likely to move than the opponent may serve as a commitment device. Therefore, if the revision opportunity is expected to arrive su¢ ciently early then the committed player's initial cost of mis-coordination or con ‡ict will be more than compensated by ensuring his preferred outcome after the opponent's revision. The framework allows, among other things, to address the issue of equilibrium selection in games in which traditional equilibrium selection approaches fail such as the Battle of the Sexes and the Game of Chicken. It also o¤ers some insigths into the debate about Pareto-dominance versus risk-dominance.

In communal dens of garter snakes, Thamnophis sirtalis, in Manitoba, males obtain copulations forcibly, by inducing hypoxic stress in females. Females emerging from their 8-month winter inactivity are weak and slow, but recover strength and speed within a day or two of emergence. Thus, males may benefit by targeting newly emerged females that are too weak to resist, and by courting females under conditions that maximize the male's physical advantage. Fieldwork at a Manitoba den supported these predictions. Both in the field and in outdoor enclosures, males focused courtship on to newly emerged (weak) rather than dispersing (postrecovery) females. Experimental trials showed that males based this choice on female skin lipids (pheromones) that predict time since emergence, rather than correlates of recent emergence that reflect female physiological state per se (low body temperature, low resistance to hypoxia, high breathing rates during courtship). Male superiority in locomotor speed was maximal at high temperatures, and males targeted courtship to hotter females. The postemergence recovery of females in this system substantially shifts the balance of power in physical encounters between males and females, and provides a fitness benefit to male ability to recognize and exploit more vulnerable females. Male ability to discern and exploit differentially vulnerable females is likely to be widespread, but less overt, in many other populations.

This paper proposes a differential game to introduce dynamic interactions into the well known battle of the sexes: the husband prefers one activity ('boxing') and the wife another ('ballet'). Although the game is played presumably non-cooperatively, both are interested and willing to invest into the development and maintenance of their personal relationship which is only possible if they spend some time together. We show for the symmetric version of the game that non-cooperative commitment strategies (i.e. open-loop strategies) lead to more 'harmony' than linear-Markov-perfect strategies where egoistic behaviour is much more pronounced. These linear-Markov-perfect strategies constrain the set of smooth, stable but nonlinear-Markov strategies in such a manner that all these nonlinear-Markovperfect strategies lead to less egoism and more harmony. Furthermore, particular nonlinear strategies may induce two steady states (depending on history) where one of the two steady states may result in a level of harmony that exceeds the cooperative outcome; under these circumstances, non-cooperation does not harm the public good harmony, in stark contrast to a play in linear-Markov-perfect strategies. Finally, numerical simulations of asymmetric situations confirm the results that were analytically obtained for the symmetric game.

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Most prior research on the tendency for groups to be less cooperative than individuals (the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect) has used the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). Experiment 1 examined the discontinuity effect with 3 additional matrices: Chicken, Leader, and Battle of the Sexes (BOS). Unlike the PDG, these matrices are characterized by correspondence of outcomes. The discontinuity effect was significant for the PDG and Chicken matrices only. With the BOS and Leader matrices, both individuals and groups pursued outcome maximization through coordinated turn taking. Despite the lesser competitiveness, sets of interacting participants in the BOS and Leader conditions did perceive that they were 2 groups. Experiment 2 examined the discontinuity effect in 2 Chicken matrices with varying outcomes associated with mutual competition. Consistent with the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the discontinuity effect was eliminated for the matrix in which mutual competition was associated with very low outcomes. Although concern for relative in-group standing gave rise to intergroup competition even in the domain of correspondent outcomes, such concern was constrained to the extent that it interfered with outcome maximization.