In this article, I examine the relationship between alterity, dialogical intersubjectivity, and democratic sovereignty in the thought of two important Mexican philosophers, one by birth and another by way of naturalization, i.e. Luis...
moreIn this article, I examine the relationship between alterity, dialogical intersubjectivity, and democratic sovereignty in the thought of two important Mexican philosophers, one by birth and another by way of naturalization, i.e. Luis Villoro and Enrique Dussel. For both philosophers, there is no sense of identity, either at the individual or collective level, without some prior sense of “the other,” i.e. the Other that is encountered and with whom solidarity may be formed by way of dialogue. And it is this heterogeneous character of our social being that in turn, at the sociopolitical and cultural levels of existence, that in turn means we cannot think democratic sovereignty, at least in any way that is adequate to the ethical demands of this heterogeneous character, in any way that is not plural. Said otherwise, for both Villoro and Dussel, because human being simply is heterogeneous, the only ethical form of politics is one that is democratically plural, because mirroring and thus being adequate to the historical and cultural pluralism that constitutes the world (in the sense of el mundo versus la realidad, or die Lebenswelt in phenomenological terms).
I proceed to make my argument in the following manner. First, I contextualize the work of both Villoro and Dussel with reference to the philosophical and theological currents of thought to which I refer simply as “dialogical thinking,” though I will also speak to the shared concerns with critical theory. While both Villoro and Dussel draw upon these European lines of thought, both thinkers offer novel interventions and extensions of these currents, largely a result of their larger concern for and awareness of the implications of the European colonization and various aftershocks thereof in the construction of Latin American nation states. In contextualizing both thinkers vis-à-vis this European current of thought, thus, I aim to increase the awareness of both Villoro and Dussel within English language scholarship on dialogical thinking, and to push our understanding of this current of thought beyond its often Eurocentric and early 20th century focus.
After offering these very general remarks defining how I understand dialogical thinking, which are intended to be merely introductory rather than exhaustive, and after noting how Villoro and Dussel incorporate major ideas from this current of thought generally and from the thinking of figures such as Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Levinas in particular, I then proceed to explicate the major contours of both Villoro’s and Dussel’s respective thinking regarding the themes of alterity, identity and political power. Here, due to the relatively low level of familiarity within the Anglo-American sphere of Villoro versus Dussel, I focus attention upon closer readings of several texts by Villoro, whereas my treatment of Dussel is more thematic and summative. I conclude thereafter by noting how Villoro and Dussel represent related, but ultimately differing responses to a problem that is both historical and political in nature, i.e. the problem of how to conceive collective identity in the wake of the violence betwixt and the mixture of different peoples in the wake of colonialism and its corresponding postmodern destruction of meta-narration.
For Dussel, what is needed is a capacity for a new form of meta-narration of history, or world-history, by which, in a way inspired by Leopoldo Zea, we might be able to anchor the amelioration the injustices of the present with reference to the past and future, in a way that incorporates the heterogeneous make-up of the world as we have it through the notion of solidarity in and through the plurality of the victims or oppressed of injustice, as a way to safeguard collective action and a sense of truth without denying the non-politically neutral character of the ‘saying’ of truth. It is this reference to the victim in solidarity, and the safeguarding of universality across or by way of particularity and alterity that makes Dussel’s project less anti-modern than “trans-modern,” because trans-historical, a point to which I return below. Yet, while Dussel has couched this emphasis upon meta-narration and world-history with the language solidarity, his meta-narratological thinking has been roundly critiqued for creating too generic and homogenizing a notion of ‘the other’ as ‘the oppressed’ that is inadequate to the particular and heterogeneous historical character of injustice in Latin America, perhaps in a way that resembles how liberation theologians spoke of the preferential option for the poor [a opção preferencial e solidária com os pobres] and oppressed.
For Villoro, similarly, the problems posed by the past in the present are problems having to do with our ability to reckon with heterogeneity whilst not abandoning any sense of solidarity or truth. But where Dussel will lay emphasis upon world-historical meta-narration, Villoro by contrast will refer to a more pragmatic notion of the present, which in turn affects his notion of democratic plurality as responsive to the concrétude or particular problems facing communities at different places and times. For Villoro, as for Dussel, history names the inheritance of the past that conditions and constitutes the present, but whose aftershocks are present lead to heterogeneous sets of problems and communities the amelioration of which requires not world-historical, meta-narratological, context, but pragmatic attention in the here and now of what-is.
In the end, I posit, both approaches offer significant resources and drawbacks for understanding the nature of injustice and the amelioration thereof. Meta-narration sans pragmatic immediacy will always run the risk of being too generic, whilst the appeal to the particular and immediate will always run the risk of being insufficiently systematic and historical, or general. What is needed is a way to think both aspects together for the sake of a just democratic politics, i.e. a politics that will be as both Villoro and Dussel suggest, in the end, plural, because erected through, rather than over and against, or in spite of, the recognition of singularity and difference.